More than a decade into the Islamist insurgency across the Sahel, terror groups—such as the al-Qaeda aligned Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Sahel (IS Sahel)—remain consistent in their operations and tactics. What has changed as they consolidate control over the region is the demographic that the terror network now targets. When terror groups want to signal their status as a legitimate threat, their operations prioritize targeting senior leaders, political figures, and foreigners. However, as the conflict has evolved, there has been an increase in civilian abductions as a strategy to exercise control over large communities, delegitimize state institutions, and further position themselves as a significant threat to the international community.

Abduction As a Tactic of Terror

Terror groups carry out abductions because the tactic requires relatively minimal planning and offers quick and high payouts. The operation may also result in consistent media coverage based on the profile of the individual or groups kidnapped. Successful kidnapping campaigns targeting foreign nationals and senior political leaders legitimize the insurgents as threats and discredit the capability of national security forces and their state governments. Ransoms also help finance terror operations, allowing the group to remain relevant in all stages of the conflict even during periods of inactive warfare.

Violent extremists carry out kidnappings as a reliable tactic in achieving geographic expansion and largescale forced submission to their fundamentalist creed. On a more local level, terror groups abduct community leaders to gain intelligence and establish a foothold across critical areas, as seen in JNIM’s early expansion across northern Mali.Flore Berger, “Kidnappings as part of territorial expansion,” Global Initiative Against Transnational Crime, March 2023, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Flore-Berger-The-silent-threat-Kidnappings-in-Burkina-Faso-GI-TOC-March-2023.pdf. Abductions further serve as a way to punish and intimidate communities who refuse to submit or are accused of working against the violent extremist group. Accordingly, asserting control reiterates the growing influence of terror groups across geography and social environments.

Targeting the Vulnerable

While economic and political incentives drive violent extremists to abduct civil servants, aid workers, and higher-profile individuals, insurgents seek social value when carrying out abductions against “easy-target” demographics. Significantly, women and children—a historically defenseless demographic within conflict zones—comprise 80 percent of the displaced population in the Sahel’s crisis, making them highly vulnerable to the violent whims of jihadists.Vibhu Mishra, “In Africa’s Sahel, conflict and climate change force millions from their homes,” United Nations, October 10, 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/10/1166076.

However, enforcing, maintaining, and expanding control across a region requires compliance from the public. In turn, terror groups deprive vulnerable communities of basic goods and services by destroying schools, threatening to kill and abduct educators, and preventing access to food supplies and foreign aid. In Burkina Faso, between July 2022 and June 2024, JNIM and ISGS limited humanitarian access to Centre-Nord, Sahel, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions.“Children and armed conflict in Burkina Faso,” United Nations Security Council, March 19, 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/101. The cowardly exploitation of helpless groups expedites large-scale deference to and reliance on jihadist groups for access to vital goods and aid.“Child alert: Extreme jeopardy in the central Sahel,” UNICEF, March 2023, https://www.unicef.org/child-alert/central-sahel-extreme-jeopardy. Opposition is unlikely within these communities as fear of retaliatory attacks from well-equipped and brutally violent jihadists prevents any pushback.

The Geographic and Generational Impact of Abductions

More than 14,800 schools have closed in the region in response to the unpredictable dangers of the insurgency, depriving three million children of education and temporary escape from violence.Vibhu Mishra, “In Africa’s Sahel, conflict and climate change force millions from their homes,” United Nations, October 10, 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/10/1166076. Between July 2022 and June 2024, a UN monitoring team recorded the abduction of 592 children, most of which were girls.“Children and armed conflict,” United Nations Security Council, June 17, 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/247. In the entirety of 2024, JNIM abducted 157 children while ISGS was responsible for the abduction of 80 children.“Children and armed conflict,” United Nations Security Council, June 17, 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/247. When terror groups specifically target schools and children, it creates a generational effect. Children begin associating school with risk, often limiting their attendance or opting out entirely.“2025 Humanitarian Needs & Requirements Overview Sahel,” CALP Network, May 2025, https://www.calpnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Sahel-2025-HNRO-ENG-0530.pdf.

Being out of school disproportionately affects girls, especially those in conflict zones.“2025 Humanitarian Needs & Requirements Overview Sahel,” CALP Network, May 2025, https://www.calpnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Sahel-2025-HNRO-ENG-0530.pdf. Out-of-school girls, as well as female abductees, are more likely to face potential indoctrination into fundamental Islamism, child marriage, sexual violence, forced labor, and in rare instances, fight training.“Nigeria: One year on since Boko Haram kidnappings,” Amnesty International UK, accessed October 16, 2025, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/nigeria-one-year-boko-haram-kidnappings; Caroline Kimeu and Ope Adetayo, “Ten years on from Chibok, what happened to the 276 Nigerian girls snatched from their school?,” Guardian, April 11, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/apr/11/nigeria-chibok-boko-haram-girls-school-abductions-islamist-militants-borno-yobe-katsina-kaduna. Unfortunately, due to social stigmatization and limited access to medical and psychosocial services, girls often remain silent about the abuse they have experienced. Families similarly remain silent about female-targeted abductions and abuse to placate militants who regularly employ reprisal attacks against informants.“CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE s/2020/487 03 June 2020 report of the united nations secretary-general,” United Nations, June 3, 2020, https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/report/conflict-related-sexual-violence-report-of-the-united-nations-secretary-general/2019-SG-Report.pdf. In some cases, girls are willingly placed in the hands of militants as an insurance policy to protect families from further attacks.

Boys are also targeted by terror groups but under different circumstances. Of the 257 children recruited by extremist groups in Burkina Faso between July 2022 and June 2024, boys were mostly affected. Upon enlistment—whether coercive or voluntary—fledgling recruits are presumably trained in combat to support the terror group’s goals.“Children and armed conflict in Burkina Faso,” United Nation Security Council, March 19, 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/101. The abduction and recruitment of children provides insurgent groups with reserves of troops, reinforcing abduction as an indispensable tool of terrorism.

Without accountable governments, violent extremists face no recourse in committing grave crimes, which normalizes violence against children and further disempowers an already defenseless demographic. Worryingly, abductions have increased beyond the JNIM and ISS strongholds of Burkina Faso and Mali.Flore Berger, Lyes Tagziria and Aziz Mossi, “Hostage to violent extremism: Kidnapping in northern Benin,” ECOWAS Commission, February 2024, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Flore-Berger-Lyes-Tagziria-and-Aziz-Mossi-Hostage-to-violent-extremism.-Kidnapping-in-northern-Benin-OCWAR-T-February-2024.pdf. In late October 2025, JNIM claimed its first attack in Nigeria, a country where mass abductions of school children have occurred for more than a decade. “Mass Kidnapping in Nigeria Demonstrates Growing Unrest,” The Soufan Center, November 25, 2025, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-november-25/. Benin also experienced a drastic increase in kidnappings as JNIM positioned itself across the Atacora and Alibori departments in 2023.Flore Berger, Lyes Tagziria and Aziz Mossi; “Hostage to violent extremism: Kidnapping in northern Benin,” Organised Crime: West African Response to Trafficking, February 2024, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Flore-Berger-Lyes-Tagziria-and-Aziz-Mossi-Hostage-to-violent-extremism.-Kidnapping-in-northern-Benin-OCWAR-T-February-2024.pdf. Regions away, ISIS-Mozambique abducted 120 children in June 2025, further suggesting that the tactic reaches far beyond the Sahel and West Africa. “At least 120 children have been abducted by insurgents in Mozambique, rights group says,” Associated Press, June 24, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/mozambique-shabab-insurgents-child-kidnap-ebb0df840676355f7e261d132ec49d91%C2%A0.

What Can Be Done?

States across the Sahel must establish comprehensive protective guardrails for children, women, schools, and humanitarian services. They should focus on promoting alternatives to violent extremism and ensuring protection for communities who remain opposed to jihadist influence. Children must also be provided training in the instance they are ever abducted—such as how to trace their families upon release, their right to medical and psychological support, and access to sensitive rehabilitation programs to offset any radicalization that may have occurred.“Abduction of Children,” UNICEF, accessed October 16, 2025, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/six-grave-violations/abduction-of-children/.

More immediate recommendations include increasing communication across neighboring municipalities and supporting local-level activism to prevent future large-scale abductions. In August 2024, 40 women were abducted while gathering fruit in northern Burkina Faso. News of the abduction failed to reach nearby communities, and subsequently, 20 more women were abducted the next day.“Burkina Faso: Some 50 women kidnapped in the north by suspected jihadists,” Africa News, August 13, 2024, https://www.africanews.com/2023/01/16/burkina-faso-some-50-women-kidnapped-in-the-north-by-suspected-jihadists/. In some cases, highly vulnerable female community leaders have taken it upon themselves to contain violent extremist influence across their communities. These women have not only organized rallies and boycotts but have actively negotiated with rebels to disarm and release abducted children.Aili Mari Tripp, Awa Maiga, and Maina Yahi, ““We Are Always Each Other's Keeper”: Transformative Dimensions of Women's Local Peacebuilding in Africa,” Global Studies Quarterly, February 7, 2025, https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/5/1/ksaf003/8005162. Despite the smaller scale of their initiatives, these women have taken their safety into their own hands, reenforcing just how little states have done to contain violent extremism and the lack of public confidence towards national counterterrorism operations. Prioritizing civilian safety is a sustainable pathway to peace and security, but as terror groups prey on vulnerable communities without any meaningful pushback, the Sahel remains blocked off from opportunities of political stability and effective redevelopment.