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While the Bangladeshi government continues to deny the presence of ISIS within its borders, increased violence against religious minorities and foreigners attributed to pro-ISIS militants has many asking if Islamist militancy is on the rise in that country. 

The murder of a Hindu priest in February is the third death for which ISIS claimed credit. Other murder victims have included a Japanese farmer and an Italian aid worker in September and October of 2015. The Sheikh Hasina government rejected arguments that ISIS was behind the violence, pointing instead to domestic militant groups, which have become more and more aggressive, reportedly in reaction to the government’s crackdown on Islamist activity since 2013. It was in 2013 that two leaders of the long-standing Jamaat-e-Islaami party were tried for war crimes dating to Bangladesh’s war of Independence in 1971.

Since then, various political administrations have maintained relationships with Islamist groups to varying degrees in order to build coalitions and stay in power.  Conversely, with the rise of Islamism in South Asia since the end of the cold war, numerous Islamist groups, both peaceful and violent, have proliferated. A common theme among these groups is envisioning the rebirth of a South Asian caliphate based on a much disputed hadith called Ghazwa-e-Hind. 

This has also contributed to the infiltration into Bangladesh of trans-national Islamist groups, from Hizb ut-Tahrir to al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-Continent (AQIS), as well as the proliferation of homegrown militant groups, best illustrated by Ansar Bangla Team (ABT). ABT gained international attention for reportedly orchestrating the murder of secular blogger Avijit Roy in March 2015.

Accusations against foreign governments, like Pakistan, complicate matters further. Pakistan’s military and intelligence services stand accused of supporting Islamist activity in the country for likely a two-pronged purpose: establish an Islamic state in Bangladesh as is hoped for in Pakistan by Islamists there; and use Bangladesh as a launching pad for anti-Indian activity.

This is not completely far-fetched. Most terrorist attacks in India can be traced back to Pakistan-based terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad - alone - or in collaboration with minor Islamist groups in India. To do the same from existing jihadi training camps on the Bangladeshi side of the Indian-Bangla border stands within reason.

The Bangladesh Chronicle reports ISIS members have met militant groups like JMB, Huji, Hizb ut -Tahrir, and ABT in hopes of making Bangladesh an Islamic state by 2020. Bangladeshi militants appear to be giving their oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in an uploaded video on YouTube from August 2014 entitled “Muslims in Bangladesh give bayah to the caliph Ibrahim (Hafizahullah).”

Bangladesh’s official statements denying ISIS’s presence may be a strategic attempt to prevent alarm, while its intelligence and law enforcement divisions continue their investigations and arrests behind the scenes. Arrests of extremists are ongoing, and include pro-ISIS sympathizers, Hizb ut-Tahrir activists and Jamaat-e-Islaami protesters. The latter political party was banned in 2013 by the Bangladesh High Court, which is now reviewing the legitimacy of Islam’s position as the official national religion in an otherwise secular state in an attempt to curb rising extremism.

While these moves are all necessary to protect Bangladesh’s secular status, none address the ability of these militant groups to collaborate, and engage with each other, when recruiting. Bangla-language extremist websites, YouTube videos, Twitter, and other social media platforms give extremist groups access to a wide audience and leave law enforcement always playing catch-up, as they were forced to do following the murder of the Hindu priest in February.  

In November 2015, Bangladesh blocked Facebook, Messenger, Viber, WhatsApp, Line and Tango – in an effort to preempt Islamist retaliation after death penalties that were upheld against two Jamaat-e-Islami leaders convicted in 2013 of war crimes committed during Bangladesh’s war of independence in 1971.

The benefit of such bans is questionable given the availability of proxy servers and backdoors. Nevertheless, despite denying the existence of ISIS in the country, Bangladesh is attempting to act against extremism on many fronts. It remains to be seen, however, if South Asia will become the newest extension of Islamist extremism that ISIS and other militant groups are working toward. 

In early March, French officials successfully prevented two girls from leaving to join ISIS in Syria, and the country collectively breathed a sigh of relief. But what happens next? What happens to the kids who are saved from falling under the spell of ISIS’s suicidal and apocryphal ideology, but often against their will?

It may be too soon for studies to reveal whether would-be foreign fighters make the transition back to normal, productive lives. Nonetheless, programs being tested in different countries—and the anecdotal evidence beginning to trickle in—hints at less-than-stellar outcomes.

The most troubling results, of course, are represented by those individuals prevented from joining jihad in Syria who have gone on to carry out terrorist plots at home. Ibrahim Abdeslam is one such individual. Reportedly thwarted from traveling to Syria in early 2015, Abdeslam was intercepted by authorities in Turkey and forcibly returned to Brussels. In November 2015, Abdeslam, blew himself up outside Paris’s Comptoir Voltaire cafe as part of the deadly ISIS attacks, which killed 130 and wounded more than 350.

How did Abdeslam manage to participate in such a complicated and deadly assault after being stopped en route to Syria? Reports say that Abdeslam was interrogated by Belgian police upon his return, but was ultimately released after authorities concluded that he showed “no sign of a possible threat.” Part of the problem was a complicated legal situation. According to one unnamed Belgian authority, “We knew [Ibrahim and Saleh Abdeslam] were radicalized and could have visited Syria,” but Ibrahim could not be prosecuted because “we had no evidence that he participated in the activities of a terrorist group.”

Abdeslam is only one of many disappointed foreign fighters who have been quietly reintroduced into Western society. Whether or not a would-be foreign fighter will be monitored, arrested, prosecuted, or placed into a de-radicalization program is very much a case-by-case decision. What’s even less clear is the success rate of de-radicalization and other intervention programs.

Consider the case of “A,” a Jewish girl from Paris who was inspired to join ISIS. “A” was just moments away from boarding a plane to Syria when she was convinced to stay behind. Her parents remained vigilant, and “A” was enrolled in a de-radicalization program, the Centre de Prévention des Dérives Sectaires liées à l’Islam (Center for the Prevention of Sectarian Abuses linked to Islam). Nonetheless, the girl reportedly still managed to stay in touch with her ISIS recruiters, even after her travel plans came to an end and after she was ensconced in the de-radicalization program.

One of the two girls stopped in early March, Israé, had attended that same de-radicalization program, apparently to little effect. Two years after Israé’s first attempt to leave for Syria, and her enrollment in the program, Israé again tried to join ISIS.

Now, Israé and her cohort Louisa are again living at home, and both face travel bans. Still, reasonable concern exists regarding how their guardians will rehabilitate the two girls, and constructively redirect their pro-ISIS fervor. After all, although Israé, Louisa, and “A” ultimately were stopped before reaching ISIS-controlled territory and becoming jihadi brides, they have both shown a fierce determination to maintain their ties to the terrorist group.

Today, concerns exist over not only reintegration, but governments’ capacity to effectively monitor ongoing threats at home. In 2015, France’s resources were stretched exceptionally thin. Since then, increased funding has been devoted to domestic and international surveillance following passage of the country’s “Stop-Djihadisme” program. France has declared that a number of domestic terrorist threats have been thwarted, but massive intelligence gaps have been revealed following the Paris attacks in November.

Similar problems plagued Belgium long before terrorists targeted the Brussels airport and metro. The country is struggling to maintain surveillance on the hundreds of Belgians already abroad, as well as track suspected extremists at home.

ISIS hopefuls, their families, and their communities today remain vulnerable, not only due to resource limitations, but to a dearth of deradicalization programs whose effectiveness has been established. So what happens next? The reality is often a mosaic of hastily thrown together solutions, tailored for each individual, and occasionally misapplied.

A group of Afghan Fulbright Scholars began an initiative in July 2015 called Afghan Fulbrighters for Peace (AFP), an effort to mobilize Afghans in the United States to engage in policy debates relevant to their country.

First, AFP established a steering committee comprised of seven Afghan Fulbrighters to lead the initiative. The students come from different backgrounds, and geographic locations within Afghanistan. They are pursuing different fields of study in the U.S., but they are all deeply concerned about the challenges and the opportunities facing Afghanistan today.

The steering committee then shared its vision with the wider Afghan Fulbright population in the U.S.—about 150 students—who welcomed the initiative. As its first activity, AFP designed a conference with the primary objectives of:

• Studying the peacebuilding strategies—spearheaded by the U.S. and Afghan governments—for Afghanistan, and providing recommendations;
• Developing a support network among Afghan Fulbrighters in the U.S. to strengthen their efforts for achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan.

As they prepared for the conference, AFP members met with Afghan and American diplomats, policy-makers, think tank directors, students, and the Afghan population in Washington D.C., New York, and other U.S. cities.

Many think tanks and individuals welcomed and endorsed the AFP initiative. The Center for International Policy (CIP) provided space for AFP meetings.  The U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) and the Institute of International Education (IIE) provided funding for the initiative. Other entities that endorsed and encouraged the conference included the Afghan Embassy in Washington DC, the U.S. Department of State, the Counter Extremism Project (CEP), the Institute for State Effectiveness (ISE), the Alliance in Support of the Afghan People (ASAP), and the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

Convening the Conference and Beyond

The AFP conference was held February 15-16, 2016, and focused on two specific topics: the insurgency in Afghanistan, and the country’s governance and rule of law. Fifteen Afghan Fulbrighters spent February 15 discussing and summarizing their recommendations. On February 16, a panel of four AFP members presented the group’s recommendations during an interactive event with an audience of Afghan and American diplomats, activists, journalists, and students at the USIP. The group also met with Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Jonathan Carpenter at the State Department, and Afghan Ambassador Hamdullah Mohib at the Afghan Embassy, to share its policy recommendations and discuss future plans and collaboration.

Summary of Recommendations:

The AFP’s recommendations concentrated on two challenges in Afghanistan: insurgency, and governance and rule of law. Below is a summary of our recommendations.

1. Insurgency:

The AFP recommends that the Afghan government and its international allies seek a politically negotiated settlement to the problem of insurgency, rather than pursue the same military strategy which has failed to bring peace over the past 15 years.

The AFP believes that the Afghan government and its international allies must confront the insurgency on three coordinated levels—national, regional, and international—and enter into negotiations from a position of strength.

On a national level, the Afghan government must emphasize a “population-centric” strategy over an “enemy-centric” strategy. This would include a) delivering social and security services and building state capacity to perform these tasks; b) increasing the developmental budget; and c) creating jobs and opportunities in which people can thrive. Simultaneously, the Afghan government must build national consensus and gain popular support among citizens, religious leaders, and civil society activists. In addition to consenting that negotiations should be pursued, these groups should work together to create the framework for an agreement.

On a regional level, Afghanistan and its neighbors must focus on socio-economic cooperation versus a security-centric strategy. This would mean creating shared economic interests through joint investments. If implemented successfully, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline might be a strong example of their proposed strategy. Furthermore, it would mean increasing joint social and cultural activities through academic exchange programs, debates, and sharing of arts such as holding joint concerts, etc.

Finally, the AFP members recommend that the international community, particularly the U.S., continue to support Afghanistan’s national and regional initiatives. Building peace in Afghanistan is a long-term process, therefore, the country needs continued support. The international community should invest more in Afghanistan’s nonmilitary sectors such as governance, rule of law, education, and economy.  

These strategies will ensure that the political negotiations have the support of the Afghan people and their international allies, and make it more difficult for the insurgent groups to recruit from the population. It will pressure the insurgent groups to seek a politically negotiated settlement and strengthen the Afghan government’s position in the negotiations.

2. Governance and Rule of Law:

Under governance and rule of law, the AFP focused on combating corruption and promoting local democratization in Afghanistan.

To fight corruption, the Afghan government must a) review and update outdated and ineffective legal systems; and b) create an independent commission to combat corruption. To promote local democratization, provincial and district governors and mayors must be elected rather than appointed by the central government. Decentralization will send powerful people to their provinces and quell the power struggles within the central government.  This will allow the central government to shift its focus to macro-level projects that can move the country forward. Moreover, local democratization will increase accountability and society’s participation in the political processes.

AFP’s plans include publishing and sharing the group’s recommendations with Afghan and American media, research centers, universities, and policy makers, as well as expanding the initiative throughout the U.S. and Afghanistan. AFP’s members will return to Afghanistan with a vision—and an action plan—to bring a lasting peace to their homeland.