Since Spring 2024, new Neo-Nazi youth formations have emerged across Germany. These groups visually and organizationally resemble the “Kameradschaft” (comradeship) scene of the 1990s and 2000s. Currently, three parallel strategies dominate the violent mobilization of young people. What’s behind the “Revolt Strategy” of the Young Nationalists, the decentralized “TikTok Divisions,” and the Active Club network? How dangerous is this development? And how can it be countered? CEP has just published a policy brief in German which provides such a strategic assessment and gives policy recommendations. This text is a summary of the key points.

Organizational Change and Strategic Innovation

Since early 2024, the violent extreme-right scene in Germany has evolved, adopting new organizational models and strategies that harken back to the 1990s “Kameradschaften” — informal groups that emerged after extreme-right associations were banned. These older networks followed concepts like “leaderless resistance” and “organization without organizations.”

In 2004, there were approximately 160 such groups in Germany with 3,000 to 4,000 members. Partying and violence were central activities, loosely bound by extreme-right or Neo-Nazi ideology.

The new wave of extreme-right youth organizing over the past year features similarly low-barrier, action-oriented, youth-friendly structures—primarily operating through TikTok, Instagram, and Telegram. But their real-world mobilization is what makes them dangerous: dozens of counterdemonstrations against LGBTQ pride events (CSD) in summer 2024, and increasingly violent attacks against political opponents. Even longtime extreme-right actors criticize the “Party-Brawl-Post” ethos of this new generation.

Three Intersecting Trends

1. The “Revolt Strategy” – Young Nationalists (JN)

The Young Nationalists (JN), the youth wing of the extreme-right micro-party Die Heimat (formerly the NPD), launched a new campaign in Spring 2024 to recruit experience-driven but politically unaffiliated youth. The party is in deep crisis, and JN membership is declining (280 in 2021; 230 in 2023). Demonstration turnout has also decreased significantly.

Last year, new “Revolt” groups—such as Elbland Revolt (Dresden), Revolt Chemnitz, and Revolt Pforzheim—have been founded. Though steered by Die Heimat/JN, these groups target youth who are disinterested in formal party work. They offer low-hierarchy, action-heavy experiences like hikes or protests—often with alcohol and drug use—and skip the traditional cadre training.

This is a deceptive recruitment strategy. It exploits themes like immigration, war, and identity loss to create fear and offer belonging—framing members as defenders of white Germans and German culture. Their social media presence is youth-oriented and filled with protest, party, and fitness content. Some group members are already on trial for violent attacks and are linked to violent football hooligan groups and extreme-right combat sports scenes.

2. Fascism-Football-Fashion: Decentralized TikTok Divisions

Spring 2024 also saw the emergence of loosely organized extreme-right youth groups like “German Youth Forward” (DJV), “Young and Strong” (JS), and “German Shock Troop (DST).” 

They are unaffiliated with formal party structures but maintain contact with JN and “The Third Way” party. Many are directly linked to extreme-right hooligan networks. They sometimes also mimic soccer fan ultras with choreographed chants and group appearances and overlap with extreme-right martial arts circles.

Their digital strategy is sophisticated: They use “fashion-statements” like bomber jackets, sneakers, boots, and fashwave visuals to merge extreme-right themes with identity-building and a promise of raised self-esteem and status. They target queer people, the left, and immigrants as enemies. DJV, in particular, attracts violence-prone youth. Its leader was recently sentenced to three years in prison for violent political assaults.

Recruitment doesn’t just happen online via TikTok, Instagram, Telegram, and WhatsApp, it spreads through friends, families, and sports stadiums. The ultra-low barrier to entry (“white, German, national”) and opportunities for self-branding (“my boots, my sneakers, my bomber jacket”) are appealing to many.

3. Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: The Active Club Network

Since April 2024, the U.S.-originated Active Club network has been active in Germany. It follows a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” strategy, aimed at building militia-like structures without explicit Nazi references to evade law enforcement. Active Clubs encourage cross-group membership and promote “White Unity” to bridge divides within the extreme-right scene. Publicly, Active Clubs present themselves as clean-cut, sober, and athletic, positioning themselves as a disciplined alternative to the party and drug scenes of Revolts and TikTok Divisions.

Key Similarities of the Three Strategies

These three strategies share the following key elements:

1. Neo-Nazism: Use of Nazi symbols and codes—often covert—without formal political training or cadre-building.
2. Fear-Based Messaging: A constant emphasis on existential threats—e.g., “white genocide,” “great replacement,” and Jewish world conspiracy theories.
3. Hero Narrative: Promises of personal status (as a defender of the white race), community, and security.
4. Violence as a Solution: Violence is framed as self-defense due to the belief that no democratic solution exists for the perceived threat.

Development of officially recorded right-wing extremist violent crimes 

The number of violent right-wing extremist crimes recorded by the police does not appear to have risen in the last year (2024: 1136 / reporting date 30.11.2024 and 2023: 1270).  These figures contradict the public perception hat a particularly high number of right-wing extremist violent crimes were committed in 2024, for example at CSD protests or during election campaigns. 

However, the sharp increase in recorded propaganda offences in 2024 (21,311 / reporting date 30.11.2024) compared to 2023 (16,698) seems to reflect the right-wing extremist (youth) mobilization at demonstrations and on social media last year. There was also an increase in the number of young suspects (2024: 144 / reporting date 30.11.2024, compared to 2023: 119).

Civil society organizations sometimes report higher numbers of (violent) crimes related to right-wing extremism. This is due to a broader definition of what constitutes a crime motivated by right-wing extremism and (potentially) due to additional cases where victims did not give notice to the police. 

Internal Criticism from Veteran Right-Wing Extremists

Established right-wing extremist leaders are increasingly critical of the Revolt and TikTok Divisions. Some label their behavior at demonstrations (drinking, smoking, yelling) as “antisocial.” They argue this confirms negative stereotypes and lacks discipline or coherent messaging, including a disturbing lack of command of the German language. 

Threat Assessment

The threat to perceived political enemies is high. Many members of “Revolt” and “TikTok Divisions” have violent criminal records. Their overlap with hooligan and martial arts scenes may lead to more organized and professional acts of violence, compared to the impulsive or intoxicated attacks seen previously.

Policy Recommendations

Right-wing extremism thrives on provocation and victim narratives. Not every 15-year-old who spray-paints a swastika or flashes a Nazi salute (which is illegal in Germany except in artistic and educational contexts) will become a violent extremist. The state response should be surgical—not blunt-force.

• Prioritize violent offenders and key actors (recruiters, organizers, financiers) for investigation and prosecution.
• Focus on ties between these youth groups and violent subcultures like hooligans and combat sports.
• Avoid sweeping crackdowns that could fuel the narrative of state overreach.

CEP Resources

• Effective Measures against Extremist Financial Strategies and Networks | Counter Extremism Project
• Financial Strategies Of Right-Wing Extremist Organizations And Actors In The United Kingdom And Germany | Counter Extremism Project
• Don’t Get Fooled—The Extreme-Right Active Club Network Is Not About Combat Sports — ARC  
• Hiding in Plain Sight_The Transnational Right-Wing Extremist Active Club Network_Sept 2023.pdf
• Guns, Drugs, and Swastikas: Europe’s Neo-Nazi Mafias | Counter Extremism Project  
• The Transnational Nexus of Violence-Oriented Right-Wing Extremism, Terrorism, and Organized Crime | Counter Extremism Project