As ISIS makes sweeping gains in Iraq, it is worrying to note that for the most part, the group is being fought by sectarian extremists.

Shiite militias – often acting as unofficial affiliates of Iran’s military – are operating outside of the Iraqi government’s tenuous reach. To some extent, these groups are working within Iraq’s popular mobilization forces (PMF), a nationally-sanctioned umbrella organization for the predominantly Shiite, and too often extremist, militias. The most powerful and prominent of these Iranian-backed militias are the Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata’ib Hezbollah. Their leaders are linked to a growing oeuvre of human rights violations, assassinations, and terrorist bombings. Their members have killed thousands of U.S. soldiers.

The Badr Organization is run by seasoned Shiite politician and leader of the PMF, Hadi al-Amiri, who has a history of instigating sectarian violence in Iraq. Between 2004 and 2006, al-Amiri reportedly ordered attacks on up to 2,000 Sunnis. According to a leaked cable from the U.S. State Department, “One of [al-Amiri’s] preferred methods of killing allegedly involved using a power drill to pierce the skulls of his adversaries.”

Today, areas where the Badr Organization fights ISIS have seen “some of the most high-profile Sunni-Shiite violence of the current conflict,” according to the Washington Post. Meanwhile, al-Amiri wields tremendous political and military power in Iraq, directing the country’s army and police in Diyala province, and even commanding the army’s 20th Battalion. The Badr Organization’s political branch holds 22 seats in the country’s parliament. Al-Amiri has himself been linked to a 1996 attack in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 U.S. Air Force servicemen.

Abu Mahdi al-Mohandes, also known as Jamal al-Ibrahimi, is the leader of Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) and the deputy leader of the PMF. Al-Mohandes is also Iraq’s deputy national security advisor and a former member of the Iraqi parliament. He has been sentenced to death in absentia for his alleged involvement in the 1983 U.S. and French embassy bombings in Kuwait, attacks that killed six, including five Americans, and injured nearly 90 others. Al-Mohandes has also been linked to the 1985 assassination attempt of Kuwait’s Emir. He is designated as a terrorist by the United States.

Qais al-Khazali is the founder and leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH). During the U.S.-led counterinsurgency, al-Khazali was one of the most wanted men in Iraq. In March 2007, al-Khazali was found and captured by coalition forces, but he was released in January 2010 as part of an apparent prisoner-hostage exchange. His group has claimed responsibility for more than 6,000 attacks on U.S. and Iraqi forces. Al-Khazali himself reportedly led the January 2007 AAH attack in Karbala that killed five U.S. soldiers.

Each of these groups has displayed a strong sense of loyalty to the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as well as Qasem Soleimani, head of Iran’s Quds Force, who reportedly coordinates military operations for all three militias. KH and AAH have explicitly rejected any cooperation with the United States in combatting ISIS. As of 2015, only KH and its leader Abu Mahdi al-Mohandes are designated by the United States.

As we seek to combat the brutality and horror of ISIS, we should keep in mind that the line of defense against ISIS is warped and untrustworthy, but necessary. Those forces keeping ISIS from Baghdad are armed not only with Iranian-backing, but with historical enmity towards the United States and non-Shiite Iraqis.

As Prime Minister Abadi attempts to build a more stable and at least nominally inclusive government, it has sought to bring these brutal figures into the political fold. But the fight against ISIS today is one of fire against fire. With these three militias leading the way, ruthlessness and sectarianism from ISIS is often being met with ruthlessness and sectarianism from the Shiite militias. Efforts by at least some of these militia leaders to repackage their forces as nationalistic and inclusive should be met with wariness at the very least.

The British Conservative Party’s decisive parliamentary win this month may finally silence British-born Islamist preacher Anjem Choudary.

Choudary, the fiery Islamist extremist, has evaded indictment on multiple terrorism related charges over the years connected to his involvement with banned Islamist groups and the radicalization of potentially hundreds of Muslim men in the UK since the 1990s.

While not necessarily well-known in the United States, Choudary is considered notorious and influential in the UK. His prolific Twitter account, media appearances and rallies advocate Islamic law for the West based on a politicized and authoritarian version of Islam that he deems the only true Islam. Such separatist rhetoric, along with Choudary’s continuous criticism of Britain’s military involvement in the Middle East, has contributed to hundreds of British jihadists leaving the UK to fight for ISIS in Syria and encouraged gruesome incidents of violence within the UK. An example of the latter includes the 2013 beheading of a British soldier in east London by two men believed to be affiliated with banned Islamist group Al-Muhajiroun.  Choudary was an originating member of Al-Muhajiroun.

Choudary has been on the Home Office’s radar for many years, but the ex-lawyer has evaded any indictment by walking a fine line between what is currently considered permissible speech in the UK and what constitutes hate speech. After his last arrest and release in September 2014, Home Secretary Theresa May announced multiple enhanced counter-terror measures to silence men like Choudary, which she hoped would be introduced as new legislation should the Tories win Parliamentary elections in May 2015. These measures include:

• Criminalization of inflammatory speech like Choudary’s, through preventive measures called Extremism Disruption Orders or EDOs;
• Closure of mosques or other venues where extremists are attempting to radicalize individuals;
• Enforcement of  a two-year ban on British passport holders from re-entering the country if they are  determined to be suspected terrorists; and
• Granting the Charity Commission enhanced powers to crack down on charitable groups that divert money to terrorism-related activities.

Since David Cameron led the Tories to victory this month, new counter extremism measures are expected to be outlined May 27 when Queen Elizabeth presents the new government to Parliament. It remains to be seen whether the new counter-extremism measures will remain identical to the May 2014 proposals, but Choudary has already responded, tweeting on May 13 that “I shall be on the BBC News at 6pm today InshaAllah responding to the latest attack by Cameron against islam & Muslims http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-32723881 …”

Obviously Choudary doesn’t like what may be coming.  The new legislation is likely to increase tension between privacy rights and national security advocates. Nevertheless, momentum seems to be in the new government’s favor. Austria has already upgraded its 1912 Islam law in February 2015.  Specifically, Austria is banning “other countries from financing Islamic groups, and bars foreign clerics from leadership positions in Austrian mosques. All imams must speak German, and Muslim clergy must prove “professional suitability,” either by completing the University of Vienna program, or demonstrating equivalent training.”

Until the new British laws are introduced and enforced, Choudary will still be found pontificating at every opportunity on social media, and in broadcast and print interviews.  He may even be found at a public venue near you.

In April, a local Nevada paper announced that Choudary would be speaking in Nevada City in June. Given Choudary’s background, it is unclear on what grounds the State Department granted any visa request he may have filed. Nevertheless, so long as the British government continues to keep Choudary’s passport securely locked away, a webcast or radio interview may be all that the residents of Nevada City are likely to get. 

“No Single Definition for Salafism, AJCS’ Conference Finds (!)”

This was the oddly bold caption headlining the 2014 conference report on “Salafism in the Arab World” (sub-title: “Perceptions, Trends and Groups”), hosted by the al-Jazeera “Center for Studies” [sic]. This “finding” was reiterated in the summary, which asserted in pride of place (as the number one point), “Salafism has no single definition.” The conference report continued in this eccentric and frivolous vein, publishing a photo of a participant – a bearded man in a long white dress – almost immediately after regretfully noting that “Salafism tends to elicit images of bearded men in long white dresses.” Indeed. For those hoping to chart the shifting sands of Salafism, the Salafism Conference would not be their first port-of-call.

Despite the inauspicious start, the conferees did clarify that Salafism was definitely not Jihadism - an ideological movement based on an extremist interpretation of the religious imperative to defend the core tenets of the Islamic faith. Jihadism is “extremist” because it explicitly sanctions and indeed encourages violence to accomplish this objective.

Similarly, the key findings simply ignored the related extremist concept of Takfirism, the act of accusing another Muslim of being an apostatizing takfir (from the word “kufr” meaning “infidel”). Takfirism is “extremist” because it is a principle that justifies the execution of any Muslim who is deemed to fall out of the correct creed.

So, the conference in totum was understandably keen to disassociate Salafism from any connotations of extremism and violence (i.e. Jihadism and Takfirism), affirming its definitively religious and pacifistic ethos.

But that is a disingenuous assertion that conveniently overlooks present realities. While the non-violent strain of Salafism was indeed predominant during the 1980s – in Europe at least, when it was widely perceived as apolitical and “quietist” (and so “not scary”) – that is no longer true, and not a realistic claim to make.

ISIS – violence and extremism incarnate – clearly self-identifies as a Salafist organization, and accurately so. Salafis of every stripe believe that Islam has been corrupted by “centuries of human interpretation.” Both ISIS and the ideology therefore call for a return to the practices and beliefs of the salaf, the first few generations of Muslims directly following the Prophet.

The key distinguishing feature is the commitment to violence to achieve this objective. The “conference Salafis” represented the “quietist strain.” They consent to the status quo and are strongly opposed to rebellion and the possibility of anarchy, which is how the Saudi Salafi (Wahabbist) dynasty has managed to retain its authority for the past 80 years. Next on the spectrum are the Salafi-Jihadis. The archetype for this is al-Qaeda, the anti-Western terrorist group responsible for the 9/11 attacks, and believers that violence is divinely ordained.

Finally, occupying a position even more extreme than al-Qaeda, ISIS holds fast to the same principles but supplements this “philosophy” with Takfirism. So, according to the ISIS Salafi-Takfiri worldview, the “enemies of Islam” list is a much longer catalogue that goes well beyond just the 20th-Century adversaries: America, Europe, Western Christendom and the Zionists. ISIS also believes that the almost 200 million Shia Muslims, as well as Sufis, Yazidis and Ba’hai, are all apostates and deserve to be slaughtered.

So, the Salafi conference was correct to say there is no one definition of Salafism. But that is not the front-page topic. That headline should have stated, “Salafism Used To Justify Murder On Massive Scale.” Instead of petulantly refusing to acknowledge any relationship between Salafism and Jihadism and Takfirism, the so-called “quietists” need to raise their voices and condemn – loudly – the use of violence in the name of Salafism.

Feminist Muslim journalist Asra Nomani was invited to speak at Duke University on April 7, 2015, and then was summarily disinvited, due to her “straightforward alliance” with alleged “Islamophobes” like neuroscientist and atheist author Sam Harris, who are accused of having an irrational “dread or fear of Islam.”

This allegation was hurled by the university’s Muslim Students’ Association but was quickly refuted by the former Wall Street Journal writer. Nomani’s talk on women’s rights, however, wound up drawing a modest audience of nine women, plus Nomani’s parents and son. Nomani is not the first to be treated so harshly. Other examples of censored Muslim feminists include:

• Raheel Raza, who faced pressure to stop screening her Muslim feminist documentary “Honor Diaries” at the University of South Dakota;
• Sisters In Islam, a reform-minded group of feminist legal scholars was the target last fall of a religious edict or fatwa issued by the patriarchal Malaysian Ulema accusing the group of  “deviating” from Islam.

The modern Muslim narrative is being monopolized by self-described Muslim-rights organizations, whose backgrounds, writings and associations are not being scrutinized, especially to the degree of those they target.   This self-imposed political correctness serves no one, and deprives Muslims of the type of lively civic debate that is important for the future.

The Muslim Students’ Association has a long history of being connected to foreign Islamist groups and individuals who advocate that society be governed under Islamic law. Yet, because they are an official Muslim organization, with a wide foreign-funded network, many people are afraid to question their statements, activities, or more importantly, investigate their overseas alliances. So instead, broadside attacks are leveled on Asra, a  professional investigative journalist who simply desires to speak to individuals of all backgrounds and opinions so she can be an informed reporter – for her alleged alliances.

From the non-violent Islamists of Turkey’s AKP to the machete-wielding Islamists killing bloggers in Bangladesh and the Islamists in Pakistan who murder politicians for daring to simply ask whether Pakistan’s blasphemy laws should be repealed - free speech and simple conversation are being attacked widely by Islamist groups and individuals.  The freedom to think for oneself  after considering a variety of opinions regarding today’s intersection of politics and religion – is being shut down at a frightening pace, especially, among Muslims.

I once worked for an alleged “Islamophobe,” because I wanted to not only understand the intellectual foundations of the group, but also the nature of their supporters. What I learned was that many purported “Islamophobes” go to great lengths to differentiate the private practice of Islam, which the majority of Muslims wish to defend, from the politicized statist systems exemplified by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Salafism, or Iran’s Khomeneism.

These sects within Islam are products of 18th and 19th century Islamic political thought in reaction to the politics and issues of those times. As such, they are seen as political movements, not religion per se. For that reason, many academics differentiate between followers of political Islam, who they term Islamists, and following the religion of Islam, which they refer to as Islamism.

But, there has never been one monolithic version of Islam. And just as the Christian community evolved away from some of the harsh prescriptions in the Old Testament without being accused of abandoning their faith, so too have the majority of Muslims who do not support jihad or apostasy. Islamophobes should support reformers and continue engaging in a critical dialogue of how religion is manipulated in the public sphere as Islamists have been doing for many decades now.

Asra Nomani and others intend to continue to engage all sides of this debate.  On May 7, Nomani led a panel discussion on “Islamophobia” at the Brooklyn Academy of Music. The panel included author Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Bassem Youssef, among others.

The outbreak of armed conflict in Syria has driven the country into chaos, with a spectrum of opposition groups claiming to be fighting for the people and against the Assad regime. As the Syrian Civil War enters its fifth year, Islamic extremist groups the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Nusra Front, and Ahrar al-Sham have emerged as the most prominent and powerful. 

In discussing the Syrian opposition groups, it is helpful to place their beliefs and goals on a scale to enable comparisons.  At one time, opposition groups ranged from those attempting to implement a free democratic society and government on the left, to those wanting to impose sharia over a newly instated caliphate on the right. Unfortunately, today there are far more Islamist groups than liberal democratic groups left operating in Syria.

ISIS, the Nusra Front, and Ahar al-Sham are Salafist, Sunni groups and make up some of the most far right Islamist groups in Syria. While the differences between their ideologies are fairly negligible, ISIS is the farthest right, hoping to create an Islamic State throughout the entire region under strict seventh century Arabia-esque conditions. The Nusra Front lies towards the “center” of the three, aspiring toward the creation of an Islamic State, but supposedly in stages and with the consent of the local population. Finally, while Ahar al-Sham hopes to create an Islamic State as well, it claims to want to confine itself to the borders within Syria and merely replace Assad with its own government. 

The histories of these three groups are tightly intertwined.  Each has ties to al-Qaeda, leading to their jockeying for position in Syria.  ISIS traces its roots to al-Qaeda in Iraq in the early 2000s, when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi began training militants to attack coalition forces.  The group suffered defeats and declined in strength until 2011, when coalition forces began to withdraw from Iraq. Under its new leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the group moved into Syria, changed its name to ISIS, conquered a wide swath of Syria and Iraq and declared itself a Caliphate.

In 2013, ISIS claimed that it and the Nusra Front would merge despite denials from both the Nusra Front and al-Qaeda.  At this point, a schism developed between ISIS and al-Qaeda and the Nusra Front, causing huge tensions.  A number of Nusra fighters defected to ISIS and the groups clashed.  ISIS blamed the group for “betrayal and treason,” and by March 2014, more than 3,000 fighters had been killed in battles between ISIS and the Nusra Front. 

In 2013, ISIS’s relations with Ahar al-Sham, a militant group whose leadership also has ties to al-Qaeda, also disintegrated.  However, Ahar al-Sham continued to cooperate with the Nusra Front. Since then, despite its inclusion in the Free Syrian Army, Ahar al-Sham has grown to become one of the largest Islamist militant groups in Syria, attempting to unite what remains of the Islamic opposition. 

Despite their shaky histories and their clashes throughout Syria, each group employs similar tactics; they carry out offensives, attempt to conquer territory, govern the areas they control, and provide services to the population.  This alignment in overall strategy is what creates such competition between the three most powerful groups in Syria.  They each have the goal of creating a new state based on Islamic law, but disagree on its character, timing and governance.

Continual jockeying for advantage and competition for fighters and resources contributes to a continuation of the cycle of violence in Syria.  While these groups are in direct competition with one other, their stated primary objective is to force out the Assad regime.   Without a viable, secular alternative, however, the end of the Assad regime could easily lead to an even more violent future for Syrians, as these three groups then turn their weapons more forcefully on one another in a battle for supremacy.