A June 2014 UN Environment Program (UNEP) report reveals that illegally harvested timber has become a key source of revenue for terror groups. Additionally, the report states that the scale of the illegal timber trade “has been totally underestimated and is now being regarded as very significant.” This significance apparently extends beyond traditional concerns over deforestation and destruction of animal habitat.

For example, the underground market in charcoal, a timber byproduct used for cooking and heating, is a significant revenue generator for the Somali terrorist group al-Shabab. According to one report, al-Shabab reaps between $25 and $68 million annually from sales and taxation of charcoal.

How can that lucrative funding stream be disputed? Illicit markets such as narcotics trafficking and even ivory smuggling are often highly organized and have elaborate supply chains. Each stage of these complex schemes are points of potential vulnerability that present opportunities for interdiction. Charcoal production, however, is a highly decentralized cottage industry. The process is under the control of no single entity. Even diversion and coercive taxation is controlled by various terrorist groups. Moreover, raw materials like timber are plentiful and the “technology” of charcoal production is incredibly simple and cheap. There are few barriers to entry into the business.  

Enforcement agencies, in addition, face the daunting task of trying to distinguish between legal and illicit charcoal inventories. This process is particularly difficult when the market consists of numerous local sellers and financial transactions are cash-based and therefore rarely produce a paper trail. Under such circumstances, the interdiction and confiscation of illicitly produced or taxed charcoal becomes virtually impossible.

The United States is acutely aware that certain illicit charcoal markets finance terrorism and moreover, effective policies to eradicate trafficking in illegally produced charcoal are few. Still, President Obama issued a well-meaning order banning Somali charcoal imports. While this ban is symbolically important, there remains ample revenue from local markets for al-Shabab and others to exploit. Thus, combatting this problem necessitates a more localized response.

Where broad government bans and sanctions have proven insufficient, helping to change consumer habits and preferences away from charcoal use could be a more effective solution. Efforts to combat this source of terrorism financing could be driven by NGO initiatives to reduce the carbon imprint resulting from home charcoal use.

Organizations, like the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves, and others that distribute small, contained alternative fuel stoves that replace fuelwood and its byproducts for home cooking could be key in this effort. Supporting campaigns like these provide an alternative method to drive down consumer dependence on terrorist-related charcoal, as well as contribute to environmental preservation.

The Americans will leave one day, Quds Force commander General Qasem Soleimani once told Iraqi leaders, but Iran will remain Iraq’s neighbor. That lesson has only been reinforced by the lead role Iran has since taken in the fight against ISIS.

Iran aspires to Middle East hegemony and its foreign policy is designed to achieve that goal. We see this Iran’s support for Syria’s Bashar Assad, its support for Houthi rebels in Yemen, in nuclear negotiations with the West, and in its support for Iraqi forces against ISIS. Iran’s message is that it is in control and any decision of significance must go through Tehran.

Iran saw the power vacuum in Iraq left by Saddam Hussein’s 2003 defeat as an opportunity to expand its influence at the expense of the U.S. and other Mideast countries. Iran armed and supported Shiite militants fighting against the U.S. and exploited Iraq’s sectarian tensions. The U.S. pulled its remaining forces from Iraq in December 2011—a year after Soleimani orchestrated an Iraqi coalition government for Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki on the condition he insist all American troops leave the country. U.S. troops departed, but Iran remained. (Soleimani’s influence in Iraq was detailed in this January post.)

With the rise of ISIS, Soleimani and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are on the ground again in Iraq and Iranian leaders regularly praise their noble fight. The Iranians are supplying heavy weaponry to Iraqi forces, including Iranian proxies such as the Badr Organization. Soleimani is hailed as a hero in Iranian media and Iran is increasingly viewed as Iraq’s champion. In March, the New York Times described security checkpoints between Tikrit and Baghdad decorated with posters of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. For a country with designs on regional supremacy, this is prime propaganda material.

In December 2014, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry called “the net effect” of Iran’s campaign against ISIS in Iraq “positive.” In the short term, this is true. ISIS represents a threat to regional stability and particularly to U.S. allies such as Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. In the long term, however, Iran is creating puppet strings throughout the region.

We are already seeing evidence of Iran’s political sway in Iraq. Nouri Maliki’s successor, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, recently criticized the Saudi campaign in Yemen, ignoring Iran’s interference in that country in support of Houthi rebels and questioning whether Saudi Arabia might invade Iraq next. “The idea that you intervene in another state unprovoked just for regional ambition is wrong,” he said. Without a broader context, one might think al-Abadi was talking about Iran, not Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia is challenging Iran’s influence in Yemen by confronting the Iranian-backed Houthis. Iran has said it would use all of its influence—and it has a lot in the country, according to Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif—to bring about a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

Unlike in Yemen, Iran’s presence in Iraq extends beyond its proxies. Iran has committed troops and its top general, Soleimani, to the fight against ISIS. In Iraq, the challenger to Iranian influence is the U.S., which is also fighting ISIS, but not by committing troops like Iran. Because of this, it is instead the highly visible Soleimani and the IRGC that are praised as Iraq’s saviors in local media.

Yemen and Iraq are pieces of the same puzzle that Iran hopes will come together to reveal Iran as being a stabilizing force in the Middle East. Barring a string of highly visible defeats of Iranian forces in Iraq, which would likely also strengthen ISIS, Iran’s influence in that country appears secure for the foreseeable future.

As Soleimani said, Iran will always be Iraq’s neighbor. 

As ISIS makes sweeping gains in Iraq, it is worrying to note that for the most part, the group is being fought by sectarian extremists.

Shiite militias – often acting as unofficial affiliates of Iran’s military – are operating outside of the Iraqi government’s tenuous reach. To some extent, these groups are working within Iraq’s popular mobilization forces (PMF), a nationally-sanctioned umbrella organization for the predominantly Shiite, and too often extremist, militias. The most powerful and prominent of these Iranian-backed militias are the Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata’ib Hezbollah. Their leaders are linked to a growing oeuvre of human rights violations, assassinations, and terrorist bombings. Their members have killed thousands of U.S. soldiers.

The Badr Organization is run by seasoned Shiite politician and leader of the PMF, Hadi al-Amiri, who has a history of instigating sectarian violence in Iraq. Between 2004 and 2006, al-Amiri reportedly ordered attacks on up to 2,000 Sunnis. According to a leaked cable from the U.S. State Department, “One of [al-Amiri’s] preferred methods of killing allegedly involved using a power drill to pierce the skulls of his adversaries.”

Today, areas where the Badr Organization fights ISIS have seen “some of the most high-profile Sunni-Shiite violence of the current conflict,” according to the Washington Post. Meanwhile, al-Amiri wields tremendous political and military power in Iraq, directing the country’s army and police in Diyala province, and even commanding the army’s 20th Battalion. The Badr Organization’s political branch holds 22 seats in the country’s parliament. Al-Amiri has himself been linked to a 1996 attack in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 U.S. Air Force servicemen.

Abu Mahdi al-Mohandes, also known as Jamal al-Ibrahimi, is the leader of Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) and the deputy leader of the PMF. Al-Mohandes is also Iraq’s deputy national security advisor and a former member of the Iraqi parliament. He has been sentenced to death in absentia for his alleged involvement in the 1983 U.S. and French embassy bombings in Kuwait, attacks that killed six, including five Americans, and injured nearly 90 others. Al-Mohandes has also been linked to the 1985 assassination attempt of Kuwait’s Emir. He is designated as a terrorist by the United States.

Qais al-Khazali is the founder and leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH). During the U.S.-led counterinsurgency, al-Khazali was one of the most wanted men in Iraq. In March 2007, al-Khazali was found and captured by coalition forces, but he was released in January 2010 as part of an apparent prisoner-hostage exchange. His group has claimed responsibility for more than 6,000 attacks on U.S. and Iraqi forces. Al-Khazali himself reportedly led the January 2007 AAH attack in Karbala that killed five U.S. soldiers.

Each of these groups has displayed a strong sense of loyalty to the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as well as Qasem Soleimani, head of Iran’s Quds Force, who reportedly coordinates military operations for all three militias. KH and AAH have explicitly rejected any cooperation with the United States in combatting ISIS. As of 2015, only KH and its leader Abu Mahdi al-Mohandes are designated by the United States.

As we seek to combat the brutality and horror of ISIS, we should keep in mind that the line of defense against ISIS is warped and untrustworthy, but necessary. Those forces keeping ISIS from Baghdad are armed not only with Iranian-backing, but with historical enmity towards the United States and non-Shiite Iraqis.

As Prime Minister Abadi attempts to build a more stable and at least nominally inclusive government, it has sought to bring these brutal figures into the political fold. But the fight against ISIS today is one of fire against fire. With these three militias leading the way, ruthlessness and sectarianism from ISIS is often being met with ruthlessness and sectarianism from the Shiite militias. Efforts by at least some of these militia leaders to repackage their forces as nationalistic and inclusive should be met with wariness at the very least.

The British Conservative Party’s decisive parliamentary win this month may finally silence British-born Islamist preacher Anjem Choudary.

Choudary, the fiery Islamist extremist, has evaded indictment on multiple terrorism related charges over the years connected to his involvement with banned Islamist groups and the radicalization of potentially hundreds of Muslim men in the UK since the 1990s.

While not necessarily well-known in the United States, Choudary is considered notorious and influential in the UK. His prolific Twitter account, media appearances and rallies advocate Islamic law for the West based on a politicized and authoritarian version of Islam that he deems the only true Islam. Such separatist rhetoric, along with Choudary’s continuous criticism of Britain’s military involvement in the Middle East, has contributed to hundreds of British jihadists leaving the UK to fight for ISIS in Syria and encouraged gruesome incidents of violence within the UK. An example of the latter includes the 2013 beheading of a British soldier in east London by two men believed to be affiliated with banned Islamist group Al-Muhajiroun.  Choudary was an originating member of Al-Muhajiroun.

Choudary has been on the Home Office’s radar for many years, but the ex-lawyer has evaded any indictment by walking a fine line between what is currently considered permissible speech in the UK and what constitutes hate speech. After his last arrest and release in September 2014, Home Secretary Theresa May announced multiple enhanced counter-terror measures to silence men like Choudary, which she hoped would be introduced as new legislation should the Tories win Parliamentary elections in May 2015. These measures include:

• Criminalization of inflammatory speech like Choudary’s, through preventive measures called Extremism Disruption Orders or EDOs;
• Closure of mosques or other venues where extremists are attempting to radicalize individuals;
• Enforcement of  a two-year ban on British passport holders from re-entering the country if they are  determined to be suspected terrorists; and
• Granting the Charity Commission enhanced powers to crack down on charitable groups that divert money to terrorism-related activities.

Since David Cameron led the Tories to victory this month, new counter extremism measures are expected to be outlined May 27 when Queen Elizabeth presents the new government to Parliament. It remains to be seen whether the new counter-extremism measures will remain identical to the May 2014 proposals, but Choudary has already responded, tweeting on May 13 that “I shall be on the BBC News at 6pm today InshaAllah responding to the latest attack by Cameron against islam & Muslims http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-32723881 …”

Obviously Choudary doesn’t like what may be coming.  The new legislation is likely to increase tension between privacy rights and national security advocates. Nevertheless, momentum seems to be in the new government’s favor. Austria has already upgraded its 1912 Islam law in February 2015.  Specifically, Austria is banning “other countries from financing Islamic groups, and bars foreign clerics from leadership positions in Austrian mosques. All imams must speak German, and Muslim clergy must prove “professional suitability,” either by completing the University of Vienna program, or demonstrating equivalent training.”

Until the new British laws are introduced and enforced, Choudary will still be found pontificating at every opportunity on social media, and in broadcast and print interviews.  He may even be found at a public venue near you.

In April, a local Nevada paper announced that Choudary would be speaking in Nevada City in June. Given Choudary’s background, it is unclear on what grounds the State Department granted any visa request he may have filed. Nevertheless, so long as the British government continues to keep Choudary’s passport securely locked away, a webcast or radio interview may be all that the residents of Nevada City are likely to get. 

“No Single Definition for Salafism, AJCS’ Conference Finds (!)”

This was the oddly bold caption headlining the 2014 conference report on “Salafism in the Arab World” (sub-title: “Perceptions, Trends and Groups”), hosted by the al-Jazeera “Center for Studies” [sic]. This “finding” was reiterated in the summary, which asserted in pride of place (as the number one point), “Salafism has no single definition.” The conference report continued in this eccentric and frivolous vein, publishing a photo of a participant – a bearded man in a long white dress – almost immediately after regretfully noting that “Salafism tends to elicit images of bearded men in long white dresses.” Indeed. For those hoping to chart the shifting sands of Salafism, the Salafism Conference would not be their first port-of-call.

Despite the inauspicious start, the conferees did clarify that Salafism was definitely not Jihadism - an ideological movement based on an extremist interpretation of the religious imperative to defend the core tenets of the Islamic faith. Jihadism is “extremist” because it explicitly sanctions and indeed encourages violence to accomplish this objective.

Similarly, the key findings simply ignored the related extremist concept of Takfirism, the act of accusing another Muslim of being an apostatizing takfir (from the word “kufr” meaning “infidel”). Takfirism is “extremist” because it is a principle that justifies the execution of any Muslim who is deemed to fall out of the correct creed.

So, the conference in totum was understandably keen to disassociate Salafism from any connotations of extremism and violence (i.e. Jihadism and Takfirism), affirming its definitively religious and pacifistic ethos.

But that is a disingenuous assertion that conveniently overlooks present realities. While the non-violent strain of Salafism was indeed predominant during the 1980s – in Europe at least, when it was widely perceived as apolitical and “quietist” (and so “not scary”) – that is no longer true, and not a realistic claim to make.

ISIS – violence and extremism incarnate – clearly self-identifies as a Salafist organization, and accurately so. Salafis of every stripe believe that Islam has been corrupted by “centuries of human interpretation.” Both ISIS and the ideology therefore call for a return to the practices and beliefs of the salaf, the first few generations of Muslims directly following the Prophet.

The key distinguishing feature is the commitment to violence to achieve this objective. The “conference Salafis” represented the “quietist strain.” They consent to the status quo and are strongly opposed to rebellion and the possibility of anarchy, which is how the Saudi Salafi (Wahabbist) dynasty has managed to retain its authority for the past 80 years. Next on the spectrum are the Salafi-Jihadis. The archetype for this is al-Qaeda, the anti-Western terrorist group responsible for the 9/11 attacks, and believers that violence is divinely ordained.

Finally, occupying a position even more extreme than al-Qaeda, ISIS holds fast to the same principles but supplements this “philosophy” with Takfirism. So, according to the ISIS Salafi-Takfiri worldview, the “enemies of Islam” list is a much longer catalogue that goes well beyond just the 20th-Century adversaries: America, Europe, Western Christendom and the Zionists. ISIS also believes that the almost 200 million Shia Muslims, as well as Sufis, Yazidis and Ba’hai, are all apostates and deserve to be slaughtered.

So, the Salafi conference was correct to say there is no one definition of Salafism. But that is not the front-page topic. That headline should have stated, “Salafism Used To Justify Murder On Massive Scale.” Instead of petulantly refusing to acknowledge any relationship between Salafism and Jihadism and Takfirism, the so-called “quietists” need to raise their voices and condemn – loudly – the use of violence in the name of Salafism.