The belief that the Iraq war was a monumental blunder is now widely held. In the public mind, the decision to dethrone Saddam Hussein has also become a ready explanation for nearly every ill to befall the world since. The latest baleful effect attributed to regime change in Baghdad is the ascent of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). No less a figure than President Obama lists ISIS as one of the "unintended consequences" of the Iraq war, which evidently imparts the lesson that the U.S. should "aim before we shoot."

A critical observer might note that this argument suffers from one conspicuous drawback: the roots of ISIS lay not only in Iraq, where America intervened, but also in Syria, where it did not.

This is not the place for an exhaustive recapitulation of ISIS’s evolution, but a brief sketch will show that it rose first in post-Saddam Iraq, and was defeated there, before it was resurrected in the present chaos of Iraq and Syria.

After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Osama bin Laden established al-Qaeda in Iraq and designated Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to be its "emir." Zarqawi proceeded to drench Iraq in blood - Iraqi blood - in the hopes of sparking a sectarian war between Sunni and Shia. This grisly strategy put Iraqi society on a knife's-edge, but it also opened an ideological fissure between bin Laden and Zarqawi that would eventually lead jihadists associated with the latter - who was eliminated by a U.S. airstrike in June 2006 - to form ISIS.

Before long, the U.S. effort in Iraq was salvaged by a combination of counterinsurgency strategy (the "surge") and the Anbar Awakening. Zarqawi's force was overwhelmed, dispossessed of tribal support in the Sunni hinterland and decisively routed on the battlefield. Although Zarqawi's scheme to restore a lost Islamic empire lay dormant, it did not become extinct. In 2011, two events conspired to give it a new lease on life.

The first came in March, when democratic demonstrations broke out on the streets of Damascus. The peaceful protests were ruthlessly crushed by Syria's calcified dictatorship, which ignited an armed rebellion. In response, the Assad regime pulverized entire neighborhoods by bullet, bomb and gas. The decision in Western capitals to withhold military aid from secular and nationalist factions of the Syrian revolt allowed jihadist bands - who were blessed with less diffident foreign allies - to become the most lethal contingent of the opposition.

The second event that led to ISIS's resurgence came in December 2011, when Iraq's Sunni "Awakening" unraveled thanks to a lethal mixture of American and Iraqi mistakes. America's indifference to Iraq's fate led to a categorical troop withdrawal that exacerbated Prime Minister Maliki's sectarian instincts. He not only demobilized and harassed the Sons of Iraq that had vanquished al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), but also labored to turn the Iraqi army into a gigantic Shia militia. Once more, the conditions were set for Sunni power to respond, this time in the form of jihadist violence.

In the midst of one-dimensional debates over post-Iraq U.S. foreign policy, what is lost is the brutal fact that inaction is a policy with unintended consequences of its own.

The February beheading of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians by ISIS-alligned extremists in Libya grabbed international headlines, as did the reality that ISIS’s influence had spread far beyond Syria and Iraq.

Since the beginning of 2015, forces loyal to ISIS have attacked a Tripoli hotel, killing nine people, including an American contractor.  In February, gunmen attacked a French-Libyan oil field, killing nine guards. While seemingly growing bolder, the presence of Islamic extremists in Libya is hardly new. Islamist activity has been steadily growing there in the wake of Muammar Gaddafi’s 2011 ouster.

In the spring of 2014, approximately 300 Libyan militants fighting with ISIS in Syria and Iraq returned to Darna, a port city in Eastern Libya. There, they united many of the city’s extremist Islamist factions and founded the Islamic Youth Shura Council. The council pledged allegiance to ISIS on June 22, 2014, renaming Darna as Wilayah Barqa (province of eastern Libya), to rebrand the city as a province of the larger ‘caliphate.’ In November 2014, ISIS ‘caliph’ Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi officially announced the expansion of ISIS into Libya, as well as other African and Middle Eastern nations. Libyan ISIS militant Abu al-Baraa el-Azdi was appointed Darna’s ‘emir.’

Returning Libyan fighters recognized the strategic importance of capturing Libya for ISIS. According to an ISIS document recovered in February 2015, ISIS sees Libya as a “strategic gateway for the Islamic State” and once conquered, plans to use Libya as a base for launching attacks on “Egypt, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Algeria, and Tunisia,” as well as “the southern Crusader states, which can be reached with ease by even a rudimentary boat.”

Further complicating the situation on the ground, part of Libya’s powerful Islamist movement Ansar al-Sharia Libya (ASL) has pledged allegiance to ISIS, while another part of ASL rejected ISIS, as did the al-Qaeda affiliated Martyrs of Abu Salem Brigade. Clashes among the rivals are ongoing. Amidst this discord, ISIS has tightened its grip on Libya’s northeast, securing a presence in the cities of Sirte, Nofilia, and Benghazi, in addition to Darna. Its ambitions in the region are aided by the fact that Libyans represent the second largest number of foreign fighters in ISIS’s core ranks after Saudi Arabia.

Some of the Islamists’ power is the natural outgrowth of the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime, under which Islamists were heavily suppressed. After his ouster, Islamist factions proliferated in the power vacuum.  Without any central authority as a counterweight, and with economic conditions weakened, extremist ideology spread quickly. Islamists have been further aided by the vast weaponry left over from Gaddafi’s many years in power. Several years after Gaddafi, Libya’s political landscape remains fragmented, as symbolized by two warring governments: an internationally recognized government based in the eastern city of Tobruk and an Islamist government based in Tripoli.

Currently, rival factions in Libya fall into three main power blocks:

• Libya Dawn: Controls northwest Libya, including the capital, Tripoli. Composed of Islamist and non-Islamist militias allied with the illegitimate Tripoli government.
• Operation Dignity: Controls most of eastern Libya, capital of Tobruk. Composed of the internationally backed government and an army  led by General Khalifa Haftar.
• Islamist jihadist groups: Includes ISIS, part of Ansar al-Sharia, al-Qaeda, and other factions.

The video of the beheading of the Egyptian Coptic Christians was one of ISIS’s strategies to strengthen the legitimacy of its Darna ‘province.’ According to ISIS expert Cole Bunzel, "A bloody, provocative video in Libya shows the world that it's serious about its gambit here. [ISIS] wants these 'provinces' to be seen as full-fledged members of the 'caliphate' with its base in Iraq and Syria."

The world can hope that the brutality seen in the execution of Coptic Christians is never repeated.  However, until there is a legitimate government in Libya that has the power to restore order and stability, the fierce competition among armed groups makes it almost inevitable.   

In February, Bengali-American blogger, Avijit Roy, was hacked to death and his wife was injured during a visit to a literary fair in Bangladesh. Roy had raised the ire of Islamists for his Bill Maher-esque anti-religious writings on his website, Mukto Mona, which means free mind.

Extremists in Bangladesh, according to CNN, resented Roy’s criticism of religion and threatened to kill him if he came home from the United States to visit. Despite the arrest of Farabi Shafiur Rahman, who has previously been jailed for his ties to the international Islamist group Hizbut Tahrir, the group Ansar Bangla-7, took credit for Roy’s murder soon after the incident by allegedly tweeting, “Target down in Bangladesh.”

Apparently, free speech is a threat to Islamists in Bangladesh. In the absence of blasphemy laws, Islamists have no avenue to censor criticism of their platform legally.  Resorting to direct violence will result in political parties being shut down.  As a result, it is alleged that Islamist parties are greenlighting attacks against critics by militant groups in the country, of which Ansar Bangla-7 is simply one. Besides Roy, this has resulted in the murder of Ahmed Rajib Haider in 2013, and more recently, Washiqur Rahman as well.

The recent spate of violence against bloggers is not new.  Humayun Azad, survived an attack more than 10 years ago - on February 27, 2004 – only to succumb to his injuries a few months later in Germany.

Governmental flip-flopping has contributed to the rising confidence of pro-Islamist militants in Bangladesh. In 2013, four secular bloggers were arrested for “hurting the religious sentiments” of the country’s Muslims on the heels of blogger Ahmed Rajib Haider’s murder.  The arrests were followed days later by an Islamist rally demanding blasphemy laws in the country.

Yet, months later, seven leaders of one of the country’s largest Islamist parties, the Jamaat-i-Islami, were tried for war crimes committed during the country’s fight for independence from Pakistan in 1971. The trials concluded with multiple convictions, including that of Jamaat party leader Abdul Quader Mollah. Mollah was given a life sentence until the public demanded not only death, but a complete ban of the Jamaat-i-Islami party during a peaceful month-long rally now referred to as the Shahbag Awakening.

Despite criticism that the war crime trials were an opportunistic pre-election ploy by the secular Sheikh Hasina government to remain in power, it is possible that the government was afraid to make a direct statement supporting the free speech rights of secular bloggers over the Islamist push for a blasphemy law. As a result, the war crimes trials may have been an attempt to de-legitimize the Islamist party indirectly.

This raises the fundamental issue of free speech against a backdrop of rising Islamism globally; and more specifically, the debate over how to defend free speech not only in Muslim-majority countries like Bangladesh, but wherever Islamists have attacked critics of political Islam, like France and the U.K.

Bangladesh, for one, must set a standard for acceptable behavior by its citizens by enforcing free speech rights directly. More importantly, the government has a duty to foster a society where one does not feel his or her faith is threatened simply if another does not agree with a particular aspect of it. Otherwise, Islamists will continue to control the narrative.

Islamists are globally politicizing Muslim identity under one narrow and fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. They have global support through a variety of networks that provide the means to indoctrinate others, money, and arms. Apolitical Muslims, progressive Muslims, minorities and human rights activists of all shades, on the other hand, remain disconnected, and by believing in democracy, cannot resort to vigilantism – they must rely on the rule of law for protection and support.

Countering extremism requires strict law enforcement as a first step. More importantly, truly countering extremism requires inculcating values such as tolerance in societies where accusations of “hurt feelings” abound, and governments that do not appease the “victim” because it fears the possibility of violence.

On January 7, 2015, France suffered the worst terrorist attack on its soil in over 50 years when gunmen Said and Cherif Kouachi barged into the Paris offices of satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, slaughtering 12. Over the next two days, another Islamic extremist, Amedy Coulibaly, killed a French policewoman as well as four hostages at a kosher supermarket in Paris.

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, France appeared unified in its shock and grief. On January 10, 2015, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls declared war “against terrorism, against jihadism, against radical Islam, against everything that is aimed at breaking fraternity, freedom, solidarity.” The next day, at least 3.7 million people marched in anti-terrorism rallies in Paris and elsewhere in France.

The government’s reaction to the attacks was swift. France mobilized troops and deployed upwards of 10,000 security personnel to protect 830 “sensitive sites,” including synagogues, airports, railway stations and major tourist attractions. Nearly half of the security officers were sent to protect Jewish schools. Some mosques have also been given equipped with extra security after more than 100 ‘reprisal’ attacks' that targeted Muslim sites. 

In the weeks and months since the attacks, France has maintained this high alert level. After a February 3, 2015 attack at a Jewish school in Nice left three soldiers wounded, the government decided to extend the alert level until at least April 10. Under this alert, the government will continue to deploy its more than 10,000 soldiers to sensitive sites throughout the country.

On January 21, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls paved a picture of what France’s domestic ‘war’ would look like. The Prime Minister announced new resources for France’s counterterrorism apparatus, and policy reforms that touch on a wide array of French institutions, including its school and prison systems.

The government also cracked down on suspected foreign fighters, barring a number of suspected jihadists from leaving the country for Syria. France has also arrested at least eight suspected jihadists since the January attacks and arrested at least 54 citizens for engaging in hate speech or supporting terrorism. One of the men convicted and sentenced was Dieudonne M'bala M'bala, a popular and notoriously anti-Semitic French comedian known for inventing a reverse Nazi salute. As authorized by an anti-terror law passed in the fall of 2014, France also began to implement censorship rules that allow the government to shut down websites promoting terrorism.

In the weeks following the January attacks, the French government also launched its “Stop-Djihadisme” (Stop Jihadism) campaign. Through a variety of resources and outreach tools, the campaign aims to empower citizens to identify and prevent violent jihadism in their own communities.

Meanwhile, in the wake of the January attacks, some French Muslims report feeling targeted and resentful of what they consider nationally-sanctioned suspicion. In France’s overcrowded and heavily Muslim-populated prisons, ongoing experiments to prevent radicalization by partially segregating dangerous Islamists do not necessarily promise success and may even serve to bolster and create new jihadist networks.

France post-Charlie Hebdo is at once a proud and highly suspicious country. It barrels down a road hastily paved and defined by what it refuses to accept: jihadism, Islamism and terrorism. Today, it remains unclear whether such a road can prove robust. In seeking a route around the country’s embedded and festering radicalization, France’s reaction to its internal threats could prove fruitful or short-sighted.  Only time will tell.

Recent worldwide attention has focused on France’s domestic counter-extremism efforts. But the country has also been very active in the global fight against extremism, particularly in Africa.

Africa’s Sahel region includes Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM), Ansar-Dine, and other jihadist groups operating there have been engaged in terrorist attacks, kidnappings, drug smuggling, and human trafficking. These groups were key in igniting the 2012 Malian civil war.

The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) led a campaign for independence beginning in January 2012. Ansar-Dine and other Islamist groups capitalized on the fighting, capturing swaths of territory and instituting sharia (Islamic law). In response to a Malian government request for foreign assistance, French forces launched Operation Serval in January 2013. 

From January 2013 to July 2014, France targeted Islamist extremists in Mali in a series of airstrikes in response to AQIM attacks. Mali is a former French colony.

At the conclusion of Operation Serval, France launched an anti-Islamist force in northern Africa in August called Operation Barkhane. Named after a crescent-shaped sand dune in the Sahara, the mission’s main objective is counter-terrorism, according to the French government. The force is made up of about 3,000 French troops working alongside soldiers from Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and Chad. France is also contributing fighter jets, helicopters, and drones.

Based in the Chadian capital N’Djamena, Operation Barkhane has the authority to cross borders as it targets Islamist extremism in Mali, Chad, and Niger. It will also create regional military bases in northern Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

In November 2014, French forces killed 24 extremists in northern Mali. The operation, in Mali’s Kidal region also resulted in the seizure of weapons, the destruction of a number of vehicles, and the capture of two extremists. In late December, French troops killed Ahmed al-Tilemsi, a senior leader of al-Qaeda splinter group al-Mourabitoun. In January, French Barkhane forces provided reinforcements after AQIM attacked a Malian army base. Eight Malian troops and 10 militants died in the raid.

Since 2014, French forces have killed or captured over 200 jihadists in the Sahel region. At least 50 have been killed since the start of Operation Barkhane, which has no announced completion date.

CEP has reviewed the details of dozens of cases involving Western foreign fighters and jihadist brides who in some way were radicalized and became involved in the conflict in Iraq and Syria. Given the similarity of the end result, you would suspect that some characteristic, some common trait, would be present in, if not all, then the majority of these cases. Yet, that does not appear to be true and no single profile appears to emerge.

What does materialize is instead something closer to a kaleidoscope, with glimmers of trends (or at least a few strange similarities) that seem to fade and then sometimes reappear across cases. No single characteristic unites the set of these Western Islamist conscripts, but these tidbits of recurring ‘trends’ do spark questions for further research. They may also help us think of possible parameters when considering how we can hope to prevent such future radicalization of our youth.

In one example of a strange recurrence, media reports reveal that Western foreign fighters Mohammed Ali Baryalei (Australia), Khaled Sharrouf (Australia), and John Maguire (Canada) all suffered childhood abuse at the hands of their fathers. Is this a noteworthy possible characteristic? Is childhood abuse – an at-risk factor for future gang violence – also a possible indicator for potential radicalization? And would addressing issues of childhood abuse therefore help prevent radicalization?

Similar questions arise when one notices that among Western foreign fighters throughout the world, a history of juvenile delinquency, prison time, and mental illness (particularly schizophrenia and extreme paranoia) repeatedly pop up. Would addressing these mental health issues through prevention programs also diminish the number of potential Western foreign fighters?

That too may be a promising research avenue to explore.  What is certain so far, however, is that it is too early to tell. 

As CEP has noted, geography, socio-economic factors and family dynamics are not yet predictive in terms of who will emerge as a future jihadist. We do know that most Western foreign fighters have thus far been predominantly Muslim, young and male. Even then, however, prevention programs targeting specifically this demographic would appear to exclude a significant number of potential cases.

For example, the effort by Muslim communities themselves to establish prevention programs may be invaluable to addressing the phenomenon of foreign fighters as a whole. But these programs, primarily focused on Muslim-born youth, do not necessarily address the significant percentage of Western foreign fighters who convert to Islam during their teenage years and beyond. These community-based programs also may not address future foreign fighters who have been documented as not being particularly active within their Muslim communities.

This is not to say that such prevention programs should be instead focused on an older crowd. Studies show that community-based gang prevention programs are most effective when addressing at-risk individuals as early as possible. And given the surprising number of teenage Western foreign fighters, the need to address this issue early may be similarly worthwhile. However, relying solely on programs aimed at young Muslim men does seem to by definition miss older converts to Islam and the Western foreign fighters who were neither religious nor particularly active within their communities. While they are likely very helpful, these programs cannot be expected to prevent all cases of Westerners seeking to become jihadists.

Media profiles of Western foreign fighters can therefore be disillusioning for anyone expecting them to reveal a personality type or a group of conclusive, predictive characteristics. As neat and as useful it would be to have a reliable profile of a Western foreign fighter, that profile continues to remain elusive.

However, the failure of researchers to accurately predict the personality characteristics and circumstances that will eventually transform someone into a radical Islamist willing to die for his or her cause is not a dead-end but a unique opportunity. Research and resources must be expanded so more can be learned and prevention programs can be better refined to protect a seemingly large and vulnerable sector of our society.