Hassan Salem is a member of the Iraqi parliament and head of al-Sadiqun (“the Honest Ones”), the political bloc of Iran-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH).“Sadiqin: The dream of the Americans will not be fulfilled, and we intend to legislate a law that will expel them,” Mawazin News, January 17, 2019, https://www.mawazin.net/Details.aspx?jimare=29837. Salem participated in violent protests against the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad on December 31, 2019, during which he declared the coming end of the United States.Steven Nabil, Twitter post, December 31, 2019, 8:54 a.m., https://twitter.com/thestevennabil/status/1212009203306397703; Michael R. Gordon, Isabel Coles, and Ghassan Adnan, “Trump Vows Retaliation After Iran-Backed Militia Supporters Try to Storm U.S. Embassy in Baghdad,” Wall Street Journal, December 31, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/protesters-attempt-to-storm-u-s-embassy-in-baghdad-11577787978; Hassan Salem, Twitter post, December 31, 2019, 5:11 p.m., https://twitter.com/HASSAN_SALEM65/status/1212134227103363073.

Salem first joined parliament in 2014 when Sadiqun ran under the State of Law bloc in the April 2014 Iraqi national elections, winning one seat. Salem joined the parliament’s Security and Defense Committee.Nicholas A. Heras, “Iraqi Shi’a Militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq Expands Operations to Syria,” Jamestown Foundation, May 15, 2014, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42367&no_cache=1#.VTlNmiHBzGc; John Hall, “Shocking image shows child aged under ten being used to fire rockets from car-mounted missile launcher in Iraq against ISIS targets,” Daily Mail (London), December 24, 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2885162/Chilling-image-shows-child-aged-ten-used-fire-rockets-car-mounted-missile-launcher-Iraq-against-ISIS-targets.html; Garrett Nada and Mattisan Rowan, “Part 2: Pro-Iran Militias in Iraq,” Wilson Center, April 27, 2018, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/part-2-pro-iran-militias-iraq; Libya Herald, “ELECTIONS 2014: Final results for House of Representative elections announced,” El Observatorio Político y Electoral del Mundo Árabe y Musulmán, July 22, 2014, http://www.opemam.org/node/5948. AAH’s political branch has sought to distance itself from the group’s militant branch, accused by international human rights organizations of various war crimes.Omar Sattar, “Why Iraq’s law on Popular Mobilization Units isn't all that popular,” Al-Monitor, March 8, 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/03/iraq-election-pmu-shiite-militias-abadi.html#ixzz4bQMI6UB4. In May 2017, the group earned a license to operate as a political party and run in the next Iraqi elections under its own name.“Iraq: High Electoral Commission Grants License To Shiite Militia,” Stratfor, May 24, 2017, https://www.stratfor.com/situation-report/iraq-high-electoral-commission-grants-license-shiite-militia. The party won 15 seats in Iraq’s May 2018 parliamentary elections.Michael Knights and Frzand Sherko, “Can Asaib Ahl al-Haq Join the Political Mainstream?,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 14, 2019, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/can-asaib-ahl-al-haq-join-the-political-mainstream. Salem won re-election and joined the Services, Reconstruction, Transport, and Communications Committee.Kosar Nawzad, “Iraqi parliament votes in new committee members,” Kurdistan 24, November 10, 2018, https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/d634370d-f075-4822-a8b2-a1cc81d4de03.

Salem has taken an adversarial position with the United States and supported parliamentary efforts to expel U.S. forces from Iraq.Omar al-Jaffal, “Iraqis split over US military decision to stay in Iraq,” Al-Monitor, August 30, 2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/08/iraq-us-troops-isis-security.html. He has accused the United States of supporting ISIS and other terrorist groups in Iraq. Salem has called for the closure of the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, which he said “has turned into a center for Israel’s Mossad” and ISIS terrorists.Tamar Beeri, “Iraqi MP: US Embassy in Baghdad serves as headquarters for Mossad, ISIS,” Jerusalem Post, July 14, 2019, https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Iraqi-PM-US-embassy-hosts-Mossad-agents-ISIS-terrorists-595644. He also accused the embassy of “interfering” in Iraq’s internal affairs by “spying, spreading rumors and hatching plots.”Tamar Beeri, “Iraqi MP: US Embassy in Baghdad serves as headquarters for Mossad, ISIS,” Jerusalem Post, July 14, 2019, https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Iraqi-PM-US-embassy-hosts-Mossad-agents-ISIS-terrorists-595644.

In March 2015, Salem accused U.S. forces of aiding ISIS fighters in escaping the region.“Hard-line Shiite militias quit Tikrit campaign over US airstrikes,” Rudaw, March 27, 2015, https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/270320151. In a February 2019 interview with Iranian media, Salem accused U.S. forces stationed at Iraq’s Ain Al-Asad military base of providing support to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Iraq’s Anbar Desert. Salem further alleged that U.S. forces facilitate Baghdadi’s travel between Iraq and Syria. Washington’s support of Baghdadi stems from its fear of an Iraqi parliament draft bill that would expel U.S. forces from Iraq, according to Salem.“Iraq MP: US giving Daesh head Baghdadi protection,” Middle East Monitor, February 28, 2019, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190228-iraq-mp-us-giving-daesh-head-baghdadi-protection/; “US-Occupied Base in Western Iraq Protecting Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi,” Fars News Agency, February 26, 2019, https://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13971207000200.

Akram al-Kaabi is the U.S.-designated secretary-general of Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (“Movement of the Party of God’s Virtuous”), an offshoot of Iran-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH).Bill Roggio, “Iraqi Shiite militia commander threatens to attack US,” Long War Journal, June 9, 2015, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/06/iraqi-shiite-militia-commander-threatens-to-attack-us.php. Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HHN) is closely tied to Iran and Hezbollah. Under Kaabi’s leadership, HHN has been at the forefront of the fight against ISIS alongside the Syrian army, Hezbollah, and other Iran-backed Iraqi militias.“Top Iraqi Militia Leader: Fighting for Iran under Soleimani's leadership Is “Blessing from God”,” Middle East Institute, April 5, 2017, http://www.mei.edu/publications/top-iraqi-militia-leader-fighting-iran-under-soleimanis-leadership-blessing-god; Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Hashd Brigade Numbers Index,” Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi's Blog, October 31, 2017, http://www.aymennjawad.org/2017/10/hashd-brigade-numbers-index.

HHN is part of Iraq’s Haashid Shaabi, the umbrella group of anti-ISIS Shiite militias also called Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The PMF coordinate anti-ISIS military ventures between the Syrian army and Iranian-sponsored militias.“Top Iraqi Militia Leader: Fighting for Iran under Soleimani's leadership Is “Blessing from God”,” Middle East Institute, April 5, 2017, http://www.mei.edu/publications/top-iraqi-militia-leader-fighting-iran-under-soleimanis-leadership-blessing-god; Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Hashd Brigade Numbers Index,” Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi's Blog, October 31, 2017, http://www.aymennjawad.org/2017/10/hashd-brigade-numbers-index.

After the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, Kaabi served as a commander in Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi (“the Mahdi Army,” a.k.a. JAM Special Groups). As a leader in the Mahdi Army, Kaabi planned and led attacks against the Iraqi government and members of Coalition forces, according to the U.S. government. Iran ordered Hezbollah in 2005 to create a group to train Iraqis to fight Coalition Forces. Under orders from Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, a covert Hezbollah unit trained members of JAM who then formed AAH.“Treasury Designates Hizballah Commander Responsible for American Deaths in Iraq,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, November 19, 2012, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1775.aspx.

The United States accuses Kaabi of providing financing and weaponry for JAM’s violent activities. In April 2008, for example, Kaabi paid a JAM leader 50 million Iraqi dinars (approximately $41,684) for carrying out three separate improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against Coalition Forces in Baghdad. Under Kaabi’s command, JAM claimed responsibility for rocket and mortar attacks against Coalition and Iraqi forces.“Treasury Designates Individuals and Entities Fueling Violence in Iraq,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 16, 2008, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1141.aspx.

Kaabi claimed that after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, he turned AAH over to its current leader, Qais al-Kazali, in order to devote himself to Islamic studies in seminary. Kaabi formed Nujaba in 2013 after ISIS began to capture large swaths of Syria and Iraq. Kaabi has denied ideological divisions with AAH resulted in HHN’s creation. He told Al-Monitor in 2015 that the groups merely “disagree on style and how the work should be managed.”Ali Hashem, “Iraq’s Shiite forces claim victory over IS,” Al-Monitor, March 16, 2015, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/iraq-shiite-hezbollah-nujaba-victory-islamic-state.html.

Kaabi is openly hostile to the United States. While the PMF and the United States share an enemy in ISIS, Kaabi has been adamant that the United States remains an enemy. According to Kaabi, the United States and ISIS are “two faces of the same coin.”Bill Roggio and Caleb Weiss, “Iraqi Shiite militia leader says he would overthrow government if ordered by Iran’s supreme leader,” Long War Journal, November 12, 2015, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/11/us-designated-terrorist-of-iraqi-militia-reportedly-in-aleppo.php. Kaabi called U.S. President Donald Trump’s December 2017 recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital “legitimate justification” to target U.S. troops in Iraq.“SHEIKH AKRAM AL-KAABI: TRUMP'S DECISION REGARDING JERUSALEM IS A LEGITIMATE JUSTIFICATION FOR TARGETING AMERICAN IN IRAQ,” Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, December 8, 2017, https://bit.ly/2u0Rb1u. Kaabi has claimed various incarnations of HHN have carried out more than 6,000 attacks on U.S. positions in Iraq since 2004.Ali Hashem, “Iraq’s Shiite forces claim victory over IS,” Al-Monitor, March 16, 2015, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/iraq-shiite-hezbollah-nujaba-victory-islamic-state.html.

Kaabi is deeply loyal to the Iranian regime and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. All of HHN’s logistical support and military training come from Iran, according to Kaabi. Both Kaabi and his followers adhere to the Khomeinist doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih, or Guardianship of the Jurist, which places religious oversight over all aspects of the government.Ali Hashem, “Iraq’s Shiite forces claim victory over IS,” Al-Monitor, March 16, 2015, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/iraq-shiite-hezbollah-nujaba-victory-islamic-state.html; Babak Dehghanpisheh, “The Iraqi militia helping Iran carve a road to Damascus,” Reuters, September 22, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-iraq-nujaba/. Kaabi has declared that he would follow any order from Khamenei, including overthrowing the Iraqi government.“State Department Terrorist Designation of Harakat al-Nujaba (HAN) and Akram ‘Abbas al-Kabi,” U.S. Department of State, March 5, 2019, https://www.state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designation-of-harakat-al-nujaba-han-and-akram-abbas-al-kabi/. According to Iraqi officials, HHN is helping Tehran build a supply line from Iran to Damascus through Iraq.Babak Dehghanpisheh, “The Iraqi militia helping Iran carve a road to Damascus,” Reuters, September 22, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-iraq-nujaba/. As of 2017, Iran reportedly paid HHN fighters $1,500 a month.Babak Dehghanpisheh, “The Iraqi militia helping Iran carve a road to Damascus,” Reuters, September 22, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-iraq-nujaba/. According to the State Department, HHN is “funded by but not under the control of the Iraqi government.”“State Department Terrorist Designation of Harakat al-Nujaba (HAN) and Akram ‘Abbas al-Kabi,” U.S. Department of State, March 5, 2019, https://www.state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designation-of-harakat-al-nujaba-han-and-akram-abbas-al-kabi/.

HHN has featured images on its website of Kaabi holding hands with Hezbollah‘s Nasrallah. Hezbollah aided the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF), a special branch of the IRGC tasked with achieving sensitive missions beyond Iran’s borders, in creating these Iran-backed militias in Iraq.“Part 2: Pro-Iran Militias in Iraq,” Wilson Center, April 27, 2018, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/part-2-pro-iran-militias-iraq; Bill Roggio, “Iraqi Shiite militia commander threatens to attack US,” Long War Journal, June 9, 2015, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/06/iraqi-shiite-militia-commander-threatens-to-attack-us.php. In August 2017, Kaabi sent a letter to Nasrallah declaring HHN’s “complete solidarity and support with your loud cry against the oppressive Zionist regime.”Babak Dehghanpisheh, “The Iraqi militia helping Iran carve a road to Damascus,” Reuters, September 22, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-iraq-nujaba/. In March 2017, HHN formed the Golan Brigade to capture the Golan Heights from Israel, which took control of the territory of the 1967 Six Day War.Babak Dehghanpisheh, “The Iraqi militia helping Iran carve a road to Damascus,” Reuters, September 22, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-iraq-nujaba/.

Kaabi has also praised deceased Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani. Kaabi told Iranian reporters in 2016 that the Iraqis “need him and his colleagues.”“Voluntary Forces Can Retake Mosul Single-Handedly: Iraqi Figure,” Tasnim News Agency, August 28, 2016, https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2016/08/28/1170391/voluntary-forces-can-retake-mosul-single-handedly-iraqi-figure. HHN released a song in 2014 praising Soleimani for confronting both the Americans and ISIS. HHN also posted photos on its website of Kaabi and Soleimani together on what the group claimed to be the Syrian frontline.Babak Dehghanpisheh, “The Iraqi militia helping Iran carve a road to Damascus,” Reuters, September 22, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-iraq-nujaba/.

After Soleimani’s death in a U.S. airstrike in Iraq on January 3, 2020, Kaabi joined other militant leaders in promising revenge. Kaabi announced that Iran-backed Shiite militias in Iraq were unified and ready to “execute a harsh, deliberate response to the American terrorist forces.”Agence France-Presse, “Iraq’s pro-Iran factions ramp up threats to US after Iran missile strikes,” Times of Israel, January 8, 2020, https://www.timesofisrael.com/iraqs-pro-iran-factions-ramp-up-threats-to-us-after-iran-missiles/.

Kaabi continued to call for the expulsion of U.S. forces in Iraq. In one statement on April 14, 2023, Kaabi stated his group would consider U.S. forces in Iraq to be “legitimate targets” if they do not leave.“Leader Of Pro-Iran Iraqi Militia Akram Al-Kaabi: U.S. Ambassador On Iraq Carries Out Blatant Acts Of Sabotage; U.S. Forces Remain Legitimate Target And Will Be Expelled From The Region,” Middle East Media Research Institute, April 16, 2023, https://www.memri.org/tv/leader-pro-iran-iraq-militia-akram-al-kaabi-reject-american-presence-legitimate-target-martyrdom. Upon the start of the Hamas-Israel war in the Gaza Strip in October 2023, an umbrella group called the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) emerged. The grouping quickly launched dozens of attacks on U.S. forces and military bases across Iraq and Syria in retaliation for the U.S.’s stance on the Gaza crisis. The IRI is reportedly a coalition of all Iran-backed Shiite militias operating in Iraq. Among the groups included are HHN, Kataib Hezbollah (KH), AAH, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada (KSS), as well as lesser-known militias, such as Tashkil al-Waritheen.Hamdi Malik and Michael Knights, “Profile: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 21, 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-islamic-resistance-iraq. HHN is considered one of the strongest factions of the IRI, and by January 2024 the militant coalition had carried out more than 100 attacks.Raya Jalabi and Felicia Schwartz, “US air strike kills commander of Iran-backed militia in Baghdad,” Financial Times, January 4, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/6c70205d-e2b0-4f1a-bb19-835f7aa2b268.

Amir Muhammad Sa’id Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla was the U.S.-designated leader and one of the founding members of ISIS. He was appointed as the successor to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on October 31, 2019, following the death of the former caliph in a U.S. raid on October 26, 2019.Hesham Abdulkhalek, Yousef Saba, and Ulf Laessing, “Islamic State confirms Baghdadi is dead, appoints successor,” Reuters, October 31, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-baghdadi-confirmation/islamic-state-confirms-baghdadi-is-dead-appoints-successor-idUSKBN1XA25A. Al-Mawla was a former officer in Saddam Hussein’s army and was considered one of the most prominent ISIS members in Baghdadi’s circle.“Baghdadi's successor likely to be Iraqi religious scholar,” CNN, October 29, 2019, https://m.cnn.com/en/article/h_873c1d33867a3fe972d26223a97b697c. The U.S. Department of State has both designated al-Mawla as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and is offering a $5 million reward for information leading to his capture.“Wanted: Amir Muhammad Sa’id Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla,” Rewards for Justice, August 21, 2019, https://rewardsforjustice.net/english/amir_al_malwa.html.; “Designation of Amir Muhammad Sa'id Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist,” Federal Register, March 24, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/03/24/2020-06112/designation-of-amir-muhammad-said-abdal-rahman-al-mawla-as-a-specially-designated-global-terrorist. On February 3, 2022, U.S. special forces launched a raid in Atmeh, northern Syria, targeting al-Mawla. At the beginning of the operation, al-Mawla detonated a bomb that killed himself and his family members.“U.S. says Islamic State leader killed in Syria raid,” Reuters, February 3, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-led-coalition-operation-northern-syria-targeted-jihadists-2022-02-03/; “U.S. Announces Death of ISIS Leader in Raid,” New York Times, February 3, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/03/world/us-raid-syria-isis.

Al-Mawla hailed from the Sunni district of Tal Afar, Iraq. He graduated from the Islamic Sciences College in Mosul. It is reported that he also studied Sharia legal studies at the University of Mosul.“New non-Arab Daesh leader confirmed by intelligence,” Middle East Monitor, January 21, 2020, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200121-new-non-arab-daesh-leader-confirmed-by-intelligence/. Upon the completion of his schooling, he served as an officer in Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s army. Following the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq and the capture of Hussein in 2003, al-Mawla turned to violent extremism and eventually took on the role of religious commissary and a general Sharia jurist for al-Qaeda.“Speculation mounts of a new ISIS leader in the making,” The National, August 8, 2019, https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/speculation-mounts-of-a-new-isis-leader-in-the-making-1.895931.

In 2004, al-Mawla was captured by U.S. forces due to his links to al-Qaeda. While imprisoned at Camp Bucca in Basra, near the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, al-Mawla met and formed a close bond with Baghdadi. It was at Camp Bucca where Baghdadi radicalized many future al-Qaeda and ISIS militants, leading the camp to be considered the birthplace of ISIS.Terrence McCoy, “Camp Bucca: The US prison that became the birthplace of Isis,” Independent, November 4, 2014, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/camp-bucca-the-us-prison-that-became-the-birthplace-of-isis-9838905.html. It is uncertain when al-Mawla was released, but it is assumed he went back to Mosul and re-joined al-Qaeda following his detention.

In 2014, al-Mawla welcomed Baghdadi to Mosul. Al-Mawla then left al-Qaeda and pledged allegiance and full support to the radical’s mission, providing ISIS the support to quickly take control of the city.Giorgio Cafiero, “New IS leader takes over following Baghdadi’s death,” Al-Monitor, October 28, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/10/isis-death-baghdadi-new-leader-qardash.html.; Chris Pleasance and Joe Middleton, “The Professor - ISIS's 'cruel but popular' new leader: Ex-Saddam officer Abdullah Qardash, who was imprisoned alongside Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and eliminated his rivals, takes the reins after former chief was killed in US strikes,” Daily Mail, October 28, 2019, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7620271/ISIS-new-leader-barely-day-former-chief-Baghdadi-died-dog.html. Al-Mawla quickly established himself among the insurgency’s senior ranks, and was nicknamed the “Professor” and the “Destroyer.” Serving Baghdadi as his lieutenant, al-Mawla was well-respected among ISIS’s members. A brutal policymaker, al-Mawla was responsible for eliminating those who opposed Baghdadi’s leadership.Remy Mahzam, “Abdullah Qardash: IS Successor to Al-Baghdadi?,” RSIS Commentary, September 20, 2019, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/abdullah-qardash-is-successor-to-al-baghdadi/#.XicauTJKipo. Furthermore, it is reported that in 2015, al-Mawla was among the people that gave an alleged Islamic ruling for ISIS to murder and enslave thousands of Yazidis—a religious minority in Iraq.“New non-Arab Daesh leader confirmed by intelligence,” Middle East Monitor, January 21, 2020, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200121-new-non-arab-daesh-leader-confirmed-by-intelligence/.

Despite al-Mawla’s Turkmen origin—most of ISIS’s senior hierarchy have been Iraqi Arabs and descended from the Prophet Mohammed’s Quraysh tribe—in August of 2019, ISIS’s Amaq News Agency reported that Baghdadi had nominated al-Mawla to be his successor.“Speculation mounts of a new ISIS leader in the making,” The National, August 8, 2019, https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/speculation-mounts-of-a-new-isis-leader-in-the-making-1.895931. On August 21, 2019, the U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice program offered a $5 million reward for information leading to his capture.“Wanted: Amir Muhammad Sa’id Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla,” Rewards for Justice, August 21, 2019, https://rewardsforjustice.net/english/amir_al_malwa.html. The State Department increased the reward up to $10 million on June 24, 2020.“Rewards for Justice – Increased Reward Offer for Information on ISIS Leader Amir Muhammad Sa’id Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla,” U.S. Department of State, June 24, 2020, https://www.state.gov/rewards-for-justice-increased-reward-offer-for-information-on-isis-leader-amir-muhammad-said-abdal-rahman-al-mawla/.

On October 31, 2019, a few days after Baghdadi’s death by U.S. forces, ISIS released an audio recording announcing al-Mawla—or rather, his nom de guerre, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi—as the new leader of ISIS.Rukmini Callimachi and Eric Schmitt, “ISIS Names New Leader and Confirms al-Baghdadi’s Death,” New York Times, October 31, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/31/world/middleeast/isis-al-baghdadi-dead.html. Intelligence officials suggest that al-Mawla is hiding out in a small band of towns to the west of Mosul or that he has gone as far as Turkey, where his brother Adel Salbi is a representative for the Turkmen Iraqi Front.Martin Chulov and Mohammed Rasool, “Isis founding member confirmed by spies as group's new leader,” Guardian, January 20, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/20/isis-leader-confirmed-amir-mohammed-abdul-rahman-al-mawli-al-salbi.

On March 24, 2020, the U.S. Department of State designated al-Mawla as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) under Executive Order 13224.“Terrorist Designation of ISIS Leader Amir Muhammad Sa’id Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla,” U.S. Department of State, March 17, 2020, www.state.gov/terrorist-designation-of-isis-leader-amir-muhammad-said-abdal-rahman-al-mawla/; “Designation of Amir Muhammad Sa'id Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist,” Federal Register, March 24, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/03/24/2020-06112/designation-of-amir-muhammad-said-abdal-rahman-al-mawla-as-a-specially-designated-global-terrorist.

On May 20, 2020, reports circulated that al-Mawla had been captured in Iraq. Iraq’s National Intelligence Service announced the capture of an ISIS leader named Abdul Nasser Qardash. Some reports initially claimed Qardash was in fact al-Mawla, who used the pseudonym Abdullah Qardash. Iraqi security forces quickly retracted the claim and identified the captured militant as an ISIS leader who had once been considered as Baghdadi’s replacement.“Iraq claims capture of senior Daesh leader,” Arab News, May 21, 2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1677661/middle-east; Ross Ibbetson, “ISIS chief once tipped to replace Baghdadi is captured in raid by Iraqi special forces,” Daily Mail (London), May 20, 2020, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8341865/New-ISIS-chief-captured-Iraqi-intelligence-officers-months-taking-over.html.

Al-Mawla remained in the shadows following his appointment, but on February 3, 2022, U.S. special forces launched a raid in Atmeh, northern Syria, targeting al-Mawla’s house. The raid included around two dozen American commandos, backed by helicopter gunships, and armed with Reaper drones and attack jets. Upon the start of the operation, al-Mawla detonated a bomb that killed both himself and his family members. The operation lasted for about three hours, leading to the death of at least thirteen people, including four women and six children. At least ten civilians were evacuated, including eight children. According to U.S. President Joe Biden’s aides, the operation was planned months in advance and included dozens of rehearsals.“U.S. Announces Death of ISIS Leader in Raid,” New York Times, February 3, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/03/world/us-raid-syria-isis; “U.S. says Islamic State leader killed in Syria raid,” Reuters, February 3, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-led-coalition-operation-northern-syria-targeted-jihadists-2022-02-03/; Eric Schmitt and Ben Hubbard, “Raid Targeting ISIS Leader Came After Months of Planning,” New York Times, February 3, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/03/us/politics/isis-leader-killed-syria.html.

On March 10, 2022, ISIS released an audio recording in which the group’s spokesperson confirmed al-Mawla’s death and announced the appointment of new ISIS leader, Abu Hasan al-Hashemi al-Qurashi. According to the recording, al-Mawla, as well as ISIS’s former spokesman, Abu Hamza al-Qurashi, were “killed in recent days.”“IS Names New Leader, Confirms Death Of Abu Ibrahim Al-Qurashi,” Agence France Presse, March 10, 2022, https://www.barrons.com/news/is-names-new-leader-confirms-death-of-abu-ibrahim-al-qurashi-01646930407?tesla=y.

Laith al-Khazali is a U.S.-designated leader in Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), an Iranian-sponsored Shiite militia and political party operating primarily in Iraq. He is the brother of AAH founder and Secretary-General Qais al-Khazali.“State Department Terrorist Designations of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and its leaders, Qays and Laith al-Khazali,” U.S. Department of State, January 3, 2020, https://www.state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designations-of-asaib-ahl-al-haq-and-its-leaders-qays-and-laith-al-khazali/.

Al-Khazali and his brother are suspected of leading a January 20, 2007, AAH attack on U.S. troops in Iraq that killed five soldiers. Al-Khazali was arrested for his suspected involvement, but U.S. forces freed him in June 2009 in order to help facilitate dialogue between the Iraqi government and AAH. Al-Khazali went into hiding immediately after his release.Alissa J. Rubin and Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Frees Suspect in Killing of 5 G.I.’s,” New York Times, June 8, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/world/middleeast/09release.html?auth=login-smartlock.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury sanction-designated al-Khazali in December 2019 after AAH killed multiple peaceful demonstrators in Iraq, accusing him for complicity in human rights abuses. His brother, Qais, was designated for his leading an entity engaged in human rights abuses.“Treasury Sanctions Iran-Backed Militia Leaders Who Killed Innocent Demonstrators in Iraq,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 6, 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm847. The U.S. Department of State sanctioned both of the al-Khazali brothers the following month as Specially Designated Foreign Terrorists.“State Department Terrorist Designations of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and its leaders, Qays and Laith al-Khazali,” U.S. Department of State, January 3, 2020, https://www.state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designations-of-asaib-ahl-al-haq-and-its-leaders-qays-and-laith-al-khazali/.

Bah ag Moussa was a U.S.-and U.N.-designated terrorist leader based in Mali. Moussa was a former officer of the Malian Armed Forces—serving as the head of the Islamic police in Timbuktu—and a founding member of Ansar al-Dine.“Security Council ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Amends One Entry on Its Sanctions List,” United Nations, August 20, 2019, https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13924.doc.htm; Andrew Lebovich, “The Local Face of Jihadism in Northern Mali,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, June 2013, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-local-face-of-jihadism-in-northern-mali/. In 2013, Bah ag Moussa settled in Tin Zaouatène and joined the Haut Conseil pour l’Unité de l’Azawad (HCUA)—a Tuareg political and military movement that features many members of the al-Qaeda-allied Ansar al-Din movement.“Bah Ag Moussa,” United Nations Security Council, August 14, 2019, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/bah-ag-moussa. Bah ag Moussa then transmitted Iyad ag Ghali’s, Ansar al-Din’s leader, messages and recruited Tuareg fighters for the jihadist camp.“Bah Ag Moussa,” United Nations Security Council, August 14, 2019, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/bah-ag-moussa.

Although he was not a public-facing member of AQIM, Bah ag Moussa—who developed a particular reputation for cruelty toward women—was far from unknown.Andrew Lebovich, “The Local Face of Jihadism in Northern Mali,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, June 2013, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-local-face-of-jihadism-in-northern-mali/. In 2007, after spending time in Saudi Arabia, Bah ag Moussa established a mosque in Timbuktu and began to preach on Mali’s official television station.Andrew Lebovich, “The Local Face of Jihadism in Northern Mali,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, June 2013, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-local-face-of-jihadism-in-northern-mali/.

In 2017, Bah ag Moussa became the operational leader of Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) under the leadership of Iyad ag Ghali. Bah ag Moussa is the half-brother of Sidi Mohamed ag Oukana, Iyad ag Ghali’s religious advisor.“Bah Ag Moussa,” United Nations Security Council, August 14, 2019, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/bah-ag-moussa.

Bah ag Moussa is responsible for leading attacks in several other localities throughout northern Mali.“Treasury Targets Al-Qa’ida in Mali,” United States Department of the Treasury, July 16, 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm730. On July 16, 2016, he led the attack against the Nampala barracks, which resulted in the death of 20 Malian soldiers.“Bah Ag Moussa,” United Nations Security Council, August 14, 2019, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/bah-ag-moussa. In March 2019, Bah ag Moussa helped lead a terrorist operation against a Malian Armed Forces base in Dioura that killed at least 21 Malian soldiers.“23 Mali soldiers dead as militants attack Dioura camp in Mopti region,” Defense Post, March 18, 2019, https://thedefensepost.com/2019/03/18/mali-soldiers-killed-attack-dioura-camp-mopti/.

On July 16, 2019, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), in concert with the Department of State, designated Bah ag Moussa as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, which targets terrorists and those providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism.“Terrorist Designation of Ali Maychou,” U.S. Department of State, July 16, 2019, https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designation-of-ali-maychou/. On August 14, 2019, the U.N. Security Council’s ISIL (Da’esh) and al Qaeda Sanctions Committee imposed sanctions against Bah ag Moussa pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4 of resolution 2368 (2017) as being associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida and otherwise supporting the groups’ acts or activities.“Bah Ag Moussa,” United Nations Security Council, August 14, 2019, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/bah-ag-moussa.

On November 13, 2020, France announced the death of Bah ag Moussa. The operation involved helicopters and ground troops, which identified and “neutralized” Bah ag Moussa who was in a truck in the Menaka region of eastern Mali.“French forces kill jihadist commander in Mali,” France 24, November 13, 2020, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20201113-french-forces-kill-jihadist-commander-in-mali?utm_source=iterable&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1715438_; “French Forces Kill al-Qaida-Linked Commander in Mali,” Associated Press, November 13, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/africa/french-forces-kill-al-qaida-linked-commander-mali.

Amadou Kouffa is a U.S.-designated radical preacher and a senior member in Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate active in the Sahel region of Africa. On November 7, 2019, the U.S. Department of State designated Kouffa as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) under Executive Order 13224.“U.S. Department of State Terrorist Designation of Amadou Kouffa,” U.S.  Department of State, November 7, 2019, https://www.state.gov/u-s-department-of-state-terrorist-designation-of-amadou-kouffa/. Kouffa is one of the top deputies to Iyad Ag Ghali, the leader of JNIM, a group which has repeatedly attacked soldiers and civilians in Mali and neighboring Burkina Faso.Tiemoko Diallo, “Mali says it confirms death of veteran jihadist leader Koufa,” November 24, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-security-france/mali-says-it-confirms-death-of-veteran-jihadist-leader-koufa-idUSKCN1NT0EJ. As well as ties with Ghali, Kouffa reportedly has links to Mokhtar Belmoktar, who founded al-Mourabitoun after leaving al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in late 2012.Conor Gaffey, “Mali Hotel Attack: What Is The Macina Liberation Front, Mali's Boko Haram,” Newsweek, November 24, 2015, https://www.newsweek.com/mali-hotel-attack-who-are-macina-liberation-front-malis-boko-haram-397727.

Born in Niafunke, Amadou Kouffa was born Amadou Diallo. “Kouffa” refers to the locality where his father officiated as an imam. Kouffa’s popularity came in part from his mastery of radio as a tool for communication in his native Fulani language.Conor Gaffey, “Mali Hotel Attack: What Is The Macina Liberation Front, Mali's Boko Haram,” Newsweek, November 24, 2015, https://www.newsweek.com/mali-hotel-attack-who-are-macina-liberation-front-malis-boko-haram-397727. In January 2015, Kouffa founded and led the militant group Macina Liberation Front (FLM), which went on to claim responsibility for a number of attacks in central and southern Mali. Given the popularity of Kouffa’s radio sermons, many of Kouffa’s recruits are Fulanis, and the FLM is often considered in Malian media to be a “Fulani movement.”Pauline Le Roux, “Confronting Central Mali’s Extremist Threat,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, February 22,2019, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/confronting-central-malis-extremist-threat/. His calls for more equality of opportunity and political reform resonated among young Fulani herders aggrieved over the theft of their livestock, abuses by administrative authorities, and certain traditional leaders, as well an identity crisis over their role in the religious, ethnic, and intergenerational crosscurrents buffeting many Sahelian communities.Pauline Le Roux, “Confronting Central Mali’s Extremist Threat,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, February 22,2019, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/confronting-central-malis-extremist-threat/. However, there is little evidence to suggest that the FLM incorporates Fulanis in West Africa beyond Mali and its borderlands.Jacob Zenn, “The Sahel’s Militant ‘Melting Pot’: Hamadou Kouffa’s Macina Liberation Front (FLM),” Jamestown Foundation, November 13, 2015, https://jamestown.org/program/the-sahels-militant-melting-pot-hamadou-kouffas-macina-liberation-front-flm/#.VlQ8n-nVvzK.

On March 1, 2017, Kouffa appeared alongside Ag Ghali, Yahya Abou Al Hamem of AQIM, Abu Hassan al-Ansari of Al-Mourabitoun, and Abu Abderrahman El Shenhadji of AQIM, to announce the merger of their jihadist groups into a single movement, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam Wal-Mouslimin (JNIM).“In Central Mali, Civilian Populations Are Caught Between Terrorism and Counterterrorism,” Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’Homme, November 2018, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh_centre-of-mali_population-sized-between-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism_727_en_november2018.pdf.

On November 23, 2018, French forces conducted a raid against jihadists in Mopti, central Mali. The forces claimed the raid killed over 30 Islamist militants, including Kouffa.Tiemoko Diallo, “Mali says it confirms death of veteran jihadist leader Koufa,” Reuters, November 24, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-security-france/mali-says-it-confirms-death-of-veteran-jihadist-leader-koufa-idUSKCN1NT0EJ. However, a few months later on February 29, 2019, video footage was released which showed Kouffa denying and mocking reports of his death.“Exclusive: Key Mali jihadist Amadou Koufa resurfaces to deny reports of his death,” France 24, February 28, 2019, https://www.france24.com/en/video/20190228-exclusive-key-mali-jihadist-amadou-koufa-resurfaces-deny-reports-death.

Ali Maychou was a U.S.-and U.N.-designated radical imam and senior leader in Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliated group in Mali. A Moroccan, Maychou joined al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2012 before co-founding JNIM with Iyad Ag Ghaly and masterminding its expansion in the Sahel in March of 2017.“In Central Mali, Civilian Populations Are Caught Between Terrorism and Counterterrorism,” Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’Homme, November 2018, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh_centre-of-mali_population-sized-between-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism_727_en_november2018.pdf. Maychou along with his brother, Youssef Maychou, led a network that recruited and sent Moroccan fighters to northern Mali via Libya.“Ali Maychou,” United Nations Security Council, August 14, 2019, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/ali-maychou. It was reported that Maychou was killed by French forces in an operation in Mali on October 9, 2019.“France claims death of top jihadist leader in Mali,” France 24, November 5, 2019, https://www.france24.com/en/20191105-france-claims-death-of-top-jihadist-leader-in-mali.

In May 2012, Ali Maychou joined the ranks of al-Mourabitoun, headed by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, and became a member of its religious police. In October 2012, he went to Timbuktu, at that time under the control of AQIM. He provided theological training to around 60 fighters, who were placed under the orders of Djamel Akkacha (a.k.a. Yahia Abou el Hammam).“Ali Maychou,” United Nations Security Council, August 14, 2019, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/ali-maychou.

After Operation Serval in 2014—a French military offensive to rout armed rebels and Islamist militants from Mali’s northern territories“France in Mali: A year of hunting jihadists in West Africa,” France 24, Janaury 11, 2014, https://www.france24.com/en/20140111-france-mali-military-intervention-operation-serval-anniversary-timeline.—Maychou took refuge in Ajdabiya, where he worked to establish contacts between AQIM and Libyan radical groups.“Ali Maychou,” United Nations Security Council, August 14, 2019, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/ali-maychou. Maychou then served as the main media personality of AQIM in the Sahel. He made multiple statements, published by Al-Andalus, the media agency of AQIM. On January 20, 2017, Ali Maychou claimed, in an audio message, responsibility for the attack perpetrated on January 18, 2017 inside the camp of the MOC (Mécanisme Opérationnel de Coordination) in Gao which led to the death of over 50 people.“Al-Qaeda affiliate claims Mali car bomb attack in Gao,” BBC News, January 18, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38663693. The camp hosts elements of the Malian Armed Forces and members of the Platform and Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) who take part in mixed patrols, as put forward by the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali.“Ali Maychou,” United Nations Security Council, August 14, 2019, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/ali-maychou.

On March 1, 2017, Maychou appeared alongside Ag Ghaly, Yahya Abou Al Hamem of AQIM, Abu Hassan al-Ansari of Al-Mourabitoune, and Amadou Kouffa of the Macina Liberation Front (FLM), to announce the merger of their jihadist groups into a single movement, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam Wal-Mouslimin (JNIM).“In Central Mali, Civilian Populations Are Caught Between Terrorism and Counterterrorism,” Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’Homme, November 2018, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh_centre-of-mali_population-sized-between-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism_727_en_november2018.pdf.

On July 16, 2019, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), in concert with the Department of State, designated Bah Ag Moussa as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, which targets terrorists and those providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism.“Terrorist Designation of Ali Maychou,” U.S. Department of State, July 16, 2019, https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designation-of-ali-maychou/. On August 14, 2019, the United Nations ISIL (Da’esh) and al Qaeda Sanctions Committee imposed sanctions against Bah Ag Moussa pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4 of resolution 2368 (2017) as being associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida and otherwise supporting the groups’ acts or activities.“Ali Maychou,” United Nations Security Council, August 14, 2019, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/ali-maychou.

On November 5, 2019, Florence Parly, France’s Minister for the Armed Forces, announced that French forces killed Ali Maychou in an operation inside Mali in early October. No other details are reported regarding the specifics of Maychou’s death.“France claims death of top jihadist leader in Mali,” France 24, November 5, 2019, https://www.france24.com/en/20191105-france-claims-death-of-top-jihadist-leader-in-mali.

Mohammad Javad Zarif is the former foreign minister of Iran. He is widely viewed as a pragmatist who has promoted reestablishing diplomatic ties with the United States in order to bolster Iran’s position in the world.Thomas Erdbrink, “Once an Outcast, Iranian Minister Carries Hope of Easing Tensions,” New York Times, August 26, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/27/world/middleeast/irans-pick-for-nuclear-talks-carries-hope-of-eased-tensions.html. Zarif, who was educated in the United States, has worked for the Iranian government in some capacity since Iran’s 1979 revolution. He led the Iranian team that negotiated the 2015 nuclear agreement with President Barack Obama’s administration and other world powers.Jethro Mullen and Nic Robertson, “Landmark deal reached on Iran nuclear program,” CNN, July 15, 2015, https://edition.cnn.com/2015/07/14/politics/iran-nuclear-deal/index.html. The U.S. government sanction-designated Zarif as a global terrorist in July 2019.“Treasury Designates Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif for Acting for the Supreme Leader of Iran,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 31, 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm749. Zarif served as Iran’s foreign minister from August 2013 until August 2021.“Zarif bids farewell to diplomacy, starts academic career,” Tehran Times, August 24, 2021, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/464277/Zarif-bids-farewell-to-diplomacy-starts-academic-career.

Zarif spent three decades studying in the United States and working for the Iranian Mission to the United Nations in New York.Thomas Erdbrink, “Once an Outcast, Iranian Minister Carries Hope of Easing Tensions,” New York Times, August 26, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/27/world/middleeast/irans-pick-for-nuclear-talks-carries-hope-of-eased-tensions.html; Marcus George and Paul Taylor, “Iran nominee seen as olive branch to United States,” Reuters, July 29, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-usa-zarif/iran-nominee-seen-as-olive-branch-to-united-states-idUSBRE96S0VO20130729?feedType=RSS. He is fluent in English and posts in English on Twitter.Javad Zarif, Twitter account, accessed August 2, 2019, https://twitter.com/JZarif. Zarif first came to the United States in 1977 to attend San Francisco State University.Don Melvin, “6 lesser-known facts about Iran's Foreign Minister Javad Zarif,” CNN, April 3, 2015, https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/03/middleeast/irans-foreign-minister-six-things-to-know/index.html; Farnaz Fassihi and David D. Kirkpatrick, “He Enjoys American Coffee and Restaurants. Is He a Credible Negotiator for Iran?” New York Times, July 4, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/04/world/middleeast/iran-us-zarif-nuclear-deal.html. During his time as a student there, he also became involved with the Muslim Students’ Association (MSA) at the nearby University of California, Berkeley. In February 1979, Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Iran from exile, beginning the Iranian revolution. Khomeini declared the new Islamic Republic of Iran on April 1, 1979.Gregory Jaynes, “Khomeini Declares Victory in Vote For a ‘Government of God’ in Iran,” New York Times, April 2, 1979, http://www.nytimes.com/1979/04/02/archives/khomeini-declares-victory-in-vote-for-a-government-of-god-in-iran.html. Representatives of the new Iranian government began to replace diplomatic staff around the world. In the United States, Zarif became the MSA’s representative to the Iranian consulate in San Francisco in an effort to ensure that it was not “deviating from the path of the revolution.”Ali Alfoneh and Reuel Marc Gerecht, “An Iranian Moderate Exposed,” New Republic, January 23, 2014, https://newrepublic.com/article/116167/mohammad-javad-zarif-irans-foreign-minister-religious-zealot. After the U.S. government closed the Iranian embassy in Washington, D.C., in early 1980, Zarif became an unofficial spokesman for Iran in the United States.Farnaz Fassihi and David D. Kirkpatrick, “He Enjoys American Coffee and Restaurants. Is He a Credible Negotiator for Iran?” New York Times, July 4, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/04/world/middleeast/iran-us-zarif-nuclear-deal.html; Thomas Erdbrink, “Once an Outcast, Iranian Minister Carries Hope of Easing Tensions,” New York Times, August 26, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/27/world/middleeast/irans-pick-for-nuclear-talks-carries-hope-of-eased-tensions.html; “US is Protecting Former Iranian Embassy Building in DC,” Jerusalem Post, January 12, 2011, https://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/US-is-protecting-former-Iranian-embassy-building-in-DC. He received his undergraduate degree in international relations from San Francisco State in 1981 and then completed a PhD from the University of Denver in international law and policy in 1988 while working for the Iranian U.N. mission.“CV Dr. M Javad Zarif,” UNESCO, accessed August 19, 2019, http://portal.unesco.org/en/files/40284/11926255963CV_Dr_M._Javad_Zarif.pdf/CV%2BDr%2BM.%2BJavad%2BZarif.pdf. In 1988, he participated in the negotiations that ended the Iran-Iraq War.Robin Wright, “The Adversary,” New Yorker, May 19, 2014, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/05/26/the-adversary-2.

Zarif began working for the Iranian Permanent Mission to the United Nations in 1982 as an adviser. He served various roles at the mission and later became Iran’s deputy permanent representative to the United Nations in 1989. From 2002 to 2007, Zarif served as Iran’s permanent ambassador to the United Nations after stints in Iran’s foreign ministry and as Iran’s deputy ambassador to the United Nations. During his time at the foreign ministry and the United Nations, Zarif served as vice president of the U.N. General Assembly and chair of the U.N. Disarmament Committee among other roles.“CV Dr. M Javad Zarif,” UNESCO, accessed August 19, 2019, http://portal.unesco.org/en/files/40284/11926255963CV_Dr_M._Javad_Zarif.pdf/CV%2BDr%2BM.%2BJavad%2BZarif.pdf.

Despite Zarif’s time in the United States and his reputation as an Iranian moderate, he has at times taken hardline positions toward the United States and Israel while praising Iranian terrorist proxy Hezbollah. In February 2019, he met with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon and promised continued Iranian support.“Zarif In Lebanon Meets Hezbollah Leader Nasrallah. Pledges Support,” Radio Farda, February 11, 2019, https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-zarif-met-hezbollah-nasrallah-in-lebanon/29764248.html. After the United States designated Zarif as a global terrorist in July 2019, Nasrallah sent him a letter of support.“Hezbollah Chief Writes Letter in Support of FM Zarif,” Islamic Republic of Iran Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 15, 2019, https://en.mfa.ir/portal/newsview/48432/Hezbollah-Chief-Writes-Letter-in-Support-of-FM-Zarif. In May 2018, Zarif was filmed chanting death to America, death to Israel, death to Britain.Reuters, “Iranian FM caught chanting 'death to US, UK, Israel,’” Ynet, May 26, 2018, https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5271124,00.html. Zarif has also declared that Iran will never trust the United States.“Zarif: Iran will never trust the United States,” Times of Israel, June 12, 2016, https://www.timesofisrael.com/zarif-iran-will-never-trust-the-united-states/. Nonetheless, Zarif reportedly believes restoring relations with the United States is in Iran’s best interests. In an interview that cited in his biography, Zarif said that relations with the United States can “never be friendly,” but are “a means to be in line with national benefits.”Thomas Erdbrink, “Once an Outcast, Iranian Minister Carries Hope of Easing Tensions,” New York Times, August 26, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/27/world/middleeast/irans-pick-for-nuclear-talks-carries-hope-of-eased-tensions.html.

Zarif has long been involved in Iran’s negotiations with the P5+1—the United States, United Kingdom, China, France, Germany, and Russia—over its nuclear ambitions. Alongside future Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, Zarif was part of a small negotiation team that, in 2003, negotiated a temporary deal for Iran to suspend enrichment between 2003 and 2005. That deal eventually collapsed as Iran did not ratify the agreement and continued its enrichment activities.Thomas Erdbrink, “Once an Outcast, Iranian Minister Carries Hope of Easing Tensions,” New York Times, August 26, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/27/world/middleeast/irans-pick-for-nuclear-talks-carries-hope-of-eased-tensions.html; Paul K. Kerr, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations,” Congressional Research Service, last updated July 18, 2019, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R40094. In August 2013, newly elected President Hassan Rouhani nominated Zarif as foreign minister.“Iran parliament approves big Rouhani cabinet nominees, rejects 3,” Reuters, August 15, 2013, https://uk.reuters.com/article/iran-rouhani-cabinet/iran-parliament-approves-big-rouhani-cabinet-nominees-rejects-3-idUKL6N0GG2WR20130815. Foreign diplomats and political observers praised the appointment, citing Zarif’s pragmatism. Zarif and the foreign ministry took over the nuclear negotiations with the P5+1 that September.Suzanne Maloney, “It’s Official: Washington’s Favorite Iranian Takes On The Nuclear File,” Brookings Institution, September 5, 2013, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2013/09/05/its-official-washingtons-favorite-iranian-takes-on-the-nuclear-file/. Zarif reached an agreement—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—with then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in July 2015. Iran agreed to curtail its nuclear activities for a set period of time in exchange for international sanctions relief.Jethro Mullen and Nic Robertson, “Landmark deal reached on Iran nuclear program,” CNN, July 15, 2015, https://edition.cnn.com/2015/07/14/politics/iran-nuclear-deal/index.html. U.S. President Donald Trump was highly critical of the JCPOA when he took office in 2017 and repeatedly threatened to withdraw. Zarif warned in April 2018 that Iran would restart its nuclear program “at much greater speed” if the United States withdrew.“Iran To Restart Nuclear Program ‘At Much Greater Speed’ If U.S. Quits Deal,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 22, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-us-prisoner-swap-zarif-negotiations/29184695.html. Trump pulled the United States out of the JCPOA in May 2018.Yara Bayoumy and Brian Love, “Europeans work to save Iran deal, and business, after Trump pulls out,” Reuters, May 8, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear/europeans-work-to-save-iran-deal-and-business-after-trump-pulls-out-idUSKBN1I90D6.

After withdrawing from the JCPOA, the Trump administration began to impose new sanctions on Iran in response to its ballistic missile activities and support of Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthi rebels, and other terrorist groups. The U.S. government imposed sanctions on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.“Treasury Designates the IRGC under Terrorism Authority and Targets IRGC and Military Supporters under Counter-Proliferation Authority,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 13, 2017, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0177.aspx; Edward Wong, “Trump Imposes New Sanctions on Iran, Adding to Tensions,” New York Times, June 24, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/24/us/politics/iran-sanctions.html; “Executive Order on Imposing Sanctions with Respect to Iran,” White House, June 24, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-imposing-sanctions-respect-iran/. Zarif resigned as foreign minister in an Instagram post on February 25, 2019.“Iran's Foreign Minister Javad Zarif resigns,” Al Jazeera, February 25, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/iran-foreign-minister-zarif-resigns-190225201531240.html. The resignation came after Zarif was left out of a meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Tehran. Zarif was allegedly not even informed that Assad was visiting, despite protocol that should have included the foreign ministry. Zarif reportedly told Iranian media that he had no credibility left and his resignation was to protect the remaining dignity of the foreign ministry. Several Iranian lawmakers reportedly claimed that Zarif had submitted his resignation 14 times at that point since becoming foreign minister in 2013.Mohammad Ali Shabani, “‘Iran has one foreign minister’: How Zarif is turning claimed weakness into strength,” Al-Monitor, February 26, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/02/iran-zarif-resignation-vaezi-rouhani-khamenei-hardliners.html#ixzz5xA8HhIgy. Rouhani rejected the resignation two days later.Mehrzad Boroujerdi, “Javad Zarif Returns—to a Foreign Ministry Still Out in the Cold,” Foreign Affairs, March 6, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2019-03-06/javad-zarif-returns-foreign-ministry-still-out-cold.

The United States imposed financial sanctions on Zarif and designated him as a global terrorist on July 31, 2019. According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Zarif oversaw “a foreign ministry that has coordinated with one of the Iranian regime’s most nefarious state entities,” the IRGC’s Quds Force, while Iran’s foreign ministry under Zarif has “engaged in and funded efforts to influence elections….”“Treasury Designates Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif for Acting for the Supreme Leader of Iran,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 31, 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm749. Zarif condemned the designation and accused the United States of shutting the door to negotiations with Iran.Tuqa Khalid, “Iran says will not tolerate ‘maritime offences’ in Gulf,” Reuters, August 5, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-iran-zarif/iran-says-will-not-tolerate-maritime-offences-in-gulf-idUSKCN1UV0KR.

According to U.S. intelligence, Iran engaged in a general disinformation campaign—including the creation of false social media accounts—to spread false news in order to influence the U.S. 2018 congressional and 2020 presidential elections.Craig Timberg and Tony Romm, “It’s not just the Russians anymore as Iranians and others turn up disinformation efforts ahead of 2020 vote,” Washington Post, July 25, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/25/its-not-just-russians-anymore-iranians-others-turn-up-disinformation-efforts-ahead-vote/; “U.S. says Russia, China, Iran seek to disrupt elections,” Reuters, October 19, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-cyber/russia-china-iran-trying-to-disrupt-u-s-november-elections-agencies-idUSKCN1MT2O6. Further, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted nine Iranians in March 2018 for acting behalf of the IRGC to steal information from 144 U.S. universities and 176 universities in 21 other countries. A spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry dismissed the allegations as “illegitimate.”Dustin Volz, “U.S. charges, sanctions Iranians for global cyber attacks on behalf of Tehran,” Reuters, March 23, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-iran/u-s-charges-sanctions-iranians-for-global-cyber-attacks-on-behalf-of-tehran-idUSKBN1GZ22K.

On July 8, 2021, Tehran hosted high-level peace talks between an Afghan government delegation and Taliban representatives. Zarif called on both sides to work towards putting an end to the fighting for the benefit of the Afghan people and stressed that Iran stands ready to host additional talks.“Afghan gov’t delegation meets Taliban in Iran,” Al Jazeera, July 8, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/8/afghan-govt-delegation-meets-taliban-in-iran.

On June 18, 2021, Ebrahimi Raisi won Iran’s presidential election.“Iran election: Hardliner Raisi will become president,” BBC News, June 20, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-57537027. Zarif’s eight-year tenure as foreign minister ended in August 2021 as Raisi began his term. On August 22, Zarif met with Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi in Tehran in what was reported as Zarif’s final meeting with an international counterpart. On August 24, Zarif announced his retirement from public service and his decision to pursue academia.“Zarif bids farewell to diplomacy, starts academic career,” Tehran Times, August 24, 2021, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/464277/Zarif-bids-farewell-to-diplomacy-starts-academic-career. On August 25, Iran’s parliament approved Hossein Amirabdollahian as Iran’s new foreign minister, despite his inclusion on an EU sanctions list for human-rights abuses.“Iran parliament approves new foreign minister, cabinet,” Deutsche Welle, August 25, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/iran-parliament-approves-new-foreign-minister-cabinet/a-58984013. Though he has left public office, Zarif has continued to promote the Iranian regime’s propaganda. In a January 1, 2022, Twitter post ahead of the two-year anniversary of the January 3, 2020, death of IRGC-Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, Zarif lamented the loss of a friend and an Iranian “hero” while accusing former U.S. President Donald Trump and former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of cowardice and warmongering.Javad Zarif, Twitter post, January 1, 2022, 8:27 a.m., https://twitter.com/JZarif/status/1477270130975383557.

Saif al-Adel is a senior al-Qaeda leader wanted by the U.S. government in connection with the August 7, 1998, bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.“Most wanted: Saif al-Adel,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed March 22, 2019, https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/saif-al-adel. Suspected of living in Iran, Adel has served as al-Qaeda’s No. 2 leader since 2020 and is the likely successor to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri following his death in a July 31, 2022, U.S. drone strike in Afghanistan.Jeff Seldin, “Al-Qaida Succession Plan Being Put to Test,” Voice of America, August 2, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/al-qaida-succession-plan-being-put-to-test-/6683304.html. On February 13, 2023, a U.N. panel of experts released a report that claimed Adel is the de facto leader of al-Qaeda.“Letter dated 13 February 2023 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Digital Library, February 13, 2023, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4002636?ln=en. Two days later on February 15, the U.S. Department of State also confirmed Adel’s role as al-Qaeda’s new leader.“Department Press Briefing – February 15, 2023,” U.S. Department of State, February 15, 2023, https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-february-15-2023/.

Born in the 1960s in Egypt, Adel was raised secular and studied business at Shibin Elkom University in Menoufiya, Egypt. In his early twenties, he frequented the Fajr al Islam in Shibin el-Kom mosque, where analysts believe he may have radicalized.Ari R. Weisfuse, “The Last Hope for the al-Qa`ida Old Guard? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl,” CTC Sentinel, March 2016, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-last-hope-for-the-al-qaida-old-guard-a-profile-of-saif-al-adl/; Erica Pearson, “Saif al-Adel,” Britannica, accessed March 26, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saif-al-Adel.

Adel joined the Egyptian military and became a lieutenant colonel in the Egyptian Special Forces in the 1980s. He was concurrently involved in Islamist activities with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)—a radical group that aimed to overthrow the Mubarak regime. Adel was arrested in May 1987, along with 6,000 other militants.Ari R. Weisfuse, “The Last Hope for the al-Qa`ida Old Guard? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl,” CTC Sentinel, March 2016, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-last-hope-for-the-al-qaida-old-guard-a-profile-of-saif-al-adl/; Erica Pearson, “Saif al-Adel,” Britannica, accessed March 26, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saif-al-Adel. He was accused of attempting to revive the EIJ and attempting to assassinate Egypt’s then-Interior Minister Hasan Abu Basha and journalist Makram Muhammad Ahmad.“Saif al-Adel,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, accessed March 25, 2019, https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2011/06/Saif.pdf; Holly Fletcher, “Egyptian Islamic Jihad,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 29, 2008, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/egyptian-islamic-jihad. However, Adel was released due to insufficient evidence and promptly demoted in military rank. According to CTC Sentinel analyst Ari R. Weisfuse, this event induced both his travel to Afghanistan and his decision to join al-Qaeda in 1989.Ari R. Weisfuse, “The Last Hope for the al-Qa`ida Old Guard? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl,” CTC Sentinel, March 2016, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-last-hope-for-the-al-qaida-old-guard-a-profile-of-saif-al-adl/.

Adel played a crucial role in building al-Qaeda’s operational capabilities and quickly ascended the hierarchy. Because of his expertise in military tactics, he conducted explosives trainings, instructed new recruits on how to carry out abductions and assassinations, and helped develop guidelines to ensure efficient target assessment and intelligence collection.Ari R. Weisfuse, “The Last Hope for the al-Qa`ida Old Guard? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl,” CTC Sentinel, March 2016, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-last-hope-for-the-al-qaida-old-guard-a-profile-of-saif-al-adl/; “Saif al-Adel,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, accessed March 25, 2019, https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2011/06/Saif.pdf. Adel is believed to have trained several of the hijackers responsible for the 9/11 attacks in the United States.Erica Pearson, “Saif al-Adel,” Britannica, accessed March 26, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saif-al-Adel. By the mid-1990s, Adel became head of al-Qaeda’s security committee, part of Osama bin Laden’s security detail, and Mohammed Atef’s right-hand man in the military committee.Ari R. Weisfuse, “The Last Hope for the al-Qa`ida Old Guard? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl,” CTC Sentinel, March 2016, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-last-hope-for-the-al-qaida-old-guard-a-profile-of-saif-al-adl/; Erica Pearson, “Saif al-Adel,” Britannica, accessed March 26, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saif-al-Adel. After Atef’s death in 2001, Adel likely succeeded him as head of al-Qaeda’s military planning.Erica Pearson, “Saif al-Adel,” Britannica, accessed March 26, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saif-al-Adel.

In 1993, Adel traveled to Somalia, where he established an al-Qaeda training camp that was later utilized as a base to conduct raids on peacekeeping forces in the region.Ari R. Weisfuse, “The Last Hope for the al-Qa`ida Old Guard? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl,” CTC Sentinel, March 2016, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-last-hope-for-the-al-qaida-old-guard-a-profile-of-saif-al-adl/. In May 1996, the Somali government expelled al-Qaeda. Adel, bin Laden, and other leaders flew to Jalalabad, Afghanistan, which was not yet under Taliban control. Adel went on to coordinate al-Qaeda fighters supporting the Taliban in their fight against the Northern Alliance. He also oversaw bin Laden’s security when the latter visited the front lines. The security of bin Laden and al-Qaeda’s organizational practices became Adel’s primary focus, but he also trained advanced al-Qaeda fighters. He created an intelligence apparatus that included some 50 people to vet recruits and reveal spies inside al-Qaeda.Ali Soufan, “Al-Qa`ida’s Soon-To-Be Third Emir? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl,” CTC Sentinel, February 2021, https://ctc.usma.edu/al-qaidas-soon-to-be-third-emir-a-profile-of-saif-al-adl/.

On August 7, 1998, nearly simultaneous bombs exploded in front of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 224 people and wounding more than 5,000 others. The attacks were directly linked to al-Qaeda.“Wanted: Sayf al-Adl,” U.S. Department of State, Rewards for Justice Program, accessed March 25, 2019, https://rewardsforjustice.net/english/saif_al_adel.html; “East African Embassy Bombings,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed March 26, 2019, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/east-african-embassy-bombings. In November 1998, a U.S. grand jury indicted more than 20 people—including Adel—for their involvement.“United States of America vs. Osama bin Laden et al. - Indictment” U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, accessed March 26, 2019, https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/us_indictment_against_bin_laden.pdf; “Wanted: Sayf al-Adl,” U.S. Department of State, Rewards for Justice Program, accessed March 25, 2019, https://rewardsforjustice.net/english/saif_al_adel.html.

In 1999, Adel met with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and convinced bin Laden to invest in Zarqawi’s emerging Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad group (JTJ), which would later be known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).Ari R. Weisfuse, “The Last Hope for the al-Qa`ida Old Guard? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl,” CTC Sentinel, March 2016, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-last-hope-for-the-al-qaida-old-guard-a-profile-of-saif-al-adl/.

In April 2001, Adel was informed of a plot that would eventually become the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. He had some reservations about the plan. In particular, Adel was concerned that al-Qaeda operated recklessly and did not consider every consequence, including U.S. counterattacks, which could endanger the position of the Taliban and lead to major setbacks for the group in Afghanistan. Despite his private dissatisfaction, however, Adel publicly supported the effort.Ari R. Weisfuse, “The Last Hope for the al-Qa`ida Old Guard? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl,” CTC Sentinel, March 2016, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-last-hope-for-the-al-qaida-old-guard-a-profile-of-saif-al-adl/; “Al-‘Adl Letter,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, accessed April 2, 2019, https://ctc.usma.edu/harmony-program/al-adl-letter-original-language-2/. and https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2013/10/Al-Adl-Letter-Translation1.pdf.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. military launched Operation Enduring Freedom, striking al-Qaeda installations in Afghanistan in an effort to dismantle the terrorist group’s leadership and operational capabilities. The operation forced al-Qaeda to evacuate the area to try and save what was left of the network. In December 2001, Adel smuggled a group of al-Qaeda operatives into Iran, using a network of safe houses. While in Iran, he reestablished contact with al-Qaeda’s senior leadership in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region and sent operatives to Afghanistan to support the insurgency and carry out operations.Ari R. Weisfuse, “The Last Hope for the al-Qa`ida Old Guard? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl,” CTC Sentinel, March 2016, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-last-hope-for-the-al-qaida-old-guard-a-profile-of-saif-al-adl/.

In April 2003, Iranian authorities arrested Adel in response to substantial pressure from the United States and Saudi Arabia.Ari R. Weisfuse, “The Last Hope for the al-Qa`ida Old Guard? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl,” CTC Sentinel, March 2016, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-last-hope-for-the-al-qaida-old-guard-a-profile-of-saif-al-adl/. Shortly after, on May 12, al-Qaeda orchestrated two major bombings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing more than 30 people. American intelligence suspected that a “small cell of leaders of Al Qaeda in Iran”—possibly including Adel—directed the attack.Thomas Joscelyn, “Analysis: 2 wanted al Qaeda leaders operate in Iran,” Long War Journal, August 13, 2018, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/analysis-2-wanted-al-qaeda-leaders-operate-in-iran.php.

After 2003, Adel’s operational involvement with the terrorist group swiftly diminished, aside from occasionally publishing articles online. By July 2010, Adel appeared to have stopped playing any operational role with al-Qaeda and started addressing political developments in the region from a philosophical standpoint. In 2011, he published a series of essays on the Arab Spring, the semantics of terrorism, and differences of opinion regarding al-Qaeda’s failures.Ari R. Weisfuse, “The Last Hope for the al-Qa`ida Old Guard? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl,” CTC Sentinel, March 2016, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-last-hope-for-the-al-qaida-old-guard-a-profile-of-saif-al-adl/. However, al-Qaeda wanted him back and sought to free Adel from Iranian custody, according to bin Laden’s files.Thomas Joscelyn, “Analysis: 2 wanted al Qaeda leaders operate in Iran,” Long War Journal, August 13, 2018, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/analysis-2-wanted-al-qaeda-leaders-operate-in-iran.php.

According to the New York Times in September 2015, Adel and four other al-Qaeda senior operatives were reportedly released by Iranian authorities in March 2015 as part of a prisoner swap with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). AQAP had captured an Iranian diplomat in Yemen in July 2013. The Iranian government, however, denied the prisoner exchange.Rukmini Callimachi and Eric Schmitt, “Iran Released Top Members of Al Qaeda in a Trade,” New York Times, September 17, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/world/middleeast/iran-released-top-members-of-al-qaeda-in-a-trade.html.

A 2018 U.N. report found that Adel played a key role in al-Qaeda’s global network, reportedly acting as one of Ayman al Zawahiri’s chief deputies, while living in Iran. The report also implied that Adel and other senior al-Qaeda leaders based in Iran “influenced events in the Syrian Arab Republic, countering the authority of Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani (QDi.317) and causing formations, breakaways and mergers of various Al-Qaida-aligned groups in Idlib”“Letter dated 16 July 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council,” U.N. Security Council, July 16, 2018, https://undocs.org/S/2018/705.—referring to the controversy over the Nusra Front’s decision to rebrand itself as unaffiliated with any external or foreign entities.Thomas Joscelyn, “Analysis: 2 wanted al Qaeda leaders operate in Iran,” Long War Journal, August 13, 2018, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/analysis-2-wanted-al-qaeda-leaders-operate-in-iran.php.

In late 2017, Abu al-Qassam, former deputy to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, claimed that Adel was—although restricted to travel abroad—not imprisoned in Iran and free to operate.Thomas Joscelyn, “Analysis: 2 wanted al Qaeda leaders operate in Iran,” Long War Journal, August 13, 2018, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/analysis-2-wanted-al-qaeda-leaders-operate-in-iran.php. This contradicted a previous report from February 2016, in which the Twitter account of Shaybat al Hukama, an al-Qaeda media operative, implied that Adel resided in Syria to aid against the Russian intervention in the Syrian Civil War, according to the Long War Journal.Thomas Joscelyn, “Al Qaeda insider returns to Twitter, discusses group’s global leadership,” Long War Journal, March 16, 2016, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/03/al-qaeda-insider-returns-to-twitter-discusses-groups-global-leadership.php. In August 2018, the U.S. State Department increased its reward for information leading directly to Adel’s apprehension or conviction from $5 million to $10 million.Thomas Joscelyn, “Analysis: 2 wanted al Qaeda leaders operate in Iran,” Long War Journal, August 13, 2018, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/analysis-2-wanted-al-qaeda-leaders-operate-in-iran.php.

On August 7, 2020, two assassins on motorcycles shot and killed al-Qaeda deputy leader Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, a.k.a. Abu Muhammad al-Masri, on the street in Tehran, Iran. Following Abdullah’s death, Adel was reportedly elevated to al-Qaeda’s No. 2 position and became next in line to succeed Zawahiri as the leader of al-Qaeda.Adam Goldman, Eric Schmitt, Farnaz Fassihi, and Ronen Bergman, “Al Qaeda’s No. 2, Accused in U.S. Embassy Attacks, Was Killed in Iran,” New York Times, November 13, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/world/middleeast/al-masri-abdullah-qaeda-dead.html; Kabir Taneja, “Al Qaeda is battered, but don’t rejoice yet,” Observer Research Foundation, November 18, 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/research/al-qaeda-is-battered-but-dont-rejoice-yet/; “Explained: Could Saif al-Adel, the terrorist who masterminded ‘Black Hawk Down’, lead Al-Qaeda now?,” Firstpost, August 2, 2022, https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/explained-saif-al-adel-next-al-qaeda-chief-black-hawk-down-ayman-al-zawahiri-11001101.html. Unconfirmed reports of Zawahiri’s death in Afghanistan from asthma complications emerged in November 2020, boosting speculation that Adel would be named the next leader.Baker Atyani and Sayed Salahuddin, “Al-Qaeda chief Zawahiri has died in Afghanistan — sources,” Arab News, November 20, 2020, https://www.arabnews.pk/node/1765746/world; Tim Stickings, “Al-Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has died, reports claim terror chief Ayman al-Zawahiri has died in Afghanistan from ‘asthma-related breathing issues,’” Daily Mail (London), November 20, 2020, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8970231/Al-Qaedas-leader-Ayman-al-Zawahiri-died-reports-claim.html; Ali Soufan, “Al-Qa`ida’s Soon-To-Be Third Emir? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl,” CTC Sentinel, February 2021, https://ctc.usma.edu/al-qaidas-soon-to-be-third-emir-a-profile-of-saif-al-adl/.

In late February 2021, some British media began reporting that Adel is soon to be or may have already been named the leader of al-Qaeda. According to retired British Army officer Colonel Richard Kemp, Adel is highly respected among both al-Qaeda and ISIS. As such, some analysts expected Adel to begin recruiting from current ISIS fighters. Analysts told the Mirror Adel is a more effective leader than Zawahiri and could make al-Qaeda as dangerous as it was in 2001.Dan Keane, “TERROR TAUNT Al-Qaeda now as dangerous as under Osama Bin Laden as new chief dubbed ‘Sword of Revenge’ vows to attack, expert claims,” Sun (London), February 25, 2021, https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/14159205/al-qaeda-dangerous-osama-bin-laden/; Chris Hughes, “New Al-Qaeda boss known as Sword of Revenge is ‘worse than Osama bin Laden,’” Mirror (London), February 24, 2021, https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/new-al-qaeda-boss-known-23559133.

On August 1, 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden announced a CIA drone strike had killed Zawahiri in Afghanistan the day before. Following Zawahiri’s death, a former Afghan government official told CNN he had heard Adel had already left Iran for Afghanistan.Matthew Lee, Nomaan Merchant, Mike Balsamo, and James Laporta, “Biden: Killing of al-Qaida leader is long-sought ‘justice,’” Associated Press, last updated August 2, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/ayman-al-zawahri-al-qaida-terrorism-biden-36e5f10256c9bc9972b252849eda91f2. Other regional observers have questioned whether Iran would allow Adel to leave. Adel’s suspected presence in Iran has raised further questions regarding Iranian influence on al-Qaeda if Adel were to be named leader. Adel’s presence in Iran could also increase international pressure on the Islamic Republic for harboring the al-Qaeda leadership.Jeff Seldin, “Al-Qaida Succession Plan Being Put to Test,” Voice of America, August 2, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/al-qaida-succession-plan-being-put-to-test-/6683304.html.

According to a report released by the U.N. Security Council on February 13, 2023, Adel is the “de facto leader of Al-Qaida.” His leadership was not officially announced out of respect for the Afghan Taliban. If Adel was announced as the new leader, the statement would also acknowledge that Zawahiri was in Afghanistan upon the time of his death, a fact that would contradict the Afghan Taliban’s claims of not harboring known terrorists. Additionally, as Adel is reportedly in Iran, the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team surmised that al-Qaeda has ambitions for expanding their greater global movement.“Letter dated 13 February 2023 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Digital Library, February 13, 2023, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4002636?ln=en; Edith M. Lederer, “UN report: Sayf al-’Adl widely seen as new al-Qaida leader,” Associated Press, February 14, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/islamic-state-group-al-qaida-ayman-zawahri-politics-organized-crime-6ad9fe3f8e79064657b6e72b123ba8d7. On February 15, the U.S. Department of State reiterated that Adel is the leader of al-Qaeda and that he is based in Iran.“Department Press Briefing – February 15, 2023,” U.S. Department of State, February 15, 2023, https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-february-15-2023/.

Al-Adel has maintained a low profile despite his new alleged new role. Eight months after the start of Hamas’s war on Israel in October 2023, al-Adel released a June 8, 2024, statement via As-Sahab Media urging supporters to go to Afghanistan to train for “special operations” against Israel and the West. According to the multi-part essay entitled, “This is Gaza: A War of Existence, Not a War of Border,” al-Adel stated that “brothers where they are” must painfully “strike all Zionist interests both Western and Jewish in all Islamic lands.” Al-Adel further claimed that “reaction to our enemies’ crimes is with action, not with words.” Bill Roggio and Caleb Weiss, “Al Qaeda leader calls foreign fighters to Afghanistan,” Long War Journal, June 8, 2024, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/06/al-qaeda-leader-calls-foreign-fighters-to-afghanistan.php. Taliban officials did not immediately respond to the statement.Akhtar Makoii, “Al-Qaeda invites anti-West ‘brothers’ to Afghanistan,” Telegraph (London), June 15, 2024, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/06/15/al-qaeda-afghanistan-taliban-israel-west/; Bill Roggio and Caleb Weiss, “Al Qaeda leader calls foreign fighters to Afghanistan,” Long War Journal, June 8, 2024, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/06/al-qaeda-leader-calls-foreign-fighters-to-afghanistan.php.

On July 16, 2024, As-Sahab Media released the fourth part of al-Adel’s essay, “This is Gaza: A War of Existence, Not A War of Borders.” In the essay, al-Adel praised Hamas for its war against Israel and advised Muslims on combat and economic tactics to weaken Israel and its partners. He also argued that militant Muslims should improve communication with another—especially regarding manufacturing drones, explosives, and projectiles—and kill civilians rather than take them hostage.“Assessing Hamas’s October 7 Attack, Al-Qaeda Essay By Sayf Al-‘Adl: Killing Civilians More Beneficial Than Taking Them As Prisoners,” Middle East Media Research Institute, July 17, 2024, https://www.memri.org/reports/assessing-hamass-october-7-attack-al-qaeda-essay-sayf-al-adl-killing-civilians-more.

Matthew Heimbach is an American white-nationalist leader who co-founded the now-defunct Traditionalist Worker Party (TWP) and briefly served as the community outreach director of the National Socialist Movement (NSM).“Traditionalist Worker Party,” Southern Poverty Law Center, accessed September 27, 2018, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/traditionalist-worker-party. Heimbach has sought to unite U.S. white-nationalist groups and bring them into the public mainstream. His efforts have included co-creating the Nationalist Front umbrella group and the promotion of the 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. Heimbach has previously claimed to reject violence, though he encouraged his followers to attack protesters in Charlottesville. He has been linked to other violent incidents as well, including a 2016 assault on a black protester at a political rally.Vegas Tenold, Everything You Love Will Burn (New York: Nation Books, 2018), 157; Brett Barrouquere, “Days after guilty plea, Matthew Heimbach re-emerges in new alliance with National Socialist Movement,” Southern Poverty Law Center, September 24, 2018, https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/09/24/days-after-guilty-plea-matthew-heimbach-re-emerges-new-alliance-national-socialist-movement. Heimbach has claimed white unity is key to improving the economic and social position of white people who have been “left behind” while minorities have prospered.Vegas Tenold, Everything You Love Will Burn (New York: Nation Books, 2018), 38, 166-169. Heimbach has declared he is acting as an advocate for white European Americans much like the NAACP does for African Americans.Vegas Tenold, Everything You Love Will Burn (New York: Nation Books, 2018), 33-48. However, on April 1, 2020, Heimbach claimed he was leaving the neo-Nazi movement as he believes all members of the working class need to work together to address longstanding political, social, and economic problems.Brett Barrouguere, “Two Prominent Neo-Nazis Recant, but Their Actions Sow Doubts,” Southern Poverty Law Center, May 14, 2020, https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2020/05/14/two-prominent-neo-nazis-recant-their-actions-sow-doubts. In July 2021, Heimbach announced he was restarting the TWP to focus on economic disparity and a violent revolution against the global elite.Mark Greenblatt and Lauren Knapp, “Extremist Heimbach To Relaunch Hate Group, Says He Supports Violence,” Newsy, July 20, 2021, https://www.newsy.com/stories/extremist-heimbach-to-relaunch-hate-group-supports-violence-3/.

Heimbach’s platform is based around the idea that the white race has been disadvantaged because of globalism and multiculturalism, which he has largely blamed on a global Jewish conspiracy. Heimbach claims white unity is necessary because the Jews hate all white people equally.Vegas Tenold, Everything You Love Will Burn (New York: Nation Books, 2018, 63, 200. The U.K. government has warned that Heimbach’s anti-Semitic rhetoric could incite violence and banned Heimbach from entering the country in October 2015.Jessica Elgot, “Theresa May bans US segregationist from UK for ‘neo-Nazi’ remarks,” Guardian (London), November 4, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/04/theresa-may-bans-us-segregationist-from-uk-for-neo-nazi-remarks. Heimbach envisions an amicable separation of the races as illustrated by his oft-used slogan “Stop the hate, separate.”Vegas Tenold, Everything You Love Will Burn (New York: Nation Books, 2018), 33-48. To accomplish this, Heimbach has pushed for unity between otherwise disparate white-nationalist groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, the Hammerskin Nation, and the NSM. He has pushed these groups—with mixed results—to soften their explicitly racist rhetoric and abandon vilified symbols like the swastika in order to appear more mainstream.Vegas Tenold, Everything You Love Will Burn (New York: Nation Books, 2018), 200-201, 208-222. Though he claims to reject violence, he has described violent groups such as the Aryan Terror Brigade as “part of the big White Advocacy tent.”“Matthew Heimbach Embracing Hard-Core White Supremacy,” Anti-Defamation League, October 4, 2013, https://www.adl.org/blog/matthew-heimbach-embracing-hard-core-white-supremacy; Mark Potok, “The Little Fuhrer: Matthew Heimbach Goes All the Way,” Southern Poverty Law Center, October 7, 2013, https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2013/10/07/little-f%C3%BChrer-matthew-heimbach-goes-all-way.

Heimbach first gained national attention while attending Towson University in Maryland, where he created the White Student Union, a group unaffiliated with the university that sought to stem the “genocide against the European people.”Caitlin Dickson, “Riding Along With a Towson University Student’s ‘White Patrol,’” Daily beast, April 24, 2013, https://www.thedailybeast.com/riding-along-with-a-towson-university-students-white-patrol. In 2013, the White Student Union created nightly patrols to seek out so-called “black predators.”“White Student Union,” Vice, December 25, 2013, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/znqpye/white-student-union. That April, Heimbach attended the annual conference of the ethno-nationalist magazine American Renaissance in Tennessee. There he met Matt Parrott and his stepdaughter, Brooke, whom Heimbach would marry the following year.Tony Rehagen, “Matthew Heimbach Has A Dream—A Very Different Dream,” Indianapolis Monthly, April 2017, https://www.indianapolismonthly.com/features/white-space/; Marwa Eltagouri, “White nationalist leader Matthew Heimbach arrested on domestic battery charges,” Washington Post, March 13, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/03/13/white-nationalist-leader-matthew-heimbach-arrested-for-domestic-battery/?utm_term=.9680702f43da; Allie Conti, “White Nationalist Matthew Heimbach Is Going to Jail,” Vice, May 15, 2018, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mbkadb/matthew-heimbach-the-white-nationalist-in-that-bizarre-love-triangle-is-going-to-jail. After graduating from Towson in the spring of 2013, Heimbach and Matt Parrott transformed the White Student Union into the Traditionalist Youth Network (TYN) to promote what they considered traditional European values.“Matthew Heimbach,” Southern Poverty Law Center, accessed October 22, 2018, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/matthew-heimbach.

In 2015, Heimbach and Parrott created the TWP as the political arm of the TYN. They registered the TWP as a political party with the intention of endorsing political candidates who shared their ethno-nationalist values.“Traditionalist Worker Party,” Southern Poverty Law Center, accessed September 27, 2018, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/traditionalist-worker-party. The TWP claimed to actively fight for a white homeland in order to secure the future existence of the white people. The TWP rejected atheism and secularism while claiming its members came from the “traditional faiths of the European people.” The TWP promoted the interests of white Americans who had been “abandoned by the System and actively attacked by globalists and traitorous politicians.”“Party Platform,” Traditionalist Worker Party, accessed August 24, 2017, http://www.tradworker.org/platform/. The party was based in a southern Indiana compound owned by Parrott. Parrott and Heimbach lived with their respective spouses in the compound and encouraged other followers to join them.Shay McAlister, “S. Indiana white nationalists working to shut the door on multicultural America,” 2016, WHAS 11 ABC, http://www.whas11.com/news/special-reports/s-indiana-white-nationalists-working-to-shut-the-door-on-multicultural-america/373394558.

In 2016, Heimbach and NSM leader Jeff Schoep created the Aryan Nationalist Alliance (ANA), to unite U.S. white-nationalist groups. The ANA platform recognized fundamental differences in both approach and ideology among its member groups but unified around the idea that all national problems—“from street crime to anti-White governmental policies, to attacks on our sovereignty and faith”—could be solved with the creation of a white nation.Vegas Tenold, Everything You Love Will Burn (New York: Nation Books, 2018), 157. ANA rebranded as the Nationalist Front in November 2016.“National Socialist Movement/Nationalist Front,” Anti-Defamation League, accessed October 15, 2018, https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/national-socialist-movementnationalist-front.

In August 2017, Heimbach promoted and attended the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. He and his TWP followers were involved in physical altercations with protesters during the rally. Heimbach also reportedly ordered followers to tear down police barricades in Charlottesville’s Emancipation Park where the rally was held.Robert King, “This Indiana man is in the middle of the 'Unite the Right' rally in Charlottesville,” Indianapolis Star, August 12, 2018, https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2017/08/12/unite-right-white-nationalist-rally-charlottesville-erupts-violence/562095001/.

The TWP collapsed in 2018 following Heimbach’s arrest and Parrott’s resignation. On March 13, 2018, Heimbach assaulted his wife and Parrott in their Indiana home after the pair discovered Heimbach was having an affair with Parrott’s wife. Heimbach was charged with misdemeanor battery and felony domestic battery in the presence of a child under 16.Marwa Eltagouri, “White nationalist leader Matthew Heimbach arrested on domestic battery charges,” Washington Post, March 13, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/03/13/white-nationalist-leader-matthew-heimbach-arrested-for-domestic-battery/?utm_term=.9680702f43da; Thomas Novelly, “White nationalist Matthew Heimbach arrested after trailer park fight over alleged affair,” Courier-Journal, March 14, 2018, https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/2018/03/14/white-nationalists-matthew-heimbach-david-parrott-trailer-park-fight-affair/423366002/. Parrott resigned from the TWP shortly after and took down the group’s website.Brett Barrouquere and Rachel Janik, “TWP chief Matthew Heimbach arrested for battery after affair with top spokesman's wife,” Southern Poverty Law Center, March 13, 2018, https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/03/13/twp-chief-matthew-heimbach-arrested-battery-after-affair-top-spokesmans-wife. It remains to be seen if other leaders will arise to revive the TWP.

The March 2018 assault led to Heimbach’s 90-day incarceration for violating the terms of his probation related to a 2016 arrest. In March 2016, Heimbach was charged with harassment and misdemeanor assault after he shoved a black protester at a rally for then-presidential candidate Donald Trump in Louisville, Kentucky. Heimbach has claimed that he acted “pursuant to the directives and requests of” Trump and his campaign.Kenneth P. Vogel, “White nationalist claims Trump directed rally violence,” Politico, April 17, 2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/04/donald-trump-rally-violence-237302. In July 2017, Heimbach pled guilty to assault charges and received a suspended prison sentence, a fine, and an order to attend anger management classes. The suspended sentence was conditional on Heimbach maintaining a clean arrest record for two years.“White nationalist pleads guilty in Trump rally case,” Associated Press, July 19, 2017, https://apnews.com/ee14f79ada6947e38e90ee9cac33d999. In May 2018, Heimbach was sentenced to 38 days in the city jail in Louisville, Kentucky, for violating the terms of his probation.Jason Riley, “White nationalist who harassed woman at Trump rally ordered to serve 38 days in jail,” WDRB.com, May 15, 2018, http://www.wdrb.com/story/38193191/white-nationalist-who-harassed-woman-at-trump-rally-ordered-to-serve-38-days-in-jail#.WvsW4CjYV28.twitter. Heimbach is still subject to a civil lawsuit related to the 2016 incident.Andrea Diaz, “Trump did not incite violence against protesters at a 2016 campaign rally, court rules,” CNN, September12, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/12/politics/trump-wins-dismissal-lawsuit-kentucky-trnd/index.html.

Since the TWP’s collapse, Heimbach has continued to promote his version of ethno-nationalism. In September 2018, he became the NSM’s community outreach director. Departing from NSM’s traditional rhetoric and signifying a shift in NSM’s tactics, Heimbach publicly stated his intent to engage with “communities of color” in what NSM leader Schoep declared a “new era of National Socialism.”Brett Barrouquere, “Days after guilty plea, Matthew Heimbach re-emerges in new alliance with National Socialist Movement,” Southern Poverty Law Center, September 24, 2018, https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/09/24/days-after-guilty-plea-matthew-heimbach-re-emerges-new-alliance-national-socialist-movement.

On December 9, 2019, Heimbach was listed as the sole incorporator of the National Socialist Charitable Coalition (NSCC)—an organization that solicits mail and donations for those convicted or accused of murders, hate crimes, and similar offenses. The NSCC claims to not promote “a political agenda” and offers no opinion on the guilt or innocence of inmates. However, the rhetoric employed throughout the site often downplays the severity of terror attacks. Among those listed in the inmate database are: Robert Bowers, the perpetrator of the 2018 Tree of Life synagogue massacre; Dylann Roof, who carried out the 2015 Emanuel AME Church shooting in Charleston; and James Alex Fields, who ran over anti-racism protesters in Charlottesville in 2017, ultimately killing one woman.Peter Smith, “Website seeks support for those accused of hate crimes, killings,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, March 2, 2020, https://www.post-gazette.com/news/crime-courts/2020/03/02/Website-seeks-support-for-killers-others-accused-of-hate-crimes/stories/202002210127. According to the NSCC, Bowers allegedly “shot several congregants,” without mentioning the number of deaths or injuries, and also reiterates Fields’s defense that the Charlottesville killing was an accident. On February 24, 2020, Heimbach surrendered the charity, leaving his former partner, Parrot, as the lone contact for the organization.Brett Barrouguere, “Two Prominent Neo-Nazis Recant, but Their Actions Sow Doubts,” Southern Poverty Law Center, May 14, 2020, https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2020/05/14/two-prominent-neo-nazis-recant-their-actions-sow-doubts.

Heimbach announced that he was leaving the neo-Nazi movement on April 1, 2020. However, some critics doubted the authenticity of Heimbach’s statement given ongoing legal proceedings concerning his violent role during the Charlottesville rally.John Eligon, “He Says His Nazi Days Are Over. Do You Believe Him?,” New York Times, April 4, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/04/us/jeff-schoep-white-nationalist-reformer.html. Heimbach claimed his decision was based on “redefining my community as all members of the working class, instead of just White members of the working class, redefines fundamentally the political, social and economic solutions to problems we all face.”Brett Barrouguere, “Two Prominent Neo-Nazis Recant, but Their Actions Sow Doubts,” Southern Poverty Law Center, May 14, 2020, https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2020/05/14/two-prominent-neo-nazis-recant-their-actions-sow-doubts. n February 2021, he told Ohio television station WKRC he had sobered up and his sympathies had shifted toward communism and leftist politicians like U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders. He told WKRC that the divisions between people were not race driven but based on economic disparities. As such, he said he would work with Black Lives Matter or any other racial group to fight against the economic gap. “The capitalist class that rules this country does not care, fundamentally,” he said.Duane Pohlman, “Can a man turn 180 degrees and renounce fascism?,” WKRC, February 4, 2021, https://local12.com/news/investigates/can-a-man-turn-180-degrees-and-renounce-fascism. Heimbach was scheduled to speak at a Medicare For All rally in Muncie, Indiana, that July. National organizers canceled the rally after receiving complaints about Heimbach’s participation.Robin Gibson, “Outrage over divisive speaker apparently cancels Muncie march plans,” Star Press, June 30, 2021, https://www.thestarpress.com/story/news/local/2021/06/30/outrage-over-divisive-speaker-apparently-cancels-muncie-march-plans/7813895002/.

In July 2021, Heimbach announced his intentions to relaunch the TWP.  He told the website Newsy he was drawing inspiration from Marxism and Bolshevism to support global revolution. Heimbach told Newsy he did not “particularly like Judaism as a religion.”Mark Greenblatt and Lauren Knapp, “Extremist Heimbach To Relaunch Hate Group, Says He Supports Violence,” Newsy, July 20, 2021, https://www.newsy.com/stories/extremist-heimbach-to-relaunch-hate-group-supports-violence-3/. Heimbach also called for President Joe Biden and former presidents Donald Trump, Barack Obama, and George W. Bush to be tried for crimes against society. He pled the fifth amendment—protection from self-incrimination—when asked if it is permissible to kill the U.S. president. According to the report, Heimbach intended to relaunch the TWP that month.Mark Greenblatt and Lauren Knapp, “Extremist Heimbach To Relaunch Hate Group, Says He Supports Violence,” Newsy, July 20, 2021, https://www.newsy.com/stories/extremist-heimbach-to-relaunch-hate-group-supports-violence-3/.

On November 23, 2021, a U.S. District Court in Charlottesville found Heimbach and other organizers of the Unite the Right rally liable in a civil suit that alleged they were responsible for injuries to counter-protesters. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on two federal conspiracy charges. The two dozen defendants in the lawsuit included Parrott, Richard Spencer, event organizer Jason Kessler, and neo-Nazi podcaster Christopher Cantwell, among others. The jury awarded plaintiffs more than $25 million in damages.Neil MacFarquhar, “Jury Finds Rally Organizers Responsible for Charlottesville Violence,” New York Times, November 23, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/23/us/charlottesville-rally-verdict.html; Ellie Silverman, “Neo-Nazi told leader of group at deadly 2017 Charlottesville rally: ‘We’re all doing it together,’” Washington Post, November 4, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2021/11/04/charlottesville-lawsuit-nazis-heimbach-trial/. According to Heimbach’s testimony during the trial, he had proposed the uniform of khakis and polo shirts for the rally. In a June 5, 2017, message to Vanguard America commander Dillon Hopper, Heimbach referred to the two of them, National Socialist Movement leader Jeff Schoep, and League of the South leader Michael Hill as the leadership of the far right. Heimbach said the Charlottesville rally would bring them together with other far-right leaders.Ellie Silverman, “Neo-Nazi told leader of group at deadly 2017 Charlottesville rally: ‘We’re all doing it together,’” Washington Post, November 4, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2021/11/04/charlottesville-lawsuit-nazis-heimbach-trial/. The jury held Heimbach liable for $500,000.Mark Morales and Steve Almasy, “Jury finds Unite the Right defendants liable for more than $26 million in damages,” CNN, November 23, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/23/us/charlottesville-unite-the-right-trial-deliberations-tuesday/index.html. After the jury announced its decision, Heimbach claimed he is a single father of two sons, working paycheck to paycheck, and will never be able to pay the damages. He accused the plaintiffs’ lawyers of wasting $20 million “to try and play Whac-A-Mole with public figureheads.”Denise Lavoie and Michael Kunzelman, “Collecting $26M award vs. white nationalists may be tough,” Associated Press, November 24, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/race-and-ethnicity-racial-injustice-charlottesville-4a50a14dff0f862b3b09da09054a690d.