This blog is the fourth entry in a five-part series about the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), an al Qaeda (AQ)-affiliated, originally Uyghur, Islamist terrorist group. Over the course of its history, TIP has gained an increasingly transnational, even global profile. With its founders originating from China, the group has been based in Afghanistan and Pakistan among AQ and the Taliban. In Syria, it helped secure Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) victory in the civil war and now threatens peace and stability there and potentially beyond. Those places have been the topics of the previous entries. This entry focuses on TIP’s global plotting, including terrorist attacks in Pakistan, China, and Central Asia as well as plots targeting Oslo, Norway and the United Kingdom. Given such a diverse threat profile, it is essential to understand these past attacks to prepare for future ones.

Attacks Within China

TIP’s attacks within China have proven difficult to attribute. Some of this is connected to the proliferation of aliases for TIP, which is further discussed in the next blog. The first attributions were made by Chinese authorities in connection with a spree of violence in the 1990s in Xinjiang. A list of these violent incidents was published in January 2002 by the Information Office of the Chinese State Council. The context of its publication were the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) deliberations over whether to list TIP (under the umbrella term ETIM) as a terrorist movement on its global terrorism sanctions list (the group was sanctioned in September 2002 as list entry QDe.088).

The State Council’s document describes instances, largely in the 1990s, of riots, subversion, explosions, arms trafficking, and other activities. In total, 162 individuals may have died during these incidents and attacks. In most cases, the list attributes this violence to varying organizations, named anything from “Islamic Holy Warriors” to numerous variations of “(East) Turkistan (Islamic) Party/(Independence/Liberation) Movement.” The most notorious terrorist attacks of the period, the 1992 and 1997 Ürümqi bombings, are attributed to the “East Turkistan terrorist organization.” Befitting the descriptor, no organization ever claimed responsibility. Instead of characterizing ETIM/TIP (which the document does mention) as the overall driver of violence in the 1990s, the Chinese documents characterize ‘East Turkistan Terrorist Forces’ as the main driving force of violence in Xinjiang. Subsequently, in August 2002, the US embassy in Beijing noted that the violence outlined in the Chinese State Council’s list could actually largely be traced to ETIM and thereby connected to al-Qaeda (AQ) and Osama Bin Laden (OBL). With the UNSC listing in September 2002, ETIM became seen as driving anti-China terrorism.

 Many of the incidents from the list can, at most, only be traced to small numbers of Chinese sources. This has led to allegations that the violence may not have been as organized or premediated as Chinese authorities claimed. Some of the listed incidents may have been spontaneous outbursts of violence, such as riots. And killings may be linked more to personal than political motives. But poor sourcing unfortunately does not allow for a conclusive assessment of these allegations.

Since the 1990s, the most pronounced threat TIP posed to the People’s Republic of China was its threat to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. It was issued by Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, then TIP’s emir, in a video around March 1st 2008. Subsequently, Chinese authorities arrested suspected extremists. One of those arrested had spent time with TIP in Waziristan, Pakistan, in 2006. After being released, he committed an attack in Kashgar, China, in 2011. While TIP endorsed the attack, they did not say that they had ordered it. This raises the question of whether lone actors inspired by TIP are a threat. The group did claim a pair of 2008 bus bombings in Kunming, Yunnan Province, and one in Shanghai leading up to the Olympics. However, Chinese authorities attributed both to lone actors. Other TIP attack claims could not be verified either. This includes a 2011 mass stabbing in Kashgar, Xinjiang, a stabbing in 2014 in Kunming, a 2013 car bombing of Tiananmen Square, and bombings in Ürümqi in 2014. Since 2014, attacks have largely subsided. In 2017, China even claimed that it was entirely free from terror attacks. Despite this mixed record of directly orchestrating attacks in China, TIP has clearly played a role in radicalizing some into committing domestic terror attacks.

Attacks in Central Asia

To date, there has only been one successful TIP attack in Central Asia. The US embassy in Beijing publicized in 2002 that a TIP attack plot against its Bishkek embassy had been discovered. However, the details of this plot remain unclear and the US Embassy in Bishkek did not comment on the incident. Kyrgyz authorities presented as evidence only the fact that the accused Uyghurs had secured plans of all foreign embassies in the country. However, in 2016, TIP did attack the Chinese embassy in Bishkek with a car bomb. The attack injured two local staff and three Chinese citizens. According to Kyrgyz authorities, the culprits had “ETIM ties,” while the bombing was reportedly ordered by an Uzbek group’s commander, Abu Saloh. His group, Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ), can be linked to TIP via Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a coalition in Syria to which both belonged. Given this track record, TIP appears to use Central Asian countries largely for transit and recruitment.

Global Attacks

Although TIP is based both in Afghanistan and Syria, two hotspots for international terrorism, attacks outside these regions that can be attributed to TIP are rare. A reason for this may be that TIP was primarily occupied with the Syrian civil war over the past 13 years. Nevertheless, there have been some examples of global plots, all unsuccessful. In 2009, two Uyghurs were arrested for a plot to attack a shopping mall in Dubai. Reportedly, a statue in front of the mall commemorating the 2008 Beijing Olympics was to be the target. One culprit admitted to training in Waziristan with TIP between 2006 and 2007 after being recruited in Mecca. He received weapons, explosives, and basic electronics training before being sent to Dubai, apparently on the personal orders of TIP’s emir, Abdul Haq al-Turkistani. Money transfers for the attack occurred via China and via hawala networks in Türkiye. The second culprit was recruited to the plot in Dubai. He sheltered the other perpetrator and acted as his translator since he spoke neither English nor Arabic. Ultimately, this strange plot was uncovered with the help of the Chinese embassy, which had been routinely observing both.

On July 8th, 2010, ten days after the convictions were handed down in Dubai, police in Oslo arrested another terrorist cell. Its leader was a Uyghur, while the other members of the cell were an Uzbek and an Iraqi Kurd. The leader, Mikael Davud (who changed his name from Mohammad Rashidin upon becoming a Norwegian citizen), maintained ties to TIP. In 2008, he was called by a top TIP commander and visited Waziristan that same year. Additionally, he maintained ties to AQ since 2001 and studied at a Pakistani madrasa in the 1990s.

The TIP-linked Oslo plot was part of a series of AQ bomb plots also targeting Manchester and the New York City subway. The Oslo plotters had been purchasing bombmaking materials, although the police managed to replace these with inert substances. The Oslo cell had considered multiple targets and one of the suspects had been applying for offshore oil platform work training. While this individual never attended the trainings, this raised concerns that the group may have been targeting Norway’s energy sector. During the trial Mikael Davud argued that the actual target was supposed to be the Chinese embassy in Oslo. Ultimately the cell was sentenced for an attack plan against a Norwegian newspaper, and Davud sentenced to eight years imprisonment. He was the first culprit sentenced under Norway’s anti-terror laws. Meanwhile, his co-conspirators evaded terrorism charges and received lower sentences. 

Outlook

Both the Dubai and Oslo plots demonstrate that TIP has been willing to attempt global attacks but has so far encountered challenges in execution . From the real but potentially overstated threat in the runup to the Olympics to the failed plots in Dubai and Oslo, there have been repeated failures. Nevertheless, the group’s most dangerous phase may still be ahead of it. With battle-hardened Islamist foreign terrorist fighters present in Syria, the group has a new pool of very dangerous individuals to draw on. As its emir has emphasized, these fighters should not lose sight of their core battle against China taking place in Central Asia. But it is also conceivable that the group could use the position it has attained in the new Syrian state and its military to mount attacks on Chinese interests in Syria, the Middle East, and beyond. Recent attacks against Chinese interests in Afghanistan demonstrate TIP’s continued terrorist ambitions.

Some have argued that TIP is more of a propaganda organization with a small militant wing. While the Syrian conflict has somewhat tipped those scales toward militancy, its propaganda prowess should not be underestimated. With decades of experience in video production and publishing a long-running and popular online magazine,the “Voice of Islam” (“Islam Awazi”), TIP has done much to radicalize Uyghurs. As outlined before, the Uyghur presence in Türkiye brings this dynamic sharply into focus. Istanbul’s Zeytinburnu neighborhood houses the East Turkistan Education and Solidarity Association (ETESA), which was authorized by Turkish authorities to manage visa extensions for Uyghurs in Türkiye. But ETESA has also been described by the veteran Uyghur “activist” and possible TIP co-founder, Abdulkader Yapchan, as TIP’s political and propaganda wing. There are also, however, noticeable deradicalization and integration initiatives in Türkiye. The Doğu Türkistan Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği, for instance, has built a Uyghur community since 1965 near Kayseri, Türkiye. By building community between Damascus, Idlib, Kayseri, and Zeytinburnu, then, it may be possible for Uyghurs to experience rootedness as the preventive factor needed to attenuate the draw of TIP. Initiatives such as this point the way to reducing the threat of TIP-organized or inspired terrorism going forward.