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In 2016, British authorities sentenced pro-ISIS propagandist Anjem Choudary to five-and-a-half years in prison for his public declarations in support of the terror group. Choudary previously led the now-banned British group al-Muhajiroun, which included several notable extremists among its membership and was outlawed in the United Kingdom for its links to terrorism.

Choudary is expected to walk free this month after serving only half of his sentence. The bewildering reason is British probationary law, which blanketly allows prisoners with fixed-term (non-life) sentences to be released on probation after completing 50 percent of their sentences.

Police arrested Choudary, Mohammed Mizanur Rahman, and several others in 2014 for public support of ISIS after Choudary pledged allegiance to ISIS and encouraged others to do the same. Even beyond his support for ISIS, Choudary has been linked to more than 600 extremists and, through them, dozens of terror plots, including the 2017 London Bridge attack and the 2013 murder of British soldier Lee Rigby.

Among the hundreds of extremists to whom Choudary is linked are:

• Abu Rumaysah (Siddhartha Dhar): A Choudary associate who was arrested alongside the preacher in 2014 for encouraging terrorism. He fled for Syria while out on bail and his whereabouts are currently unknown.
• Khuram Butt: One of the June 2017 London Bridge attackers who belonged to Choudary’s al-Muhajiroun organization.
• Michael Adebolajo: One of two murderers of British fusilier Lee Rigby. He reportedly attended al-Muhajiroun events. Adebolajo was sentenced to life in prison.
• Michael Adebowale: One of two murderers of British fusilier Lee Rigby. He reportedly attended al-Muhajiroun events. Adebowale was sentenced to 45 years in prison.
• Mohammed Mizanur Rahman: Rahman was arrested alongside Choudary in 2014 and also sentenced to five-and-half years in prison. Rahman is also expected to be released by the end of 2018, and some authorities have warned that he is more dangerous than Choudary because of his youth.
• Omar Bakri Muhammed: The Syrian Islamist cleric who created the al-Muhajiroun network in the United Kingdom and recruited Choudary. He is currently serving a prison sentence in Lebanon for organizing jihadist training camps there.
• Ubaydullah Hussain: A Norwegian-Pakistani national and incarcerated ISIS supporter. Hussain visited Choudary in England in 2014 just three months before Choudary’s arrest.

Terror plots to which Choudary is linked include:

• A 2018 failed car ramming plot by former al-Muhajiroun member Lewis Ludlow
• The May 3, 2015, attack on a “Draw Muhammad” contest in Garland, Texas. After the attack, Choudary publicly told contest organizer Pamela Gellar she should have anticipated a violent response.
• A 2012 failed plot to blow up the London stock exchange. Four of the perpetrators were former students of Choudary’s. He reportedly claimed the plans were “taken out of context.”
• A 2012 failed terror plot by al-Muhajiroun member Mohammed Benares, who was arrested that March for downloading al-Qaeda bomb-making plans. He was found guilty and jailed the following year.

British authorities say they will take steps to prevent Choudary’s resumption of his cheerleading for ISIS and terror. Officials have announced more than 20 restrictions they intend to place on Choudary, including barring him from Internet access or meeting with former al-Muhajiroun colleagues, including Rahman. Additionally, MI5 has pledged it will keep close surveillance on Choudary.

The British Parliament last month began discussing the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill 2017-19, which would increase maximum sentences for terror offenses and curb early releases for terror convicts like Choudary. These steps are encouraging, but Choudary—a trained lawyer—is likely to control his speech and actions just enough to remain technically within the law, while continuing his advocacy for and encouragement of extremist ideologies and actions. He and his followers unfortunately pose as great a threat now as they did at the time of Choudary’s sentencing. 

In July 2016, British authorities sentenced radical Islamic cleric and propagandist Anjem Choudary to more than five years in prison for a series of pro-ISIS speeches he posted to YouTube. Now halfway through his sentence, Choudary is one of more than 80 extremist prisoners expected to go free in the coming months.

Under British parole rules, prisoners serving fixed prison sentences are “normally released automatically halfway through their sentence” and placed on probation.  According to the Guardian, more than 40 percent of the 193 prisoners sentenced for terrorism offenses between 2007 and 2016 will go free by the end of 2018.

U.K. Security Minister Ben Wallace has called on police to increase supervision of freed radicals and actively work toward getting them to “disengage” from extremism. The government has also made changes to the prison system to prevent the radicalization of non-extremist prisoners, including moving extremists into their own wing. Nonetheless, British authorities have warned that freed terrorist prisoners present an additional worry for an already overstretched probation system.

To ease this added stress, the U.K. should increase resources dedicated for deradicalization programs during the incarceration period and beyond. In June, the U.K. government unveiled its revised counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST). Within CONTEST is the United Kingdom’s Prevent strategy, a program designed to respond to extremist ideology, build relations with civil society groups, and provide support to prevent radicalization. Through Prevent, the government has funded sports activities, leadership development forums, discussions on current affairs, and other programs to boost communal engagement in combating extremism. The U.K. has also incorporated a mentoring program for those reported as at-risk of radicalization. But the strategy is largely focused on preventing radicalization. The issue of rehabilitation receives some attention but deserves much more.

Other countries have found mixed results in deradicalization programs, giving the U.K. an opportunity to review what has and hasn’t worked.

• U.S. authorities convicted Minnesota resident Abdullahi Yusuf of attempting to join ISIS. After cooperating with authorities and participating in a first-of-its-kind deradicalization program in the U.S., Yusuf was sentenced in 2016 to time served and 20 years of supervised release, while continuing with the deradicalization program at a halfway house. While Yusuf returned to court in May 2017 for violating his parole by watching a documentary about western ISIS fighters, he has since returned to the deradicalization program.
• In 2015, France initiated a deradicalization pilot program to enable convicts who have completed their sentences to meet with psychologists and other educators. Approximately 30 convicts have since completed the program, which can last between six months and two years. France opened its first deradicalization center, officially dubbed the Center for Prevention, Integration and Citizenship, in 2016. The center shut down less than a year later due to under enrollment, leading members of the government to label the program a “complete fiasco.” This past February, Prime Minister Edouard Philippe unveiled a new 60-point plan to combat radicalization that included new deradicalization centers, more quickly removing online propaganda, and separating extremist inmates from the general prison population to prevent them from radicalizing others. The plan has, however, received criticism from the Muslim community for not including lessons about a peaceful Islam.
• Saudi Arabia has reported success in deradicalizing extremist prisoners with its Prince Mohammed Bin Naif Counseling and Care Centre, which has claimed an 86 percent success rate among the 3,300 former jihadists who completed the program. Still, 12 percent of those who completed the program returned to terrorism. Former Guantanamo detainee Said al-Shihri graduated from the program and then went on to become a co-founder of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
• Indonesia’s National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT) has designed multiple methods to address deradicalization, including mentoring programs with ex-radicals. Reformed Indonesian radical Ali Fauzi Manzi is a former chief bomb maker for Jemaah Islamiyah and the brother of one of the Bali suicide bombers. In 2016, he created the Circle of Peace Foundation, which runs an extremist mentoring program that focuses on deradicalization. Manzi has told media that only a former terrorist can properly address somebody else’s radicalization. He believes that the shared ideology and training in extremist networks create bonds between radicals, and that leaving their networks leads to fears of being socially ostracized or physically harmed. Manzi also promotes a continuing communal response after a prisoner’s release and explains that recidivism can occur because former radicals find themselves without a social or economic support network. The Circle of Peace Foundation has reportedly successfully deradicalized 37 jihadists since 2016.  

The pending release of some 80 radicals is not the U.K.’s only cause for concern. The country has reportedly thwarted one terror plot per month since March 2017. In April 2018, the number of people imprisoned on terrorist offenses in the United Kingdom rose to an all-time high of 441, representing a 17 percent rise over the same period a year earlier. The British government has also noted a 75 percent increase in the number of terrorism-related convictions over the past three years. With an increasing number of extremists entering the British penal system, active deradicalization must be part of the government’s strategy from the beginning, not just when a prisoner is approaching probation.

Europe has a Hezbollah problem. A year after a suspected Hezbollah bus bombing killed seven in Bulgaria in July 2012, the European Union designated Hezbollah’s military wing as a terrorist organization. But the EU drew a distinction between Hezbollah’s military and political operations. The problem, then as now, is that Hezbollah doesn’t have separate military and political wings. Hezbollah is a single entity with one leader—Hassan Nasrallah—directing all of its actions.

While the EU might distinguish between Hezbollah’s operations, Hezbollah doesn’t. After the 2013 designation of Hezbollah’s military wing, Hezbollah spokesman Ibrahim Mussawi told Spiegel Online: “Hezbollah is a single large organization, we have no wings that are separate from one another. What’s being said in Brussels doesn’t exist for us.” Indeed, whether it’s Hezbollah’s recent political campaign in Lebanon’s parliamentary elections this past May or Hezbollah’s military campaign in Syria on behalf of Bashar al-Assad, Nasrallah is giving the orders.

It is past time that European governments recognize Hezbollah for what it is: a murderous, terrorist organization predicated on dangerous Islamist ideals. Hezbollah freely acknowledges there is no distinction between its political and military leadership, but European leaders continue to promote a legal fiction even as Hezbollah has targeted European interests for over 30 years.

Among Hezbollah’s first attacks in 1983 were bombings of French forces in Lebanon and the French embassy in Kuwait. It is responsible for the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847 between Athens and Rome, and has been linked to a 1985 restaurant bombing in Madrid. In 2013, Cyprus sentenced three Hezbollah agents to prison for conducting intelligence activities. Further, Hezbollah stands accused of trafficking in forged European passports, visas, and other documents that have allowed its agents to pass through the EU. A partial Hezbollah ban allows the group to further imbed itself in Europe, creating new avenues of moral, material, and financial support for its deadly activities.

The EU’s false distinction actually emboldens Hezbollah’s supporters and allows the group to promote its hateful ideology. In London, Hezbollah flags flew this past June—as in past years—as supporters marked Quds Day, the annual day of anti-Israel protests instituted by Iran in 1979. Hezbollah’s supporters in Europe claim they are legally supporting Hezbollah’s political party and not its vicious paramilitary, though they both march under the same flag. German intelligence estimates that there are 950 Hezbollah supporters in the country. According to Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Germany has served as a safe haven for Hezbollah supporters. Unless Hezbollah as a whole is designated, its agents can continue to use political affiliation as a shield.

In 2017, the U.S. House of Representatives introduced a resolution calling on the EU to sanction Hezbollah in its entirety, in line with the U.S. designation. Canada, Israel, and the seven members of the Gulf Cooperation Council have all designated Hezbollah in its entirety. The Arab League has also designated Hezbollah as a whole, though Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, and three other members of the 22-nation body objected. But within the European Union, the Netherlands is the only country that has designated Hezbollah as a singular organization.

There has recently been some—but not enough—movement in Europe’s political spheres to change Hezbollah’s status. In January, representatives from Sweden, Denmark, and Hungary spurred more than 60 members of the European Parliament to write EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini demanding the designation of all of Hezbollah. The letter cited Hezbollah’s destabilizing activities in the Middle East as well as its growing arsenal, and called for the EU to recognize that “Islamist-inspired terrorism is not only a threat to the Middle East, but is also the top threat to Europe’s security.” Mogherini responded that Hezbollah’s designation is up to individual states. According to Mogherini, “the EU remains convinced that engaging in a constructive dialogue with all political parties present in” Lebanon is necessary because of the country’s fragile and complex political dynamics.

Also in January, British Labour MP Joan Ryan urged the House of Commons to take up the debate, arguing that if Hezbollah doesn’t accept the distinction between its political and military identities, neither should the British government. Nonetheless, the Labour Party distributed a memo advising that changing Hezbollah’s status could hurt “dialogue and meaningful peace negotiations in the Middle East.”

In a promising first step, and despite Labour’s objections, U.K. Home Secretary Sajid Javid reportedly plans to outlaw Hezbollah in its entirety later this year. It is important that Javid follow through with his promise and for the rest of the EU to follow his example.

In October 2014, Lebanese citizen Muhammad Ghaleb Hamdar was arrested in Lima, Peru. He was charged with conspiracy to commit terror after authorities found explosive materials and photos of potential targets––including popular Peruvian tourist locations––in his apartment. While in custody, Hamdar confessed that he was a member of Hezbollah’s External Security Organization and that he was working in Peru on its behalf. Nonetheless, a Peruvian court absolved Hamdar of the terrorism conspiracy charge in April 2017.

This was not Hezbollah’s first attempt to carry out an attack in South America. Both the Iranian-backed Lebanese terror group and the Iranian regime itself were linked to two major attacks in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in the 1990s: the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in the city that killed 29 people, and the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center that killed 85. Investigations into those events quickly led back to several Hezbollah operatives residing in the Tri-Border Area—a region straddling the borders of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina that has served as a base of operations for the group. However, the attacks were also possible due to extensive Iranian infiltration of the South American continent that has come to light in recent years and continues today.

In 2013, Alberto Nisman, the Argentine prosecutor assigned to investigate the still-unresolved 1994 AMIA bombing case, released a 500-page report detailing the Iranian regime’s expanding influence throughout South America. According to the report, in 1982, the Iranian regime held a “Seminar on the Ideal Islamic Government” in which it decided that it would try to achieve then-Iranian Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini’s vision to attain a unified, global Islamic state governed by sharia law, and approved the use of violence for its expansionist objectives. After the regime identified South America as an initial target, it planted operatives in embassies and mosques in several South American and Caribbean countries. For example, Iranian cleric Mohsen Rabbani worked at the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires and also served as a leader at the At-Tauhid mosque in the city. Although some Iranian operatives were expelled or arrested from their respective countries, Rabbani successfully facilitated the two attacks in Buenos Aires in the 1990s, and in 1997, returned to Iran––where he remains today––without facing repercussions.

Mosques and so-called “cultural centers” throughout South America continue to serve as hubs for Iranian- and Hezbollah-linked operatives to associate, propagate their radical ideology, and generate support. According to Nisman, many of these mosques and cultural centers have received direct financial support from the Iranian regime. Some function under the direction of Iranian operatives, who operate freely in their respective countries. The Islamic Cultural Center of Brazil and Mezquita do Brás mosque in São Paulo are led by Taleb Hussein al-Khasraji, a former Iranian government employee who is now a naturalized Brazilian citizen. The Iranian cleric Seyed Javad Ebrahimi was reportedly appointed imam of the Imán Mahdi mosque in Santiago, Chile, by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei himself.

Other mosques and cultural centers, however, are led by South American converts to Shia Islam who have adopted pro-Iranian and pro-Hezbollah views themselves. Between 2007 and 2013, more than 1,000 Latin Americans reportedly traveled to Iran to study with Mohsen Rabbani himself. The At-Tauhid Mosque in Buenos Aires is one of several mosques in Argentina led and frequented by Argentine sheikhs who studied with Rabbani and who reportedly have links to Hezbollah. Major Islamic cultural centers in Colombia, Chile, and Peru have also reportedly been led by native citizens of those countries who studied with Rabbani in Iran. Edwar Quiroga Vargas, the leader of the Iranian-sponsored Inkarri-Islam cultural center in Peru, reportedly regularly hosts Hezbollah-linked individuals. In 2016, he established a political party called “Partido de Dios”––a direction translation to “Party of God” or “Hezbollah.”

Iran has strived to make its ideology accessible to Latin Americans through resources including translated literature offered by cultural centers and HispanTV, an Iranian-sponsored Spanish-language news station broadcasted across the American continent. Inkarri-Islam, which is located in Peru’s rural Apurímac region, reportedly ties Shia Islamic narratives to indigenous Incan narratives in an attempt to cultivate popular support––while also promoting a heavily anti-Semitic agenda that calls for the liberation of the Incas from “Zionist colonization.”

Unfortunately, governments are turning a blind eye as Iran and Hezbollah continue to make inroads across South America. Known Hezbollah operatives continue to reside freely in Brazil and Paraguay, and Peru failed to prosecute Hamdar for terrorism. Not only has Argentina failed to implicate anyone for the 1994 AMIA bombing, but Nisman accused its government of attempting to collude with the Iranian regime on the investigation in exchange for trade concessions. Nisman’s claims resulted in his death a day before he was due to present evidence in court.

Although Hezbollah and Iran have not carried out a terrorist attack in South America since 1994, the arrest of Hamdar suggests that they are still willing and ready to use violence in the region in pursuit of their radical objectives, making their continued and unhindered presence a serious cause for concern.