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The demand for antiquities and other cultural property sold through online retailers and social media has skyrocketed since 2015—the sales volume is estimated to reach $9.58 billion in 2020, according to a 2017 policy brief published by the Antiquities Coalition, a U.S.-based think tank that campaigns against cultural racketeering. Unfortunately, this rapid growth also translates into increasing online sales of illicitly exported, stolen, or forged cultural objects. In fact, the majority of objects offered for sale on the Internet carry no authentic documentation, according to a 2018 UNESCO report.

Virtual galleries and online auctions—through sites like eBay, Trocadero, and LiveAuctioneers, to name a few—provide platforms for both businesses and private individuals to sell and purchase antiquities in a quick but also potentially dubious manner. In most cases, online sales not only lack secure documentation of either provenance (an antiquity’s prior legal ownership history) or provenience (its “findspot” in an archaeological excavation), but also offer vendors the ability to conceal their identities and quickly disappear.

The structure of the online antiquities trade and increasing demand is likely also driving industrial-scale looting of archaeological sites, particularly in conflict zones. Buyers interested in owning a piece of history may risk purchasing objects that support organized criminals or are part of terrorist financing activities. In May 2015, the U.S. military raided an ISIS compound in Syria and found information outlining the terror group’s potential involvement in the excavation and trade of antiquities. Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, as well as Skype and WhatsApp have allegedly been used to trade antiquities and close deals.

Following the arrest of the Aboutaam Brothers in 2017, authorities gathered further evidence of ISIS-looted antiquities entering Western art markets in 2018. On March 28, Spanish authorities arrested Jaume Bagot Peix and Oriol Carreras Palomar—known experts and dealers in ancient art—on suspicion of illicit antiquities trafficking and knowingly financing terrorist activities. According to Spanish authorities, Bagot and Carreras led a network that illegally acquired antiquities originating from archaeological sites looted by ISIS-affiliated terrorist groups, before selling the artefacts in their gallery in Barcelona. They also hired foreign intermediaries to acquire and ship the antiquities via third countries to conceal their origin and avoid alerting authorities. The network began operating in late-2014, but didn’t attract attention until October 2016 due to fraudulent import records. During a police raid in 2018, Spanish authorities seized numerous artefacts originating from the northern regions of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania in Libya, particularly from sites in Apolonia and Cyrene that had been raided by ISIS affiliates. Some artefacts showed imperfections that indicated a violent extraction without the use of adequate archaeological techniques.

Antiquities Coalition chair Deborah Lehr said that “[i]f confirmed, [this] will be a smoking gun that ‘blood antiquities’ are reaching the international art market…” and probably affirms the necessity of a recent, and controversial, legislative proposal in the European Union (EU).

The U.N. Security Council has already passed resolution 2347 (2017), addressing this very issue. In paragraph 17, the resolution outlines a range of measures on how governments and private sector stakeholders should reorganize the antiquities sector to harden it against the misuse by terrorism financers. In 2018, the EU emphasized the need to counter illegitimate art trafficking believed to encourage organized crime, money laundering, and terrorist financing. In fact, “the illicit market in works of art can be as profitable as for drugs, weapons or counterfeit goods,” said Corrado Catesi, Interpol’s Works of Art Unit coordinator.

Indeed, the EU reached a provisional interinstitutional agreement in December 2018 aimed at preventing the illicit import of cultural goods from non-EU countries. The legislative proposal introduces a broader definition of at-risk cultural goods for importation, implements a comprehensive licensing system, requires importers to exercise a higher degree of due diligence, and grants custom authorities more power. The European Parliament adopted the agreement on first reading with 590 votes on March 12, 2019. Its final adoption by the Council is pending.  

International art dealers and their associations alleged that false assumptions triggered this prospective EU legislation and similar proposals in the United States. The Committee for Cultural Policy (CCP), a U.S. non-profit organization whose aim is to strengthen the public dialogue on arts policy, criticized the lack of clear evidence and quantifiable data to back the assumption that terrorist organizations finance their activities through illegal sales of art and antiquities. CCP disputed the existence of an actual market for these looted antiquities, labeling them “virtually unsellable.” CPP also doubted the feasibility and logistics outlined in the current EU proposal.

The art industry can be expected to lobby against legislation that they feel burdens them with administrative obligations and costs. But despite all speculation, the undeniable profitability of illicit antiquities trafficking has drawn the attention of ISIS and other terrorist groups—particularly when antiquities are within geographical reach—and has led to large-scale and organized looting activities in ISIS-controlled territories in Syria and Iraq. And while it may not be their most lucrative endeavor, strong indicators point to it generating meaningful income, which contributes to the organization’s survival.

Europe has a Hezbollah problem.

Last June, Hezbollah flags flew across London as protesters marked Quds Day, Iran’s annual day of anti-Israel protests. British officials found themselves unable to block the protests as demonstrators argued that they were supporting Hezbollah’s legal political wing and not its U.K.-sanctioned deadly military arm.

That is about to change. On Monday, the U.K. Home Office announced intentions to designate Hezbollah in its entirety, a commendable—if long overdue—move. As of yesterday, both houses of Parliament had approved the updated designation. The Home Office’s February 25 statement cited Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian civil war and continued stockpiling of weapons in southern Lebanon in contravention of U.N. resolutions in its decision. According to Javid’s statement, it was “no longer tenable to distinguish between the military and political wings of” Hezbollah. This is an understatement at best. But now that the United Kingdom has taken this step, it is past time that the European Union followed this example and designated Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organization.

The United Kingdom first designated Hezbollah’s military wing in 2001 but maintained a distinction between the terror group’s terrorist and political wings. The European Union designated Hezbollah’s military wing in 2013, making the same distinction fearing that it would upset relations with Lebanon, where Hezbollah is a powerful political party. The result was that political support of Hezbollah remained legal, which has led to public displays of support for the Lebanese terror group in Europe under the guise of political demonstrations. In response, Germany moved in 2016 to ban Hezbollah’s flag as a symbol of violent propaganda, though it did not take the step of banning the group as a whole. The United Kingdom will become only the second EU country to have banned Hezbollah in its entirety. In 2004, the Netherlands designated Hezbollah as a whole as a terrorist group, recognizing that “Hezbollah’s political and terrorist wings are controlled by one co-ordinating council.”

Countries that have banned Hezbollah as a whole—such as the United States and Canada—still maintain ties with Lebanon—just not with Hezbollah’s political representation. This should be the model for the European Union as well.

Even Hezbollah has long scoffed at Europe’s false division of the group. As far back as 2000, Hezbollah deputy leader Naim Qassem said that “Hezbollah’s secretary-general is the head of the Shura Council and also the head of the Jihad Council, and this means that we have one leadership, with one administration.” Qassem reaffirmed Hezbollah’s unitary structure in 2012: “We don’t have a military wing and a political one; we don’t have Hezbollah on one hand and the resistance party on the other.” Hezbollah readily admits that its politicians and its combatants both take orders from Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. So why does Europe continue to insist otherwise?

Hezbollah has targeted Europe for decades. In June 1985, Hezbollah was responsible for the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 traveling from Athens to Rome. On July 18, 2012, a suicide bomber killed five Israeli tourists and the Bulgarian driver aboard an Israeli tour bus in Burgas, Bulgaria. Bulgarian officials identified Hezbollah as responsible for the attack. In 2013, a Cypriot court sentenced Lebanese-Swedish national Hossam Taleb Yaccoub to three years in prison for collecting intelligence on Israeli tourist targets on behalf of Hezbollah.

The EU’s failure to recognize Hezbollah for what it is will only hurt Lebanon by continuing to legitimize the terror group. Hezbollah has long had a detrimental effect on Lebanon, politically and militarily. Most recently, Hezbollah received the powerful Health Ministry portfolio in the Lebanese government. This has raised worldwide concerns that Hezbollah may try to siphon resources to Shiite areas of Lebanon—where Hezbollah maintains its political base—and away from Sunni regions that generally oppose the group. Another fear is that Hezbollah could redirect government funding to care for its fighters returning from Syria, further cementing Lebanon’s role in a war it never wanted.

The U.K. government’s decision to ban all of Hezbollah is a recognition of the reality of Hezbollah’s unitary leadership structure and its detrimental impact on Lebanon itself. The European Union remains in denial as long as it promotes its artificial division of Hezbollah’s ranks.

“Denounce your work colleagues, neighbors or acquaintances today and collect instant cash. Help us to remove these problem Germans from the economy and public office.”

With these provocative words, the German left-wing activist art collective Center for Political Beauty (Zentrum für politische Schöhnheit or ZPS) launched the online campaign “SOKO Chemnitz” in early December 2018 and caused a massive controversy within German society.

On August 26, 2018, police arrested two refugees—from Syria and Iraq—suspected of fatally stabbing a German man in Chemnitz. The incident triggered far-right extremists and neo-Nazis to riot in the streets and attack immigrants. Subsequent police investigations of far-right suspects allegedly involved in the riot proved to be difficult and cumbersome. Political parties were unprepared for the size and ugliness of the far-right show of force and wound up blaming one another for the degree of xenophobia it revealed.

On December 3, 2018, ZPS launched its online campaign SOKO Chemnitz by uploading about 7,000 pictures of Chemnitz protestors, and called upon the German society to identify the individuals and engage in the group’s efforts of “denazification.” On the website “soko-chemnitz.de,” ZPS asked for valuable information, including names, addresses, and employers in exchange for cash rewards of between €30 and €120.

SOKO Chemnitz went viral within hours, causing a variety of controversial reactions on social media. Some people endorsed the initiative, expressing thanks that someone finally revolted and showed moral courage. Those same people thought that police investigations had neglected far-right political crimes like the alleged National Socialist Underground’s (NSU) series of attacks against migrants living in Germany, but heavily prosecuted left-wing activities such as the G20 protests in Hamburg. Others supported the gist of the campaign but condemned the technique of public denunciation as being too reminiscent of the type of hate and defamation that took place during the Nazi regime and later during Stasi control in Eastern Germany, believing that those types of campaigns—whether on the left or right—never belong in a democratic constitutional state like Germany. A large number of people harshly criticized SOKO Chemnitz, expressing shame that someone could even conceive of taking such actions in present day Germany, while a few individuals also demanded that the initiators of the intimidation and defamation campaign face legal consequences.

Compiled controversial reactions on Twitter after launching “SOKO Chemnitz” online (12/03/2018)

On December 5, 2018, ZPS deactivated its database and revealed the true intention of SOKO Chemnitz, calling it a “honeypot trap.” ZPS used the website SOKO Chemnitz to lure far-right sympathizers and neo-Nazis into revealing their identities and surrendering the identity of their networks.

ZPS assumed that people who participated in the Chemnitz riots would want to check if their picture was uploaded. But the website only showed a maximum of 20 pictures at once, thereby inducing the user to type first and family names into the search function, instead of manually scrolling through numerous samples. By collecting those search terms, ZPS created a list of so-called “braune Mobber” (Nazi rioters). Using analysis and visualization tools, the group then evaluated connections between central figures, influencers, followers, and physical whereabouts. The website eventually posted this statement: “[u]sing the search function, you [Nazis] shared more with us than publicly available sources could ever have revealed.”

After announcing the hoax, reactions on social media were again controversial. The majority of people who responded were amused and congratulated ZPS on this “awesome campaign” and its “huge success.” Those previously shocked by the call for a denunciation campaign expressed relief, claiming that they suspected all along that the campaign served a deeper and more useful purpose. Some people mocked neo-Nazis and Saxony’s police for falling for the trap. Others challenged the validity of the results, either doubting that Nazi rioters “were stupid enough to search their names” or wondering whether ZPS possessed the technological expertise necessary to carry out its plan. They believed the results to be fabricated and suspected that ZPS panicked in response to the backlash against the campaign and used the honeypot explanation to save face.

Compiled controversial reactions on Twitter after revealing the “honeypot trap” (12/05/2018)

Much remains unknown. Despite publishing a small sample of its search activity records and an unreadable network analysis diagram, ZPS has yet to present its findings to the public. However, on December 12, 2018, ZPS announced on its website that it submitted all relevant data—including names, IP-addresses, search requests, and automatic term weighting—to the police of Saxony, Germany’s interior ministry, and the criminal police office’s specialized unit on countering militant far-right extremism in Berlin. ZPS also said it had deleted its own database and referred further questions to those authorities.

Did ZPS just put a cherry on the cake—or was their logic flawed and overly simplified from the beginning? A skeptic might classify the data as irrelevant or non-incriminating, given that not every Chemnitz protestor was a neo-Nazi, glorified Hitler and the Third Reich, or committed violent crimes. On the other hand, the data might have revealed important information on far-right networks in Eastern Germany and could therefore help intelligence agencies to monitor groups and individuals, analyze trends, and potentially dismantle violent circles. Whether SOKO Chemnitz revelations bear fruit in the future remains an open question, one that may never be answered definitively.

In 2017, European security services uncovered that Islamist domestic terrorists and foreign fighters received social welfare payments totaling more than two million euros between 2012 and 2016. Among the primary reasons for the lack of governmental oversight were insufficient coordination between government authorities combined with unclear division of responsibilities, legislative loopholes, and missing control mechanisms.

ISIS generates most of its wealth in Syria from oil sales, taxation, extortion, and confiscation of property and cash. However, a smaller portion of the terror group’s revenue originates from Europe, collected through donations from ISIS-sympathizers, charity scams, and—notably—social welfare payments.

For example, Anis Amri, the perpetrator of the December 2016 Christmas market attack in Berlin, used multiple identities to apply for asylum and to over-claim for social welfare benefits in Germany. It is likely that Amri received a monthly stipend of €135, housing allowances, vouchers, and other payments in kind.

According to Belgian authorities, Salah Abdeslam, the logistical mastermind of the 2015 Paris attacks, collected approximately $21,000 in unemployment benefits up until three weeks prior to the attacks. Khalid and Ibrahim el-Bakraoui, suicide bombers in the coordinated Brussels March 2016 attacks, together received $34,700 in unemployment benefits between February 2014 and May 2015. It appears that the Belgian social welfare system provided these terrorists with the “livelihoods and indirect support for their terrorist activities”—including deadly attacks on European soil.

There were several reasons why European governments failed to promptly detect the terrorists’ misuse of the welfare system. Germany and Belgium struggled with fragmented bureaucracy, confusion of responsibilities, insufficient coordination, lack of information sharing, and legislative loopholes. When Amri applied for asylum in Germany, registration procedures were insufficient and aliases went unchecked. His case involved numerous police, intelligence, immigration, and welfare offices on the local and federal level because he often moved. Information sharing was proved difficult and cumbersome. Belgium similarly suffered from little coordination between security and welfare officials, as well as deficient legislation. Benefits are only suspended after a person is convicted of terrorism charges, not while he is under suspicion.

Government entities could also be working at cross-purposes. Law enforcement and intelligence services monitored suspected terrorists while governmental welfare offices granted the same individuals unemployment benefits. A cynic might argue that European governments financed both the prevention and planning of terrorist attacks.

Moreover, European welfare payments seem to have found their way into foreign fighters’ pockets. In 2016, Denmark revealed that it mistakenly paid unemployment benefits and disability pensions—worth $95,000—to 29 foreign fighters who had joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Danish citizen and U.S.-designated terrorist Basil Hassan, believed to be behind the assassination attempt on Islamic critic Lars Hedegaard in 2013, received welfare payments of more than $8,000 while fighting for ISIS in Syria. The allowances were claimed by Hassan’s friends who impersonated him at the unemployment office in Copenhagen.

In France, more than 100 foreign fighters received social welfare benefits of approximately €500,000 after joining ISIS abroad. Relatives used identity cards to claim unemployment and housing benefits, as well as income and family support on behalf of the fighters. The money was then transferred through a network of sympathizers—particularly Turkish and Lebanese intermediaries—to Syria and Iraq.

Terrorists’ ability to take advantage of the European welfare system stemmed from negligence by social welfare offices to carry out controls and verify entitlement to benefits, as well as insufficient communication between government authorities and intelligence agencies.

European governments have since made efforts to counter terrorists’ exploitation of government support services. Germany enhanced its asylum application processes to be able to swiftly detect duplicate applications and aliases within databases and avoid over-claiming of social benefits. Some politicians have advocated going further and completely terminating cash payments, while others have defended the existing system. The Belgian prime minister’s spokesman stated, “This is a democracy. We have no tools to check how people spend their benefits.” On the other hand, the Dutch government is currently discussing a rather controversial legislation that would suspend welfare payments for terrorist suspects—not just convicted terrorists—following intelligence services’ investigations and findings.

It remains to be seen how rigorously European governments will tackle this form of support for terrorism. However, improvements in controls and inter-agency communication are clearly critical to avoid the continued blatant abuse of taxpayers’ funds by terror supporters and foreign fighters, many who may soon be returning home after fighting abroad for ISIS and other groups.