This blog is the second entry in a four-part series about the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), an al Qaeda (AQ)-affiliated, originally Uyghur Islamist terrorist group. While remaining an AQ-affiliate, TIP is also closely linked with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), fighting alongside it in the Syrian civil war. After the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, TIP joined the newly formed Syrian Armed Forces. TIP’s actions in Syria contain important lessons about the group as a terrorism risk and who it may target.

As Syria’s Assad regime crumbled under a rebel offensive led by the Salafi extremist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)in late 2024, attention turned to this group and its leader: Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, who would become interim president under his birthname of Ahmed al-Sharaa. While HTS had led the decisive charge against the regime, it was supported by a coalition of groups, which included the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) and its 3,500 members (not all of them are fighters). Similar to other groups of this coalition, TIP has formally dissolved and integrated into the new Syrian states’ security apparatus in early 2025. However, this does not necessarily mean that the fighters of TIP no longer pose a terrorism risk.

Uyghurs in Türkiye

TIP’s sizeable contingent of ethnically Turkic Uyghur Muslims was one of the largest and most well-organized groups of non-Arab foreign terrorist fighters in the Syrian civil war. Many of its members likely crossed into Syria from Türkiye, where Uyghurs have routinely migrated from China. Some of this migration has been facilitated by human trafficking networks set up specifically for Uyghurs and run by Turkish citizens. Uncovering such a network in 2015, Chinese authorities arrested 10 Turkish citizens alongside several Uyghurs in Shanghai. Türkiye-linked human trafficking groups have also been discovered in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Among those Uyghurs who made it from China or Southeast Asia to Türkiye, some crossed one more border and settled in northern Syria’s Idlib province.

The first Uyghur settlements were created in Syria around 2012, in the wake of the expanding civil war. Initially, it was largely men that travelled to Syria, with women and children following later. But whether the majority of Uyghurs going to Syria were motivated by Islamist-terrorist aims or if this migration was organized by the TIP from the outset cannot be definitively ascertained. One leader in the TIP denies this, saying that they only took up arms as the war evolved. However, given the timing of the migration into an increasingly active war zone and the pattern of women and children following military-age males, it seems unlikely that the migration did not follow a strong ideological motivation.

While TIP announced its involvement in the Syrian conflict in December 2012, by 2015 the Uyghur presence in Syria became increasingly visible. This may be directly linked to increasing pressure on TIP in Pakistan brought on by Sino-Pakistani counterterrorism cooperation. In particular, Pakistan’s Zarb-e-Azb operation (launched at China’s behest in June 2014-April 2016) caused TIP fighters to relocate to Syria. Yet despite the rising visibility of TIP in the Syrian conflict, tensions exist between Syria and their Afghan home base: there have frequently been reminders issued by ideologues and also TIP’s emir (Abdul Haq al-Turkistani) that fighters should not forget that their core battles are in Central Asia and China (more on this in the next blog entry).

Groups in Syria with Uyghur membership

In addition to TIP, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has also attracted Uyghurs to Syria: ISIS-recruited Uyghurs reportedly number a few hundred. But it is important to note the complexities of obtaining reliable data. Frequently, Central Asian individuals have been mislabeled as Uyghurs in Syria. For instance, this pro-Assad Lebanese news clip falsely claims that an ISIS Kazakh child soldier is Uyghur. Interestingly, ISIS’s Uyghur language propaganda publication frequently criticized TIP, claiming that the group espouses nationalist tendencies. In return, TIP’s emir has called ISIS’s “caliphate” illegitimate.

In addition to TIP and ISIS, Uyghurs also joined a group that used to call itself Katibat al-Ghuraba al-Turkistan and is now known as the Mujahidin Ghuroba Division (MGD). MGD is a small group that fought alongside HTS and endorses al-Qaeda (AQ). While it claims to represent the Uyghur cause, its emir does not himself appear to be Uyghur. In addition, the group has created a branch of Palestinian foreign terrorist fighters. Finally, there are also a range of terrorist mercenary formations in Syria that include Uyghurs.

The TIP-AQ-HTS Triangle

While these different groups may seem to present a certain plurality of Uyghur terrorism in Syria, with the exception of ISIS they all have significant ties to HTS. MGD has been considered part of the HTS network. And after the fall of the ISIS “caliphate”, many ISIS fighters chose to join HTS. TIP itself has always fought closely with HTS and, over time, become a kind of HTS dependent (see part one of this series). While some experts dispute that TIP is part of AQ’s network, TIP remains sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council as an affiliate of al-Qaeda (list entry QDe.088). In addition, personnel ties as well as AQ and TIP publications clearly put TIP in the AQ orbit. Similar to the top AQ leaders as well as the leaders of all AQ affiliates around the globe, TIP has pledged allegiance to the Afghan Taliban and its former leader Mullah Omar. In addition, various TIP commanders hold positions within AQ and, most importantly, TIP’s emir is a long-time member of AQ’s governing shura council (although it is unclear whether he retains this position). In the early days of Syria’s civil war, both HTS’s precursor Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and TIP were AQ-affiliated terror groups. This is the likely origin of their relationship, which has even been rumored to have led to a formal, secret allegiance of TIP to HTS, though this remains unconfirmed. While HTS has publicly moved away from AQ, TIP has continued to embrace the organization in its publications. TIP leaders outside of Syria have also urged caution against getting involved in HTS’s power struggles with other groups, in line with AQ’s messaging on the topic. Alongside several TIP leaders being sent from Afghanistan to Syria in 2018 to ensure better operational control, it seems very likely that TIP remains committed to AQ and that especially the organization’s leadership in Afghanistan seems committed not to let this allegiance falter as HTS has publicly distanced itself from AQ.

Given its size and integration with HTS, it is not surprising that TIP has been a prominent fighting force across the Syrian civil war. The group was involved in the lengthy attempted relief of the siege of Aleppo until 2016 and was one of the last groups to withdraw from this battle. In the same year, it was involved in heavy fighting in Latakia on the Syrian coast. During that offensive, various extremist rebel groups were implicated in massacres of the Alawite civilian population.

Earlier battles within Idlib led to the capture of checkpoints and settlements, foremost Jisr al Shughur, which has become a main Uyghur base and settlement in Syria. Given that the group holds territory, the number of associated persons of the group has been claimed by one TIP political leader as 15,000. As this leader acknowledges, at most 1/5th are fighters, while the rest are women, children, teachers, farmers and other civilians. With such a diverse base then, might it be possible for this community to integrate into the new Syria as peaceful civilians? Syrian civil society actors who the author consulted, such as Yassin al-Haj Saleh or Heba Alkadri doubt it. And indeed, many Uyghur extremists will remain armed as part of Syria’s new army. Integrated into the 84th Division of Foreign Fighters, a risk remains that some of these foreign terrorist fighters, now with access to regular military equipment, may decide to conduct terrorist operations either inside or outside Syria again. Unfortunately, the massacres of Alawites in early 2025 give little cause for hope. Eye witnesses noted Uyghurs among the perpetrators although whether they were former TIP fighters or Uyghurs at all remains unclear (given that Uyghurs are regularly confused with Central Asians in Syria).

A Threatening Outlook

To assess the threat posed by TIP and other Uyghur terrorists in Syria, it is important to note China’s role in Syria’s economy. While official exports from China to Syria were only valued at 357 million USD in 2023, informal trade and re-export from Dubai, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan amounts to a much higher sum. Due to years of Western sanctions, large-scale import substitution has taken place over the course of the civil war, putting Chinese business networks in a dominant position in the country. Whether these business networks will remain safe from being targeted by Uyghur terrorists remains to be seen.

Further, Uyghur extremists may threaten the current Syrian government. As the realities of governance forces it to make pragmatic, compromising decisions, veteran jihadi terrorists, to include AQ-linked Uyghurs, may feel disenfranchised. Echoing US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack, disgruntled Islamist terrorists who see the “caliphate” they ostensibly fought for not come into being may easily turn on al-Sharaa before targeting other countries. Returning to Central Asia and targeting China directly is certainly a clarion call TIP’s emir put out as recently as December 2024.

Another risk is that the emboldened and strengthened Uyghur movement in Syria may expand its networks that are already active in Türkiye. As described by veteran Uyghur “activist” and possible co-founder of TIP, Abdulkader Yapchan, TIP is only the military arm of the Islamist Uyghur movement. Its cultural arm is based in Türkiye. The East Turkistan Education and Solidarity Association (ETESA) heads TIP’s propaganda outlets. Officially based in the Uyghur neighborhood of Zeytinburnu, Istanbul, ETESA has been granted recognition by the Turkish government as representing the Uyghur diaspora and even been given the privilege of administering Uyghur visa extensions. Extending this network into the Syrian Uyghur community that is buttressed by income from military and civilian jobs could create a broadened, permanent base for Uyghur Islamist agitation. 

However, other scenarios are also possible. Given that statelessness drives terrorism, the promise of Syrian citizenship and integration through work could bring stability. A good example is Kayseri in Türkiye’s Anatolian heartland. There, diaspora Uyghurs have built a community since 1965 that is peaceful and well-integrated under the banner of the Doğu Türkistan Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği. As noted by one of its leaders, those with friends, family, and work, as well as those with marketable skills, can integrate well and don’t fall prey to extremism. Only time will tell whether this possibility can extend into Syria.