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You may be a notorious terrorist financier, but you can still use Instagram to raise money. At least that’s the case for U.N.-sanctioned Hajjaj bin Fahd al Ajmi, one of several Gulf-based donors to have funneled millions to al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. Despite being sanctioned, Ajmi is still able to use Instagram to fundraise and win ad sponsorship deals, publishing more than 1,000 posts to more than 1.7 million Instagram followers. This status quo is unacceptable: Instagram needs to shut Ajmi down.

Ajmi has been sanctioned by the United Nations, United States, United Kingdom, and European Union for financing al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, the Nusra Front (also known as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham). The Kuwaiti-based sheikh is particularly adept at using social media as a fundraising platform. In 2012, he launched a fundraising campaign on Twitter to finance unspecified jihadist groups in Syria, raising hundreds of thousands of dollars and reportedly providing groups with weapons and other material support. The following year, Ajmi used Twitter and YouTube to solicit funds for an August 2013 militant offensive in Latakia, Syria, in which jihadist groups including the Nusra Front and ISIS massacred several hundred civilians. Human Rights Watch named Ajmi as one of the offensive’s “most prominent donors.” Nonetheless, Ajmi has used Instagram in recent years to actively solicit donations for terrorist-affiliated charities and has even received money through sponsored posts.

Through his Instagram posts, Ajmi has urged donations to terrorist-linked charities, such as Mercy International (depicted below), an organization accused of facilitating al-Qaeda’s 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya, and the Islamic International Charitable Organization, an organization with reported ties to Hamas. As in the example below, his posts frequently exploit the plight of victims in the Syrian civil war, highlighting the suffering of children to elicit sympathy and—most importantly—financial support.

On his Instagram account, Ajmi also posts advertisements for goods and services such as restaurants, real estate investments, and cars. Ajmi has publicly admitted to receiving sponsorship payments from these ads, which has helped him overcome the financial challenges of being widely sanctioned, according to the Wall Street Journal.

On first glance, it may seem like an oversight that Instagram has allowed an internationally-sanctioned terrorist financier to use its platform to fundraise for himself and for terrorist-affiliated charities. However, as a for-profit company (parent company: Facebook), Instagram has a financial incentive for   keeping Ajmi—with his 1.7 million followers—on its platform.                  

This should not be allowed to continue. On Instagram, Ajmi does not make any attempt to conceal his identity––or his status. In Arabic, his profile states his name in full (Hajjaj bin Fahd al Ajmi). In reference to a new terrorist designation by several Gulf countries, his description for several weeks read, “Not a terrorist. A new clip concerning the terrorist designation in the joint announcement” and directs the reader to a YouTube video entitled “Hajjaj al-Ajmi is not a terrorist.”

Ajmi's Instagram account description, screenshot from July 2017.

It is unconscionable that Facebook, Instagram’s parent company, allows a U.N.-designated terrorist like Ajmi to remain active, let alone use the platform to solicit donations for terrorist-linked charities and as a business opportunity for himself. Instagram’s Community Guidelines asserts that it is not a platform used to “support or praise terrorism.” Its parent company, Facebook, similarly claims that “social media should not be a place where terrorists have a voice. We want to be clear how seriously we take this.” And yet, it remains the case that Instagram is allowing an internationally-sanctioned al-Qaeda terrorist financier to run rampant on its platform, raising money for himself and other terrorist-linked actors.

It’s time for Facebook prove its “seriousness” and crack down on terrorist financing carried out in plain view on its platforms. It’s time to shut down Ajmi.

In a bid to better its international standing, Hamas unveiled its new political platform May 1 in Qatar. Despite what are being marketed as ideological compromises, the new document is depressingly similar to its old political platform. What it reveals, instead of any meaningful movement toward a lasting peace, is a cynical attempt by Hamas to ingratiate itself with the region’s Sunni powers.

Since Hamas won Palestinian legislative elections in 2006 and began its authoritarian stranglehold on the citizens of Gaza, the so-called quartet of Middle East peacemakers (the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia) have demanded the group renounce violence, recognize Israel, and adhere to past Palestinian agreements before receiving international recognition. Hamas has routinely refused. But the group’s frayed ties with Iran have forced it to go cup in hand to neighboring Egypt and other Sunni nations, which led to this new document.

Hamas’s 1988 charter focuses on four central themes: Hamas’s allegiance to the Muslim Brotherhood; Palestine’s sanctity as part of the greater Arab nation; Israel’s illegitimacy as a state; and Hamas’s dedication to destroying Israel through armed conflict and only armed conflict. The document is also peppered with anti-Semitic tropes that make clear that Hamas’s outrage is directed at all of “the warmongering Jews,” not just Israelis. For example, Article 28 specifies: “Israel, Judaism and Jews challenge Islam and the Moslem people.”

Gone from the new policy document, which does not replace the original 1988 charter, are the references to “the Jews.” But Israel remains, and Hamas’s leaders swear they are not anti-Semitic, only anti-Zionist. Yet that claim is inconveniently contradicted by everyday evidence.  Hamas’s official al-Aqsa television station continues to broadcast sermons demonizing “the Jews,” such as a January 6 sermon by a Hamas parliamentarian accusing “the criminal Jews” of smuggling drugs and pornography into Gaza in order to undermine Palestinian society.

Hamas’s new document falls pitifully short of meeting international demands. While it accepts a Palestinian state along the pre-1967 ceasefire lines, it does not recognize Israel’s legitimacy. “We were and we still are in an open war with the criminal enemy,” Hamas political leader Khaled Meshaal said on March 27, referring to Israel. And while the new document accepts a Palestinian state along the pre-1967 lines, it also rejects “any alternatives to the full and complete liberation of Palestine, from the river to the sea.”

Nor has Hamas renounced violence or its determination to destroy Israel. In the last 10 years, Hamas has launched thousands of rockets at Israeli civilian centers. In Late March, Hamas reportedly acquired dozens of new and more powerful missiles.  The recent election of hardliner Yahya Sinwar as Hamas’s political leader in Gaza reinforces Hamas’s commitment to armed conflict. Sinwar is closely associated with Hamas’s armed wing, which maintains ties to ISIS’s affiliate in the Sinai. Hamas’s new document continues to embrace “armed resistance” as “the strategic choice for protecting the principles and the rights of the Palestinian people.”

If Hamas’s core ideologies remain intact, what has changed and what is the purpose of this new document? The biggest modification is the removal of references to the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas’s original charter defined Hamas as “one of the wings of the Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine.” Since the 2013 fall of Egypt’s Brotherhood-led government, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf states have designated the Brotherhood a terrorist organization. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has cajoled Hamas to do the same as a precondition for restoring ties. Hence, Hamas has cleansed references to the Brotherhood from its offices and its new political program.

But words on a piece of paper cannot override genetics. Hamas is still an outgrowth of the Brotherhood, and the two groups share the core values of Islamism. Rather than an ideological shift, Hamas's rewrite is nothing more than realpolitik, an opportunistic ploy to get back into Egypt’s graces and reopen its smuggling tunnels to that country. Whether Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas will ally with whoever presents the better deal.

The disavowal of the Brotherhood may be enough to mend some fences, but the new political program remains far removed from the Quartet’s demands. It is a momentary distraction from the fact that Hamas’s core ideology of violent Islamism is immutable and remains in full effect.

Hamas may have put a new coat of paint on the barn, but the foundation is still rotten. They just hope you won’t notice. 

Turkish voters will decide on April 16 whether their country’s parliamentary system, where the prime minister is chosen by elected lawmakers, should be replaced by a presidential model with a strong executive. Should the constitutional referendum pass, the role of prime minister will be dissolved, and Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, will have new and unprecedented powers to appoint his own cabinet and name top members of the judiciary. A yes vote will also extend Erdogan’s hold on power by making him eligible for two additional five year terms and give him the authority to dissolve parliament on national security grounds without the approval from any other government body.

The Netherlands and Germany entered the campaign fray since they host a large community of Turkish ex-pats who will be voting on April 16. Given the greater press freedoms in Europe, the “No” campaign has a stronger voice abroad than in Turkey itself. This has increased tensions between Turkey and the governments of Germany and the Netherlands, reminding the public of the growing clash between the autocratic tendencies of Erdogan and the more open societies of Europe vis-à-vis politicians. Erdogan has arrested hundreds of journalists in the past few years for criticizing his political positions, and even demanded in 2016 that Germany prosecute a comedian for satirizing him.

Polling suggests the support for Erdogan’s constitutional reforms are as close as 50-50 and as they have done in the past, Erdogan and his party, the AKP, have waged a campaign based on the need to respond to internal and external terror threats.

Regionally, Turkey continues to oppose the Assad regime, but has also tried to patch up differences with Russia and has also played a role in arming and training fighters that are slowing clawing their way toward the ISIS stronghold of Raqqa.  

The April 6 U.S. bombing of a Syrian airbase used by the Assad regime to launch a chemical weapons attack on the town of Khan Sheikhun, signaling a possible increase in U.S. involvement in the region, was supported by Erdogan. But Turkish support for a larger role in Syria is likely to wane in the long-term since the West’s anti-ISIS strategy heavily relies on Kurdish fighters – an ethnic group that the AKP and Erdogan consider a greater threat to Turkish borders than ISIS – and one whose demands at the end of the war will likely be recognition of a larger Kurdistan than currently exists in northern Iraq.

Should Erdogan prevail on April 16, and consolidate more executive power, the relationship between NATO member Turkey and the West is likely to deteriorate further. Erdogan may be intentionally gambling with Turkey’s western relationships in favor of cultivating a leadership role in Muslim-majority countries. Strong economic gains in the past 10 years gave Erdogan the ability to advance his neo-Ottoman agenda by building economic, charitable and religious ties from Bosnia to Pakistan. Moreover, Erdogan has used his international trips to Muslim-majority countries to push the argument that Muslim countries must unite in opposition to an anti-Islam agenda in the West. As a result, during the time Turkey has been stable and relatively prosperous, Erdogan succeeded in making himself popular among Muslims globally. Whether turning East is economically an effective strategy remains to be seen.

Erdogan’s over-confidence may become Turkey’s Achilles heel.  If the constitutional referendum passes, the West will likely become warier of the Turkish regime in general, hurting Turkey’s economy in the long-run, though probably not hurting Erdogan and his family personally.  Consequently, the economic power of Turkey, which is the engine of Erdogan’s soft power in the East, may lose steam, resulting in the AKP falling out of favor among Turks if the country’s economic growth rate continues to drop from a its high of 9 percent in 2012; to 6.1 percent in 2015; and to 2.9 percent in 2016.

Conversely, if Erdogan’s “Yes” campaign fails, the AKP is likely to also lose the next general election in 2019, having over-played its hand politically, providing Turkey’s secular parties an opportunity to prove  they can again lead, despite Turkey’s complicated internal politics and thorny regional issues like the response to terrorism. 

On March 22, 2017, terrorist assailant Khalid Masood killed five people during a vehicle and stabbing attack in London. The following day, a similar attack was thwarted in Antwerp, Belgium. On April 7, another assailant carried out a suspected terrorist attack, this time in Sweden, hijacking a truck and careening into crowds of pedestrians at the Ahlens Mall in Stockholm, killing at least three people and wounding countless more. Similar ISIS-claimed attacks in Nice, Ohio, and Berlin each involved armed assailants using cars and trucks as weapons, charging at pedestrians in crowded civilian areas.

The recent spate of vehicular attacks is not a new phenomenon. Attacks using vehicles were carried out beginning in 2006 in London, Quebec, Dijon, Nantes, Jerusalem, and North Carolina. ISIS’s explicit calls to employ cars as weapons—and encouragement from other terrorist organizations like Hamas—appear to have served as an inspiration for the recent wave of attacks worldwide.

Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Hamas Call for (and Claim) Attacks:

Terrorist groups like al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Hamas have called for or claimed responsibility for vehicular terrorist attacks. Al-Qaeda’s second issue of Inspire magazine, in October 2010, contained an article urging vehicular attacks and referring to a pickup truck as a potential “mowing machine” that can be used to “mow down the enemies of Allah.” Inspire editor-in-chief Yahya Ibrahim urged al-Qaeda followers to “[g]o for the most crowded location” and “pick up as much speed as you can” in order “strike as many people as possible.”

Other groups have similarly encouraged the use of motor vehicles as weapons of terror. In the fall of 2014, ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani issued a call to kill non-believers using any means at their disposal. In November of that year, French ISIS fighter Abu Salman al-Faranci appeared in an ISIS video calling for followers to carry out attacks if they cannot travel to ISIS-held territory. As Faranci said: “Terrorize them and do not allow them to sleep due to fear and horror. There are weapons and cars available and targets ready to be hit. Even poison is available…”

On July 14, 2016, Tunisian-born Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel used a 19-ton refrigerated truck to carry out the Bastille Day attack in Nice, killing 84 people and wounding hundreds more. In mid-November 2016, ISIS’s third issue of Rumiyah included an article calling for its followers to carry out vehicle attacks. The article specified the ideal type, weight, and speed of a car needed for terror purposes, and encouraged attacks on “large outdoor conventions and celebrations, pedestrian-congested streets, outdoor markets, festivals, festivals, parades[, and] political rallies.” Later that month, Somali-born Abdul Razak Ali Artan carried out a car and knife attack at Ohio State University, wounding 11 people.

ISIS and al-Qaeda are not the only terrorist groups to urge vehicular attacks. In November 2014, Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups—including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—praised a wave of vehicular attacks in Israel and called for more. One such image posted online read, “Run [them] over, son of Hebron...and son of Jerusalem. Take your car...and run over the Zionists.”

Timeline of Major Vehicular Terrorist Attacks:

Terrorists have carried out attacks using cars and trucks in a wide range of countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, Israel, Germany, and Belgium. CEP has documented 11 major vehicular terrorist attacks in the United States and Europe since 2000. Of these attacks, three took place in France and two in the United States. The single deadliest vehicular terrorist attack in Europe was the July 2016 Bastille Day attack in Nice, when terrorist assailant Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel killed 84 people and wounded hundreds at Nice’s Promenade Des Anglais.

• March 4, 2006: United States. Iranian-born Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar uses an SUV to ram into pedestrians at the University of North Carolina, wounding eight people. Taheri-azar tells investigators that he carried out the attack in order to punish the U.S. government and “avenge the deaths or murders of Muslims around the world.”
• May 22, 2013: United Kingdom. Two British-born assailants ram a car into British soldier Lee Rigby before attacking and killing him with knives and a meat cleaver.
• October 20, 2014: Canada. Canadian-born ISIS supporter Martin Couture-Rouleau rams a car into a group of soldiers at a shopping center in Quebec, killing one and wounding another.
• December 21, 2014: France. A man rams his car into crowds in the eastern French city of Dijon while shouting “Allahu Akbar,” injuring 13 people.
• December 22, 2014: France. A man who had recently watched a program on Chechnya rams a van into a crowd of pedestrians in Nantes, western France, wounding at least 10 people.
• July 14, 2016: France. Tunisian-born Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel carries out the Bastille Day attacks in France, killing 84 people and wounding hundreds more. ISIS claims responsibility.
• November 28, 2016: United States. Somali-born Abdul Razak Ali Artan carries out the car and knife attack at Ohio State University, wounding 11 people. Prior to the attack, Artan calls al-Qaeda propagandist Anwar al-Awlaki “our hero” in a message posted to Facebook. ISIS claims responsibility.
• December 19, 2016: Germany. Tunisian-born Anis Amri carries out the Christmas Market attack in Germany, killing 12 people and wounding 48 others. ISIS claims responsibility.
• March 22, 2017: United Kingdom. British-born Khalid Masood rams a crowd of pedestrians on London’s Westminster Bridge, killing four people and wounding dozens more. The driver then crashes his car into the gates of the Palace of Westminster. He stabs to death a police officer outside the nearby Houses of Parliament before being shot and killed by police. ISIS claims responsibility.
• March 23, 2017: Belgium. A man is intercepted while driving at high-speed toward crowds at De Meir, the major shopping street in Antwerp.
• April 7, 2017: Sweden. An unidentified assailant drives a truck into a crowd at a shopping mall in Stockholm, killing at least three people and injuring others.

There has also been a wave of vehicular terrorist attacks targeting Israeli soldiers and civilians. These car-ramming attacks include:

• July 2, 2008: Assailant rams a front-end loader into buses and cars in Jerusalem, killing three people and wounding 40 others.
• July 22, 2008: Assailant rams a bulldozer into nearby vehicles in Jerusalem, wounding at least 16 people.
• September 22, 2008: Assailant rams his car into a group of Israelis in Jerusalem, injuring 15 Israeli soldiers and four civilians.
• March 5, 2009: Assailant uses a bulldozer to ram into an Israeli police car, injuring two officers.
• October 22, 2014: Assailant rams his car into a crowd of pedestrians at a light rail train station in Jerusalem, killing two people—including a three-month-old girl—and wounding seven more.
• November 5, 2014: Assailant drives into a crowded area in Jerusalem, killing two people and wounding more than a dozen others. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) both praise the recent wave of vehicular attacks and call for more.
• January 8, 2017: An alleged ISIS supporter plows a truck into a group of Israeli soldiers in Jerusalem, killing four people and injuring at least 10 others.
• April 6, 2017: Assailant carries out a vehicular attack in the West Bank, killing one Israeli soldier and wounding another in an attack praised by Hamas.