Freedom of speech and freedom of religion are key rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Unfortunately, there are some in our country who have used the Constitution as an enabling device to further their advocacy of violent ideologies and actions.

Anwar al-Awlaki was born in New Mexico, attended Colorado State University, and worked at mosques in San Diego and Virginia. He was also a jihadist propagandist and, according to the United States government, a “key leader” of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Al-Awlaki died in a 2011 U.S. drone strike in Yemen. But before he moved to Yemen in 2004, al-Awlaki preached at U.S. mosques, where he also reportedly met with future 9/11 hijackers. He also directly influenced many other extremists. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted but failed to blow up an airplane with explosives hidden in his underwear, allegedly received direct instructions from al-Awlaki. Nidal Hasan, who shot and killed 13 people in his 2009 attack at Fort Hood, called al-Awlaki a teacher and a friend. Faisal Shahzad, the failed Times Square bomber, also claimed to be under al-Awlaki’s influence.

Al-Awlaki may be gone, but other Islamist propagandists are following in his footsteps. Ahmad Musa Jibril is an American Islamist preacher who may well become the inheritor of al-Awlaki’s mantle. From his home in Dearborn, Michigan, Jibril has produced Internet lectures advocating an extremist Salafist version of Islam. His YouTube sermons have praised Syrian fighters as “real men,” while his tweets are filled with anti-West invective, such as this January 2014 post.

Jibril differs slightly from al-Awlaki in style. He does not specifically advocate violence, but he praises Islamist ideals and thereby inspires his followers to violent jihad. The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) dubbed Jibril part of “a new set of spiritual authorities” influencing Westerners to become foreign fighters in the Syrian conflict. Sixty percent of foreign fighters in Syria follow Jibril on Twitter, according to an April 2014 ICSR report. Jibril “bridges the gap” for Westerners who may not understand Arabic, said the ICSR's Shiraz Maher. Jibril “provides the political and theological justification” and “comfort” to jihadists, said ICSR director Peter Neumann.

While al-Awlaki eventually moved to Yemen, Jibril appears content to continue living in Michigan. Jibril’s Facebook and Twitter accounts have not been updated in more than a year, attributable to June 2014 court-ordered restrictions following violations of his probation from a  2005 fraud conviction for which he spent seven years in prison. Federal Judge Gerald Rosen reportedly restricted Jibril’s social-media access to ensure he does not influence others.

The accounts may be inactive, but they continue to influence foreign fighters. In June, for example, three British women—Sugra Dawood, Zohra Dawood, and Khadija Dawood—flew to Turkey with their combined nine children in order to cross into Syria. One of Sugra Dawood’s children, 14-year-old Ibrahim Iqbal, reportedly “liked” Jibril’s Facebook page.

Jibril has yet to return to his digital pulpit since the court-ordered restrictions expired in March, but his audience continues to grow. His Facebook page has more than 240,000 likes, up from about 217,000 in July 2014. His YouTube page has more than 9,500 subscribers, and his Twitter account has more than 28,000 followers.

Al-Awlaki made the leap from rhetorical to physical support for AQAP, while Jibril remains an ideological supporter of general jihadism rather than a specific group. Still, the similarities between them are clear, as illustrated below.

Al-Awlaki eventually wore his militancy on his sleeve, making it easier for U.S. authorities to label, track, and eventually kill him. Islamists like Jibril—who just avoid crossing the line from repugnant-yet-protected speech into explicitly violent rhetoric—are harder to stop.

For more than a decade now, a debate has raged over whether Pakistan is an ally or a foe in the battle against violent extremism. In Western media, analysis usually focuses on Pakistan’s weak civil central government, the virulently anti-Indian military or conspiracy theories about the country’s intelligence arm – the ISI.

If the conversation is limited to these three factors – then you are left to conclude that Pakistan is incapable or unwilling to address extremism. Yet, if one looks past the government and takes a closer look at what the people of Pakistan are doing, a more complex picture emerges. The truth is, a growing number of Pakistanis are initiating grassroots change, especially by pushing counter-narratives to radicalism through public education programs and campaigns throughout the country.

It is easy to see why many people concluded that waiting for the government to act was pointless. As Pakistan’s Express Tribune reports, “The 2006 Madrassa Reform Project [in Pakistan] aimed to reform 8,000 schools by integrating a balance between formal and religious education and expanding curricula to include the teaching of social and hard sciences, religious tolerance, and human rights. Only 6.3 percent of the targeted madrassas were reached. In 2008, the education ministry reported it had only spent $4 million of the allotted $100 million for madrassa reform over the past six years.”

Also, in 2013, the former Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan emphasized the need to correct the Islamized education system to combat indoctrination. Yet, there has been no change due to alleged budgetary constraints.

Into this void have flooded regular Pakistanis. Organizations such as Khudi host a variety of programs, seminars and conferences to raise awareness of issues related to human rights, including respect for tolerance in society. The group also publishes an inter-university magazine to increase communication between Pakistani youth throughout the country’s provinces. The magazine provides an opportunity for students who typically identify ethnically, linguistically and parochially with their unique communities, to get to know students of other provinces. One goal of such interraction is a reduction in sectarian violence in Pakistan, which has increased significantly in the last decade.

Other identified CSO activity by The World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE) includes the National Rural Support Programme, which improves the communication skills of local communities, so they may better identify and combat issues of extremism at a local level.

A WORDE report, “Pakistan’s Civil Society: Alternative Channels to Countering Violent Extremism,” highlights the activities of religious leaders and organizations that have played a critical role in reducing extremism in Pakistan. Imam, Dr. Tahir ul-Qadri, authored a 600-page fatwa rejecting terrorism and suicide bombing. An organization in Lahore called the Minhaj-ul-Quran encourages its religious students to celebrate Christmas with Christians in the city. Interfaith activity is a key factor in increasing respect and tolerance for non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan.

De-radicalization programs are also a necessary counter-extremism measure. Such programs represent a unique area of NGO and CSO outreach, due to the role played by the Pakistani military. Unlike the general population, arrested militants are already processed into the military/law enforcement system. As a result, this is one area where the Pakistani military has made an effort to support de-radicalization programs, such as the Sabaoon Center for Rehabilitation. The Sabaoon Center is run by the Hum Pakistani Foundation in Swat, where some of the heaviest anti-Taliban fighting has occurred over the years. Other known de-radicalization programs include Mishal, Sparley, Rastoon, Pythom, and Heila.

The Pakistani government has attempted to address extremism also, but with mixed results. After Taliban militants killed more than 100 children at the Peshawar school in December 2014, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif presented a 20-point National Action Plan (“NAP”) to address extremism in Pakistan. Unfortunately, only one point addressed education reform, which focused narrowly on registering and regulating religious schools. The remainder of the plan focused on cracking down on terrorists, including increasing the power of anti-terrorism laws, enforcement and anti-terrorism courts.

As a result, since the passage of NAP, there has been a spike in death sentences in Pakistan’s anti-terrorism courts, resulting in 139 executions between January-June of 2015 alone. This comes on the heels of the July 2014 Protection of Pakistan Act, which increased monitoring for terrorism-related activity in the country. The new legislation “grants police officers the powers to shoot and kill alleged terrorists and detain suspects for questioning for up to 60 days without charge.”

Still, with or without the active contribution from Pakistan’s central government, the push to improve education is growing. Pakistani Nobel-laureate, Malala Yousafzai recently began a campaign entitled #booksnotbullets, hoping to push governments like Pakistan to divert funds from its military to education. 

Progress is being made, but sometimes only in small increments. Malala’s campaign comes on the heels of Pakistani authorities acquitting eight of the 10 Taliban members who stood accused of shooting Malala in the head and wounding other girls on a school bus. Twenty-five-year sentences were expected for all 10 defendants but a purported lack of evidence resulted in most of the attackers being acquitted.  

The number of foreign fighters who have joined ISIS now exceeds 20,000, illustrating the effectiveness of the group's recruitment strategies. Governments and private groups like CEP are experimenting with a variety of initiatives designed to counter the powerful and deceptive narratives of ISIS and prevent every more at-risk youth from joining its ranks. Among the groups trying to help families prevent their sons and daughters from becoming radicalized are several community based organizations that have garnered attention due to their unique composition: Mothers who have lost children to extremist groups.

Groups of mothers of children who have chosen jihad come from a variety of backgrounds and have sprung up in Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, France, Sweden, and the United States. These mothers have organized support groups and advocacy initiatives out of a common bond: losing their children to jihad.

One American mother, Abeyte Ahmed from Minneapolis, told CBS News that the pain of her loss never goes away. However, that pain is motivating her and other mothers to reach out to help other parents take preventive action.

The mothers against jihad go by many different names and operate independently, but they all are dedicated to the same cause, helping other families recognized the signs and dangers of extremism. These groups include, among others, Women Without Borders, Mothers for Life, Syrien ne bouge, agissons, Concerned Parents Collective, and Support for Families Touched by Violent Extremism. They are determined to prevent children from other families from becoming radicalized by providing the support they never had; a secure network of moral support, promotion of  reintegration for returned radicals, and education on parenting skills necessary to recognize radicalization.

For example, Austria-based Women Without Borders launched a project called “Mothers for Change,” which aims to help mothers notice signs of radicalization. Founder Edit Schlaffer believes women “must become visible players in the security arena.”

Mothers for Life established the “Open Letter Project,” which uses the foundation of the mother-child relationship in an attempt to convince children to reconsider their decisions and return from Syria and Iraq. Mothers for Life is an international network of mothers organized through the German Institute on Radicalization and de-Radicalization Studies. The project includes a three-page letter that aims to convince children to reject extremism and jihad and return home. The letter also encourages other children not to leave by emphasizing the strong mother-child bond as explained in the Quran.

The deep pain and yearning for the return of their children is made plain in each letter: The mothers write, “We did not want you to leave. We want you to return. We want you to live. Even if you think death will give you that ‘better’ life, remember that even the Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "Paradise lies at the feet of your mother" [Musnad Ahmad, Sunan An-Nasâ’i, Sunan Ibn Mâjah].”'

These mothers from around the world have decided to take action, not only because of the impact on their families, but because of dissatisfaction with government programs. European governments, such as in Belgium, France, and the U.K., arrest and jail returning jihadists or prohibit radicalized nationals from returning home. Parents favor therapy and reintegration support as a solution, as in Denmark’s Aarhus Model, which consists of counseling.

French mother Dominique Bons lost her son Nicolas to ISIS in Syria, and her biggest complaint is French authorities did nothing when she alerted them about her concerns about her son’s behavior. Due to this inaction, she and other parents formed the support group Syrien ne bouge, agissons which translates to "If nothing is changing, let's act."

The work of mothers against jihad has apparently attracted ISIS’s attention, as the group seems to have designed its most recent guidebook, “Sister’s Role in Jihad,” as a direct response. The ISIS guidebook urges mothers to “raise jihadi babies” through activities such as camping to learn about outdoor survival skills, using toy guns to practice aim, and playing with dolls to learn about beheadings. ISIS’s response clearly demonstrates its concern that the mothers may be making a difference.

As governments and the international community struggle to defeat the lure of ISIS and other extremist groups, the actions taken by these mothers are a welcome development.

And the mothers show no signs of backing away from the fight to prevent radicalization. In the words of Dominique Bons, a mother who has lost two of her children to violent extremism, "The mothers are on the front line. There are fathers, too, of course. But mothers will stop at nothing."

“Turkey narrowly averted a disaster,” stated the Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) leader, Selahattin Demirtas after Turkish voters pushed his party past the 10 percent electoral threshold necessary to qualify for seats in the parliament.  The voting results will likely curb the authoritarian aspirations of President Recep Erdogan and his Islamist AKP Party. The pro-Kurdish HDP attracted votes from a broad swath of liberals, secularists, women and minority rights supporters in the historic June 7 election.  

The election outcome is promising for a country that has, despite strong economic growth in the last 10 years, seen significant democratic rights eroded under the Islamist rule of the AKP. As many analysts have written, the AKP has of late used its power to undermine the military, censor the media, jail journalists and political rivals, restrict women’s rights, and block access to the Internet and social media to silence criticism, all the while building stronger ties with Islamist movements in the Middle East.

On April 9, 2015, for example, Erdogan came to the Muslim Brotherhood’s rescue, stating that Turkey would not consider improving relations with Egypt until ex-president Mohammed Morsi was released from prison, the arbitrary ban on political parties in Egypt was removed and the 18,000 jailed followers of Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood were released.

The AKP’s defense of the Muslim Brotherhood is natural. In terms of ideology, neither Morsi, nor Erdogan or ISIS for that matter, differ in their worldview; they only differ in strategy. ISIS believes in force, while Erdogan believes in working through the system. As Erdogan said a few years ago, democracy is like a tram, "You ride it until you arrive at your destination, then you step off."

Turkey’s stance in defense of the Brotherhood is not welcome in Egypt.  Its president, General Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, in December implored Sunni Islam’s oldest theological seminary, al Azhar, to reform Islam. Sisi argued this was essential to combat growing Islamist extremism in the region.

Unfortunately, in most ways, Sisi’s, government has been as authoritarian as the AKP, making true democratic reform seem unrealistic in Egypt, at least in the near term.

As the Arab Spring has shown, men and women from North Africa to the Middle East support representation that recognizes pluralism. Despite the March terrorist attack on the Bardo Museum, only Tunisia has shown a sincere effort to chart a path toward freedom and inclusion and steer the country away from extremism. As the Atlantic reported after the terror attack in Tunis, even the Islamist Ennahda party has “at every crucial turn on the sometimes troubled path from dictatorship, embraced flexibility and moderation” to support a vision of “a republic of freedom, democracy, and social justice.”

The newly emerging pro-democratic coalition in the Turkish parliament will hopefully now focus on programs to educate and integrate all parts of Turkey. Voters in the rural parts of the country, as a result of AKP outreach and social welfare programs, formed the backbone of AKP’s support for more than 10 years.

The people of Turkey have spoken loudly in favor of freedom. We will have to wait and see how far that message resonates and whether it can be replicated elsewhere.