I emailed her and also sent a message on Facebook. No answer. Then I remembered my sister-in-law uses WhatsApp on her phone. She was in Lahore Sunday for a family wedding. The children were with her. I had no idea if they were staying near Gulshan-e-Iqbal Park. Lahore is a big, beautiful city, full of history, monuments, street food, and fun, Pakistan’s cultural center.

As my in-laws readied themselves for another day and night of wedding festivities on Easter Sunday, the city was reminded that it was also home to discontent and anger.

A splinter group of the Pakistani Taliban targeted a popular park where Easter celebrations were underway. The bomb blast killed more than 73 men, women and children and injured 320. As the chaos unfolded, rioting was spreading in another part of the city as mourners for Mumtaz Qadri, the recently hanged murderer and former bodyguard of liberal lawmaker Salmaan Taseer, marked the 40th day of his death with nationwide riots and rallies calling for Sharia law in Pakistan. Qadri killed Taseer in 2011 after the lawmaker pushed to reform Pakistan’s blasphemy laws, which are often used in disputes to attack neighbors for personal gain. The targets are often Christian Pakistanis.

My sister-in-law thankfully responded to my messages on Whatsapp after what felt like an eternity, “We are fine. The city is in lockdown.” Relieved, I simply replied, “Ok, be safe. Bye,” and returned to the emerging headlines and comments growing on my Facebook feed. There were people asking for blood donations at the hospitals in Lahore. Some messages indicated families were looking for a loved one, and Facebook asked its billion plus members to check in – asking us all if we were safe. 

This was not the first time Christians have been targeted by Islamists in Pakistan. The same group that took responsibility for the attack, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, targeted two Christian churches in March 2015, killing 14 and wounding 70. This Easter’s attack was a possible response to the previous day’s announcement on Voice of Jihad, a website of the Afghan Taliban, announcing “Only Islamic rituals can be celebrated in an Islamic country.”

Lahore’s diverse cultural history can be attributed to the men and women who have traversed its roads for centuries. Rulers have included the Hindus, Sikhs, and Turks. Ptolemy mentions Lahore in his studies of geography in the 2nd century. Descriptions by a Chinese traveler confirm the city’s existence again in the 7th century. Today, it is the capital of Pakistan’s largest province – Punjab.

The Christians in Pakistan, especially Lahore, are part of the diversity and indigenous history of the country. Islamism, and its offspring – groups like Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, are the foreigners; born of Cold War politics to ward off the Russians in Afghanistan and fight India in Kashmir. Such groups have been tolerated for far too long.

As law enforcement began raids and making arrests following the Easter carnage, the real question that needs to be asked is will the government address the madrassas and training camps in southern Punjab, which continue to remain active with the Pakistani government’s knowledge. A 2008 U.S. State Department cable from its Lahore consulate office to Washington, D.C. noted that the number of extremist recruits in Punjab appeared to be increasing in certain areas since 2005. Locals stated this was the result of social services work being increasingly provided by extremist networks who were then “minimizing the importance of traditionally moderate Sufi religious leaders in these communities.” The State Department cable highlights that the locals in affected Punjabi communities want the government to come in to stop the spread of extremist activity, replace the social services attracting the poor with government help instead. It is unclear if any improvements have been made since that 2008 cable.

It is unlikely. But, while we wait for the government to act, others are. There are numerous grass-roots organizations in the country that focus on a range of gaps in society from illiteracy, health education to specifically addressing issues of tolerance and democracy. The Insan Foundation Trust, for example, trains media staff to identify prejudicial content against minorities and women in programming to remove it. More importantly, the training includes learning how to create content to replace that bias to build greater understanding between communities in Pakistan through the entertainment and news aired daily throughout the country.

Chasing jihadists after every attack is not a strategy. It only ensures another Ankara, Belgium, or Lahore. A real strategy requires shutting down extremist channels for recruitment. This includes shuttering their ability to feed a child in a madrassa in return for spewing hate; targeting the foreign governments that sponsor the extremist networks in Pakistan; and asking the educated Islamist sympathizers among Pakistan’s government and military to understand that aligning with extremists in the  fight for Kashmir is not worth losing Pakistan.

While the Bangladeshi government continues to deny the presence of ISIS within its borders, increased violence against religious minorities and foreigners attributed to pro-ISIS militants has many asking if Islamist militancy is on the rise in that country. 

The murder of a Hindu priest in February is the third death for which ISIS claimed credit. Other murder victims have included a Japanese farmer and an Italian aid worker in September and October of 2015. The Sheikh Hasina government rejected arguments that ISIS was behind the violence, pointing instead to domestic militant groups, which have become more and more aggressive, reportedly in reaction to the government’s crackdown on Islamist activity since 2013. It was in 2013 that two leaders of the long-standing Jamaat-e-Islaami party were tried for war crimes dating to Bangladesh’s war of Independence in 1971.

Since then, various political administrations have maintained relationships with Islamist groups to varying degrees in order to build coalitions and stay in power.  Conversely, with the rise of Islamism in South Asia since the end of the cold war, numerous Islamist groups, both peaceful and violent, have proliferated. A common theme among these groups is envisioning the rebirth of a South Asian caliphate based on a much disputed hadith called Ghazwa-e-Hind. 

This has also contributed to the infiltration into Bangladesh of trans-national Islamist groups, from Hizb ut-Tahrir to al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-Continent (AQIS), as well as the proliferation of homegrown militant groups, best illustrated by Ansar Bangla Team (ABT). ABT gained international attention for reportedly orchestrating the murder of secular blogger Avijit Roy in March 2015.

Accusations against foreign governments, like Pakistan, complicate matters further. Pakistan’s military and intelligence services stand accused of supporting Islamist activity in the country for likely a two-pronged purpose: establish an Islamic state in Bangladesh as is hoped for in Pakistan by Islamists there; and use Bangladesh as a launching pad for anti-Indian activity.

This is not completely far-fetched. Most terrorist attacks in India can be traced back to Pakistan-based terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad - alone - or in collaboration with minor Islamist groups in India. To do the same from existing jihadi training camps on the Bangladeshi side of the Indian-Bangla border stands within reason.

The Bangladesh Chronicle reports ISIS members have met militant groups like JMB, Huji, Hizb ut -Tahrir, and ABT in hopes of making Bangladesh an Islamic state by 2020. Bangladeshi militants appear to be giving their oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in an uploaded video on YouTube from August 2014 entitled “Muslims in Bangladesh give bayah to the caliph Ibrahim (Hafizahullah).”

Bangladesh’s official statements denying ISIS’s presence may be a strategic attempt to prevent alarm, while its intelligence and law enforcement divisions continue their investigations and arrests behind the scenes. Arrests of extremists are ongoing, and include pro-ISIS sympathizers, Hizb ut-Tahrir activists and Jamaat-e-Islaami protesters. The latter political party was banned in 2013 by the Bangladesh High Court, which is now reviewing the legitimacy of Islam’s position as the official national religion in an otherwise secular state in an attempt to curb rising extremism.

While these moves are all necessary to protect Bangladesh’s secular status, none address the ability of these militant groups to collaborate, and engage with each other, when recruiting. Bangla-language extremist websites, YouTube videos, Twitter, and other social media platforms give extremist groups access to a wide audience and leave law enforcement always playing catch-up, as they were forced to do following the murder of the Hindu priest in February.  

In November 2015, Bangladesh blocked Facebook, Messenger, Viber, WhatsApp, Line and Tango – in an effort to preempt Islamist retaliation after death penalties that were upheld against two Jamaat-e-Islami leaders convicted in 2013 of war crimes committed during Bangladesh’s war of independence in 1971.

The benefit of such bans is questionable given the availability of proxy servers and backdoors. Nevertheless, despite denying the existence of ISIS in the country, Bangladesh is attempting to act against extremism on many fronts. It remains to be seen, however, if South Asia will become the newest extension of Islamist extremism that ISIS and other militant groups are working toward. 

In early March, French officials successfully prevented two girls from leaving to join ISIS in Syria, and the country collectively breathed a sigh of relief. But what happens next? What happens to the kids who are saved from falling under the spell of ISIS’s suicidal and apocryphal ideology, but often against their will?

It may be too soon for studies to reveal whether would-be foreign fighters make the transition back to normal, productive lives. Nonetheless, programs being tested in different countries—and the anecdotal evidence beginning to trickle in—hints at less-than-stellar outcomes.

The most troubling results, of course, are represented by those individuals prevented from joining jihad in Syria who have gone on to carry out terrorist plots at home. Ibrahim Abdeslam is one such individual. Reportedly thwarted from traveling to Syria in early 2015, Abdeslam was intercepted by authorities in Turkey and forcibly returned to Brussels. In November 2015, Abdeslam, blew himself up outside Paris’s Comptoir Voltaire cafe as part of the deadly ISIS attacks, which killed 130 and wounded more than 350.

How did Abdeslam manage to participate in such a complicated and deadly assault after being stopped en route to Syria? Reports say that Abdeslam was interrogated by Belgian police upon his return, but was ultimately released after authorities concluded that he showed “no sign of a possible threat.” Part of the problem was a complicated legal situation. According to one unnamed Belgian authority, “We knew [Ibrahim and Saleh Abdeslam] were radicalized and could have visited Syria,” but Ibrahim could not be prosecuted because “we had no evidence that he participated in the activities of a terrorist group.”

Abdeslam is only one of many disappointed foreign fighters who have been quietly reintroduced into Western society. Whether or not a would-be foreign fighter will be monitored, arrested, prosecuted, or placed into a de-radicalization program is very much a case-by-case decision. What’s even less clear is the success rate of de-radicalization and other intervention programs.

Consider the case of “A,” a Jewish girl from Paris who was inspired to join ISIS. “A” was just moments away from boarding a plane to Syria when she was convinced to stay behind. Her parents remained vigilant, and “A” was enrolled in a de-radicalization program, the Centre de Prévention des Dérives Sectaires liées à l’Islam (Center for the Prevention of Sectarian Abuses linked to Islam). Nonetheless, the girl reportedly still managed to stay in touch with her ISIS recruiters, even after her travel plans came to an end and after she was ensconced in the de-radicalization program.

One of the two girls stopped in early March, Israé, had attended that same de-radicalization program, apparently to little effect. Two years after Israé’s first attempt to leave for Syria, and her enrollment in the program, Israé again tried to join ISIS.

Now, Israé and her cohort Louisa are again living at home, and both face travel bans. Still, reasonable concern exists regarding how their guardians will rehabilitate the two girls, and constructively redirect their pro-ISIS fervor. After all, although Israé, Louisa, and “A” ultimately were stopped before reaching ISIS-controlled territory and becoming jihadi brides, they have both shown a fierce determination to maintain their ties to the terrorist group.

Today, concerns exist over not only reintegration, but governments’ capacity to effectively monitor ongoing threats at home. In 2015, France’s resources were stretched exceptionally thin. Since then, increased funding has been devoted to domestic and international surveillance following passage of the country’s “Stop-Djihadisme” program. France has declared that a number of domestic terrorist threats have been thwarted, but massive intelligence gaps have been revealed following the Paris attacks in November.

Similar problems plagued Belgium long before terrorists targeted the Brussels airport and metro. The country is struggling to maintain surveillance on the hundreds of Belgians already abroad, as well as track suspected extremists at home.

ISIS hopefuls, their families, and their communities today remain vulnerable, not only due to resource limitations, but to a dearth of deradicalization programs whose effectiveness has been established. So what happens next? The reality is often a mosaic of hastily thrown together solutions, tailored for each individual, and occasionally misapplied.

A group of Afghan Fulbright Scholars began an initiative in July 2015 called Afghan Fulbrighters for Peace (AFP), an effort to mobilize Afghans in the United States to engage in policy debates relevant to their country.

First, AFP established a steering committee comprised of seven Afghan Fulbrighters to lead the initiative. The students come from different backgrounds, and geographic locations within Afghanistan. They are pursuing different fields of study in the U.S., but they are all deeply concerned about the challenges and the opportunities facing Afghanistan today.

The steering committee then shared its vision with the wider Afghan Fulbright population in the U.S.—about 150 students—who welcomed the initiative. As its first activity, AFP designed a conference with the primary objectives of:

• Studying the peacebuilding strategies—spearheaded by the U.S. and Afghan governments—for Afghanistan, and providing recommendations;
• Developing a support network among Afghan Fulbrighters in the U.S. to strengthen their efforts for achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan.

As they prepared for the conference, AFP members met with Afghan and American diplomats, policy-makers, think tank directors, students, and the Afghan population in Washington D.C., New York, and other U.S. cities.

Many think tanks and individuals welcomed and endorsed the AFP initiative. The Center for International Policy (CIP) provided space for AFP meetings.  The U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) and the Institute of International Education (IIE) provided funding for the initiative. Other entities that endorsed and encouraged the conference included the Afghan Embassy in Washington DC, the U.S. Department of State, the Counter Extremism Project (CEP), the Institute for State Effectiveness (ISE), the Alliance in Support of the Afghan People (ASAP), and the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

Convening the Conference and Beyond

The AFP conference was held February 15-16, 2016, and focused on two specific topics: the insurgency in Afghanistan, and the country’s governance and rule of law. Fifteen Afghan Fulbrighters spent February 15 discussing and summarizing their recommendations. On February 16, a panel of four AFP members presented the group’s recommendations during an interactive event with an audience of Afghan and American diplomats, activists, journalists, and students at the USIP. The group also met with Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Jonathan Carpenter at the State Department, and Afghan Ambassador Hamdullah Mohib at the Afghan Embassy, to share its policy recommendations and discuss future plans and collaboration.

Summary of Recommendations:

The AFP’s recommendations concentrated on two challenges in Afghanistan: insurgency, and governance and rule of law. Below is a summary of our recommendations.

1. Insurgency:

The AFP recommends that the Afghan government and its international allies seek a politically negotiated settlement to the problem of insurgency, rather than pursue the same military strategy which has failed to bring peace over the past 15 years.

The AFP believes that the Afghan government and its international allies must confront the insurgency on three coordinated levels—national, regional, and international—and enter into negotiations from a position of strength.

On a national level, the Afghan government must emphasize a “population-centric” strategy over an “enemy-centric” strategy. This would include a) delivering social and security services and building state capacity to perform these tasks; b) increasing the developmental budget; and c) creating jobs and opportunities in which people can thrive. Simultaneously, the Afghan government must build national consensus and gain popular support among citizens, religious leaders, and civil society activists. In addition to consenting that negotiations should be pursued, these groups should work together to create the framework for an agreement.

On a regional level, Afghanistan and its neighbors must focus on socio-economic cooperation versus a security-centric strategy. This would mean creating shared economic interests through joint investments. If implemented successfully, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline might be a strong example of their proposed strategy. Furthermore, it would mean increasing joint social and cultural activities through academic exchange programs, debates, and sharing of arts such as holding joint concerts, etc.

Finally, the AFP members recommend that the international community, particularly the U.S., continue to support Afghanistan’s national and regional initiatives. Building peace in Afghanistan is a long-term process, therefore, the country needs continued support. The international community should invest more in Afghanistan’s nonmilitary sectors such as governance, rule of law, education, and economy.  

These strategies will ensure that the political negotiations have the support of the Afghan people and their international allies, and make it more difficult for the insurgent groups to recruit from the population. It will pressure the insurgent groups to seek a politically negotiated settlement and strengthen the Afghan government’s position in the negotiations.

2. Governance and Rule of Law:

Under governance and rule of law, the AFP focused on combating corruption and promoting local democratization in Afghanistan.

To fight corruption, the Afghan government must a) review and update outdated and ineffective legal systems; and b) create an independent commission to combat corruption. To promote local democratization, provincial and district governors and mayors must be elected rather than appointed by the central government. Decentralization will send powerful people to their provinces and quell the power struggles within the central government.  This will allow the central government to shift its focus to macro-level projects that can move the country forward. Moreover, local democratization will increase accountability and society’s participation in the political processes.

AFP’s plans include publishing and sharing the group’s recommendations with Afghan and American media, research centers, universities, and policy makers, as well as expanding the initiative throughout the U.S. and Afghanistan. AFP’s members will return to Afghanistan with a vision—and an action plan—to bring a lasting peace to their homeland.

The triple bombings in Brussels that killed 31 people serves as a reminder that despite almost 15 years since 9/11, there has been a fundamental failure among Muslims from the  government level down to the community level to confront the sectarian drivers radicalizing Muslims towards violence.

Belgium, like other parts of Europe, is a hub for Islamism, an ideology that has spread globally for almost 100 years through Salafi  interpreted Qurans, school curricula, media programming, social and civic institutions throughout the world. The result has been in many cases the demise of diverse indigenous Muslim cultures from Africa to Indonesia. President Obama in a recent interview, noted his shock in the increase of hijabi women in Indonesia, a place where he lived for a few years as a child. He attributed it to the success of fundamentalist proselytizing.

Gilles Kepel, professor and chair of Middle East Studies at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris, concluded in the 1990s that European Muslims were becoming vulnerable to the Salafist movement, which urged Muslims to return to a literalist and austere “authentic Islam” that rejected integration in western countries and advocated for the infusion of Islam in every aspect of daily life. This group, Kepel argued in 2005, is responsible for 30 terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2005 throughout Europe.

Yet, Salafis comprise less than one percent of the global Muslim population. The majority of Muslims are not Salafi, they are Sunni and Shia. Within these two strains of Islam, further branches unfurl into more diverse interpretations of the faith – where music, art, and culture has flourished for hundreds of years -- despite ISIS’s continued destruction of their shrines, tombs, and history along with those of other indigenous religious groups.

As immigrants to Western countries, the majority of these men and women fled autocratic regimes and aspire to raise their children in better circumstances wherever that might be. As a result, and even among well-settled Muslim families, faith is a personal matter, and practiced along cultural norms, not by the out-of-context doctrinal rules that even non-violent extremists demand.

More importantly, there are Muslims who identify with Islam from a cultural, rather than purely spiritual perspective. Their identity is affirmed by their faith even if they practice nominally or not at all. These individuals exist in Muslim-majority countries, as well as in the West. They are gay, straight, liberal and conservative. They are themselves targets of extremism, and yet are nevertheless lumped together with radicalized Muslims when the media, politicians and Muslim leaders insist on only speaking in terms of Islam or not Islam. The truth is much more subtle than that.

The origins of Salafi jihadism can be traced to the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928 in Egypt. One of the organization’s central ideologues is Sayyid Qutb. Qutb argued that living under Islamic law was the corrective corrupt societies needed. The brotherhood’s motto summarizes Qutb worldview with the simple statement, "The Quran is our constitution."

Yet, Muslim youth encounter a disproportionate number of fundamentalist organizations and literature when they want to learn more about their faith, as the Telegraph noted in a November 2015 article.

With both Muslim and non-Muslim communities trying to understand how to prevent the next terrorist attack, it should be important to concede the connections between Salafism and extremism. As one former grand Imam from the Mosque in Mecca concluded, “ISIS is a product of Salafism.”

To engage in this real war of ideas, Syed Hossein Nasr recently published a translation of the Quran in English. CNN asks, “Could this Quran curb extremism?” The commentaries are informed by Sunni and Shia scholarship and address issues that ISIS is accused of taking out of context or reading too narrowly in order to justify its violent extremist agenda.

The Study Quran is a chance to also address the Islamist organizations, and worldview broadly through revised curricula in schools, counter-narratives via social media, and sermons at religious institutions wherever needed.  Sunni Islam’s oldest and well-respected institution, Al-Azhar, in Egypt, has also called for sweeping educational reforms. The grand Imam, Sheik Ahmed al-Tayeb, called “corrupting” interpretations of Islam for the violence done in Islam’s name at a conference in February 2015.

These are more thoughtful and simply better solutions to overly broad and fear-based reactions to murderous attacks, and must be part of a future without them.

Welcome to the View from the U.K., perspectives on the state of extremism, radicalisation, and counterterrorism in a country challenged by the threat of ISIS recruiting and home-grown violence

On 2 February 2016, representatives of tech giants Google, Facebook, and Twitter appeared in front of the U.K. Parliament’s Home Affairs Select Committee as part of its Countering Extremism Inquiry.

Facebook hosts 1.59 billion accounts across the world, Twitter has 320 million users, and Google, just the previous day, had become the largest company in the world. Google’s subsidiary YouTube sees 400 hours of video uploaded every minute. In short, these companies provide very powerful platforms for communicating used by people all over the world.

The U.K. Anti-Terror Police Chief Mark Rowley had reported to the Committee in 2015 that cooperation between U.K. security authorities and Internet-based services were less than ideal, going as far as to say that some Internet platforms were “undermining” counterterrorism activities.

Understandably, none of the social media company representatives were prepared to accept responsibility for dissemination of extremist narratives but were quick to condemn them. There was a reticence from the representatives to even admit that their platforms were being utilised by extremists to spread their messages. Most notable is that none of the companies stated that they monitored the content of their websites or had teams dedicated to ensuring that extremist and terrorist activity was reported to the authorities. Instead, they relied on users (i.e. the general public) to report activity that was of concern. Twitter argued that its platform was inherently transparent but failed to recognise any responsibility for keeping an eye out for dangerous or inappropriate activity.

The representatives included Dr. Anthony House, Head of Public Policy Strategy for Google Europe, the Middle East and Africa; Simon Milner, Policy Director for U.K. Facebook; and Nick Pickles, Head of U.K. Public Policy for Twitter. They were asked how many requests they had received from the British authorities for information on their users in relation to terrorist activity. Google had 1,200 requests in 2013 and 3,000 in 2015, a significant rise but still relatively small considering their vast customer base. Twitter reported that they had less than 300 requests in the last six months of 2015. The Committee Chair asked the three if social media companies tipped off account holders who were under surveillance, but a straight answer was not forthcoming. Twitter works with law enforcement on a case-by-case basis, the committee was told, and decisions are made on whether to notify users about investigations that are content specific. Facebook’s requests from authorities are similar in number to Google’s and they don’t tip off account holders under investigation in the U.K. They may, however, do so in the U.S. because of differing legal considerations.

In terms of counter-extremism activity, Facebook and Google launched respective innovative programs to empower users to take action against extremism. Facebook’s Online Civil Courage Initiative (OCCI) was announced recently as a three-year program in Berlin, and is aimed at combatting online extremism and hate speech. OCCI provides a better understanding of social media platforms and helps people respond to hate speech and extremism online, promoting the civil courage that already exists amongst Facebook users. Facebook will also provide financial and marketing support to European NGOs already working in the field of countering online extremism, help develop best practices for use by NGOs, governments, and other online services, and fund essential research into the causes of violent extremism and hate speech, in order to better understand these problems.

Google’s AdWords Grant program is beginning a pilot that would run ads against terrorism-related search queries. Under the programme, users who search for extremist-related material are to be shown counter-radicalisation links. The initiative, aimed at combatting the online influence of groups such as ISIS, is running alongside another pilot scheme designed to make counter-radicalisation videos easier to find on YouTube.

Twitter did not mention anything similar but claimed that they could be of assistance in terms of expertise. Twitter made clear, however, that they would not be involved in counter messaging. Whilst they might not be the creators of an extremist message they are certainly providing a platform for hate speech that can be propagated unchecked and unchallenged. Of more concern is the fact that Twitter does not seem to elevate reports of extremist content. There is one avenue for reporting all types of inappropriate content and it is not particularly streamlined or efficient. As Twitter admits, they rely on the public to flag content, so it is alarming they do not empower users properly.

Some Social media companies are beginning to take action against extremists’ misuse of their online platforms. Nonetheless, the programs are relatively new and small. These companies must continue to work cooperatively with NGOs, industry, and governments to tackle extremists’ recruitment, propagandizing, and incitement to violence even before it begins. 

Reading - and watching - the news out of Syria, it is difficult for observers to find grounds for optimism. The “peace talks” hosted by the United Nations collapsed in Geneva before they ever reached takeoff speed. The “cessation of hostilities” agreement negotiated between the United States and Russia that went into effect February 27 is riddled with loopholes, and violations have been alleged almost daily. If Russia’s continued bombardment of the anti-Assad opposition under the guise of counterterrorism is any indication, the truce will break down sooner rather than later.

The reason has been well explained by Laurent Fabius, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs: “There can’t be a political negotiation when one side is murdering the other.”

That is certainly an apt characterization of the state of affairs in Syria today.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the ancient city of Aleppo, once home to more than two million people and currently at the forefront of the battle between the Assad regime and its moderate opposition. Renowned as a stronghold for fractious but non-jihadist rebels, Aleppo, about 60 miles from the Turkish border, has been contested terrain since 2012. In 2014, a broad array of rebel groups associated with the Free Syrian Army joined forces to rid the city of ISIS fighters, but now it is almost entirely encircled by Assad's forces, bolstered by the Iranian Quds Force, Iraqi Shiite militias, and Hezbollah. Overhead, the Russian air force hit supply lines to the city and its civilian infrastructure, including hospitals and schools.

A narrow corridor remains open for residents of the besieged city to escape to safety, and 70,000 people fled prior to the announcement of the cease fire. Turkey, however, has sealed its border after already accepting more than two million Syrian refugees during the past five years of strife. The undermanned and ill-equipped Free Syrian Army still controlled and defended the eastern half of Aleppo, while the regime continued to tighten the noose.

The city’s strangulation will continue apace without a credible threat of force from U.S. and NATO forces, which almost certainly isn’t in the offing, or unless the ceasefire takes hold and leads to serious political negotiations. Even if the ceasefire collapses and pro-government forces drive rebels from Aleppo, it does not mean that Assad will succeed in his declared ambition to reclaim control over the whole of Syria. That possibility still looks remote, so long as ISIS maintains control over a vast stretch of territory from eastern Syria to western Iraq. (ISIS’s position is reasonably secure given that the coalition against it seems content to wage a battle of attrition, hemming in the jihadist army at the margins but not attacking its strategic reserves.)

What is conceivable is that, after years of international demands for a political transition in Syria, the Assad regime will manage to cling to power. The official U.S. demand in August 2011 that Assad “step aside” was effectively disowned when Secretary Kerry admitted recently that an interim government might have a place for Mr. Assad.

The offensive in the outskirts of Aleppo demonstrates the sound rule that political leverage generally follows battlefield success. In other words, as a senior U.S. security official recently admitted to the New York Times, a military solution to the Syria crisis is at hand. It’s “just not our military solution.” The military solution, so long shunned by the West, is being supplied instead by the Russian-Iranian-Syrian-Hezbollah axis.