The outbreak of armed conflict in Syria has driven the country into chaos, with a spectrum of opposition groups claiming to be fighting for the people and against the Assad regime. As the Syrian Civil War enters its fifth year, Islamic extremist groups the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Nusra Front, and Ahrar al-Sham have emerged as the most prominent and powerful. 

In discussing the Syrian opposition groups, it is helpful to place their beliefs and goals on a scale to enable comparisons.  At one time, opposition groups ranged from those attempting to implement a free democratic society and government on the left, to those wanting to impose sharia over a newly instated caliphate on the right. Unfortunately, today there are far more Islamist groups than liberal democratic groups left operating in Syria.

ISIS, the Nusra Front, and Ahar al-Sham are Salafist, Sunni groups and make up some of the most far right Islamist groups in Syria. While the differences between their ideologies are fairly negligible, ISIS is the farthest right, hoping to create an Islamic State throughout the entire region under strict seventh century Arabia-esque conditions. The Nusra Front lies towards the “center” of the three, aspiring toward the creation of an Islamic State, but supposedly in stages and with the consent of the local population. Finally, while Ahar al-Sham hopes to create an Islamic State as well, it claims to want to confine itself to the borders within Syria and merely replace Assad with its own government. 

The histories of these three groups are tightly intertwined.  Each has ties to al-Qaeda, leading to their jockeying for position in Syria.  ISIS traces its roots to al-Qaeda in Iraq in the early 2000s, when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi began training militants to attack coalition forces.  The group suffered defeats and declined in strength until 2011, when coalition forces began to withdraw from Iraq. Under its new leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the group moved into Syria, changed its name to ISIS, conquered a wide swath of Syria and Iraq and declared itself a Caliphate.

In 2013, ISIS claimed that it and the Nusra Front would merge despite denials from both the Nusra Front and al-Qaeda.  At this point, a schism developed between ISIS and al-Qaeda and the Nusra Front, causing huge tensions.  A number of Nusra fighters defected to ISIS and the groups clashed.  ISIS blamed the group for “betrayal and treason,” and by March 2014, more than 3,000 fighters had been killed in battles between ISIS and the Nusra Front. 

In 2013, ISIS’s relations with Ahar al-Sham, a militant group whose leadership also has ties to al-Qaeda, also disintegrated.  However, Ahar al-Sham continued to cooperate with the Nusra Front. Since then, despite its inclusion in the Free Syrian Army, Ahar al-Sham has grown to become one of the largest Islamist militant groups in Syria, attempting to unite what remains of the Islamic opposition. 

Despite their shaky histories and their clashes throughout Syria, each group employs similar tactics; they carry out offensives, attempt to conquer territory, govern the areas they control, and provide services to the population.  This alignment in overall strategy is what creates such competition between the three most powerful groups in Syria.  They each have the goal of creating a new state based on Islamic law, but disagree on its character, timing and governance.

Continual jockeying for advantage and competition for fighters and resources contributes to a continuation of the cycle of violence in Syria.  While these groups are in direct competition with one other, their stated primary objective is to force out the Assad regime.   Without a viable, secular alternative, however, the end of the Assad regime could easily lead to an even more violent future for Syrians, as these three groups then turn their weapons more forcefully on one another in a battle for supremacy.

“Nothing is safe from the cultural cleansing under way in the country: it targets human lives, minorities, and is marked by the systematic destruction of humanity’s ancient heritage.” – Irina Bukova, Director-General of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 6 March 2015

Since ISIS launched its bloody and brutal territorial seizure in the summer of 2014, thousands of civilians in Iraq and Syria have lost their lives to the group’s heavy-handed interpretation of Islam. A report by the Iraq Body Count monitoring project shows that approximately 4,325 civilians were killed by ISIS last year in Iraq alone. According to estimates made in late 2014, more than 20,000 foreign fighters from the Middle East, the former Soviet Union and the West joined the jihad in Iraq and Syria. More than one-fifth were from Western Europe. Then there are the refugees and internally displaced people, who, after witnessing the death of loved ones or seeing their homes ripped from them, are forced to watch the destruction of their culture and their ties to the land.

While ISIS continues to claim future generations, it makes casualties of histories and cultures that have been on this earth for centuries. Evidence of the rich history and diversity of the region are being erased, sometimes in minutes, and in its stead, ISIS establishes its narrow view of religion, history, art – all humanity. What is taking place is truly cultural genocide.

Destruction of monuments and relics from civilizations past is not a new phenomenon. Conquerors and warring parties have historically sought to assert their military dominance through siege and pillage—from the Crusades of the Middle Ages to Nazi plunder of European cultural legacies and Soviet vandalism of Russian cultural monuments and cathedrals.

Islamic extremists have adopted these same tactics en masse decades later: In 2001, the Taliban exploded 1,700 year-old sandstone statues of Buddha in the Bamiyan Valley of the Hindu Kush Mountains in central Afghanistan. In 2012, Ansar Dine attacked Timbuktu in Mali, a hub of trade and Islamic learning that flourished from the 13th to the 17th centuries. Ansar Dine destroyed tombs containing antiquities, battered down the door of a 15th century mosque, and set fire to libraries containing ancient manuscripts. That same year, Fundamentalist Salafist Muslims targeted Sufi heritage sites in Libya and Egypt.

What sets ISIS apart is its scale of wanton destruction in such a short period of time and the extent to which this destruction is used for propaganda and profit. ISIS has razed its way through many historical sites, even publicizing their attacks.

• Summer of 2014: According to Human Rights Watch, in June 2014, ISIS destroys seven Shiite places of worship in the city of Tal Afar, kidnapping 40 Shia Turkmen in the process.  On July 25, ISIS extremists explode the Tomb of Jonah, located in a Sunni mosque also called the Mosque of the Prophet Yunus in Mosul. Jonah was a key figure in Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. ISIS also blows up several Sunni holy sites during the summer.
• February 26, 2015: ISIS strikes again in Mosul. Videos show ISIS destroying 7th century stone statues from Nineveh, an ancient Assyrian city, housed in a Mosul Museum. Thousands of books and manuscripts, containing ancient narratives, are destroyed in Mosul’s libraries.
• March 5, 2015: Iraq’s Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities confirms that ISIS bulldozed the ancient Nimrud archeological site near Mosul, using heavy military vehicles.  Nimrud, also Assyrian, was founded more than 3,300 years ago. Director General at UNESCO, Irina Bokova declares, “The deliberate destruction of cultural heritage constitutes a war crime. There is absolutely no political or religious justification for the destruction of humanity’s cultural heritage.”
• March 7, 2015: Iraqi officials report that ISIS desecrates the ancient city of Hatra, completely bulldozing the ruins of the UNESCO heritage site. The city was founded during the Parthian Empire more than 2,000 years ago. Unlike the destruction of Assyrian heritage sites at Nineveh and Nimrud, Hatra or Al-Hadr reflects a combination of Greco-Roman and eastern influence, including temples dedicated to Apollo and Poseidon. The Iraq Tourism and Antiquities Ministry blames the international community for failing to help Iraq protect its ancient monuments.
• March 12, 2015: Iraqi antiquities director, Qais Rasheed reports that Khorasabad, a 2,700-year-old city famed for its colossal statues of human-headed winged bulls, has been ransacked and razed by ISIS. Without satellite imagery, it is difficult to assess the damage to the three square kilometer site, but Rasheed confirms that looting took place and the ancient city’s walls were demolished. 

The very fabric of the region’s religious and cultural history has been reduced to tatters and bare threads. One’s initial reaction is, “Why? Why this seemingly nihilistic destruction of priceless artefacts?” The “because” is dual, there is a push and a pull.  David Pinault explains that ISIS uses Quranic scripture and accounts of the Prophet Muhammad himself to justify attacks on these regional treasures.The video showing the destruction of the Mosul Museum is accompanied by elegant chants that quote Quranic verses describing Abraham, a key figure in both Judeo-Christian and Islamic traditions, smashing his father’s idols. An ISIS extremist goes on to remind viewers that even Muhammad “removed and destroyed the idols with his own exalted and noble hands when he conquered Mecca.”

This justification tactic is utter hypocrisy, according to Peter Webly of the Tony Blair Faith Foundation: “While it is true that Muhammad ordered the destruction of the pagan idols in the Ka’aba… the mere existence of such an extensive pre-Islamic heritage across most of the Muslim world reveals the lie that ISIS is emulating the practice of his [Muhammad] companions when it conquered other lands…” Furthermore, the fact that ISIS is involved in the illicit trade of antiquities and materials such as gold, tarnishes their ‘holier-than-thou’ literalism.

ISIS’s war path decimates culture and history because they stand to gain a lot from their heinous acts. The benefit of destruction is two-fold – profit and propaganda. The same destruction meant to rid Iraq and Syria of its ‘false idols’ is ultimately allowing the group to capitalize on ruination. The profit from the illicit trade of stolen antiquities perpetuates inestimable harm. According to a Wall Street Journal report on the heroes attempting to curb antiquities smuggling, looting is ISIS’ second-largest source of revenue after oil. An Iraqi official also claims that ISIS has made as much as $36 million from one single area at al-Nabek in Syria, an early Christian site known for its mosaics. ISIS has even established an office to deal specifically with looted antiquities. The whole racket is simply not in line with their violent literalism and public justifications for destroying heritage sites. If the Quran told them to destroy, why profit?

Then there is the message. What better propaganda is there for young extremists? “Here it is, your opportunity to follow in the footsteps of prophets, Abraham and Muhammad. It is your chance, confused youth, to rail against mundane life in pluralistic societies. Come with us and destroy the past.” 

It is clear that ISIS, so self-righteous in their actions, seeks not merely to destroy blasphemous ‘false idols’—they want to obliterate the cultural origins of the very people they are attempting to suck into their caliphate. They are destroying the past so that they might rewrite a rich history and protect their violent future.

In the spring of 1995, 20-year old Alisa Flatow, an American student at Brandeis University, was in the middle of her semester in Israel studying at a women’s seminary. Alisa boarded a bus on April 10 bound for the beach, but never reached her destination. A suicide bomber from the Iranian sponsored group Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) drove up next to the bus and blew up his car.

Alisa’s father, Stephen, flew from his New Jersey home to Israel’s Soroka Medical Center, where his daughter was on life support. He recalled holding Alisa’s hand as doctors declared her brain dead. She was taken off of life support a half hour after he arrived. In total, eight people died in the PIJ attack.

Alisa was the oldest of Stephen and Rosalyn Flatow’s five children. She majored in sociology at Brandeis and planned to become a physical therapist. According to a statement released by her family shortly after her death, Alisa “believed in the good inherent in all people. She believed she was safe in Israel and no one could dissuade her from that belief.”

This month marks 20 years since Alisa’s untimely death. Iran’s connections to global terrorism are well documented. Alisa’s memory lives on in multiple institutions in New Jersey and Israel since dedicated to her.

Her tragedy is also the inspiration behind a landmark legal case in the fight against global extremism, as Alisa’s father turned his family’s tragedy into a call to arms against state sponsors of terrorism, notably Iran.

The 1996 Antiterrorism Amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act removed legal immunity from foreign governments that sponsor terrorism. Later that year, Congress created what is commonly called the Flatow Amendment, which allowed U.S. citizens to file for damages from countries that sponsor terrorist acts. Stephen Flatow used his new legal rights to file suit against Iran for sponsoring the attack that killed his daughter. In 1998, he won a $248 million judgment against Iran. Flatow has collected only a fraction of that amount, but he opened the door for other U.S. victims of terror to seek a small measure of justice.

Matthew Eisenfeld, a 25-year-old rabbinical student from Hartford, Conn., and 22-year-old Sara Duker of Teaneck, N.J., were among the 24 people killed in a February 25, 1996, Hamas bus bombing in Jerusalem. Their families won a $327 million judgment against Iran in 2000 for sponsoring the attack. A U.S. court held Iran liable in 2006 for the 1996 bombing of an American military dormitory in Saudi Arabia and ordered the country to pay $254 million to the families of 17 victims. The courts have also held Iran liable for the 1983 Marine Barracks bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, and awarded more than $10 billion to its victims. Most recently, a U.S. court in September 2014 ruled in favor of some 300 terror victims who alleged that Jordan’s Arab Bank had facilitated payments to Hamas and other terrorist groups.

In a recent article on the anniversary of Alisa’s death, Stephen Flatow said that his daughter still “plays a big role” in his life “as if she is still here.” The Flatows and other families have struggled to collect their settlements over the years but the case set an important precedent in the fight to hold accountable sponsors of terrorism.

Turkey’s relationship with violent extremist group ISIS might generously be described as “permissive” - less generously, “complicit.”

Not only has Turkey adopted a relaxed stance toward ISIS, some claim it has actively aided and abetted the terror group. This is notable because – uniquely – confronting ISIS head-on is one task on which the rest of the world appears united. And even across the Middle East, where every issue is fiercely disputed, historical enmity and sectarian divisions have been temporarily shelved in favor of the larger aim of destroying ISIS. Except by Turkey.

The reason is clear: Turkey has embraced the ancient maxim that “my enemy’s enemy is my friend.” Here, Turkey’s enemy is not ISIS, but the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a banned militant organization that seeks autonomy for Turkey’s Kurds, which comprises as much as 20 percent of the total population. As the Turkish government openly concedes, the decades-long “Kurdish problem” is far more pertinent than the “ISIS problem.”

In 2014, Turkey’s laissez-faire stance toward ISIS was illustrated by two exemplary cases. First, Turkey (a NATO member) did not allow U.S. airplanes to use its military base at İncirlik to attack ISIS, which meant NATO pilots were forced to fly from bases in the Gulf, adding thousands of additional flight miles to their missions and thereby increasing the risk of being shot down. Second, it was only after several weeks of intense international pressure – and at the very last moment – that Turkey finally relented and permitted PKK-affiliated Syrian Kurdish military support for the beleaguered Syrian town of Kobani, whose residents faced imminent slaughter at the hands of ISIS.

While these facts are beyond dispute, Turkey has sharply denied the stronger accusation that it is actually complicit in assisting ISIS. Responding to claims that Turkey has provided weapons, logistical support, financial assistance and military training to ISIS, Turkish President Recep Erdogan entreated the U.S. “to make your assessment about Turkey basing your information on objective sources.”

A reasonable request. Still, an example of a non-objective source might be CNN Türk. While parent CNN International was covering the Kurdish protests that were engulfing the country on June 2, its Turkish subsidiary elected to televise a documentary on penguins. This followed a cooking program showcasing the “Flavors of Nigde” two days earlier when the demonstrations commenced. We might also discount other major Turkish news channels aligned with the ruling AKP party that decided to show a dance competition and a workshop on studying abroad. It was “a classic case of the revolution not being televised.”

Ironical observations aside, such selective reporting illustrates how the “Kurdish Problem” colors Turkish politics both internal and external, even when the rest of the world might be dancing to a different beat. For the Turkish government, the overarching regional foreign policy priority invariably translates into not doing anything that might help the Kurds – led by exiled leader Abdullah Ocalan - inch towards autonomy. The calculus has translated into standing back and allowing ISIS to – in the eyes of Turkey – weaken the PKK and, by extension, the Kurdish independence movement. To the rest of the world, however, such calculated abstention looks like cooperation and complicity with a brutal extremist terrorist organization.

The charge of complicity is probably an unfair assessment overall, given that Turkey has in fact authorized the use of force against ISIS and has finally implemented serious measures to make it much harder for prospective ISIS fighters to cross its once  porous border into Syria. (It has also provided millions of dollars of humanitarian aid, and hosts almost 2 million Syrian refugees).

But as regional power with the second-biggest army in NATO after the U.S., and a large, mostly secular population seeking greater integration with the West via EU membership, it is not sufficient. Indeed, despite the White House’s official line (“we respect their internal decision-making processes”), U.S. dissatisfaction with Turkey’s behavior is strong. This became obvious when U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden strayed from the official Administration line by publicly disparaging Turkey’s commitment.

Under the narrow, opaque lens of domestic politics, Turkey’s equivocation is understandable. But in the long-term, it is doubtful that the world will easily forget Turkey’s sluggishness on the ISIS front, especially as it seeks a greater role on the world stage.

The belief that the Iraq war was a monumental blunder is now widely held. In the public mind, the decision to dethrone Saddam Hussein has also become a ready explanation for nearly every ill to befall the world since. The latest baleful effect attributed to regime change in Baghdad is the ascent of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). No less a figure than President Obama lists ISIS as one of the "unintended consequences" of the Iraq war, which evidently imparts the lesson that the U.S. should "aim before we shoot."

A critical observer might note that this argument suffers from one conspicuous drawback: the roots of ISIS lay not only in Iraq, where America intervened, but also in Syria, where it did not.

This is not the place for an exhaustive recapitulation of ISIS’s evolution, but a brief sketch will show that it rose first in post-Saddam Iraq, and was defeated there, before it was resurrected in the present chaos of Iraq and Syria.

After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Osama bin Laden established al-Qaeda in Iraq and designated Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to be its "emir." Zarqawi proceeded to drench Iraq in blood - Iraqi blood - in the hopes of sparking a sectarian war between Sunni and Shia. This grisly strategy put Iraqi society on a knife's-edge, but it also opened an ideological fissure between bin Laden and Zarqawi that would eventually lead jihadists associated with the latter - who was eliminated by a U.S. airstrike in June 2006 - to form ISIS.

Before long, the U.S. effort in Iraq was salvaged by a combination of counterinsurgency strategy (the "surge") and the Anbar Awakening. Zarqawi's force was overwhelmed, dispossessed of tribal support in the Sunni hinterland and decisively routed on the battlefield. Although Zarqawi's scheme to restore a lost Islamic empire lay dormant, it did not become extinct. In 2011, two events conspired to give it a new lease on life.

The first came in March, when democratic demonstrations broke out on the streets of Damascus. The peaceful protests were ruthlessly crushed by Syria's calcified dictatorship, which ignited an armed rebellion. In response, the Assad regime pulverized entire neighborhoods by bullet, bomb and gas. The decision in Western capitals to withhold military aid from secular and nationalist factions of the Syrian revolt allowed jihadist bands - who were blessed with less diffident foreign allies - to become the most lethal contingent of the opposition.

The second event that led to ISIS's resurgence came in December 2011, when Iraq's Sunni "Awakening" unraveled thanks to a lethal mixture of American and Iraqi mistakes. America's indifference to Iraq's fate led to a categorical troop withdrawal that exacerbated Prime Minister Maliki's sectarian instincts. He not only demobilized and harassed the Sons of Iraq that had vanquished al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), but also labored to turn the Iraqi army into a gigantic Shia militia. Once more, the conditions were set for Sunni power to respond, this time in the form of jihadist violence.

In the midst of one-dimensional debates over post-Iraq U.S. foreign policy, what is lost is the brutal fact that inaction is a policy with unintended consequences of its own.