Glasgow girl, Aqsa Mahmoud, wrote on Tumblr from Syria:

“The media at first used to [portray] the ones running away to join the Jihad [holy war] as being unsuccessful, [and say that they] didn’t have a future and [came] from broke down families etc. But that is far from the truth. Most sisters I have come across have been in university studying courses with many promising paths, with big, happy families and friends and everything in the Dunyah to persuade one to stay behind and enjoy the luxury. If we had stayed behind, we could have been blessed with it all from a relaxing and comfortable life and lots of money.”

A long way from her Harry Potter, Coldplay loving days, Mahmoud is a reminder that radicalization is not only the purview of young Muslim men.  An estimated 550+ politicized Muslim women are making or have made their way to ISIS-held territories. Besides Mahmoud, examples include:

• Shamima Begum, 15; Kadiza Sultana, 16; and Amira Abase, 15 (UK)
• Salma and Zahra (UK)
• Sabina Selimovic, 15, and Samra Kesinovic, 17, (Austria)
• Yusra Hussain (UK)
• Hayat Boumeddiene (France) and
• “the Caliphettes”

As Mahmoud confirms in her messgae, the girls are not impoverished or uneducated, but are deeply devout and yearn for a purpose in life tinged with romantic notions of wedded bliss to jihadi warriors and a rewarding afterlife based on their piety. Yet, the decisions made by these women , and the young men they love, is not only the result of Islamist tweets, Youtube videos and the messaging from young hipster jihadis they met online or in their neighborhoods. Their desire to be in “Muslim lands” is based on an identity crisis supported by western media, albeit, unintentionally.

In an effort to be protective of innocent Muslims since 9/11, most media outlets self-censor the debate over Islam as a faith versus Islamism – Islam as a political movement- resulting in criticism of the latter being blindly labelled as “Islamophobia.” Yet, as is evident from the Atlantic article, “What ISIS Really Wants,” by Graeme Wood and articles published since the Obama administration’s Counter Violent Extremism Summit in February, like Asra Nomani’s Daily Beast article, “Will It Take The End of the World For Obama To Recognize ISIS As 'Islamic'? devout Muslims are looking to Islamic scripture to understand the political chaos they see in the Middle East and the West’s policy response to it.

Given the decentralized nature of Islam, there are numerous interpretations of scripture within the myriad Muslim communities around the world. That said, the ideology of groups such as ISIS falls within that pool of interpretation. It is not Islam, but it is. Muslims are taught that as long as one says the Shahada (there is no God but God and Muhammad is his prophet), he or she is Muslim. While the interpretation of Islam that ISIS and its ilk choose to follow is literally medieval, there is yet to be a counter-message rooted in scripture that argues for pluralism, universal human rights and individual freedom of thought and action. This is what needs to be supported as part of the counter-extremism effort, not only in Muslim majority countries, but in Western countries as well, to prevent extremist recruitment and lone wolf jihadism.

The smartest article I have read recently on this point is a personal story from Thanaa al-Naggar at Gawker.com, entitled, “Practicing Islam in Short Shorts.”  She hits nail on the head – for all the rigid interpretations of Islam, there are positive, personal ones if one chooses. This allows Muslims to live in the West without giving up their faith.

Yet, without a foundation in scripture, such “moderate” Muslims cannot defend themselves in a religious debate, allowing the most medieval interpretations of Islam to take over (ISIS quotes 13th century Islamic scholars).   It is urgent, as Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi implored an audience of Sunni clerics recently at one of Islam’s oldest theological schools, al-Azhar  – counter the extremist narrative of Islam based on scripture so Muslims may live in today’s society. Otherwise, Muslim girls like Aqsa, Hayat and Shamima will continue on their pilgrimage towards violence, separatism and hate for years to come.

China’s largest province, Xinjiang, could become another front in the global war on terror if the government’s policies against Uyghur separatism do not become more nuanced soon. Marginalized from the country’s economic boom, separatists from the mostly Muslim Turkic-minority Uyghur community have increasingly turned to violence against the Han migrants flooding into the province for work. China has responded harshly in the name of national security, choosing to tie all separatist activity to Islamist extremism rather than address any of the local grievances. As the Council on Foreign Relations notes, this has made it difficult for outside observers, including the media and human rights groups, to distinguish between China’s “genuine counterterrorism” efforts and its “repression of minority rights” in the province.

The Uyghur have reportedly lived in the area continuously since the 3rd century and experienced periods of independence along with foreign rule for many centuries. Long before the People’s Republic of China annexed the province in 1949, the Mongols, Arab caliphates and ancient Chinese dynasties all laid claim for a time to what China calls Xinjiang  today and what some Uyghur separatists have re-named Eastern Turkestan.

China is not likely to give up sovereignty in its largest oil and gas producing province any time soon. Economic growth initiatives and a new bullet train into Xinjiang is helping to improve the local economy and integrate the province into China proper.  Unfortunately, as some analysts note, many job advertisements explicitly seek Mandarin-only speakers or those who are ethnic Han. This has resulted in some Uyghurs becoming suspicious of the increased Han migration, believing it is a growing threat to their culture and possibly an attempt to dilute the 10 million-strong Uyghur community, which is approximately 45 percent of the total Xinjiang population.

In February, a Uyghur suicide-bomber self-detonated at a hotel in Xinjiang, killing seven. In July 2009, riots in Xinjiang’s capital of Urumqi left 197 dead. This incident received national attention.  The provincial government responded by increasing the security budget in 2010 by almost 90 percent, to 2.89 billion yuan ($423 million). The underlying issues of discrimination and economic disparity were not addressed. Consequently, conflicts continue. Last year, 29 people were killed in a mass knife attack at a train station in the southern Chinese city of Kunming. Following the government line, the Chinese media labelled the act terrorism.

The most recent incident comes after the federal government launched an anti-terror campaign last year, following the Urumqi incident, blaming Uyghur separatists and Islamist insurgents seeking to establish an independent state.

China is also cracking down on religious observances of Muslims in Xinjiang. In cities across the region, signs warn people against public prayer. Individuals younger than 18 cannot enter mosques. Video cameras are often trained on mosque entrances by the government to keep track of who comes and goes daily.  Civil servants are banned from participating in Friday prayer services and Uyghur college students are not permitted to fast during Ramadan.

Ironically, outside of Xinjiang, Chinese Muslims, mostly ethnic Hui, are not discriminated against by the Han. Some observe it is because they are physically indistinguishable from the Han and Mandarin-speaking. Thus, it seems that the problems in Xinjiang are more closely tied to lack of assimilation of a unique ethnic group, rather than Islamist extremism alone.

Yet, if China continues to threaten Uyghur religious identity, the likelihood of attracting more discontented Muslims to jihadism will grow. Uyghur separatists, to date, seem more inclined to interact with Islamist groups in Pakistan and central Asia for training only, not Islamist indoctrination. Yet, there is a trickle of radicalization in the province, embodied by groups such as the Eastern Turkestan Islamist Movement (ETIM). ETIM’s actual numbers, capabilities and connections to more serious extremists like al-Qaeda or ISIS is unclear.

Strategically located at the border of eight countries: Russia, Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Mongolia, and the central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Xinjiang can either be a buffer to Islamist extremism or an Islamist foothold into China. As evidenced in other nationalist movements where Muslims are involved, like Chechnya or Bosnia, Islamist foreign fighters sometimes take on a cause whether they are invited or not; or in the case of the Iranian revolution, usurp power once a common goal (overthrowing the Shah) is achieved.

Should Islamist extremists in any of these countries (and there are many) turn their attention east, it would be very easy for foreign fighters to adopt the Uyghur nationalist movement as a Muslim cause and introduce Xinjiang to dreams of an enduring caliphate.

More than 20,000 foreign fighters from 80 countries have joined the ranks of ISIS and other extremist groups in Iraq and Syria. Somewhat surprisingly, of that total, almost 4,000 fighters have come from Western Europe.

Why would so many leave relatively comfortable lives in the West to take up jihad?

Religious extremists often believe they are waging a divine battle for good against evil and have historically justified their actions – no matter how violent or grotesque – as appropriate, divine acts in the service of God. Their opponents therefore become not just ideological opponents, but amoral enemies of God. The defense of God’s message against such enemies in turn enables extremists to justify and rationalize all manner of actions that appear cruel or bizarre to outsiders.

Islamic extremism is grabbing headlines today for its widespread brutality, but religious-based extremism is far from exclusive to Islam. For example, Jewish extremist Baruch Goldstein committed a reprehensible massacre of 29 Muslim worshippers in a Hebron mosque in 1994. In addition, violent Jewish Israeli nationalists have committed so-called price-tag attacks on Muslim businesses, houses of worship, and private property. In one such recent attack, members of a Jewish anti-Arab group set fire to a bilingual Hebrew-Arabic school in Jerusalem. An Orthodox rabbi from Teaneck, N.J., made international headlines in November 2014 with a blog post stating, “Arabs who dwell in the land of Israel are the enemy in that war and must be vanquished.”

One manifestation of Christian extremist violence took place in 1994 when the Rev. Paul Hill killed Dr. John Britton and his bodyguard outside a Florida abortion clinic. Before his 2003 execution, Hill said he expected “a great reward in Heaven.”

The Army of God, a Virginia-based anti-abortion group, has claimed responsibility for the bombings of abortion clinics in Georgia and Alabama, while praising the murders of abortion doctors – though it did not claim direct responsibility for those acts. Its website invites visitors to send thank-you notes to Scott Roeder, convicted for the 2009 murder of Dr. George Tiller, medical director of a Kansas abortion clinic.

Christian Pastor Terry Jones of Florida issued a worldwide call in 2010 to burn copies of the Koran on September 11, which he dubbed “International Burn a Koran Day.” The Southern Poverty Law Center lists Jones as part of the “Anti-Muslim Inner Circle.”

All of these people were motivated by what they believed to be a divine duty. Clearly, even as mainstream religious leaders seek to condemn religious-based extremism, the justification of violence as a holy endeavor remains an enduring phenomenon across religions.

A January 18 Israeli airstrike on a Hezbollah convoy in Syria left six dead, including a senior Iranian general who had been advising the Syrian military. The strike had been in response to Syrian rocket fire within the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights. Hezbollah responded 10 days later with a rocket attack on an Israeli patrol in the disputed Shebaa Farms area of the Golan Heights, killing two soldiers. Israel responded by shelling Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon.

It seemed like another war between Israel and Hezbollah was inevitable. Then on January 30, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah said his group doesn’t want a war but is “not afraid of war.” He added that Hezbollah has thrown out its rules of engagement with Israel and will strike when and where it chooses.

To most observers, this sounded more like an attempt at deterrence than a ‘rally-the-troops’ address. Recent skirmishes may point toward a new conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, but Hezbollah’s military situation and Israel’s political situation make that scenario much less likely. Hezbollah and Israel were obligated to respond to January’s tit-for-tat attacks, but both refrained from the types of large-scale retaliation that would inevitably have led to a full scale conflict. Indeed, Hezbollah has reportedly told Israel through unofficial channels that it is uninterested in war.

Hezbollah might actually be at its weakest in years. The Shiite terror group has been stretched thin fighting on behalf of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, losing at least 1,000 men. It also faces threats from ISIS, the Nusra Front, and other Sunni rebel groups. A depleted Hezbollah and Syrian forces reportedly began a campaign in early February to push the Nusra Front out of southern Syria.

A sustained Israeli aerial assault would further weaken Hezbollah, allowing Syrian jihadist groups to take advantage on other fronts and perhaps even push into Lebanon. A war with Israel would also wreak havoc on Lebanon, further incensing a public already angry at Hezbollah for dragging Lebanon into the Syrian war and suspicious the Shiite group is putting Iran’s interests ahead of Lebanon’s.

Israeli strikes on Syrian government targets better serve Hezbollah’s interests. Israel has officially remained neutral in the Syrian civil war, but increased Israeli strikes against Syrian targets risk raising suspicions that jihadist rebel groups are collaborating with the Jewish state. Such suspicions could weaken rebel factions that do not want to be seen collaborating with Israel. Israel likely knows this and has limited its strikes in Syria to targets directly affecting its interests, avoiding overt interference in the Syrian conflict.

With Israeli elections scheduled for March, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is looking to bolster his security credentials. Last summer’s conflict with Hamas is still fresh in the minds of many Israelis, as is Netanyahu’s inability to score a decisive victory against the terrorist group that rules the Gaza Strip. Engaging in a war with Hezbollah ahead of elections would likely damage Netanyahu’s reelection chances if he could not score a quick and decisive victory, which is unlikely. Continued small pinpoint strikes against immediate Hezbollah threats demonstrate strength while pragmatically avoiding getting drawn into a wider conflict.

Israel will likely continue to respond to individual attacks on its northern frontier and concentrate its air power on stopping major weapons shipments from Iran. Hezbollah will continue to beat its chest in response. Full-fledged war, however, currently serves no one’s interests. 

What do the perpetrators of the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen have in common? Beyond the similarity of their chosen targets, three of the four men were homegrown Islamist extremists radicalized in European prisons.

Paris shooters Cherif Kouachi and Amedy Coulibaly met at French prison Fleury-Merogis, Europe’s largest jail, holding more than 4,000 inmates.  Kouachi was arrested and imprisoned for attempting to join jihad against American troops in Iraq in 2005.  Coulibaly was serving his third sentence for armed robbery. In their youth, both men had formed associations in Islamic radical circles.

The two men were housed in the same wing of the prison and were influenced by Djamel Beghal, a radical jihadist with ties to Osama bin Laden.  Beghal had been sent to France decades before to set up a terrorist cell. He was serving a 10-year sentence for a plot to bomb the U.S. embassy in Paris and became famous within the prison’s walls. Although Beghal was kept in isolation, the men found ways to contact him. It was during this period that Coulibaly converted to Islam.

Cherif Kouachi was again jailed in 2008 for helping to send militants to Iraq. Coulibaly also served an additional sentence in 2013 for his involvement in the effort to free Islamist Smain Ait Ali Belkacem from prison. Coulibaly was released in 2014. Instead of reforming the pair, prison had served as a nurturing environment for their growing extremism. Their ideologies continued to fester and intensify, coming to a head in Paris in early January 2015.

Twenty-two year old Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussein, the perpetrator of the Feb. 15 Copenhagen attacks, was born and raised by Palestinian parents in the Danish capital. In January 2014, he was arrested and imprisoned on burglary charges and the stabbing of a 19-year old man. While in prison, he was radicalized to the point of pledging allegiance to ISIS, which he did on his Facebook page just days before the attacks. Prison authorities warned that El-Hussein was at “risk of being radicalized in jail,” but Danish intelligence services did not see him as an imminent threat. Two weeks after he was released, he carried out the deadly attacks that killed two and wounded five..

These perpetrators illustrate the severity of Islamic radicalization in European prisons. Today, Muslims constitute more than half of the population in French prisons, though they comprise only 8 percent of the French population. This makes it easy for radical Islamist prisoners to prey on potential recruits, rallying for their larger cause. EU governments will not be able to put a significant dent in extremism until they find a way to effect change in the prison system that today transforms so many into violent jihadists.   

The United Arab Emirates labeled two U.S. non-profit groups, the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Muslim American Society, as terrorist organizations in late 2014 due to connections to the Muslim Brotherhood. The U.S.  has not taken similar action, however, it has on multiple occasions prosecuted other organizations for funneling money to extremist groups.

In July 2004, U.S. authorities indicted officials from the Dallas, Texas-based Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development for financial relations with a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. Holy Land, then the country’s largest Muslim charity, had provided money for orphanages and clinics in the West Bank and Gaza, but it also provided $12.4 million to Hamas, according to the indictment. Authorities closed down the foundation in 2001.

In 2008, five Holy Land leaders were found guilty of providing material support to Hamas. During the trial, CAIR argued the case was politically motivated. Unbeknownst to many then, CAIR had been an unindicted co-conspirator in the trial.

After the verdict, CAIR continued to operate freely in the United States. It collected $5.9 million in contributions in 2012, according to tax records. Just days before the UAE’s designation, CAIR reportedly honored Sami Al-Arian, a former University of South Florida professor who founded the USF-affiliated World and Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE) in 1990 to promote scholarly research and dialogue between Muslim and Western scholars. Al-Arian and WISE were under investigation for several years for ties to Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and its secretary general, former USF professor Ramadan Shallah.

Shallah joined WISE’s leadership when he arrived at USF in 1991. He left USF in early 1995 and was introduced as PIJ’s new leader that October. WISE denied knowledge of Shallah’s affiliation with any Middle East political group. In May 1997, however, the Immigration and Naturalization Service alleged that the Tampa-based Islamic Concern Project and WISE were fronts for Palestinian terror groups.

In February 2003, the Department of Justice accused Al-Arian of being PIJ's North American leader. Most charges against him were dropped in 2006 after he pleaded to one count of aiding PIJ, and he is currently awaiting deportation.

In 2012, two Australian organizations – World Vision, a Christian relief, development and advocacy group, and AusAID, the Australian government agency responsible for managing the country’s overseas aid programs – were listed as financial supporters of the Union of Agriculture Work Committee (UAWC) in the Palestinian territories. The UAWC, however, was created in 1986 by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and PFLP members have appeared at recent events.

Great Britain’s Charity Commission began investigating the relief organization Children in Deen in April 2014 after a participant in a 2013 aid convoy, Abdul Waheed Majeed, had allegedly become Britain’s first suicide bomber in Syria. Children in Deen is one of more than 80 charities the Charity Commission is investigating for possible extremist ties.

Charities present prime opportunities for abuse by extremists. Under the guise of providing welfare, charities can launder money and provide fresh supplies to extremist groups in far-away lands through the use of aid convoys, as well as create sympathy for the needy and the extremist groups claiming to represent them.

“Even if extremist and terrorist abuse is rare, which it is, when it happens it does huge damage to public trust in charities,” said William Shawcross, chair of Britain’s Charity Commission.

Unfortunately, it is not rare enough.

As many as 20,730 foreigners have joined armed militant groups in Iraq and Syria, making the two countries the most popular destinations for Muslim foreigner fighters in modern history.

While garnering tremendous media attention of late, the phenomenon of foreign fighters is not new. Muslim foreign fighters have joined modern conflicts since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, when influential Islamic scholar Abdullah Azzam issued a fatwa (religious decree) declaring that fighting against the Soviets was fard ayn (an individual religious duty) for all Muslims.

From 1980 until 2010, 10,000 to 30,000 Muslim foreign fighters took part in 16 conflicts throughout the world. Of these, Afghanistan has drawn the greatest contingency of foreign fighters by far, followed by the 2003 Iraq war and the 1992-1995 Bosnian war. Afghanistan has consistently drawn foreign fighters since the 1980s, and conflicts in Somalia, Chechnya and Tajikistan have also drawn comparatively small but notable contingencies of foreign fighters.

The phenomenon of foreign fighters poses a particular threat to the West. An analysis by Thomas Hegghammer of the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment estimates that one in nine foreign fighters have returned home to perpetrate attacks. Statistics from 1990 to 2010 show that during that time, 26 percent  of all terrorist plotters had foreign fighter experience, and about 46 percent of all plots included at least one veteran foreign fighter. For executed attacks that resulted in fatalities, 67 percent had at least one veteran foreign fighter. While not all foreign fighters have become al-Qaeda members, the majority of al-Qaeda members began their careers as foreign fighters, and most international jihadist groups are the by-products of foreign fighter mobilizations.

Today, Muslim foreign fighters have traveled to Iraq and Syria from more than 80 different countries, including at least 14 in Western Europe. Of these, France is estimated to have produced the greatest number of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria, while Belgium has produced the highest number per capita. Almost one-fifth of all foreign fighters are estimated to come from Western Europe.

Some of these foreign fighters have already returned from conflict zones to their home countries, and a subsection of these fighters have already plotted or carried out attacks against the West. French native Mehdi Nemmouche is allegedly one, having purportedly returned from fighting abroad with ISIS to perpetrate the attack at a Jewish Museum in Belgium that killed four.

Over the last two years, European security officials have disrupted at least five terrorist plots with possible links to foreign fighters from Iraq and Syria, in countries ranging from Kosovo to the U.K. Following the January 2015 Islamist attacks in Paris, European countries, particularly Belgium and France, have disrupted terrorist cells and made sweeping arrests that have involved suspected terrorists and returned foreign fighters.

Western countries differ in their policies towards toward returning foreign fighters. Some choose to monitor or imprison citizens known to have fought in Iraq and Syria, while others emphasize their commitment to rehabilitation. Others still have begun to refuse re-entry to returning foreign fighters altogether. While the response differs by country and even by case, all governments appear to recognize the threat posed by returnees. For although foreigners may have left to fight in the conflict zone for a wide array of reasons – some for adventure, some for violence, some to defend their brothers and sisters – their return after fighting poses a clear, statistical threat.

In the words of a European counterterrorism official speaking to CNN, “The threat of attacks has never been greater – not at the time of 9/11, not after the war in Iraq – never.”

Right-wing extremist groups have traditionally rejected democratic values, particularly equality. They have, however, used the democratic process to gain strength across Europe in recent years. Last year, right-wing extremist political parties received record votes in the EU Parliament and made important gains in a number of national legislative bodies.

Right-wing extremism is characterized by strong ethno-nationalism and the belief in a homogenous nation. Minorities are viewed as outsiders and become scapegoats responsible for society’s problems. This has led to anti-immigration political platforms, rallies, and acts of violence across the continent.

Marine Le Pen, head of France’s National Front, scored Islamist extremism in a recent New York Times op-ed.  On its own, the piece could be interpreted as being reasonable.  Contextually, it is important to know that Le Pen heads a xenophobic, anti-immigration, and historically anti-Semitic organization. National Front won a third of France’s 74 seats in the 751-member European Parliament last year, which French Prime Minister Manuel Valls called “an earthquake.” The National Front’s win is indicative of a crisis of confidence in the EU, he said.

Greece’s neo-Nazi party, Golden Dawn, advocates National Socialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. It considers the United States and liberalism to be Greece’s absolute enemies.  Golden Dawn supports the Arabs “oppressed by Zionism,” but also fights against what it sees as the “Islamification” of Greece and the rest of Europe.  Its popularity spurred by the global financial crisis and opposition to economic austerity measures, Golden Dawn won 6.9 percent of the vote in Greece’s 2012 parliamentary elections. Since then, members of the party have been implicated in hundreds of attacks and racist incidents against immigrants, including the 2013 fatal stabbing of a left-wing musician. Greece moved to ban Golden Dawn after the murder, and its party leadership and prominent lawmakers are in pre-trial detention for belonging to a criminal organization. Despite this, Golden Dawn won 17 seats in Greece’s 300-seat parliament in January, making it the third largest party in Greece.

The Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) claims to protect Hungarian values and describes itself as a “radically patriotic Christian party.” A 2014 Hungarian court ruling said Jobbik may be described as neo-Nazi. It has argued that Jews represent a national security risk, while calling for detention camps for Roma “deviants.” It became Hungary’s third largest political party after the country’s elections last year.

In Germany, a group called Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident (Pegida) held several rallies in January that drew upwards of 25,000 people protesting the “Islamization” of the West. Pegida’s leaders insist they are not racist and are exercising their rights to free speech and assembly. German Chancellor Angela Merkel accused the group of having “hatred in their hearts” but defended their right to speak freely. 

The Netherlands’ Party for Freedom head Geert Wilders is known for extreme anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant views. Dutch authorities said in December they would charge Wilders with anti-immigrant hate speech for remarks he made during a March 2014 rally against Moroccans in the country. He was previously charged with hate speech in 2011 after he compared the Quran to Mein Kampf and called for the holy book to be banned. He was acquitted of the charges.

Right-wing extremism may appear synonymous with hatred against immigrants, but the growing popularity of the movement is more complex. European austerity measures stemming from the global financial crisis have angered citizens in a number of countries and many are looking for someone to blame. Eighty years ago, Jews represented “the other” in otherwise largely homogenous European societies. Today, the failure of Muslim immigrants to assimilate into Europe has given right-wing extremists a new scapegoat; and the rise of Islamist extremism has allowed right-wing extremists to disguise their ideology as a defense of traditional values and a shared history against a violent ideology bent on conquest.