News and Media

In the latest blow to ISIS’s military prowess, U.S.-backed forces recaptured Raqqa, Syria, on October 17. In July, the terror group lost control of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, which it captured in 2014. These major territorial losses present a serious PR problem for the group, which relies heavily on the public image that it cultivates through online propaganda. ISIS has strived to re-frame its losses in a positive light and assure its supporters that it is undeterred. However, the loss of Raqqa--the de facto capital of ISIS’s caliphate–may be ISIS’s greatest PR challenge to date. Nonetheless, if ISIS is able to overcome this reputational setback, it may prove itself to be more dangerous than even before.

In the August 2017 issue of Rumiyah, ISIS’s slick, English-language propaganda magazine­, ISIS tried to redefine its bitter defeat in Mosul as a victory. One article declared that “anyone who witnessed the Battle of Mosul knows with certainty that the Battle of Raqqah will be nothing but a loss and source of regret for the murtaddin [apostates] and their supporters.” The issue also featured a graphic boasting of ISIS’s “successes” in Mosul, such as the number of casualties that the group inflicted. Similar graphics about the battle of Raqqa also appear in the August and September issues, despite the significant losses that the group was already suffering there.

As ISIS’s capital, Raqqa was of utmost symbolic and strategic importance to the group. “It was among the first cities which the mujahidin conquered,” an ISIS military commander explained in the August 2017 issue of Rumiyah. “Raqqah was the base from which the Islamic State expanded, and the center for the Khilafah’s [caliphate’s] operations on the various fronts.” Unsurprisingly, ISIS appears to be struggling with painting the loss of its most important city in any positive light. Thus far, it appears to think that silence is the best policy until it can resolve how to explain this obvious PR crisis. The October 19 issue of ISIS’s weekly Arabic newsletter––published two days after the city was officially retaken––did not contain a single mention of Raqqa. And ISIS has so far failed to publish its October issue of Rumiyah––a periodical that it has released near the start of every month for over a year now.

Another approach that ISIS has taken in recent months has been to portray itself as simply undeterred by its losses: July’s issue of Rumiyah featured an article entitled “Either We Exterminate the Mushrikin [sinners] or Die Trying.” And while ISIS is probably in reality seriously disconcerted, its determination to persevere beyond its territorial losses is no mere empty threat. After all, ISIS existed as a dangerous threat even before it laid claim to a caliphate. The group today known as ISIS evolved from its predecessors al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)––which functioned principally as insurgent groups during the Iraq war. ISIS may plan to revert back to guerrilla warfare in the event it loses all of its territory, bide its time and make another grab at a caliphate when conditions are favorable again.

Furthermore, ISIS has a more dangerous tool at its disposal: its virtual caliphate. Through its remarkably adept use of technology and digital media, ISIS was not only able to entice more than 40,000 people from around the world to join its fight in Iraq and Syria, but also to direct and inspire people to carry out attacks in its name globally––in effect, extending its reach and reputation far beyond the bounds of its physical caliphate. In the issue of Rumiyah following the August 2017 Barcelona attack, ISIS stated that “the soldiers of the Islamic State will escalate these attacks to a greater level in the coming period.” Indeed, without claims to a caliphate, ISIS will find it more crucial than ever to encourage and claim credit for attacks, especially in the West, in order to maintain the public perception that it is a capable and dangerous threat.

It remains to be seen whether ISIS can convince potential supporters that despite the fall of Mosul and Raqqa, it is still capable of plotting and inspiring attacks like Barcelona, Orlando, Manchester, and Paris. An ISIS that can retain fierce loyalty and influence despite setbacks on the battlefield could be more dangerous than ever. It therefore becomes more essential than ever to also confront ISIS on the virtual battlefield––in additional to the territorial one.

The Trump administration recently unveiled its new strategy to counter the threat Hezbollah and Iran pose to the United States and its interests abroad. Despite talk of designating the entire Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist entity. President Trump chose instead to add a few more sanctions to those that already apply to the military organization. The President did follow through on his threat to decertify the Iran Nuclear Deal, however, and Congress now has until December 12 to vote to impose new sanctions – effectively pulling the United States out of the deal – or do nothing and allow the deal to remain in place.

As for Hezbollah, the White House issued a $5 million and a $7 million reward for information leading to the capture of two high ranking Hezbollah members, Fuad Shukr and Talal Hamiyah. It was also announced that United States will increase its efforts to convince the E.U. to include Hezbollah’s political wing alongside its military wing on the E.U.’s list of international terrorist organizations. Nathan Sales, the U.S. counterterrorism coordinator, claimed that any distinction between these two branches is “false” and that “Hezbollah has no political wing.”

The White House’s new initiatives come in response to as the unprecedented influence and power of Iran and by association, Hezbollah. Beginning in 2003, Iran has worked to expand its influence throughout Iraq by funding, training, and arming a variety of Shi’ite and Kurdish political parties and militias. Central to this strategy is the IRGC – the military arm of Tehran tasked with maintaining domestic security and exporting radical Shi’ite ideology abroad. IRGC officers train anti-American and anti-Sunni private military units (PMU) such as the terrorist groups Kata’ib Hezbollah and the Badr Organization, while other IRGC veterans have served as Iran’s ambassadors to Iraq. Iran’s train and equip program in Iraq accelerated following ISIS’s rapid advances through the country, providing Iran with unmatched influence over Iraq’s economy, armed militias, and political establishment. With the outbreak of civil war in Syria, Iran and Hezbollah found an opportunity to continue to expand their influence in a country already friendly to their cause.

In 2012 the IRGC began forming a network of allied militias throughout government-controlled parts of Syria known as the National Defense Force (NDF). Between 2012 and 2013 Iran and Hezbollah – which officially entered the Syrian war in 2013 – built upon these efforts in Aleppo, creating the mostly Shi’ite Local Defense Force (LDF) with a closer tie to Hezbollah. These largely local militias are funded and trained by the IRGC and, owing their existence and continued survival to Iran, operate outside the control of Damascus.

Hezbollah, which has as many as 7,000 fighters in Syria supporting the Assad regime, has embarked on its own militia-building experiments, creating and encouraging a network of partner organizations known as “Syrian Hezbollah.” Israeli defense officials believe that, if and when the next Israel-Hezbollah war occurs, these Syrian Hezbollah units will mobilize as well. Equally concerning is the growing presence of Hezbollah units in Syria’s south, despite demands from both the U.S. and Israel that Russia remove these units from the area. In the most recent battle for the southern Syrian city of Dara’a, Hezbollah fighters flooded the city, at one point accounting for more than 20 percent of pro-government casualties. Hezbollah is also engaged in the fighting along the Beit Jinn pocket adjacent to the Golan Heights.

In addition, Hezbollah, the IRGC and its allied foreign militias have taken charge of the frontlines stretching across Syria’s desert to the Syria-Iraq border near al-Qaim. Hezbollah lost more than 40 fighters here in late August in its attempts to reach the border while on October 26, Iraqi PMUs launched their own offensive to liberate al-Qaim from ISIS. The completion of these two operations will secure Iran’s land route through Syria and Lebanon to the Mediterranean Sea.

With Assad’s victory in Syria looking more assured each day, Iran and Hezbollah are set to exploit their expanded influence: new air and naval bases for Iran, thousands of loyal Syrian Hezbollah fighters stationed along the Golan Heights, and easy transportation of weapons and troops across the highways spanning Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. If Iran and Hezbollah are allowed to achieve these goals, they will greatly enhance their capacity to plan and conduct terror operations against Israel, the United States, and opposition groups across the Middle East.

While it is still a political adversary, Russia remains one of the only entities capable of slowing Iran’s expansion in Syria and in the region. The United States must insist that as part of any political settlement, Russia assists in  removing Hezbollah and Iranian militias from the sensitive frontlines, such as in north Hama and across southern Syria de-escalation zones around Dara’a and Quneitra. Yet simply pushing back on Iranian deployment will not solve the problem; economic pressure on both the foreign and domestic sections of the IRGC must be increased. The IRGC controls at least 50 percent of Iran’s economy and has spent an estimated $1 billion funding its proxy militias just in Syria. Designating the IRGC as a foreign terrorist organization will force foreign businesses to shift their transactions to non-IRGC owned institutions. This will in turn deprive the IRGC of the resources that today allows it to arm and pay the salaries of its Syrian and Iraqi proxies, which would be a welcome first step in loosening Tehran’s grip over the Syrian people.

ISIS officially claimed credit late on November 2 for the October 31 attack in Manhattan, in which Sayfullo Saipov drove a rental truck down a busy bicycle path, killing eight people. CEP has translated from Arabic and analyzed ISIS’s announcement, which is unique in a number of ways.

ISIS’s designation of Sayfullo Saipov as a “solder of the Caliphate” is unique in that ISIS normally does not claim credit for attacks when operatives are captured alive (as is the case with Sayfullo Saipov).

This claim of responsibility is different in both how it was issued and the language used. In most international terrorist attacks, ISIS’s Amaq news agency issues the initial claim of responsibility (translated into multiple languages), and then its weekly newsletter al-Naba follows up with more details later. This time the claim was issued exclusively in al-Naba late on Thursday, November 2. Traditionally, Amaq and al-Naba claims for responsibility include language suggesting that a “source close to Amaq” or a “source close to the Islamic State” relayed attack details to the group’s media officials. However, the al-Naba story on the New York attack relies exclusively on outside media reporting of the attacks.

Thus far, ISIS has not given Saipov a kunya (a nickname given to an ISIS operative), something they did for Las Vegas shooter Stephen Paddock. In the Las Vegas attack, ISIS may have given Paddock a kunya to push back against media and public skepticism about ISIS’s claim of responsibility. Given media reports of Saipov’s letter of allegiance to ISIS, the group likely does not feel the same pressure to give Saipov a kunya or describe his background (as they did with Paddock’s conversion story).

The wording of the al-Naba claim suggests that ISIS is alleging that the attack was inspirational and not directed by operatives within ISIS’s external operations wing. This conclusion is based upon: (1) the absence of any Amaq footage of the attack or Saipov pledging bay’ah to Baghdadi before the attack; (2) the wording of al-Naba’s claim suggesting that the group learned of the attack from the media and not a “source close to Amaq Agency” or a “source close to the Islamic State;” and (3) the al-Naba claim is scarce on details about the plot and omits important details like the bag of knives that Saipov carried in his truck.

Translation of al-Naba Claim of Responsibility

Attack by One of the Soldiers of the Caliphate in Downtown Manhattan Results in the Killing and Wounding of More Than 20 Crusaders

One of the soldiers of the Islamic State in America on Tuesday attacked a number of the Crusaders on one of the city of New York’s streets, near the memorial commemorating the decimation (the raid of September 11^th), which resulted in the killing and injuring of more than 20 Crusaders, praise be to Allah.

Media reported that the mujahid brother rammed a number of Crusaders with a small truck in the Manhattan area, which resulted in the killing of 8 and the wounding of 12, praise be to Allah. Another media source revealed that among the 8 killed were 5 Argentinians and Belgians. 

The operation has stirred up–thanks to Allah–fear inside Crusader America, which led them to increase security measures and strengthen measures against immigrants inside America. This is among the most prominent of the attacks which targeted the Crusaders in America, which was most recently the attack that the mujahid brother Abu Abdul Barr al-Amriki–May Allah Accept him–committed on a large gathering of the Crusaders in Las Vegas, which brought down hundreds killed and wounded–praise be to Allah. This attack came in the context of the soldiers of the Caliphate in America and Europe responding to calls to target nationals of the Crusader states participating in the coalition against the Islamic State. Praise be to Allah.

On August 30, 2017, the Counter Extremism Project found that YouTube had posted a “warning label” on an extremist lecture by notorious al-Qaeda recruiter Anwar al-Awlaki:

Awlaki’s lectures have played an influential role in inspiring dozens of U.S. and European extremists to attempt or carry out acts of terrorism. Specifically, Awlaki’s “Battle of Hearts and Minds” lecture—has been used to rally supporters and lionize terrorists, whom Awlaki refers to admiringly as shaheed (martyrs). In December of 2013, the “Battle of the Hearts and Minds” was used by ISIS as part of its recruitment and promotional materials.

Considering the documented and proven role Awlaki-content plays in the successful recruitment and radicalization of terrorist actors, it is puzzling why YouTube has persisted in keeping Awlaki on its platform. Beginning in January 2016, the Counter Extremism Project (CEP) has tracked the presence of Awlaki content on YouTube, and analyzed how Awlaki content remains accessible, ubiquitous, and often promoted on the video sharing platform. In that time, CEP has made the following key findings:

1. Awlaki’s content remains consistently and readily available on YouTube, and searches for “Anwar al-Awlaki” continue to yield more than 70,000 results; and
2. YouTube’s algorithms continue to nudge users toward (a) Awlaki’s content generally, and (b) his most incendiary and egregious content in particular.

Today, CEP notes that YouTube’s policies surrounding Awlaki and other forms of extremist and terrorist material remain incomplete, inconsistent, and unclear. For example:

Why the warning label?

In March 2017, hundreds of advertisers fled Google’s video-sharing platform YouTube after finding that their ads were appearing next to extremist and terrorist content. Rather than simply remove this material, it appears that Google has opted to allow some videos to remain on YouTube affixed with a warning label—something that has never been applied previously to any other type of content in violation of YouTube’s Terms of Service (e.g. pornography, copyright violations, etc.).

This “warning label” policy essentially creates an entirely new class of content, i.e. “inflammatory” or “inappropriate or offensive content to some audiences.” When so much other content uploaded to YouTube is blocked or removed with regularity, it is unclear why YouTube is essentially creating a ‘carve-out’ for extremist content to remain online. It is also unclear how (or why for that matter) YouTube differentiates between terrorist content to be removed, and content that merely warrants a warning label. All extremist and terrorist content should be removed from You Tube in accordance with its Terms of Service.

YouTube’s policies again being applied inconsistently

YouTube’s so-called warning labels are being applied inconsistently to extremist and terrorist content. For example including Awlaki’s lectures. Some versions of Awlaki’s “Battle of the Hearts and Minds” lecture have been taken down, while others are prefaced with the warning label, and others still are live on the site without a warning label. Meanwhile, dozens of copies of Awlaki’s other lectures remain live on the site. How can the public have confidence in YouTube polices to disrupt extremist content if it cannot even apply its highly-touted new efforts consistently across the same content?  

What about Awlaki?

YouTube notes that it “strictly prohibits content intended to recruit for terrorist organizations, incite violence, celebrate terrorist attacks or otherwise promote acts of terrorism. We also do not permit foreign terrorist organizations to use YouTube.” Anwar al-Awlaki was a U.S.-sanctioned terrorist who served as the public face of al-Qaeda’s Yemeni affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Awlaki has inspired dozens of U.S. and European terrorists, including Orlando gunman Omar Mateen, San Bernardino shooter Syed Farook, and Boston bombers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. Awlaki’s was a self-declared leader of AQAP and his “Battle of the Hearts and Minds” lecture was used by ISIS in its 2013 recruitment material. Given the foregoing, any reasonable individual would determine that Awlaki-related content clearly qualifies as clear terrorist material. How can YouTube credibly assert otherwise in keeping Awlaki content live on its platform?

CEP appreciates YouTube’s implicit acknowledgement that Awlaki content is at least “inappropriate” enough to warrant a warning label. CEP has highlighted the issue of Awlaki on YouTube since 2015. In certain cases, YouTube finally took action to disable comments, sharing, video view count, autoplay, and several other features that serve to promote and further Awlaki’s messaging.

Unfortunately the limited action falls short and appears designed more to appease advertisers than protect the general public, who suffers the consequences of terrorist attacks rooted in Awlaki’s deadly rhetoric. Indeed, Awlaki played a unique role in rallying his supporters to terrorize the public. Awlaki was cited as a potential influence in dozens of U.S. and European terrorism cases, and his lectures—including “Battle of the Hearts and Minds”—have been used as recruitment fodder for internationally-sanctioned terrorist organizations al-Qaeda and ISIS alike.

Despite this reality, YouTube persists in allowing Awlaki to remain on its platform, opting for a piecemeal and reactive approach to pressure and criticism. This response—now including the bizarre addition of a warning label on some versions of Awlaki’s lectures—demonstrates YouTube’s alarming and persistent disregard for public safety, all the more baffling considering that YouTube is a company that entirely depends upon—and profits from—the public as both consumers and content providers. This seemingly random and post hoc approach to Awlaki content begs serious questions regarding YouTube’s standard business practices, let alone its business ethics.

Far more remains to be done to ensure that content promoting terrorism—explicitly prohibited by YouTube’s Terms of Service and overtly represented by Anwar al-Awlaki’s material—does not remain readily accessible on YouTube’s platform. YouTube must be transparent about its definition and policies regarding extremist and terrorist videos on its platform, including content pertaining to deceased al-Qaeda terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki. YouTube must then apply its policies in a manner that is proactive, responsible, consistent, and transparent to the public.