The terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 were a turning point for the European Union (EU)’s counterterrorism approach. Both countries were familiar with homegrown terrorism—with Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the United Kingdom. Hence, these attacks showcased a potential security gap regarding external vulnerabilities. Indeed, these attacks transformed the EU’s perspective on terrorism since they demonstrated that Islamist-terrorist violence had become a concerning reality. At the social level, the support for the “war on terror” decreased following these attacks due to a widespread sentiment that the EU’s involvement made it more vulnerable to further external terrorist attacks. At the political level, strict and securitized regulations were promptly put in place. Nevertheless, a decade later, the EU was faced with a new wave of attacks. This is the second in a three-part blog series on the evolving counterterrorism strategies of the EU and will explore the differences in the various approaches across the continent.

In 2015, six EU member states—Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom—were faced with 211 terrorist attacks (whether foiled, failed, or completed). Since then, 815 foiled, failed, or completed attacks took place in EU member states. Besides Islamist terrorist, left-wing extremist, and ethno-separatist inspired attacks, authorities detected a surge in right-wing extremist motivated violence across the EU since 2016. Counterterrorism observers have continued to record this surge since then.

As far as legislative developments are concerned, 2015 marked a key change in the counterterrorism sphere, with 12 EU countries having updated their national counterterrorism strategies to reflect changing priorities and an effort to address key issues, such as mitigating preparatory acts to commit attacks—with a special focus on traveling with such intent—as well as effectively collecting and sharing information for legal purposes. These attacks showcased gaps in member states’ capacities to address vulnerabilities, especially since a growing number of such attacks were conducted by single perpetrators who had been living in the targeted countries prior to the attack.

This change from the typical structured group-based attacks to spontaneous individual actions prompted policy alterations in terms of stricter firearms control, more efficient use of intelligence and information sharing, as well as stricter border controls, including for EU citizens.

Differences between National Counterterrorism Strategies

Despite all EU member states sharing a responsibility to reflect the EU’s principles in their national policies, the actual practical implementation of legislative changes at each national level varies. In fact, member states have discretion regarding how they implement EU law at their national levels, resulting in diverse practical policy outcomes. Even when implementing the same legislation, countries have different legal systems and administrative capacities, hence the actual result is likely to be different. This is the case in all policy areas, including counterterrorism.

These are the key differences of the current national counterterrorism strategies of EU member states:

• Focus: Despite the overall focus on Islamist extremism and, more recently, on right-wing extremism, different member states have distinct priorities and trends of concern. For example, countries such as Italy, Spain, and Greece have experience dealing with actions carried out by left-wing extremist or ethno-separatist individuals and groups. Hence, these variations can result in differences in terms of the development and implementation of policies.

• Top-down vs bottom-up: Since 2015, authorities have increasingly focused on preventing radicalization by addressing its root causes and drivers, as well as by supporting individuals to step away from it. However, the way this is implemented in concrete policies differs between member states, with some operationalizing these efforts through state-based initiatives, while others put in place community-led programs (for example, the Violence Prevention Network, Fryshuset, and the Youth Empowerment and Innovation Project). 

• Administrative approaches: Some member states adopt a highly centralized top-down approach to counterterrorism, with state and governmental authorities taking responsibility for leading efforts and initiatives in the field. However, other member states such as Finland and Sweden opt for a bottom-up approach, putting an onus on local-level actors. In addition, the role of law enforcement agencies also varies, especially in those countries that have more than one domestic security authority, like France, Germany, and Belgium.

• Capacity: Despite its widely recognized importance and urgency, member states have varying budgets and priorities that impact their capacities to address matters related to counterterrorism. Consequently, the amount of resources allocated to counterterrorism efforts and, consequently, the ability to deal with the issues both in terms of prevention and countering, varies significantly between member states. 

Despite these differences, the EU maintains its commitment to create a more harmonized counterterrorism response among member states by providing EU funds, creating cooperation opportunities, and coordinating actions at the EU-level. Indeed, the differences in national counterterrorism strategies and their implementation seem to be less noticeable in securitized regulations, seen by the EU and member states as more urgent such as firearms regulation, stricter border control, intelligence and information sharing, and countering terrorism financing. Nonetheless, it could be beneficial to increase the efforts to harmonize the various approaches also toward the anticipation of vulnerabilities and the prevention of radicalization and extremism. These issues have already been recognized as key steps in the field but have yet to be homogeneously implemented across all member states.

The unexploited potential of lessons learned

The experience of EU member states with terrorism in the last two decades has provided several learnings that are fundamental for more efficient efforts to prevent and counter this phenomenon. Although hard-power measures such as heightened physical security preparedness and resources, border control, and the limitation of certain fundamental rights and freedoms are often more swiftly put forward and adapted, other matters of equal importance—especially of a preventive and supporting nature – have frequently not been approached with the same sense of urgency. 

However, with the amount of information currently available and the EU’s heightened ability to conduct foresight work, it has become clear that, both politically as well as financially, not prioritizing the harmonization of preventative approaches can be costly for member states. Hence, continuous care for victims and survivors and their involvement in awareness-raising efforts, holistic mechanisms to prevent radicalization (especially online and among youth), and support systems toward an adequate (re)integration of vulnerable individuals can be seen as useful first steps in the direction of more effective counterterrorism efforts.