I recently wrote about Ahmad Jibril, an Islamist preacher in Michigan who has become one of the most influential cheerleaders for foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria. Jibril is not the only Islamist preacher living in relative comfort under Western tolerance, however. British authorities recently arrested Islamist cleric Anjem Choudary for providing support to ISIS. But just as Jibril remains free in the United States, there is another Islamist in the United Kingdom who not only lives freely, but also reportedly receives government welfare support.

Hani al-Sibai is an Egyptian-born cleric who trained as a defense attorney and reportedly provided legal defense to Egyptian Islamist groups before moving to England in 1994. He also has a long relationship with al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who previously led the terrorist group Egyptian Islamic Jihad before it allied with al-Qaeda in 2001. Al-Sibai was also reportedly the mentor of ISIS executioner Jihadi John, identified as the British citizen Mohammed Emwazi. The United States and the United Nations have both designated al-Sibai as part of al-Qaeda. The United States accuses him of “training and providing material support” to the terrorist group, as well as “conspiring to commit terrorist acts.” Al-Sibai denies all ties to al-Qaeda.

Al-Sibai requested asylum in Great Britain in 1994 after an Egyptian court convicted him in absentia of plotting terrorist attacks. Al-Sibai claimed he had been tortured because of his connections to the Muslim Brotherhood. Britain denied his request for asylum but has been unable to carry out his deportation, despite calls from lawmakers, because of a legal prohibition on deporting people who could face torture or death upon their return.

Since making his home in England, Al-Sibai has repeatedly praised terrorism against the West and called the 7/7 bombings in London a “great victory” for al-Qaeda. He has called Osama bin Laden “one of the lions of Islam.” Jihad, he believes, is “mandatory” for all Muslims “when Muslim land is occupied by non-believers.”

Al-Sibai is also the founder and director of the Maqreze Center for Historical Studies in London, which he runs out of his home. The center’s website—which has since shut down—hosted a number of al-Sibai’s lectures and videos and reportedly influenced young British jihadists, such as Emwazi. In appearances on Al Jazeera and other programs, al-Sibai claims he is merely a Middle Eastern political analyst as he praises Islamist fighters and denigrates the West. In March, he appeared on a Lebanese news program, but female host Rima Karaki refused to give al-Sibai a soapbox. The interview devolved into an argument after Karaki tried to steer al-Sibai back to the topic. He proceeded to tell Karaki to shut up and yelled that he could say whatever he wanted because it was “beneath” him to be interviewed by her. Karaki then cut his microphone.

Al-Sibai’s exploits are well known to the British government and public, and yet he remains a free man who reportedly lives with his wife and five children in a west London home worth £1 million. He and his wife also reportedly collect disability payments from the British government. Al-Sibai allegedly receives £50,000 a year.

This is not the first time the United Kingdom has faced this problem. The Jordanian cleric Abu Qatada fought British deportation for more than a decade while undergoing multiple arrests for ties to terrorism. Jordan had accused him of involvement in two terrorist plots in that country. Qatada had also been tied to Chechen terrorists, and he had once been described as Osama bin Laden’s “spiritual ambassador in Europe.” Britain finally negotiated a deal last year with Jordan to guarantee Qatada a fair trial upon his return. Two Jordanian courts subsequently acquitted him.

In a response to CEP inquires, dated August 28, the British Home Office confirmed that al-Sibai remains on the United Kingdom’s consolidated list of financial sanctions targets and that it “actively” pursues the removal of people such as al-Sibai “whose presence in the UK is not conducive to the public good….”

The Home Office also noted the UK’s “proud tradition over many years of providing a place of safety for refugees who need protection. It does not do so lightly….” Asylum applicants are subject to “a series of background and security checks.”

This is likely why al-Sibai was initially denied asylum. As the Home Office points out, the United Kingdom is “sometimes faced with individuals who do not qualify for asylum but who we are unable to return because of the situation in their home country.” Britain keeps events in the home country “under review” in order to “quickly try to remove the individual if circumstances change.”

Perhaps, as it did with Jordan and Abu Qatada, Britain can negotiate an agreement with Egypt to deport al-Sibai, internationally recognized as an al-Qaeda adherent. Or perhaps it is time for the United Kingdom to recognize that al-Sibai is in the country for the foreseeable future and enforce its other laws that would treat him like the criminal he is.

As of early July, al-Sibai was under investigation for benefits fraud. Well, that’s a start.

At the funeral of a slain police officer, Ahmet Camur, Turkish President Recep Erdogan stated, “We bid a farewell to our martyr that we believe has reached martyrdom. How happy is his family, how happy his nears!”

The cult of martyrdom is a well-documented psychological tool used by Islamists to recruit individuals for jihad. It is interesting to see Erdogan’s use of the same jihadist rhetoric against the Kurds, but not ISIS. ISIS has already called for the fall of Istanbul and challenged the authority of Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), calling Erdogan “treacherous” and a “taghut” (idolater of false gods), “who trick people into becoming slaves of the crusaders,” as reported by Turkish newspaper Today’s Zaman.

For Erdogan, ISIS is a threat to the larger Middle East but not to Turkey, where the Kurds pose the biggest threat to Turkish sovereignty. The slain police officer died in clashes against the PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party), a militant faction within the larger pro-Kurdish rights movement in Turkey. The group is part of a separatist movement that has gained momentum since the establishment of a de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussain. The AKP fears a loss of Turkish territory to a larger Kurdish state should the PKK and other Kurdish separatist groups keep gaining strength.

Ironically, Turkey’s governing political party, the AKP, originally gained prominence by being an inclusive party and by promising to recognize Kurdish identity and language as part of Turkey’s national identity.

Instead, Erdogan now appears to be doubling-down against the Kurds.  Domestically, Kurdish identity remains unrecognized. Moreover, Turkey has assimilated more than one million Turkic-refugees from places like Dagestan, Afghanistan and Iran. This has resulted in an upheaval of local demographics.  Already-present minorities like the Kurds, who comprise approximately 15 percent of the total Turkish population, are likely to see that percentage shrink in the next generation should this policy continue. 

Further, Erdogan continues to label pro-Kurdish activists as terrorists, turning Kurds into a national security threat to improve AKP’s poll numbers and chances for an electoral sweep in expected elections later this year.

It is likely Erdogan hopes that ISIS will wipe out the nascent state of Kurdistan in Iraq’s north before targeting ISIS directly. Unfortunately, by invoking jihadist rhetoric against the Kurds, Erdogan risks opening the door to pro-ISIS radicalization in Turkey and increasing the country’s instability, not strengthening its sovereignty as he hopes. Both the AKP and ISIS are Islamist parties vying for their respective versions of an Islamic state. Like ISIS, the AKP believes in the superiority of Islamism over other ideologies like secular democracy and capitalism. ISIS is merely a more violent strain of the Islamist movement the AKP represents. 

By targeting the Kurds instead of negotiating with them, the AKP is increasing the likelihood that factions within the Kurdish nationalist movement will be co-opted by pro-ISIS Islamists.

The Islamist narrative transcends borders, turning regional issues wherever Muslims may be present into a global “Muslim cause.” The anti-Russian and secular Chechen nationalist movement was hijacked by Islamists through this rhetoric as was the Iranian revolution after the fall of the Shah in 1979. Today, Islamists are manipulating domestic problems from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan to hasten the overthrow of what they perceive as corrupt governments in favor of an Islamic state. Erdogan, as an Islamist himself, does not realize that he and his AKP party are simply another corrupt government that requires removal in the eyes of ISIS. While Turks are unlikely to respond to Erdogan’s call for martyrdom against the Kurds, there is a chance that some within Turkey will respond to ISIS.

Incidents recently in Turkey bear this out. A pro-ISIS Turkish Kurd bombed a rally organized for the liberal Turkish-Kurd HDP party on June 5, 2015, days before the country’s national elections, killing four and wounding more than 100. In the following month, another pro-ISIS Kurd killed 32 people and wounded 100 in an attack at the Turkish border town of Suruç. Such incidents are likely to empower minor players like the Turkish Islamic Front or Hezbollah in Turkey. Both groups have ties to foreign Islamist groups and states.

For now, there has been pushback against Erdogan’s jihadist rhetoric. A Twitter-storm erupted after Camur’s funeral following further statements by Erdogan to the effect that more Turks should become policemen as it is a path to happiness because martyrs sit next to prophets in heaven.

One anonymous individual tweeted:  “Let ministers of the AK Party send their kids for military service to be happy.”

Another chirped: “I don't know what to say [about Erdogan’s remarks]. The only think that I know is I felt ashamed to be a human.”

It would be in the AKP’s best interests to negotiate with secular Kurds if the party truly wants to protect Turkish sovereignty and be a real regional player in the Middle East.

The modern culture of the West tends to promote tolerance and respect for individuals, including those in immigrant or minority ethnic communities, no matter how illiberal their worldview, as long as they are not violent. Thus, while Western governments vigorously prosecute the war on terror, they often overlook essential ideological sources of “violent extremism.”

It is within this context of moral relativism and political correctness that Prime Minister Cameron delivered a stem-winder of a speech on July 20 in Birmingham, England. His remarks were intended to spur governmental and civil-societal resistance to “the growing scourge of radicalization” in British society. It called for decisive action to stigmatize barbaric practices such as female genital mutilation in the Muslim community and summoned universities to challenge the core tenets of the Islamist narrative – anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, for instance – in the same way they challenge Holocaust denial. It deserves to be remembered as one of the most ambitious and tough-minded addresses by a Western political leader about the growing threat posed by religious fanaticism.

Cameron’s message has been a mighty long time in coming. Thanks to ISIS’s control of vast swaths of Iraq and Syria, its expansion into Libya and Yemen – and its extensive recruiting power through social media – the subject of extremist ideology now commands attention worldwide. More often than not, however, the response of world leaders has been characterized by complacency and confusion.

Cameron broke from this pattern, advancing the argument that “any strategy to defeat extremism must confront, head on, the extreme ideology that underpins it.” Every decent government opposes violent extremism. Where Cameron parts company from the Western governing class is his insistence in calling the threat by its right name: Islamism.

For the prime minister to acknowledge the connection between an ultraconservative interpretation of Islam and violence - rather than to indulge the conceit that Islam is simply “a religion of peace” - serves a dual purpose. First, it brings pressure to bear on the agents of intolerance that have eclipsed liberal and reformist voices in Muslim communities. In modern-day Britain, Muslim victims of Islamism have been forced to endure female genital mutilation and forced marriage, among other characteristics of the “honor” culture. The past insouciance of British institutions toward these vulnerable members of society is nothing less than a betrayal of citizenship.

The second purpose of recognizing the faith-based ideology at the root of this violent menace is to support the voices of a more modern and diverse Islam, in Britain and beyond. Given the battle of ideas raging in the Islamic world, it does no good for open societies to pretend they are neutral, or, more bewildering still, to deny that any battle is being fought. For the sake of their own security, Cameron argued, British institutions should actively encourage “reforming” voices in Muslim communities who embrace liberal values.

For too long, political leaders have refused to confront Islamic extremism out of concern for cultural sensitivity or liberal tolerance. This has all but guaranteed that it would fester, and spread. To cite but one example: British Muslims who count themselves as supporters of ISIS now outnumber Muslims who serve in in the British armed forces. The triumph of liberal civilization over the illiberal ideology in our midst depends on staring the enemy full in the face. Prime Minister Cameron deserves our thanks for having done so.

Freedom of speech and freedom of religion are key rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Unfortunately, there are some in our country who have used the Constitution as an enabling device to further their advocacy of violent ideologies and actions.

Anwar al-Awlaki was born in New Mexico, attended Colorado State University, and worked at mosques in San Diego and Virginia. He was also a jihadist propagandist and, according to the United States government, a “key leader” of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Al-Awlaki died in a 2011 U.S. drone strike in Yemen. But before he moved to Yemen in 2004, al-Awlaki preached at U.S. mosques, where he also reportedly met with future 9/11 hijackers. He also directly influenced many other extremists. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted but failed to blow up an airplane with explosives hidden in his underwear, allegedly received direct instructions from al-Awlaki. Nidal Hasan, who shot and killed 13 people in his 2009 attack at Fort Hood, called al-Awlaki a teacher and a friend. Faisal Shahzad, the failed Times Square bomber, also claimed to be under al-Awlaki’s influence.

Al-Awlaki may be gone, but other Islamist propagandists are following in his footsteps. Ahmad Musa Jibril is an American Islamist preacher who may well become the inheritor of al-Awlaki’s mantle. From his home in Dearborn, Michigan, Jibril has produced Internet lectures advocating an extremist Salafist version of Islam. His YouTube sermons have praised Syrian fighters as “real men,” while his tweets are filled with anti-West invective, such as this January 2014 post.

Jibril differs slightly from al-Awlaki in style. He does not specifically advocate violence, but he praises Islamist ideals and thereby inspires his followers to violent jihad. The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) dubbed Jibril part of “a new set of spiritual authorities” influencing Westerners to become foreign fighters in the Syrian conflict. Sixty percent of foreign fighters in Syria follow Jibril on Twitter, according to an April 2014 ICSR report. Jibril “bridges the gap” for Westerners who may not understand Arabic, said the ICSR's Shiraz Maher. Jibril “provides the political and theological justification” and “comfort” to jihadists, said ICSR director Peter Neumann.

While al-Awlaki eventually moved to Yemen, Jibril appears content to continue living in Michigan. Jibril’s Facebook and Twitter accounts have not been updated in more than a year, attributable to June 2014 court-ordered restrictions following violations of his probation from a  2005 fraud conviction for which he spent seven years in prison. Federal Judge Gerald Rosen reportedly restricted Jibril’s social-media access to ensure he does not influence others.

The accounts may be inactive, but they continue to influence foreign fighters. In June, for example, three British women—Sugra Dawood, Zohra Dawood, and Khadija Dawood—flew to Turkey with their combined nine children in order to cross into Syria. One of Sugra Dawood’s children, 14-year-old Ibrahim Iqbal, reportedly “liked” Jibril’s Facebook page.

Jibril has yet to return to his digital pulpit since the court-ordered restrictions expired in March, but his audience continues to grow. His Facebook page has more than 240,000 likes, up from about 217,000 in July 2014. His YouTube page has more than 9,500 subscribers, and his Twitter account has more than 28,000 followers.

Al-Awlaki made the leap from rhetorical to physical support for AQAP, while Jibril remains an ideological supporter of general jihadism rather than a specific group. Still, the similarities between them are clear, as illustrated below.

Al-Awlaki eventually wore his militancy on his sleeve, making it easier for U.S. authorities to label, track, and eventually kill him. Islamists like Jibril—who just avoid crossing the line from repugnant-yet-protected speech into explicitly violent rhetoric—are harder to stop.

For more than a decade now, a debate has raged over whether Pakistan is an ally or a foe in the battle against violent extremism. In Western media, analysis usually focuses on Pakistan’s weak civil central government, the virulently anti-Indian military or conspiracy theories about the country’s intelligence arm – the ISI.

If the conversation is limited to these three factors – then you are left to conclude that Pakistan is incapable or unwilling to address extremism. Yet, if one looks past the government and takes a closer look at what the people of Pakistan are doing, a more complex picture emerges. The truth is, a growing number of Pakistanis are initiating grassroots change, especially by pushing counter-narratives to radicalism through public education programs and campaigns throughout the country.

It is easy to see why many people concluded that waiting for the government to act was pointless. As Pakistan’s Express Tribune reports, “The 2006 Madrassa Reform Project [in Pakistan] aimed to reform 8,000 schools by integrating a balance between formal and religious education and expanding curricula to include the teaching of social and hard sciences, religious tolerance, and human rights. Only 6.3 percent of the targeted madrassas were reached. In 2008, the education ministry reported it had only spent $4 million of the allotted $100 million for madrassa reform over the past six years.”

Also, in 2013, the former Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan emphasized the need to correct the Islamized education system to combat indoctrination. Yet, there has been no change due to alleged budgetary constraints.

Into this void have flooded regular Pakistanis. Organizations such as Khudi host a variety of programs, seminars and conferences to raise awareness of issues related to human rights, including respect for tolerance in society. The group also publishes an inter-university magazine to increase communication between Pakistani youth throughout the country’s provinces. The magazine provides an opportunity for students who typically identify ethnically, linguistically and parochially with their unique communities, to get to know students of other provinces. One goal of such interraction is a reduction in sectarian violence in Pakistan, which has increased significantly in the last decade.

Other identified CSO activity by The World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE) includes the National Rural Support Programme, which improves the communication skills of local communities, so they may better identify and combat issues of extremism at a local level.

A WORDE report, “Pakistan’s Civil Society: Alternative Channels to Countering Violent Extremism,” highlights the activities of religious leaders and organizations that have played a critical role in reducing extremism in Pakistan. Imam, Dr. Tahir ul-Qadri, authored a 600-page fatwa rejecting terrorism and suicide bombing. An organization in Lahore called the Minhaj-ul-Quran encourages its religious students to celebrate Christmas with Christians in the city. Interfaith activity is a key factor in increasing respect and tolerance for non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan.

De-radicalization programs are also a necessary counter-extremism measure. Such programs represent a unique area of NGO and CSO outreach, due to the role played by the Pakistani military. Unlike the general population, arrested militants are already processed into the military/law enforcement system. As a result, this is one area where the Pakistani military has made an effort to support de-radicalization programs, such as the Sabaoon Center for Rehabilitation. The Sabaoon Center is run by the Hum Pakistani Foundation in Swat, where some of the heaviest anti-Taliban fighting has occurred over the years. Other known de-radicalization programs include Mishal, Sparley, Rastoon, Pythom, and Heila.

The Pakistani government has attempted to address extremism also, but with mixed results. After Taliban militants killed more than 100 children at the Peshawar school in December 2014, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif presented a 20-point National Action Plan (“NAP”) to address extremism in Pakistan. Unfortunately, only one point addressed education reform, which focused narrowly on registering and regulating religious schools. The remainder of the plan focused on cracking down on terrorists, including increasing the power of anti-terrorism laws, enforcement and anti-terrorism courts.

As a result, since the passage of NAP, there has been a spike in death sentences in Pakistan’s anti-terrorism courts, resulting in 139 executions between January-June of 2015 alone. This comes on the heels of the July 2014 Protection of Pakistan Act, which increased monitoring for terrorism-related activity in the country. The new legislation “grants police officers the powers to shoot and kill alleged terrorists and detain suspects for questioning for up to 60 days without charge.”

Still, with or without the active contribution from Pakistan’s central government, the push to improve education is growing. Pakistani Nobel-laureate, Malala Yousafzai recently began a campaign entitled #booksnotbullets, hoping to push governments like Pakistan to divert funds from its military to education. 

Progress is being made, but sometimes only in small increments. Malala’s campaign comes on the heels of Pakistani authorities acquitting eight of the 10 Taliban members who stood accused of shooting Malala in the head and wounding other girls on a school bus. Twenty-five-year sentences were expected for all 10 defendants but a purported lack of evidence resulted in most of the attackers being acquitted.