The families of American victims of Iranian-sponsored terrorism could soon see a small measure of justice in the form of financial compensation after many years of pursuing legal action against Iran. However, as surprising as it sounds, the last hurdle preventing the potential payout could be the U.S. Supreme Court.

Iran has been found liable for billions of dollars for sponsoring terrorist attacks that killed hundreds of Americans. In 1996, Stephen Flatow, father of terror victim Alisa Flatow, lobbied to change American law in order to allow U.S. citizens to sue foreign sponsors of terrorism. His legislative success sparked a succession of terrorism lawsuits, largely against Iran.

In 2001, a lawsuit was filed against Iran by families of some of the 241 servicemen killed in the 1983 Hezbollah bombing of the United States Marine barracks in Beirut. In 2003, a federal judge found Iran guilty of financing the attack and eventually awarded the families $2.65 billion in compensatory damages. Unfortunately, collecting has been a long and arduous process that has taken the plaintiffs through Congress and now the Supreme Court.

On one side are 1,300 victims of Iranian-sponsored terrorism, including representatives of 173 of the 241 victims killed in the 1983 Marine barracks attack. At stake is $1.75 billion in Iranian funds that were frozen in 2012. On the opposing side is the Bank of Iran, arguing the constitutionality of the distribution.

Specifically at issue in this Supreme Court case, Bank Markazi (Bank of Iran) v Deborah Peterson, argued on January 13, is whether Congress unconstitutionally overstepped its bounds in writing and passing the 2012 Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act.

The bill greatly strengthened U.S. economic sanctions against Iran in an effort to compel Tehran to abandon its illegal nuclear weapons programs, its support for global extremist groups, and other dangerous policies. It also specifically addressed the Marine barracks victims’ lawsuit, allowing U.S. courts to seize the frozen assets of Iran’s central bank, Bank Markazi, to pay down the debt to the victims.  Lower courts have upheld the constitutionality of the 2012 law, but lawyers for the Bank of Iran argued that the law effectively directs a particular result in a single pending legal case and Congress therefore violated the Constitution by encroaching on the role of the federal judiciary.

The Supreme Court is not hearing arguments about Iran’s guilt. It will rule before the end of its term in June solely on whether Congress overstepped its authority in writing the 2012 law. A win for the victims would result in $1.75 billion being divided among the families. A win for the bank would make it more difficult, but not quite impossible, for those same American victims to collect damages.

The families of those killed by Iranian sponsored terrorism have waited a long time for justice. No amount of financial compensation can return what Iran took from them, but it does exact some form of punishment on Iran for its actions. Further, an Iranian acknowledgement of its guilt—even if forced—would shine a spotlight on Iran’s continued support for global terrorism.

Seven law professors specializing in national security issues filed a brief in support of the plaintiffs. The victims of the Beirut barracks and other Iranian horrors have also received support from the

Obama administration and both parties in Congress in their search for justice. Still, the Supreme Court will have the final say in this case based not on the certainty of Iran’s lawless behavior, but on a rather narrow constitutional question.

Welcome to the View from Brussels, a perspective from the de facto capital of Europe on the state of counterterrorism, extremism, and radicalisation throughout the European Union.

On December 15, the European Commission unveiled plans for a single, EU-wide Border and Coast Guard. The Commission’s proposal comes in response to the roughly 1.5 million refugees who crossed into the European Union “illegally” in 2015, an extraordinary migration not seen at such a scale since the end of World War II.

While the proposed plan would dramatically enhance border control capabilities, the proposal has been called into question for potentially violating the sovereignty of Member States.

The European Union Border and Coast Guard would replace the current EU border force, Frontex, which has been overwhelmed by the refugee crisis due to exceedingly limited financial resources, capacity, and authority. A strengthened and unified border control agency would help EU Member States cope with the ongoing refugee crisis and better protect Europe’s citizenry, particularly in light of the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and the rise of far-right, anti-immigrant political parties in parts of Europe.

The proposed European Border and Coast Guard package includes:

• A reserve pool of border guards and technical equipment that would be available at the disposal of the EU Border and Coast Guard for increasing rapid response capabilities;
• A larger role for the agency in returning illegal migrants, which would include escorts, monitors, and return specialists;
• Enhanced coordination with non-EU countries to better secure Europe’s external borders;
• An enhanced focus on internal security within Europe, including cross-border crime and terrorism risk analysis; and
• The “right to intervene” in EU Member States when deficiencies along external borders are identified.

The proposal notably calls for the creation of a rapid response force of at least 1,500 guards that could be deployed with three days’ notice, and enhanced technical and operational cooperation at all levels of a common EU border force. The rapid response agency’s budget would also be expanded to nearly double that of Frontex—from €143 million to roughly €280 million a year by 2017.

The proposal is monumental for the EU Union because of the inclusion of the “right to intervene.” This gives the multinational force the authority to deploy to any EU Member State without the consent of that country—a dramatic shift on the issue of national sovereignty within the EU.

EU leaders agreed to expedite consideration of the European border guard proposal. On 18 February during the EU Summit, the European Council concluded that “as far as the ‘European Border and Coast Guard’ proposal is concerned, work should be accelerated with a view to reaching a political agreement under the Netherlands Presidency [June 2016] and to make the new system operational as soon as possible.”

However, the notion of a single EU force that can intervene in any EU Member State without the consent of that country is likely to face a lengthy and uphill battle. Nonetheless, the refugee crisis shows no signs of slowing, and there remains ever increasing security concerns throughout Europe. EU nations will have much to consider.

More information on the proposed European Border and Coast Guard is available here.

ISIS shootings, suicide bombings, and mass beheadings are documented on a daily basis. However troubling these frequent reports may be, the broader picture is even more frightening; the terror group has amassed far more firepower than explosives and guns. Multiple authoritative reports describe an ISIS arsenal complete with chemical weapons, scud missiles, American tanks, and anti-aircraft missiles.

It’s not surprising that an opportunistic killing machine like ISIS has stockpiled a multitude of weapons in an area that has seen decades of war. As the terror group has seized territory in Iraq and Syria and defeated local security forces, it has grabbed American, Chinese, and Soviet-style weaponry, including arms dating back to the 1970s and newer American M-16 rifles. Especially after conquering Mosul, Iraq, ISIS fighters inherited a wide array of modern internationally manufactured weapons. Reportedly, these include American Humvees, artillery pieces, tanks, and even black hawk helicopters. 

Beyond battlefield weaponry, ISIS has begun to experiment with more unconventional warfare, with the aim of launching attacks against civilians in Western cities.

In early January, Sky News obtained eight hours of video smuggled out of Raqqa, Syria, by an ISIS defector. The video—meant to instruct ISIS sympathizers in Europe and elsewhere—details how to build a driverless car equipped with a bomb, assemble various types of explosives, and repurpose anti-aircraft missiles. The self-driving car would contain a mannequin fitted with a thermal suit to outwit car bomb security scanners—regularly deployed in Western countries near government and military buildings—into registering that there is a driver inside.

The video was filmed in ISIS’s new “research center” in Raqqa, where engineers have been plotting to export the group’s violence to the West. Many of these engineers are Western foreign fighters who provide ISIS with valuable technical and scientific skills.

What may be a sober consideration for Western defense agencies are reportedly thousands of anti-aircraft missiles recommissioned by the research center. The terror group was rumored to have non-operational anti-aircraft missiles in the past, but it is now believed ISIS has discovered a way to make them functional again by maintaining their thermal batteries. This development could potentially change the battlefield calculations of future confrontations with the Islamist terror group.

The discovery of the video from Raqqa’s research center follows a December 2015 briefing from the European parliament on ISIS’s alleged attainment of non-conventional weapons. While the memo pointed out that ISIS has thus far utilized car bombs, suicide belts, and automatic weapons, it warned that EU states should prepare for the “genuine risk” of ISIS using chemical or biological weapons against targets in the EU.

Authorities have long posited the use of chemical weapons by ISIS. Reports from Iraq and Syria have detailed the treatment of patients with burns associated with mustard gas and neurotoxic acids. Former FBI agent Timothy Gil Sr. told Fox News in January that he believed ISIS operatives had experimented with chemical weapons inside Iraq and Syria with the intent to share their expertise—over social media—with potential lone wolf attackers in the West. Earlier this month, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons confirmed that mustard gas had been used against Kurdish fighters last August, with an American diplomat alleging that ISIS was behind the attack.

Since the November 2015 Paris attacks, ISIS propaganda videos have repeatedly warned about an imminent attack on a major European city. While the group’s recent attacks in Paris, Beirut, and Ankara have depended on explosives and Kalashnikovs, it’s clear that ISIS has the intent—and perhaps now the capability—to stage an attack using deadlier weaponry.

While ISIS’s continued barbarism is revolting, its ambition and technical capabilities give it an even greater potential to spread death and suffering. There is certainty that the group has every intention to continue its reign of terror in its self-styled provinces, as well as in the EU, and in America. It would be dangerous for public officials and civilians alike to fail to appreciate the group’s true military aspirations.

Families faced with the horror of losing a loved one to the lure of ISIS  propaganda have often chosen collective action in the hopes of  stopping radicalization and emigration to ISIS controlled areas. But other families have chosen to wage their battle privately, taking action to halt the radicalization of their sons and daughters into their own hands.          

While foreign fighters have flocked to fight in Syria since the opening clashes of the civil war in 2011, it has been only fairly recently that ISIS has clamped down on their ability to leave the self-declared caliphate. As the coalition air campaign intensified in the fall of 2015 and efforts by ISIS to seize Kobane failed, the first reports of executions of fleeing foreign fighters began to emerge. Now radical groups, particularly ISIS, have turned their security apparatus against their own foot soldiers, erecting a sprawling network of checkpoints and informants to halt the outflow and carrying out grisly executions of those caught. Naturally, families and friends of potential fighters increasingly see a trip to Syria to fight as a near certain death sentence and have consequently mounted desperate attempts to keep their loved ones at home and away from the fighting.

Some families have taken an active role in physically preventing their relatives from traveling to Syria. Jamshed Javeed, a high school chemistry teacher of Pakistani descent living in the U.K., came to the attention of authorities when friends became concerned about his sudden radicalization. When Javeed revealed intentions to travel to Syria, his parents hid his equipment for fighting in Syria and passport, forcing Javeed to postpone his trip. When Javeed remained resolute in his plan to travel to Syria, his family confronted him and recorded their subsequent 25 minute argument, which was later used as evidence in court. They then reported him to anti-terror police who arrested him three days later at the airport. Outside of the western world, in September 2015 in Riyadh, a father reported his two sons, aged 19 and 21, to security forces when he discovered they were planning terrorist attacks on behalf of ISIS.

To facilitate communication between families and authorities, the government of Australia, at an October 2015 extremism summit, discussed the formation of a "family hotline" where family members could report radicalized young people outside of the existing national security apparatus.       

Other families have been forced to take more extreme action. In May 2014, the mother of Zakariya Ashiq, a then 20 year old British man who was trying to enter ISIS controlled territory, intercepted her son in Turkey and seized his money, debit card and passport, forcing him to return to the U.K.

Increasingly, families have also used the media to appeal to their relatives to return home. In one high profile case, Akhtar Iqbal and Mohammad Shoaib held a televised press conference begging their wives and children to return home from Syria. The men are the husbands of two of three British sisters, Khadija Dawood, Sugra Dawood, and Zohra Dawood, who immigrated to ISIS controlled territory with their nine children in June 2015. After a pilgrimage to Mecca, the group of 12 disappeared, secretly traveling to Syria via Turkey. Similarly, family members of three teenage British girls, who traveled from the U.K. to Syria in February 2015, made televised, emotional pleas for the girls to return home. None of the families, however, was successful.

Still others have come to regret their decision to contact authorities. After British man Yusuf Sarwar left his parents a note stating he had traveled to Syria to fight with al-Qaeda affiliated group Jabhat al-Nusra, his mother reported him missing to the police. When he later returned home, Sarwar was sentenced to more than 12 years in jail. Sarwar’s mother was appalled by the verdict, stating: “As soon as I found out about the letter I went to the police and co-operated but the police have betrayed me and misused me...If I had known they would put my son behind bars I would not have told them about the letter.” She urged legal reform, arguing that, in the future, the parents of other Jihadists wouldn’t come forward knowing their children would be jailed for significant periods of time.

The “mastermind” of the November 13 Paris attacks, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, was radicalized in a Belgian prison while serving time for theft. Charlie Hebdo and kosher supermarket shooters Amedy Coulibaly and Cherif Kouachi also spent time in jail, meeting in a French prison in 2005, where they were radicalized to violent Islamism by a fellow inmate.

The threat of prison radicalization—especially severe in France and Belgium—may feel remote to Americans, but it shouldn’t. During the past two years, dozens of homegrown jihadists have begun to trickle into our prisons, convicted of providing material support to ISIS and other extremist groups. As the Obama administration promotes criminal justice reform and outlines initiatives, we’d do well to include counter-extremism programs in any prison reform package. It would be money well spent.

While Europe’s prison radicalization problem is well known, the potential for radicalization in the U.S. has not always been appreciated, except by extremists. In the past, al-Qaeda manuals have specifically identified American inmates as targets for conversion, pointing to their existing disillusionment with U.S. policies. Today, at least seven Americans convicted on ISIS-related offences had already served time in U.S. prisons, often on unrelated charges like drug possession.  While in prison, terror convicts—like attempted al-Shabab fighter Zachary Chesser—have managed to engage in unauthorized meet-ups with other convicted terrorists, raising the fear that radicalization may already be taking root.

As a result of recidivism and jihadist attacks, some countries, like France and Belgium, have awoken to the perpetuation of terror through prison radicalization. These governments have begun to isolate dangerous jihadists from the larger prison population, and are now hiring expert Muslim staff in an attempt to reeducate radicalized inmates. In Saudi Arabia, a major de-radicalization program—boasting a 90% success rate—consists of intense religious debate and psychological counseling within prisons. While these programs lack robust longitudinal data, they mark crucial first steps in tackling a dangerous pattern worldwide.

Unfortunately, the U.S. has yet to implement any de-radicalization programs in its own prison system, although there have been some U.S. efforts to explore de-radicalization in detention centers in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Minnesota recently, one judge experimented with a de-radicalization program for an ISIS-inspired teen, but the program came to an abrupt end in April after a box-cutter was discovered under his bed. There are no known plans to expand or replicate the experiment.

Despite the disappointment of the Minnesota intervention experiment, we cannot afford to give up on de-radicalization. We need a tailed approach for prisons designed to both rehabilitate those who enter the prison system already radicalized, as well as to prevent indoctrination of the larger prison population. De-radicalization programs must be subject to detailed examination and rigorous, independent evaluation. But nascent American programs can draw from the seemingly successful characteristics of existing programs worldwide: pro-social and pro-Western education, vocational training, family engagement, and an emphasis on individualized attention.

Fortunately, some of the prison reforms President Obama promoted in July—reduced overcrowding, a crackdown on gang activity, and vocational training—may have the corollary benefit of reducing the threat from emerging jihadist networks. It’s a first step, but more is needed. By addressing this threat now, we can prevent U.S. correctional facilities from becoming factories for jihadism.