By Elena Martynova, EU GLOCTER PhD Candidate, Seconded to CEP

Most analyses of terrorism and sports focus on attacks that take place at stadiums. Much less attention has been given to whether sports themselves or the wider industries surrounding them can be used for terrorism financing. This blog covers several potential intersections between sports and the terrorism financing landscape, with consideration of moving money or even generating revenue from online sources such as sports betting, esports, and gaming forums, as well as in the physical world through combat or training clubs and sporting events. 

Sports Betting and Gambling

Sports betting has rapidly expanded into a massive global industry, valued at approximately USD 100.9 billion in 2024, with Europe accounting for the largest share of global revenue. The rise of online sportsbooks, micro-betting, and crypto-based casinos introduces new vulnerabilities for terrorist financing. While many jurisdictions classify casinos as high-risk and impose corresponding controls on licensed platforms, similar scrutiny is not always applied to sports betting, especially in recognizing how closely these industries overlap. 

The greatest risks emerge not from legitimate operators but from illegal or loosely regulated platforms. Extremist groups, unlike criminal organizations, might not rely on match-fixing to generate revenue, but they can exploit these platforms to move or obscure funds. Large betting farms such as the controversial 1xBet operate in regulatory gray zones, hosting vast numbers of obscure sporting events that funnel users toward more profitable gambling products and create opportunities for misuse. Poorly regulated sportsbooks, particularly those using cryptocurrencies, enable individuals to deposit illicit funds into online wallets and withdraw them elsewhere as seemingly legitimate “winnings.” As highlighted in a recent Isle of Man typology report, three individuals colluded in online poker games to channel funds to a player later found to have alleged ties to a sanctioned North African terrorist organization. Ultimately, on online sports betting platforms, illegal operators, criminal networks, and potentially even state-linked actors, can exploit high-transaction volumes and potentially weak oversight depending on the jurisdiction in which they operate.

Gaming and Forums

Whether gaming qualifies as a sport is debatable, but it increasingly intersects with the financial dynamics seen in sports and gambling. Research by GNET and RUSI has documented cases where extremist actors used in-game currency to move or obscure funds, or even sold extremist games and modifications. Play-to-Earn (P2E) models could also increase vulnerabilities and haven’t been explored by existing research. This is where blockchain-based games reward players with crypto tokens or NFTs that can be sold on exchanges, creating decentralized assets with real-world value. These systems could enable discreet value transfers or even self-financing by lone actors, especially as virtual gaming economies begin to resemble lightly regulated financial platforms.

Forums revolving around gaming present additional challenges. Gaming communities could easily be used to solicit membership “dues” or support payments that are redirected to extremist causes. Streaming platforms pose similar risks, with tipping functions, prepaid-card donations, and crypto contributions complicating efforts to trace the origin of funds. The money can be significant, with streamers that promote white supremacist theories and right-wing extremist ideological narratives earning between $150,000 and $550,000 in 2020 on specific platforms. Although still developing, these trends are similar to the risks emerging in online sports betting, particularly the virtual economies, pseudonymity, and large, networked communities, making gaming an increasingly important part of the broader discussion on terrorism financing.

Physical Clubs

Combat sports, particularly mixed martial arts, have been identified by the EU’s Radicalisation Awareness Network and CEP as spaces where some right-wing extremist groups recruit members, build cohesion, and generate income through events, merchandise, and training fees. Investigations in Germany have revealed fight clubs with links to neo-Nazi networks that host tournaments and sell branded gear as part of a wider funding model. Smaller sports clubs are similarly vulnerable. These organizations can be used to channel funds through fake sponsorships, inflated participation fees, or low-visibility community fundraising activities. Because sports clubs tend to be well-trusted local institutions, they can be exploited without attracting the same scrutiny applied to more traditional nonprofit channels.

Sporting Events

Sports events generate a wide range of financial activity, and several parts can be co-opted by extremist-affiliated groups in a similar way to criminal organizations. At the local level, fans (such as ultra groups), stadium vendors, ticket sellers, equipment shops, and informal betting operators could be sympathetic to extremist causes or may be pressured to pay “fees” or protection money. These revenues are rarely large but are steady and predictable, making them attractive for sustaining day-to-day operations. Beyond localized taxation, illicit sports merchandise markets often intersect with broader smuggling networks, while sports equipment supply chains create opportunities for trade-based money laundering through practices like over- or under-invoicing. 

Risk Context 

In general, especially right-wing extremist movements, which in some cases also rely on decentralized, self-financed models, could easily use combat sports events, gaming communities, and betting platforms to raise small amounts of money for operations, including lone-actor activity. Hybrid criminal-extremist partnerships could become more active in sports like football clubs, particularly in regions where organized crime already plays a significant role. New developments such as sports NFTs, crypto-based prize pools, and tokenized fan platforms could introduce future vulnerabilities. While none of these techniques are guaranteed, they are consistent with how extremist actors have historically adapted to new financial environments.

All of this, however, needs to be kept in context. Most of the available public evidence on illicit sports relates to money laundering activity of criminal groups. The sports sector should not be treated as a primary terrorism financing channel. However, there must be a focus on identifying and monitoring blind spots and ensuring proportionate oversight. Sports associations, particularly at the amateur level, could benefit from greater transparency requirements around sponsorships and beneficial ownership. Closer cooperation between regulators and private-sector actors in betting, esports, streaming, and event management would also help. Attention to right-wing extremist financing is especially important, as these networks rely heavily on merchandise and events that overlap with sports-related activities.

The broader lesson is that policymakers and researchers should not focus solely on new technologies when thinking about terrorism financing, but also on broader industry contexts. Sports are a large cultural and economic domain. Extremist actors, who are often opportunistic rather than innovative, are likely to exploit what is familiar and profitable. Sports might not become a dominant terrorism financing channel, but they are part of the wider ecosystem that extremists move through. Ignoring that connection risks overlooking something potentially major.