News and Media

On March 8, 2016, 29-year-old American combat veteran Taylor Force was brutally murdered in a Tel Aviv stabbing spree that wounded 10 other people. The attacker, 22-year-old Bashar Masalha of the West Bank, was shot dead by Israeli police. A native of Lubbock, Texas, Force graduated from West Point in 2009 and served tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan. He was in Israel on a trip with his Vanderbilt University classmates.

While Force’s family was left to mourn his slaying, Masalha’s family reportedly began earning a monthly salary from the Palestinian Authority (PA). Masalha’s family is but one of many receiving these stipends from the PA, colloquially known as “pay-for-slay.” Palestinian government money is paid out to terrorists serving sentences in Israeli prisons, as well as to the families of any Palestinian killed by Israel, including terrorists killed carrying out a terror attack. Like Masalha.

In July 2017, the Times of Israel reported that—based on numbers provided by the PA Finance Ministry—the PA’s budget allocated more than $344 million for so-called martyrs’ payments to prisoners and families of those “killed or wounded in the struggle against Zionism.” Of the $344 million, about $153 million was allocated to current and former prisoners, while $191 million was earmarked for “families of martyrs,” an increase of more than $16 million over the previous year.

It is an odious practice that encourages and rewards terrorism. Inspired by the tragic death of Taylor Force, the U.S. Congress is pushing the PA to end these payments by threatening to cut off American aid. Introduced in the House of Representatives and in the Senate in 2017, the Taylor Force Act conditions U.S. aid on the PA taking steps to end the financial incentive to carry our violence and terrorism against Israeli and U.S. citizens. The bills specifically call for an end to payments to the families of those imprisoned after being convicted of terrorist acts or who died while carrying out terrorist acts.

The U.S. government is the largest donor to the PA, though its payments are indirect. Overall, since the creation of the PA in 1994, the U.S. government has contributed more than $5 billion in bilateral economic and non-lethal security assistance. U.S. aid, is divided into three categories: development and humanitarian assistance through USAID, economic assistance for law and order, and support for the U.N. Relief Works Agency (UNRWA). In fiscal year 2016, the U.S. government contributed $290 million to the PA through USAID and $54.8 million for security and justice assistance.

The House passed the Taylor Force Act in December. Senate sponsor, Senator Lindsay Graham, believes it will pass soon as part of an omnibus spending bill.

Support for the bill is not universal in Israel. More than 100 Israeli generals spoke out last year warning that the denial of U.S. economic aid to the PA could leave it unable to fund infrastructure projects and cause massive budget gaps, hastening its economic collapse and fostering chaos and insecurity.

Furthermore, Palestinian security cooperation has helped Israel maintain relative calm in the West Bank. Without a functioning PA, the West Bank could fall into anarchy, allowing Hamas—or something worse—to seize control. Should that scenario play out, Israel would have no choice but to reassert its military authority throughout the territory to prevent Hamas from seizing power. Commanders for Israel’s Security, the group of Israeli generals and senior intelligence officials behind last year’s protest against the bill, has called for the bill’s details to be changed to prevent this scenario. Similarly, an August 2017 op-ed co-authored by CEP Board Member Ambassador Dennis Ross called for incentivizing the PA to reform, rather than punishing it.

The pernicious practice of so-called martyrs’ payments must end, there is no disagreement on this point. The question is how?

In the coming months, Hizb ut-Tahrir America—the U.S. chapter of the Hizb ut-Tahrir (“HT”) Islamist network—plans to host its annual Khilafa Conference, which extols the virtues of establishing a future global Islamic caliphate. While HT doesn’t explicitly call for violence, it does indoctrinate the impressionable to a way of thinking that can and has led members toward violent extremism. Because of its incendiary and radical teachings, Hilton, Ramada, Best Western, and other hotel companies should thoroughly reject HT’s brand of extremism and deny HT a venue.

HT seeks to transform existing Muslim governments into a single Islamic caliphate based on a hardline interpretation of the Quran. HT intends to do this through grassroots outreach to sway Muslims to effect change through popular protest. HT’s international leaders have spoken out vociferously against Western ideals of freedom and tolerance. For example, Australian HT representative Uthman Bader has openly endorsed the death penalty for Muslim apostates. Abdul Wahid, executive chair of HT Britain, has denounced valuable and necessary extremist deradicalization programs for “making people less Islamic.”

Former HT leader Maajid Nawaz, now a renowned international advocate against extremism, has recalled the “ambivalent” attitude toward terrorist violence within HT, which has its share of infamous alumni. Before joining al-Qaeda, both Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and former al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi were members of HT. ISIS executioner Mohammed Emwazi, a.k.a. “Jihadi John,” reportedly attended HT events while in university in England. In 1996, former HT leader Omar Bakri Muhammad founded al-Muhajiroun with Anjem Choudary. The British government has outlawed al-Muhajiroun, a terrorist organization that is reportedly linked to half of the terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom since 1995. Choudary is currently serving a prison sentence for supporting ISIS, while Bakri Muhammad is serving a prison sentence in Lebanon for creating a Lebanese al-Qaeda affiliate.

HT has been banned in multiple countries, including Germany, Turkey, Russia, and Jordan. Using freedom of speech as a shield for its odious rhetoric, HT remains free to operate within most Western democracies, including Australia, Great Britain, and the United States. The Australian and British governments have sought to ban the group.

While HT certainly has the constitutional right to free speech and assembly, private U.S. corporations have no obligation to provide them venues for the propagation of extremism. Indeed, there is precedent for rejecting HT. In 2012, the Meadows Club in Illinois refused to host HT’s annual conference. Marriott also canceled a 2010 HT event in Illinois. Since 2014, HT America has found a home at the Ramada Inn in Glendale Heights, Illinois, where it has held at least nine events. In 2017, the Ramada hosted HT’s annual conference in April and then another gathering in June.

CEP has written to Ramada’s corporate management—the Wyndham Hotel Group—requesting that it examine HT’s record and bar the organization from using its facilities. While the hotel chain did not respond, HT’s public event in November, 2017 was instead held at the Hilton Indian Lakes Hotel in Bloomingdale, Illinois. We hope that means Ramada’s corporate leaders reconsidered the business ramifications of hosting a global Islamist group. Sadly, the Hilton corporation has also been unresponsive to written concerns about HT.

Both companies boast of their commitment to corporate social responsibility and human rights. This should include denying space to groups that overtly promote radical ideologies. These hotel chains should take the moral and responsible stand and ensure that there is no room for hatred and extremism.

On February 13, a channel titled “Le Moujahid Solitaire” (The Lone/Solitary Mujahid) appeared on the Telegram messaging platform. The French language group posted information on several types of explosives that can be made with legally obtainable components, as well as how to manufacture various poisons. The channel also shared a link to a bomb-making instructional video hosted on the French video-sharing site, Dailymotion. The Telegram channel is notable because of its content and French-language focus, especially following the recent arrest of a man in Nîmes, France who was suspected of planning a terrorist attack.

Telegram is an encrypted chat and message service available for mobile devices and personal computers. The program is free, allows for anonymity, and is easy to use, allowing users to quickly share text, video, and audio content. As of December 2017, it had more than 180 million users worldwide and continues to gain hundreds of thousands of new users every day. It wasn’t until after the November 2015 Paris attacks that Telegram felt compelled to crack down on terrorists’ misuse of its platform, following allegations that the ISIS assailants used the tool to communicate and plot. Telegram continued to face controversy when, in late January, the company’s mobile app was temporarily removed from the Apple Store due to users disseminating child pornography.

The “Le Moujahid Solitaire” is the first French language iteration of the notorious English language Telegram channel, “Lone Mujahid.” This channel was known for bomb making instructions, advice on knife attacks, and suggesting potential targets. Previous versions of the “Lone Mujahid” channel have used British English, and have urged attacks in the U.K. and Australia. The French language focus of the channel is new, and with more than 125 members, it shows the continued desire of ISIS and their online supporters to strike in Europe.

The appearance of “Le Moujahid Solitaire” follows several recent terrorism related arrests in France. On January 20, 2018, it was reported that French authorities had arrested a man in Nîmes who was in possession of explosives and bomb-making instructions. The individual had made a video in which he pledged allegiance to ISIS. In September and November, French police made several arrests related to suspected terror cells, including potential bombings. French authorities claimed that in the November arrests, perpetrators communicated via Telegram.

Telegram claims to close approximately 100-200 ISIS Telegram channels per day for violations of its terms of use, yet troubling channels continue to appear on the platform. As long as the company refuses to take further action to permanently remove and/or prevent the ongoing misuse of its platform, channels such as “Lone Mujahid” and its potential foreign language offshoots will flourish. Moreover, the appearance of the French Telegram channel illustrates how the threat of ISIS remains despite the group’s decrease in territorial holdings.

YouTube’s actions continue to fall short of its rhetoric when it comes to fighting extremism. Despite very public announcements of new technologies, more content reviewers, and a stated dedication to preventing terrorists and extremist groups from using the site, YouTube is still lacking in three categories: the removal of Anwar al-Awlaki content; preventing the initial upload of new official ISIS content; and removing videos made by ISIS supporters. While YouTube has made progress in deleting of thousands of hours of gruesome content and videos that urge the use of violence, there is still a troubling amount of room for improvement.

After years of pressure, YouTube officially began to remove all Awlaki videos last November. A leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Awlaki has been tied to 55 extremists in the U.S., either through direct communication while he was alive or through the proliferation of his sermons and lectures on platforms like YouTube. YouTube’s pledge to remove all examples of Awlaki content was praised on both sides of the aisle, with Senators Cotton and Feinstein both voicing their support. And yet, since then, Awlaki content remains on YouTube. Simple searches in late January revealed 14 Awlaki videos still on the site, including some that had been uploaded in December, long after YouTube’s ban. It is very likely that even more Awlaki videos have made their way back to the site, concealed by a modicum of sophistication. This calls into question YouTube’s long-term commitment to preventing banned content from being reintroduced onto the platform.

New ISIS videos can remain on YouTube for days. The company claims to remove extremist videos through hashing technology, which functions like a video fingerprint. Once a hash is created from a video, it can be used to prevent reuploads of that same footage. When applied correctly, hashing can indeed prevent unwanted extremist and terrorist propaganda from making it onto the platform in the first place. Unfortunately, it appears that YouTube lacks clear procedures and sufficient capacity for rapid identification of new content to create new hashes, which can be deployed to remove new ISIS propaganda films. In three recent cases, official ISIS videos calling for terrorist attacks were on the site for 2 days, 6 hours, and 3 hours, respectively, garnering thousands of views. In early January, the European Commission set a goal of 2 hours for the removal of terrorist content, which includes new videos as well as reuploaded content. While YouTube has improved the rate at which it removes reuploaded content, 2 days, and even 3 hours, is too long for terrorist content to remain active and sharable on the site.

Additionally, thinly-veiled pro-ISIS media groups are still active on YouTube. An English language channel identified as the “War and Media Agency,” which purports to be a documentary news program, has been on the platform for more than a month. Several of its videos have thousands of views, and the channel has more than 150 subscribers. The “War and Media Agency” is, in fact, an online pro-ISIS front that uses ISIS produced photos and a robotic voice generator to broadcast statements from ISIS’s Amaq News Agency. It is disconcerting that such a low level of subterfuge could fool both YouTube’s content reviewers and the site’s machine learning algorithms and vaunted artificial intelligence.

It has been almost three and a half years since the first ISIS beheading videos appeared on YouTube, and far longer since extremists have used the website to amplify their calls for violence. It is unacceptable that YouTube has not been able to fully solve either problem despite repeated assurances. The situation is compounded by YouTube’s lack of transparency regarding which videos have been hashed and how these hashes are deployed to the site. A more proactive and transparent approach will be critical to prevent the next terrorist organization, hate group, or propagandist from also making the site a pillar of their online strategy.