Overview

Ramzi bin al-Shibh is a key facilitator of the 9/11 attacks currently held by the United States at the Guantanamo Bay.“The Guantanamo Docket: Ramzi Bin al Shibh: JFT – GTMO Assessment,” New York Times, accessed August 10, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo/detainees/10013-ramzi-bin-al-shibh. Originally intended to be the fourth hijacker-pilot in the attacks, he played the role of facilitator when he was unable to obtain a U.S. visa.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 168, 225, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. Bin al-Shibh was captured by Pakistani authorities in 2002 and transferred to Guantanamo in 2006. In 2008, he and four co-defendants were charged on eight counts of capital murder. His trial is ongoing.“The Guantanamo Docket: Ramzi Bin al Shibh: JFT – GTMO Assessment,” New York Times, accessed August 10, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo/detainees/10013-ramzi-bin-al-shibh;
“Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Fast Facts,” CNN, last modified December 22, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/03/world/meast/khalid-sheikh-mohammed-fast-facts/.

Ramzi bin al-Shibh was born in Ghayl Bawazir, Yemen, to a religiously observant family.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 161, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf;
“The Guantanamo Docket: Ramzi Bin al Shibh: JFT – GTMO Assessment,” New York Times, accessed August 10, 2017, 2, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo/detainees/10013-ramzi-bin-al-shibh. Little is known about his early life, but according to the U.S. Department of Defense’s Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF), he became interested in religion at age 12.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 161, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf;
“The Guantanamo Docket: Ramzi Bin al Shibh: JFT – GTMO Assessment,” New York Times, accessed August 10, 2017, 2, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo/detainees/10013-ramzi-bin-al-shibh. He worked for the International Bank of Yemen from 1987 to 1995, and fought for two months in support of the Yemeni government during that country’s civil war in 1994.“The Guantanamo Docket: Ramzi Bin al Shibh: JFT – GTMO Assessment,” New York Times, accessed August 10, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo/detainees/10013-ramzi-bin-al-shibh. In 1995, after being denied a U.S. visa, he relocated to Germany, claiming that he was a political refugee from Sudan named Ramzi Omar seeking asylum.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 161, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. He lived in Hamburg under the name Umar al-Yemeni until his application was denied in November 1997, at which point he returned to Yemen to obtain a student visa.“The Guantanamo Docket: Ramzi Bin al Shibh: JFT – GTMO Assessment,” New York Times, accessed August 10, 2017, 2, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo/detainees/10013-ramzi-bin-al-shibh. He then returned to Hamburg as a student under his true name. However, his academic performance proved poor, and he was expelled from a school in September of 1998.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 161, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf.

While in Germany, bin al-Shibh linked up with a group of Islamists who would later comprise the Hamburg contingent of the 9/11 plot.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 160, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. The group included hijacker-pilots Mohamed Atta (Flight 11), Marwan al Shehhi (Flight 175) and Ziad Jarrah (Flight 93). Also belonging to the plotters’ social circle in Hamburg were fellow extremists Said Bahaji, Zakaria Essabar, Mounir el Motassadeq, and Abdelghani Mzoudi, some of whom were later found to have helped the cell as they planned and coordinated the attacks.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 164-165, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf.

The 9/11 Commission could not determine how each member of the Hamburg cell met each other. The Commission did, however, successfully determine that bin al-Shibh first met Atta at a mosque in Hamburg in 1995.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 161-162, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. In 1998, bin al-Shibh began sharing an apartment at 54 Marienstrasse with two members of his extremist circle: Atta and Shehhi. In their shared apartment, the group hosted discussions with the rest of their extremist social circle three to four times per week, sharing opinions later characterized by the 9/11 Commission as “extremely anti-American.”National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 164, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. At some point in the late 1990s, the group also joined up with Lebanese-born Ziad Jarrah, who first met bin al-Shibh in the Quds mosque in Hamburg.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 162-163, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. By the late 1990s, bin al-Shibh was denouncing a “Jewish world conspiracy” and praising violent jihad, according to the 9/11 Commission.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 161, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf.

In 1999, four members of the Hamburg group—bin al-Shibh, Atta, Shehhi, and Jarrah—became committed to participating in violent jihad. The four decided to leave Germany to fight in Chechnya against the Russians, but were encouraged to travel to Afghanistan after a chance encounter with fellow extremist Khalid al Masri.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 165, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. According to bin al-Shibh, Masri connected the cell to an al-Qaeda contact in Duisburg, Germany—Mohamedou Ould Slahi—who recommended that the group travel to Afghanistan for training before traveling to Chechnya. Upon agreeing to Slahi’s suggestion, the group was instructed to obtain Pakistani visas and travel through Karachi to the Taliban’s office in Quetta.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 165-166, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf.

Bin al-Shibh, Atta, Shehhi, and Jarrah left Germany for Afghanistan in November 1999. When the group arrived at the Taliban office in Quetta, they were shuttled to Kandahar and introduced to then-al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. According to findings from the 9/11 Commission, after meeting privately with bin Laden, each of the four swore an oath of loyalty to bin Laden and volunteered to participate in a martyrdom mission. The group then met with al-Qaeda military commander Mohammed Atef, who told them that they had been assigned to a highly secretive mission. As the first part of the assignment, Atef instructed the group to return to Germany and enroll in flight training school. They were told that they would eventually be joined in their operation by fellow al-Qaeda operative Nawaf al Hazmi, who would help hijack Flight 77 and serve as Atta’s second-in-command.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 166; 242, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf.

By early 2000, bin al-Shibh and his cohorts had begun staggering their return to Germany, each traveling through Karachi. In Karachi, they met with 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), who had first conceived of the plot—approved by bin Laden in late 1998 or early 1999—to weaponize airplanes and crash them into buildings in the United States.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 149; 167, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. During bin al-Shibh and Atta’s joint meeting with KSM in January 2000, the pair was given practical instructions on how to evade government detection as well as more basic instructions on how to live in the United States. Bin al-Shibh and his cohorts returned to Hamburg in early 2000.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 167, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf.

Upon returning to Germany, the four al-Qaeda members began researching flight schools in Europe and worked to conceal their extremist behavior. Ultimately, the group decided to receive flight training in the United States, where flight schools were less expensive and required fewer training hours.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 167-168, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. In August 2000, bin al-Shibh briefly traveled to Dubai, where he met with KSM’s nephew, Ammar al-Baluchi. He then continued on to Yemen, where he obtained a U.K. visa in the hopes that it would help him acquire a U.S. visa. He reportedly traveled to London in the hopes of finding a wife or acquiring a false passport that would help him travel to the United States, but failed on both accounts, returning to Germany in September 2000.“The Guantanamo Docket: Ramzi Bin al Shibh: JFT – GTMO Assessment,” New York Times, accessed August 10, 2017, 4-5, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo/detainees/10013-ramzi-bin-al-shibh.

Although Atta, Shehhi, and Jarrah successfully obtained new passports and visas, bin al-Shibh’s four visa requests were denied because it was suspected that he might seek to work as an undocumented alien in the United States, even though he had already been accepted to flight school in Florida and sent a deposit. Bin al-Shibh would therefore remain behind as a facilitator for the operation.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 168, 225, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. The other three traveled to the United States to begin flight training, obtaining their pilot licenses by January 2001.“The Guantanamo Docket: Ramzi Bin al Shibh: JFT – GTMO Assessment,” New York Times, accessed August 10, 2017, 5, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo/detainees/10013-ramzi-bin-al-shibh.

In January 2001, Atta returned to Germany for a progress meeting with bin al-Shibh, informing him that the three Hamburg pilots had completed their flight training and were awaiting further instruction from al-Qaeda and that a fourth pilot, Hani Hanjour, had joined the operation.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 227, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. In late January, bin al-Shibh returned to Afghanistan to relay the information to bin Laden, briefly contracting malaria while there. After he recovered in March, bin Laden informed him of the intended targets for the 9/11 attacks, and gave him further instructions to relay to the hijackers.“The Guantanamo Docket: Ramzi Bin al Shibh: JFT – GTMO Assessment,” New York Times, accessed August 10, 2017, 5, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo/detainees/10013-ramzi-bin-al-shibh;
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 243, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf.

In June, bin al-Shibh traveled to Pakistan, where he met with KSM. KSM told him to ask Atta to select an attack date, and gave him the contact information of a possible additional hijacker, Zacarias Moussaoui. KSM also gave bin al-Shibh a Saudi passport under the name Hasan Ali al-Assiri and a ticket to Malaysia, where he was supposed to meet Atta. However, Atta could not make the trip because he was busy helping the muscle hijackers settle into the United States. Bin al-Shibh remained in Malaysia for three weeks, briefly traveling to Bangkok before returning to Germany, as instructed by KSM. While in Afghanistan and Pakistan, bin al-Shibh also helped facilitate the travel of the muscle hijackers through the area.“The Guantanamo Docket: Ramzi Bin al Shibh: JFT – GTMO Assessment,” New York Times, accessed August 10, 2017, 6, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo/detainees/10013-ramzi-bin-al-shibh;
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 243-4, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf.

Bin al-Shibh and Atta decided to meet in Spain instead. Bin al-Shibh traveled to Reus, near Barcelona, on July 9. The two stayed in the area until bin al-Shibh returned to Hamburg on July 16. They spent their time in Spain discussing attack details and logistics. By his own account, bin al-Shibh relayed a request from bin Laden during this time to execute the attacks as quickly as possible, as he was concerned about having so many operatives in the United States. Atta responded that he would need five to six more weeks to continue organizing arrangements before providing an attack date. Bin al-Shibh informed Atta of the need to withhold the attack date from the hijackers until the last minute, but to provide him with one week’s advance notice of the date so that he could travel to Afghanistan and relay the date to bin Laden directly.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 244, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. Atta also told bin al-Shibh during this meeting that although he understood bin Laden’s preference to target the White House over the U.S. Capitol, the Capitol was a more feasible target.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 244, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. Atta confirmed that the muscle hijackers had all arrived in the United States without issue, and he was dividing them into teams based on their ability to speak English.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 244-5, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf.

Another point of discussion during the meeting was hijacker Ziad Jarrah’s strained relationship with Atta. At one point, KSM instructed bin al-Shibh to send funds to Zacarias Moussaoui. The 9/11 Commission suggests that KSM may have been motivated by concerns that Jarrah might back out of the operation and viewed Moussaoui as a potential substitute pilot for him. In accordance with KSM’s instructions, Bin al-Shibh wired Moussaoui a total of $15,000 in July.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 246, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. Moussaoui was arrested in August 2001, and the 9/11 Commission believes that the 9/11 plot could have been uncovered had authorities investigated further and discovered his communications with bin al-Shibh.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 276, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. Bin al-Shibh also met with Jarrah when he traveled to Germany in late July, and convinced him not to withdraw from the operation.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 246, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf.

In the final weeks before the 9/11 attacks, Atta coordinated further with bin al-Shibh, discussing additional logistics of the attacks.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): 248, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. In mid-August, Atta contacted bin al-Shibh and gave him a riddle: two branches, a slash, and a lollipop––code for the attack date, 9/11. Bin al-Shibh then relayed the date to KSM. On September 8, Bin al-Shibh met al-Baluchi in Dubai. The two traveled together to Pakistan. KSM picked them up in Karachi on the morning of September 11. They celebrated upon seeing the 9/11 attacks on the news.“The Guantanamo Docket: Ramzi Bin al Shibh: JFT – GTMO Assessment,” New York Times, accessed August 10, 2017, 7, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo/detainees/10013-ramzi-bin-al-shibh.

On September 12, 2001, bin al-Shibh traveled to Afghanistan, meeting with bin Laden and other al-Qaeda officials in Kabul and mid-September, who praised him for his assistance in the plot. Bin Laden sent him to an al-Qaeda training camp near Kabul, where he underwent training for about a month in weaponry and guerrilla warfare. Over the next few months, as the United States commenced operations in Afghanistan, Bin al-Shibh traveled with other al-Qaeda members throughout the country. In November, he met with senior al-Qaeda leaders in Zormat, and in December, worked as a cook in Kandahar. While in Kandahar, he discussed potential future operations against the West with KSM. After Kandahar fell to U.S. coalition forces, bin al-Shibh traveled to Karachi, Pakistan.“The Guantanamo Docket: Ramzi Bin al Shibh: JFT – GTMO Assessment,” New York Times, accessed August 10, 2017, 7-8, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo/detainees/10013-ramzi-bin-al-shibh.

Bin al-Shibh and KSM discussed the possibility of bin al-Shibh’s attending a flight school in Karachi, but this plan was ultimately discarded after bin al-Shibh’s key involvement in the 9/11 attacks became public. Bin al-Shibh instead stayed at several al-Qaida safe houses in the first few months of 2002. In June, KSM consulted bin al-Shibh about the possibility of conducting an operation similar to the 9/11 attacks at London’s Heathrow airport.“The Guantanamo Docket: Ramzi Bin al Shibh: JFT – GTMO Assessment,” New York Times, accessed August 10, 2017, 9, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo/detainees/10013-ramzi-bin-al-shibh.

On September 10 and September 11, Pakistani authorities raided several al-Qaida residences in Karachi. Bin al-Shibh was captured and taken into custody.“The Guantanamo Docket: Ramzi Bin al Shibh: JFT – GTMO Assessment,” New York Times, accessed August 10, 2017, 9-10, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo/detainees/10013-ramzi-bin-al-shibh. He was handed over to U.S. custody and taken to a prison in an undisclosed third country for further interrogation.“Binalshibh to go to third country for questioning,” CNN, September 17, 2002, http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/09/16/alqaeda.pakistan/. On September 6, 2006, then-U.S. president George Bush publicly acknowledged that bin al-Shibh had been transferred to Guantanamo two days prior.“14 terror suspects profiled,” CNN, September 7, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/09/06/terrorr.detainees/. That December, the Department of Defense Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF) concluded that bin al-Shibh posed a high risk and was of high intelligence value.“The Guantanamo Docket: Ramzi Bin al Shibh: JFT – GTMO Assessment,” New York Times, accessed August 10, 2017, 2, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo/detainees/10013-ramzi-bin-al-shibh. Bin al-Shibh chose not to attend his military hearings at Guantanamo in February and March of 2007, choosing to remain in his cell instead.“The Guantanamo Docket: Ramzi Bin al Shibh: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Transcripts for High Value Detainees,” New York Times, accessed August 10, 2017, 3, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo/detainees/10013-ramzi-bin-al-shibh. In 2010, the CIA admitted that it has tapes of bin al-Shibh’s interrogations in Morocco.“CIA tapes prove Morocco rendition,” The Australian (Surry Hills), August 29, 2010, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/cia-tapes-prove-morocco-rendition/news-story/d8cb292fbc8307e7f3ac8028d94928a5. In 2014, the Senate Intelligence Committee revealed that bin al-Shibh had been subjected to various torture techniques.“The Senate Committee’s Report on the C.I.A.’s Use of Torture,” New York Times, December 9, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/12/09/world/cia-torture-report-document.html.

In February 2008, a military commission indicted bin al-Shibh and four fellow Guantanamo detainees on capital murder charges related to the 9/11 attacks. The U.S. government also announced that it would seek the death penalty against the defendants.“Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Fast Facts,” CNN, last modified December 22, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/03/world/meast/khalid-sheikh-mohammed-fast-facts/. In January 2009, bin al-Shibh publicly admitted that he was proud of helping to execute the 9/11 attacks.“Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Fast Facts,” CNN, last modified December 22, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/03/world/meast/khalid-sheikh-mohammed-fast-facts/;
Jane Sutton, “Guantanamo court convenes amid chaos,” Reuters, January 18, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-guantanamo-hearings-idUSTRE50I01I20090119.

Between 2009 and 2012, the status of bin al-Shibh’s trial fluctuated as U.S. authorities requested freezes and delays in the proceedings. In November 2009, the U.S. Justice Department announced that the trial would be transferred to a New York court room. That decision was reversed in April 2011 when Attorney General Eric Holder said that the trial would be re-transferred to Guantanamo. The capital charges were re-filed against bin al-Shibh and his four co-defendants that May. They included conspiracy, murder in violation of the law of war, attacking civilians, attacking civilian objects, intentionally causing serious bodily injury, destruction of property in violation of the law of war, hijacking aircraft and terrorism. The detainees appeared in public for the first time during their arraignment at Guantanamo in May 2012. However, during the proceedings, the detainees largely refused to cooperate.“Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Fast Facts,” CNN, last modified December 22, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/03/world/meast/khalid-sheikh-mohammed-fast-facts/.

In December 2013, bin al-Shibh’s trial was once again frozen because of suspicions that he was not mentally fit to stand trial, as he often disrupted the proceedings with outbursts and at other times, refused to talk or cooperate.Carol Rosenberg, “Alleged 9/11 conspirator stymies mental health board,” Miami Herald, January 31, 2014, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article1959854.html. He claimed that he was being mistreated and deprived of sleep in his prison, forcing the hearings to focus on the conditions of his incarceration.Carol Rosenberg, “Alleged 9/11 conspirator stymies mental health board,” Miami Herald, January 31, 2014, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article1959854.html;
Carol Rosenberg, “9/11 competency hearing puts focus on Guantanamo’s secret prison,” Miami Herald, April 13, 2014, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article1962826.html. In July 2014, the U.S. army judge Col. James L. Pohl temporarily removed bin al-Shibh’s trial from that of the other four 9/11-affiliated detainees, claiming that his specific issues were slowing the proceedings, but the decision was reversed in December 2015 after prosecutors protested. Bin al-Shibh was deemed competent to stand trial. Nonetheless, the proceedings have continued to face various delays,Carol Rosenberg, “Guantanamo judge formally restores five-man 9/11 trial,” Miami Herald, December 4, 2015, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantanamo/article48035305.html. and as of 2021, the trial has still not taken place.“About the 9/11 war crimes trial,” Miami Herald, May 15, 2017, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantanamo/article1928877.html.