At one time, it was assumed that it was impossible to study the motives of women who sacrifice their lives during acts of terror, simply because those instances were so rare and isolated.  However, as female participation in suicide bombings has gradually become more common, the phenomenon has begun to capture the attention of sociologists and researchers worldwide.

In the past, psychologists posited that only abused, grieving, vengeful or coerced women could turn toward becoming suicide bombers. Because the incidence of female terrorism is highest in the Islamic world, it was presumed that given the tendency there to respect stricter gender roles, terrorists would recruit women for suicide bombings only as a last resort. That assumption may no longer be valid.

Groups are concluding that there appear to be a number of advantages to using females to carry out suicide bombing missions. Women often appear less conspicuous to authorities and therefore are less likely to raise suspicion and be stopped before detonating thier explosives.

Nevertheless, studies of female suicide bombers tend to focus on personal traumas and emotional issues as motivating factors for the women involved. This differs markedly from the sociological study of male suicide bombers, which has concentrated on motivating factors associated with religion and politics, in addition to the power of indoctrination, recruitment and religious extremism.

As it turns out, the motivation factors for female suicide bombers can be more complex and layered. For example, the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University published an article entitled Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality? The article highlights the story of Wafa Idris, a 25-year-old   Palestinian divorcee. Her husband left her because she was unable to have children, and she returned to her parents’ home where she became “an economic burden.” Barren and divorced, the chances of her building a new life were slim. Her only chance for societal redemption was to become a suicide bomber. On January 27, 2002 Wafa detonated a bomb on her person and became the first female suicide bomber to attack within Israel.

Some women, like their male counterparts, become suicide bombers to further a political or religious cause. However, motivating factors for female terrorists sometimes involved other personal and gender-specific factors, including challenges to patriarchal systems that relegate them to second-class citizenship. Nevertheless, in the vast majority of cases, the women interviewed did not express regret for their actions. 

Recently, media reports have described a new and disturbing development involving women and terrorism in Nigeria. The Islamist terror group Boko Haram is suspected of using kidnapped school girls  to carry out suicide bombings. This recent phenomenon represents a devastating complication in the fight to stop women from participating or being forced to participate in suicide bombings.

Clearly, in order to prevent future incidents where women take their own lives while murdering innocent men, women and children, past assumptions about motivations will have to be shelved and more resources devoted to understanding  and preventing this phenomenon from growing.

Sayyid Qutb, (1906-1966) was a prominent Egyptian author and the intellectual father of modern jihadism. Following are representative examples of the frequently violent, divisive and extremist rhetoric characteristic of the man who became an icon of the Muslim Brotherhood:

Racist: “Jazz is the American music, created by Negroes to satisfy their primitive instincts—their love of noise and their appetite for sexual arousal.” (from The Looming Tower)

Anti-Semitic: “The Jews are behind materialism, animal sexuality, the destruction of the family and the dissolution of society.” (from In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad)

Anti-Gay: “In all modern jahili societies, the meaning of ‘morality’ is limited to such an extent that all those aspects which distinguish man from animal are considered beyond its sphere. In these societies, illegitimate sexual relationships, even homosexuality, are not considered immoral.” (from Qutb’s Milestones)

Anti-Christian, Anti-Jewish: “The true goal of the People of the Book, whether Jews or Christians… is to lead Muslims astray from their religion to the religion of the People of the Book.” (from In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad)

Anti-Non-Salafist Muslims (Takfirism): “Indeed, people are not Muslims, as they proclaim to be, as long as they live the life of Jahiliyyah… This is not Islam, and they are not Muslims.” (from Qutb’s Milestones)

Anti-West: “I hate those Westerners and despise them! All of them, without any exception: the English, the French, the Dutch, and finally the Americans, who have been trusted by many.” (from The Looming Tower)

Anti-Secular, Non-Salafist Muslims: “There are two parties in all the world: the Party of Allah and the Party of Satan – the party of Allah which stands under the banner of Allah and bears his insignia, and the Party of Satan, which includes every community, group, race, and individual that does not stand under the banner of Allah.” (from In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad)

Teaching Hatred and Violence: “Let us… plant the seeds of hatred, disgust, and revenge in the souls of these children. Let us teach these children from the time their nails are soft that the white man is the enemy of humanity, and that they should destroy him at the first opportunity.” (from The Looming Tower)

Anti-Democracy: “Islam is a declaration of the freedom of man from servitude to other men. Thus it strives from the beginning to abolish all those systems and governments which are based on the rule of man over men.” (from Qutb’s Milestones)

Pro-Pan-Islamism: “It is the nature of Islam to dominate, not to be dominated, to impose its law on all nations, and to extend its power to the entire planet.” (from The Looming Tower)

Pro-Violence:“[Resistance to shariah] must be removed by physical force, which is ultimately the only way.” (from In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad)
 

As evidenced by the recent cyberattack against Sony Pictures, acts of cyberterrorism are increasingly being committed by state actors.

From mid-2012 to early 2013, a group called the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters launched more than 200 distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against PNC, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and other financial institutions. DDoS attacks overwhelm websites with traffic, such as external communications requests, in order to overwhelm and create a bottleneck within the server’s operations, making the site unreachable.

The U.S. accused Iran and its Quds Force, the Islamic Republic’s expeditionary terrorist arm, of orchestrating the attacks.

The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), loyal to Syrian President Bashar Assad, claimed responsibility for a number of cyberattacks in 2013. It hacked into the Associated Press’ Twitter account and released a tweet saying that President Obama had been wounded in a White House bombing. As a result, the Dow Jones average plunged 140 points. The SEA hacked the U.S. Marines’ website, posting a message accusing President Obama of siding with al-Qaeda in Syria. It also targeted Qatar’s domain name system, compromising government websites, including state-sponsored Al Jazeera.

One component of a comprehensive defense against terrorism is heightened public awareness of the threat. The same is true for cyberterrorism. Coincidentally, the Sony attacks occurred at a time when the U.S. was attempting to do just that.  October was National Cyber Security Awareness Month and November was Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Month.

There are challenges to raising awareness of the threat from cyberterrorism, not the least of which is the lack of consensus on even a definition of the term.  

NATO, for example, defines cyberterrorism as “a cyber attack using or exploiting computer or communication networks to cause sufficient destruction to generate fear or intimidate a society into an ideological goal.”

The FBI defines it as the “premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which result in violence against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents.”

In her book, Computer Forensics: Cybercriminals, laws and evidence, cybercrime expert Dr. Marie-Helen Maras defines it as:

“The politically, religiously, or ideologically motivated use of computers (or related technology) by an individual, group, or state targeting critical infrastructure with the intention of harming persons and/or damaging property in order to influence the population (or segment of the population) or cause a government to change its policies.”

To appropriately respond to cyberterrorism, authorities first need to reach consensus on how to define it.  Until there is a standard definition, there cannot be effective laws and regulations aimed at preventing or curtailing this criminal activity.  Also, differing country to country standards make transnational cooperation and enforcement needlessly complex. This gap was highlighted by the government’s debate over whether the recent attack on Sony was cyberterrorism or cybervandalism.

CEP has opened its own front in the cyberspace battle with the #Digital Disruption Campaign, designed to identify and expose extremists who are misusing social media platforms like Twitter to radicalize and recruit new members, and to plan violent attacks against innocent people. Through this rigorous research and crowdsourcing campaign, CEP has monitored hundreds of accounts and exposed violent calls to action and instances of direct threats against individuals that jihadis are propagating on Twitter. 

On Jan. 27, CEP CEO Ambassador Mark Wallace, in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, highlighted the need for more aggressive actions for identifying and removing extremists from social media platforms. Wallace outlined a number of mechanisms by which social media companies can be proactive in preventing the hijacking and weaponization of Twitter and other platforms. He reiterated CEP’s calls for Twitter, in particular, to significantly strengthen its policies along the lines of new guidelines it developed to prevent bullying and harassment of women.

Fighting cyberterrorism will also require strengthened public-private partnerships. The Pentagon spends about $3 billion a year on cyberdefenses. A 2013 Executive Order called for increased information sharing to protect critical infrastructure. It largely focused on what the government provides to the private sector and not what the private sector provides to the government. To be effective, information sharing must be a two-way street.

In July 2013, 50 financial institutions simulated a cyberattack to test their responses. A key finding was that information sharing between the public and private sectors is essential to protecting critical infrastructure from cyberterrorism. Former Senator Judd Gregg, CEO of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, which led the exercise, said he hoped the test would encourage Congress to pass legislation promoting information-sharing.

Hopefully, an intensified awareness to the many dangers of cyberterrorism of all kinds, and greater cooperation between public and private entities can give this issue the exposure it deserves and boost the effectiveness of our efforts to prevent it.

Al-Qaeda cells and affiliated groups are increasingly reliant on the money they collect through kidnap-and-ransom operations. Although each group develops its own financial strategy, hostage-taking is a consistent and major source of income for AQ cells everywhere. Since 2008, al-Qaeda is believed to have accrued at least $150 million through ransoms. Following are brief summaries on how collecting ransom fits into the broader financial structure of various AQ groups. For a more in-depth analysis of the groups and their finances, please see our individual website reports.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): Of all al-Qaeda cells, AQIM has raked in the largest percentage of its money from ransoms, amassing upwards of $90 million to date. Kidnapping-and-ransom operations have become a characteristic of the North African al-Qaeda cell. AQIM has even published an online manual on the process for other jihadist groups. While hostage-and-ransom operations are AQIM’s primary source of funding, other fundraising operations supplement it. According to a report by the Australian government, these other fundraising operations include: “robbery, people and arms trafficking, money laundering and smuggling and increasingly, the facilitation of drug trafficking from South America into Europe,” as well as limited financial backing from AQIM supporters abroad.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): A New York Times article from July 2014 puts AQAP’s total yield from hostage-taking at almost $30 million. According to the U.S. State Department, kidnap-and-ransom operations are AQAP’s primary source of funding alongside robberies and other types of thefts. In a 2012 letter to Algerian allies, AQAP founder Nasir al-Wuhayshi wrote that “[m]ost of the battle costs, if not all, were paid for through the spoils. Almost half the spoils [for a year-long operation in Yemen] came from hostages.”

The Nusra Front: In September 2014, al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate reportedly raked in $25 million in exchange for the release of 45 United Nations peacekeepers. Up until this point, the Nusra Front seems to have relied on a monthly stipend from ISIS and private donations to fund its operations. Since the 2014 split and ensuing rivalry between al-Qaeda and ISIS, however, it is unlikely that ISIS has continued its monetary generosity. It is also unclear as to what role hostage-taking plays in the Nusra Front’s broader financial strategy. The Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate has thus far managed to garner a significant amount of financial support from wealthy Gulf-based donors.

Al-Shabab: As of July 2014, al-Qaeda’s Somalian affiliate has extorted more than  $5 million through kidnappings. Although significant, al-Shabab’s kidnapping-and-ransom operations do not serve as the group’s primary source of income. Instead, al-Shabab seems to derive most of its funding from an illicit charcoal trade, which accounts for an estimated $35-50 million annually.

From the Sinai Peninsula to Libya, jihadist groups have pledged allegiance to ISIS. The self-proclaimed “Islamic State” is exploiting its brand name to build loyalty and lure recruits.
-------------------
ISIS the Brand
In an audio recording released in early November 2014, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi claimed that jihadi groups in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia had pledged allegiance to ISIS. Baghdadi urged these groups to wage jihad against their respective governments, and change their names to reflect devotion to ISIS. Earlier in the year, jihadi groups in the Philippines and Indonesia took similar action, swearing their loyalty to ISIS.  

According to Middle East expert Samer Shehata, smaller jihadi groups join ISIS for increased recognition and legitimacy. When these groups join ISIS, they go from being off-the-radar to enjoying the visibility of the ISIS brand name. In turn, ISIS expands its name, bolstering its notoriety and international influence. But money is thought to play the biggest role, with Baghdadi offering funding in exchange for pledges.

Money Talks
With its daily income estimated at upwards of $3 million, ISIS is believed to be the richest terrorist group in history. According to King Abdullah II of Jordan, ISIS fighters are paid approximately $1,000 per month, an amount equivalent to an upper-middle-class income in Jordan. Considering ISIS’s largesse, it’s no surprise that far-flung jihadi groups have flocked to Baghdadi’s “caliphate.”

Having deep pockets, (coupled with technological advancement) has allowed ISIS to try its hand at producing sophisticated, high production value videos in a brand-building effort. Whereas al-Qaeda filmed its fatwas in caves with a single camera and indifferent lighting, ISIS has taken self-promotion and jihadi recruitment methods to a new level. “Although the disbelievers dislike it,” an ISIS video released on November 16, is produced and edited to resemble a Hollywood action movie, albeit a gruesome one.

The slickness of ISIS’s propaganda is appealing to both international jihadist groups and individuals susceptible to radicalization. And ISIS surely knows its target audience, reinforcing its status with a steady outpouring of technologically advanced media, including a jihad-themed video game for children. Just as a profitable corporation uses its resources to build name recognition and increase market share, ISIS invests in controlling the narrative and building its brand to allure both organized groups and attract new recruits.  

[Screenshot taken from the slickly edited ISIS video, released on November 16, 2014]
http://www.iraqinews.com/features/urgent-video-peter-kassig-beheaded-isis-16-syrians/

In late October, ISIS fighters retreated from the Iraqi town of Jurf al-Sakher. According to Iraqi military sources, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) provided the Iraqi army with weapons and training in order to force ISIS’s retreat. The person reportedly guiding Iran’s intervention was Qasem Soleimani, a man praised by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as “a living martyr of the revolution.”

Soleimani heads the IRGC’s Quds Force, which carries out foreign operations on behalf of the Iranian government. Soleimani has been a major player in the region for years, even leading the insurgency against U.S. forces in Iraq. Because of his influence over Iraqi insurgents, Soleimani emerged as a powerbroker in Iraq. In March 2008, he reportedly helped negotiate an end to fighting between U.S.-backed Iraqi leaders and followers of radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr. That same year, he sent a message to then-commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus: “General Petraeus, you should know that I, Qasem Soleimani, control the policy for Iran with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza and Afghanistan.”

In Syria too, Soleimani has played the part of puppet master. In January 2012, Soleimani met with President Bashar al-Assad in Syria and pledged additional military aid against rebel forces. The following month, four Iranian jets carried munitions to Syria. In August 2012, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reportedly ordered the Quds Force to step up attacks against Western targets in retaliation for the U.S.-backing of moderate Syrian rebels. In mid-May through early June 2013, Soleimani coordinated a two-week offensive by Syrian forces, aided by Hezbollah, to retake the rebel-controlled city of Qusair, leaving more than 500 rebels dead and 1,000 wounded. Soleimani “is now running Syria. Bashar is just his mayor,” said one commander in the Free Syrian Army.

Iran’s top general is also personally overseeing the fight against ISIS, and in marked contrast to past behavior, has willingly posed for pictures with troops following successful battles. In June, Iran sent IRGC units to Iraq to fight ISIS while providing tons of military supplies and equipment to Iraqi forces and directing surveillance drones over Iraq. Soleimani reportedly went to Baghdad to oversee the operations. According to several reports, he played an advisory role in recent victories against ISIS in Samarra (June) and Amirli (August).  All this despite living under a U.N. travel ban that was imposed in 2007.

Clearly, Iran and the United States share an enemy in ISIS. As the old adage goes, “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” However, given Soleimani’s history of antagonism toward the West, in this instance, the enemy of our enemy is still our enemy.

In mid-December, at least 150 women and girls, some of them pregnant, were executed for refusing to marry or perform sexual acts for ISIS fighters. The women were systematically shot before being dumped into a mass grave in Fallujah, Iraq. According to regional Iraqi officials, a single ISIS militant, Abu Ana Al-Libi, was responsible for all the executions. Most of the 150 women and girls belonged to the Yazidi religious minority, which ISIS views as heretical.

This horrific incident comes nearly a month after ISIS’s Department of Research and Fatwas published a manual, “Questions and Answers on Taking Captives and Slaves.” The pamphlet was an apparent response to the many questions ISIS fighters posed on burning questions like whether it was OK to have sex with female captives, and the justification for buying, selling and beating these non-Muslim women. One representative section of the translated document reads:

“Question: Is it allowed to have intercourse with a female slave who has not reached puberty?”
“Answer: You may have intercourse with a female slave who hasn't reached puberty if she is fit for intercourse; however, if she is not fit for intercourse, it is enough to enjoy her without intercourse.”

[ISIS manual detailing permissible treatment of sex-slaves]

Personal accounts of slavery under ISIS, as told by women fortunate enough to have escaped, are disturbing. Hannan, a young Yazidi woman who escaped ISIS’s grasp, said ISIS militants denigrated the Yazidi religion. “They said: ‘Yazidis are infidels. Now you will live as Muslims.’ They took many girls for sex. They told us: ‘Forget the life you knew.’” Hannan recalled being sold at a slave market: “They were shooting to scare us. They took whomever they wanted, by force. We were crying the whole time. We wanted to kill ourselves but we couldn’t find a way.”

A report by Amnesty International (AI) tells of slave-girls so traumatized that they were driven to end their own lives. The girls feared rape, forced marriage or being traded amongst ISIS fighters. A Yazidi girl told AI, “[our master] said that either we marry him and his brother or he would sell us. At night we tried to strangle ourselves with our scarves. We tied the scarves around our necks and pulled away from each other as hard as we could, until I fainted.”

ISIS is holding 3,500 Yazidi women and girls captive. These figures, from late December, are based on Yazidi-kept records.

According to Middle East researcher Matthew Barber, ISIS has launched a “21st century slavery project.” In ISIS’s fourth issue of its English-language recruitment magazine Dabiq, the militant group brags about its Yazidi sex slaves, firmly justifying slavery under sharia (Islamic law). The magazine says: “One should remember that enslaving the families of the kuffar (nonbelievers) and taking their women as concubines is a firmly established aspect of the sharia that if one were to deny or mock, he would be denying or mocking the verses of the Quran and the narrations of the Prophet.”

More broadly, ISIS has an abysmal track record when it comes to its treatment of women. According to a U.N. report released in November 2014, women and girls living in ISIS-controlled areas of Syria and Iraq are essentially confined to their houses, “excised from public life.” A female is not permitted to leave the house without a mahram, or male guardian. ISIS’s all-female brigades, Al-Khansaa and Umm Al-Rayan, patrol the streets to enforce a strict Islamic dress code. ISIS dictates every aspect of women’s lives; what they wear, with whom they interact, and where and with whom they work. Indeed, every woman, even Sunni Muslim women, experience a certain type of slavery under ISIS rule.

To enforce its rules for female behavior, ISIS imposes harsh penalties on dissenters. In August, ISIS militants beheaded a female dentist in Syria for continuing to treat male patients. In September, a woman was arrested, detained, and put on trial in a self-proclaimed “sharia court” in Mosul for speaking out against ISIS and “abandoning Islam.” She was tortured and publicly executed.

According to AI, ISIS’s atrocities constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity. It is clear that the women and girls living under ISIS’s rule of terror, whether Sunni or non-Islamic Yazidis, require increased attention and international action.

As the forefather of modern jihadism, Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) profoundly influenced virtually every ‘Islamic’ extremist group operating today. According to the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, the diverse jihadist movement cites Qutb more frequently than any other modern author. Esteemed Egyptian political commentator Aly Salem writes, “It is not an exaggeration to say that Qutb is to Islamism what Karl Marx is to communism.”

So who is Sayyid Qutb? In one respect, he is one of the most provocative and controversial Islamic writers in history. Qutb is responsible for the concept of “new jahiliya,” the idea that the modern world exists in a deplorable state of barbaric ignorance akin to the pre-Islamic societies as described in the Qur’an. He is also responsible for theorizing the solution to jahiliya by introducing the concept of “offensive jihad,” as well as conveniently resurrecting the excommunication practice of takfir, in order to sanction the killing of uncooperative Muslims.

In The Looming Tower, Pulitzer Prize-winning author Lawrence Wright probes the human side of the contentious theologian. In it, Qutb is revealed as an “alone and unconsoled” middle-aged man whose “dearest relationship… was that with his mother, Fatima.” One failed relationship dissuades Qutb from ever marrying any of the “dishonorable” women he encounters, Wright concludes. Nonetheless, Qutb “still enjoyed women—he was close to his three sisters—but their sexuality threatened him.” Wright’s portrait reveals a man who was capable of memorizing the Qur’an by the age of 10, yet clearly struggled, especially with the corporeal aspects of relationships with women. On his 1948-1950 trip to America Qutb writes proudly of closing the door in the face of a woman who propositioned him, saying, “I heard her fall on the wooden floor outside and realized that she was drunk. I instantly thanked God for defeating my temptation and allowing me to stick to my morals.”

In describing the overarching torment he feels from American women, Qutb writes, “A girl looks at you, appearing as if she were an enchanting nymph or an escaped mermaid, but as she approaches, you sense only the screaming instinct inside her, and you can smell her burning body, not the scent of perfume but flesh, only flesh. Tasty flesh, truly, but flesh nonetheless.” Charming.

The arc of modern jihadist groups has today overshadowed their ideological origins from within the mind of Sayyid Qutb. The ability to recruit young people to violent  groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda today seems to rely less overtly on theological arguments championed by Qutb than on the ability to tweet pictures of violence and encourage people to “put the chicken wings down and come to jihad, bro.” In this culture, women and young girls are recruited under the banner of “sex jihad” or jihad al-niqah, and an implicit promise of a future filled with romance, adventure and violence.

However, anyone who seeks a true glimpse into the ascetic future that awaits them before they go ahead and drop the chicken wings need look no further than the bleak and repressed example of their ideological inspiration.