This blog is the first entry in a new four-part series about the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), an al Qaeda (AQ)-affiliated, originally Uyghur Islamist terrorist group. While remaining an AQ-affiliate, TIP is also closely linked with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and fought alongside it in the Syrian civil war. After the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, TIP joined the newly formed Syrian Armed Forces. Given the close relationship between TIP and HTS and the fact that HTS now controls the transitional government of Syria, examining the role and character of TIP and its close relationship with the new government is crucial for assessing potential terrorism risks emanating from Syria.

Over a week between November and December 2024, Syria’s Assad regime disintegrated under pressure from a rebel offensive after 14 years of war. This offensive was led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Salafi extremist group. Its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known by his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, took the reins of the country and became Syria’s president on January 29, 2025. 

To assess the current terrorism risks coming from Syria, it is critical to examine what HTS was, as the group’s armed wing dissolved, alongside other groups, into the new Syrian Armed Forces, with its leaders taking up positions in the transitional government. For years, the organization has morphed and evolved, merging with others and turning on former allies—all while officially propagating an image of increased moderation and diminished extremism. Nevertheless, the organization began as a Syrian affiliate of al-Qaeda (AQ). Tracing its history, an organization emerges that, through its polymorphism, has been able to coopt, rule, and win a nearly 15-year civil war. But its checkered history remains while the turn to moderation strains the relationship with allies like the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP). Actors disenfranchised by HTS’s public path of moderation may once again pose a security threat, both within Syria and potentially outside of that country.

The Beginning

HTS started life as Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), an organization likely established in 2011, in the wake of the Syrian revolution. Its existence was publicly announced in 2012. JN represented a move into Syria by AQ’s Iraqi branch, then named the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). From the outset, JN was headed by Syrian-born AQ member al-Jolani. Al-Jolani was sent to Syria by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who at that time was still loyal to AQ. Because of JN’s close relationship with Iraq, the group was initially understood by some in the counter-terrorism space as an ISI affiliate rather than a distinct national branch of AQ. Consequently, when al-Baghdadi transformed ISI into the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), he demanded that JN dissolve itself into ISIS. However, al-Jolani sought to preserve his organization by pledging allegiance to AQ’s then-emir, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Zawahiri demanded that ISIS change back into ISI, limit its operations to Iraq, and keep working with JN in Syria. Al-Baghdadi refused, thereby breaking ISIS away from AQ.

JN was a violent, Salafi-terrorist organization. As an official AQ affiliate, it was included in the United Nations Security Council’s Consolidated List of sanctions targets in 2014. JN also committed crimes against humanity against Alawites in Latakia in 2013, working with ISIS during that offensive. Despite the AQ-ISIS split, this cooperation continued early in the civil war, as ties remained between leaders as much as between fighters. But over time a deadly rivalry developed between JN and ISIS, leading to JN conquering much of Idlib province. A coalition of extremist groups named the “Army of Conquest,” which included TIP, helped JN expand its territorial reach.

Re-Establishment

As it attempted to consolidate power in Idlib, JN changed not only its allies several times but also its name. In July 2016, JN announced that it was dissolving. In reality, it was succeeded directly by a new organization named Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS). JFS disassociated publicly from AQ, likely motivated by the expanded power base this might allow, possible sanctions relief and a greater freedom of action in independence from AQ. But some members continued to hold positions in both AQ and JFS. Accordingly, international actors refused to recognize JFS as an entity separate from and unaffiliated with AQ. JFS continued to work, as JN had, with Islamist terrorist groups like TIP. Close links were exemplified by cooperation during the attempted breaking of the siege of Aleppo and mutual condolences on the death of each group’s fighters. Terrorism researcher Kyle Orton even went so far as describing TIP as “JFS-dependent.” And with mounting battlefield defeats of ISIS, its fighters also joined JFS and would continue to into the HTS era. 

HTS

In 2017, Jabhat Ansar al-Din, Jaysh al-Sunna, Liwa al-Haq and Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki merged into HTS, which was dominated by JFS and its leader, al-Jolani. In contrast to JFS, HTS displayed hostility towards foreign AQ representatives in Syria. This was again likely motivated by hopes of a broader power base in an environment now even less conducive to AQ. In this way HTS’s founding motivated some foreign AQ fighters to establish a new Syrian AQ affiliate, Hurras al-Din (HAD). HTS subsequently decimated HAD, which has not claimed an attack since 2021 and announced its dissolution in January 2025. Other groups were either coopted or expelled from Idlib by HTS. TIP submitted to HTS in the face of their level of integration and HTS’s prosecution of opposition. However, given its size and significance, TIP was allowed to retain its nominal separation from HTS. HTS’s dislodging of former allies was complemented by new alliances. Türkiye and its proxy Syrian National Army (SNA) made major inroads in Idlib as a result. Emerging from negotiations between HTS and Turkish Military Intelligence (MIT), Türkiye’s engagement brought HTS sought-after, long-term foreign backing and support for its governance, granting it an improved position in the long game of winning the civil war. HTS’ civilian administration leveraged Turkish telecommunications and electricity and introduced the Turkish lira as currency. Now aligned with and increasingly armed by the Turkish government, which Salafi terrorists often consider to be Muslim-Brotherhood-aligned apostates, HTS shifted away from the classical mold of Salafi terrorism, garnering heavy criticism from Chechnyan and other terrorist groups. In Idlib, HTS increasingly focused on establishing an authoritarian government and consolidating power, arresting civil opposition elements while pursuing a relatively less extremist Islamist agenda. For example, the mosque structures of Idlib, predominantly Sufi, were largely left untouched and morality police stopped patrolling in 2020, though making ‘amoral’ TikTok videos could still result in one’s arrest.

Figure 1: HTS and important affiliates over time, 2012–25 (by the author)

Using this governance model, HTS built its strength and bided its time. After its 2024 victory in the civil war alongside the National Liberation Front (NLF) of aligned armed groups, a “Victory Conference” was held in January 2025. The conference included most rebel groups, with most of those pledging to dissolve and be integrated into Syria’s new military. This included HTS and TIP but also the SNA. Importantly, this integration also included many foreign terrorist fighters, including most of TIP’s 3,500. While the polymorphic HTS may have transformed away from its AQ beginnings, it may be exactly this public moderation that threatens its former leader and others. As US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack voiced in June 2025, disgruntled Islamist terrorists without a perspective in the new Syria who see the “caliphate” they ostensibly fought for not come into being may easily turn on al-Sharaa before targeting other countries. For now, they are integrated, perhaps permanently, into the Syrian army without clear vetting procedures. The 84th Division of Foreign Jihadis already constitutes largely Uyghurs. It remains to be seen whether regular military life and the promise of citizenship can tie these individuals down. And beyond Syria, TIP will continue to pose a threat in other parts of the world, as part three and four of this blog series will discuss.