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As evidenced by the recent cyberattack against Sony Pictures, acts of cyberterrorism are increasingly being committed by state actors.

From mid-2012 to early 2013, a group called the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters launched more than 200 distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against PNC, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and other financial institutions. DDoS attacks overwhelm websites with traffic, such as external communications requests, in order to overwhelm and create a bottleneck within the server’s operations, making the site unreachable.

The U.S. accused Iran and its Quds Force, the Islamic Republic’s expeditionary terrorist arm, of orchestrating the attacks.

The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), loyal to Syrian President Bashar Assad, claimed responsibility for a number of cyberattacks in 2013. It hacked into the Associated Press’ Twitter account and released a tweet saying that President Obama had been wounded in a White House bombing. As a result, the Dow Jones average plunged 140 points. The SEA hacked the U.S. Marines’ website, posting a message accusing President Obama of siding with al-Qaeda in Syria. It also targeted Qatar’s domain name system, compromising government websites, including state-sponsored Al Jazeera.

One component of a comprehensive defense against terrorism is heightened public awareness of the threat. The same is true for cyberterrorism. Coincidentally, the Sony attacks occurred at a time when the U.S. was attempting to do just that.  October was National Cyber Security Awareness Month and November was Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Month.

There are challenges to raising awareness of the threat from cyberterrorism, not the least of which is the lack of consensus on even a definition of the term.  

NATO, for example, defines cyberterrorism as “a cyber attack using or exploiting computer or communication networks to cause sufficient destruction to generate fear or intimidate a society into an ideological goal.”

The FBI defines it as the “premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which result in violence against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents.”

In her book, Computer Forensics: Cybercriminals, laws and evidence, cybercrime expert Dr. Marie-Helen Maras defines it as:

“The politically, religiously, or ideologically motivated use of computers (or related technology) by an individual, group, or state targeting critical infrastructure with the intention of harming persons and/or damaging property in order to influence the population (or segment of the population) or cause a government to change its policies.”

To appropriately respond to cyberterrorism, authorities first need to reach consensus on how to define it.  Until there is a standard definition, there cannot be effective laws and regulations aimed at preventing or curtailing this criminal activity.  Also, differing country to country standards make transnational cooperation and enforcement needlessly complex. This gap was highlighted by the government’s debate over whether the recent attack on Sony was cyberterrorism or cybervandalism.

CEP has opened its own front in the cyberspace battle with the #Digital Disruption Campaign, designed to identify and expose extremists who are misusing social media platforms like Twitter to radicalize and recruit new members, and to plan violent attacks against innocent people. Through this rigorous research and crowdsourcing campaign, CEP has monitored hundreds of accounts and exposed violent calls to action and instances of direct threats against individuals that jihadis are propagating on Twitter. 

On Jan. 27, CEP CEO Ambassador Mark Wallace, in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, highlighted the need for more aggressive actions for identifying and removing extremists from social media platforms. Wallace outlined a number of mechanisms by which social media companies can be proactive in preventing the hijacking and weaponization of Twitter and other platforms. He reiterated CEP’s calls for Twitter, in particular, to significantly strengthen its policies along the lines of new guidelines it developed to prevent bullying and harassment of women.

Fighting cyberterrorism will also require strengthened public-private partnerships. The Pentagon spends about $3 billion a year on cyberdefenses. A 2013 Executive Order called for increased information sharing to protect critical infrastructure. It largely focused on what the government provides to the private sector and not what the private sector provides to the government. To be effective, information sharing must be a two-way street.

In July 2013, 50 financial institutions simulated a cyberattack to test their responses. A key finding was that information sharing between the public and private sectors is essential to protecting critical infrastructure from cyberterrorism. Former Senator Judd Gregg, CEO of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, which led the exercise, said he hoped the test would encourage Congress to pass legislation promoting information-sharing.

Hopefully, an intensified awareness to the many dangers of cyberterrorism of all kinds, and greater cooperation between public and private entities can give this issue the exposure it deserves and boost the effectiveness of our efforts to prevent it.

Al-Qaeda cells and affiliated groups are increasingly reliant on the money they collect through kidnap-and-ransom operations. Although each group develops its own financial strategy, hostage-taking is a consistent and major source of income for AQ cells everywhere. Since 2008, al-Qaeda is believed to have accrued at least $150 million through ransoms. Following are brief summaries on how collecting ransom fits into the broader financial structure of various AQ groups. For a more in-depth analysis of the groups and their finances, please see our individual website reports.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): Of all al-Qaeda cells, AQIM has raked in the largest percentage of its money from ransoms, amassing upwards of $90 million to date. Kidnapping-and-ransom operations have become a characteristic of the North African al-Qaeda cell. AQIM has even published an online manual on the process for other jihadist groups. While hostage-and-ransom operations are AQIM’s primary source of funding, other fundraising operations supplement it. According to a report by the Australian government, these other fundraising operations include: “robbery, people and arms trafficking, money laundering and smuggling and increasingly, the facilitation of drug trafficking from South America into Europe,” as well as limited financial backing from AQIM supporters abroad.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): A New York Times article from July 2014 puts AQAP’s total yield from hostage-taking at almost $30 million. According to the U.S. State Department, kidnap-and-ransom operations are AQAP’s primary source of funding alongside robberies and other types of thefts. In a 2012 letter to Algerian allies, AQAP founder Nasir al-Wuhayshi wrote that “[m]ost of the battle costs, if not all, were paid for through the spoils. Almost half the spoils [for a year-long operation in Yemen] came from hostages.”

The Nusra Front: In September 2014, al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate reportedly raked in $25 million in exchange for the release of 45 United Nations peacekeepers. Up until this point, the Nusra Front seems to have relied on a monthly stipend from ISIS and private donations to fund its operations. Since the 2014 split and ensuing rivalry between al-Qaeda and ISIS, however, it is unlikely that ISIS has continued its monetary generosity. It is also unclear as to what role hostage-taking plays in the Nusra Front’s broader financial strategy. The Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate has thus far managed to garner a significant amount of financial support from wealthy Gulf-based donors.

Al-Shabab: As of July 2014, al-Qaeda’s Somalian affiliate has extorted more than  $5 million through kidnappings. Although significant, al-Shabab’s kidnapping-and-ransom operations do not serve as the group’s primary source of income. Instead, al-Shabab seems to derive most of its funding from an illicit charcoal trade, which accounts for an estimated $35-50 million annually.

From the Sinai Peninsula to Libya, jihadist groups have pledged allegiance to ISIS. The self-proclaimed “Islamic State” is exploiting its brand name to build loyalty and lure recruits.
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ISIS the Brand
In an audio recording released in early November 2014, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi claimed that jihadi groups in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia had pledged allegiance to ISIS. Baghdadi urged these groups to wage jihad against their respective governments, and change their names to reflect devotion to ISIS. Earlier in the year, jihadi groups in the Philippines and Indonesia took similar action, swearing their loyalty to ISIS.  

According to Middle East expert Samer Shehata, smaller jihadi groups join ISIS for increased recognition and legitimacy. When these groups join ISIS, they go from being off-the-radar to enjoying the visibility of the ISIS brand name. In turn, ISIS expands its name, bolstering its notoriety and international influence. But money is thought to play the biggest role, with Baghdadi offering funding in exchange for pledges.

Money Talks
With its daily income estimated at upwards of $3 million, ISIS is believed to be the richest terrorist group in history. According to King Abdullah II of Jordan, ISIS fighters are paid approximately $1,000 per month, an amount equivalent to an upper-middle-class income in Jordan. Considering ISIS’s largesse, it’s no surprise that far-flung jihadi groups have flocked to Baghdadi’s “caliphate.”

Having deep pockets, (coupled with technological advancement) has allowed ISIS to try its hand at producing sophisticated, high production value videos in a brand-building effort. Whereas al-Qaeda filmed its fatwas in caves with a single camera and indifferent lighting, ISIS has taken self-promotion and jihadi recruitment methods to a new level. “Although the disbelievers dislike it,” an ISIS video released on November 16, is produced and edited to resemble a Hollywood action movie, albeit a gruesome one.

The slickness of ISIS’s propaganda is appealing to both international jihadist groups and individuals susceptible to radicalization. And ISIS surely knows its target audience, reinforcing its status with a steady outpouring of technologically advanced media, including a jihad-themed video game for children. Just as a profitable corporation uses its resources to build name recognition and increase market share, ISIS invests in controlling the narrative and building its brand to allure both organized groups and attract new recruits.  

[Screenshot taken from the slickly edited ISIS video, released on November 16, 2014]
http://www.iraqinews.com/features/urgent-video-peter-kassig-beheaded-isis-16-syrians/

In late October, ISIS fighters retreated from the Iraqi town of Jurf al-Sakher. According to Iraqi military sources, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) provided the Iraqi army with weapons and training in order to force ISIS’s retreat. The person reportedly guiding Iran’s intervention was Qasem Soleimani, a man praised by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as “a living martyr of the revolution.”

Soleimani heads the IRGC’s Quds Force, which carries out foreign operations on behalf of the Iranian government. Soleimani has been a major player in the region for years, even leading the insurgency against U.S. forces in Iraq. Because of his influence over Iraqi insurgents, Soleimani emerged as a powerbroker in Iraq. In March 2008, he reportedly helped negotiate an end to fighting between U.S.-backed Iraqi leaders and followers of radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr. That same year, he sent a message to then-commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus: “General Petraeus, you should know that I, Qasem Soleimani, control the policy for Iran with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza and Afghanistan.”

In Syria too, Soleimani has played the part of puppet master. In January 2012, Soleimani met with President Bashar al-Assad in Syria and pledged additional military aid against rebel forces. The following month, four Iranian jets carried munitions to Syria. In August 2012, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reportedly ordered the Quds Force to step up attacks against Western targets in retaliation for the U.S.-backing of moderate Syrian rebels. In mid-May through early June 2013, Soleimani coordinated a two-week offensive by Syrian forces, aided by Hezbollah, to retake the rebel-controlled city of Qusair, leaving more than 500 rebels dead and 1,000 wounded. Soleimani “is now running Syria. Bashar is just his mayor,” said one commander in the Free Syrian Army.

Iran’s top general is also personally overseeing the fight against ISIS, and in marked contrast to past behavior, has willingly posed for pictures with troops following successful battles. In June, Iran sent IRGC units to Iraq to fight ISIS while providing tons of military supplies and equipment to Iraqi forces and directing surveillance drones over Iraq. Soleimani reportedly went to Baghdad to oversee the operations. According to several reports, he played an advisory role in recent victories against ISIS in Samarra (June) and Amirli (August).  All this despite living under a U.N. travel ban that was imposed in 2007.

Clearly, Iran and the United States share an enemy in ISIS. As the old adage goes, “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” However, given Soleimani’s history of antagonism toward the West, in this instance, the enemy of our enemy is still our enemy.