Doxing, the practice of exposing personal identifiable information (PII) for hostile purposes, continues to be a standard tactic used by right-wing extremist movements with a significant online presence. Acts of doxing used by extremists can lead to harassment, intimidation, violent threats, identity theft, and swatting. In addition to potential physical and psychological harm, doxing can be used to try to silence reporting on or investigations of extremist movements. The tactic often costs minimal resources and can be spread quickly on Telegram and online forums. Doxing is usually an act of revenge. In addition to journalists, researchers, and activists, targets have included former extremists who have left their respective groups or who have been accused of leading personal lives that contravene what is considered acceptable behavior. 

Potential Low Resource Cost

Once extremist groups obtain PII, they can share it on social media or other communication platforms and repost and recirculate it. Doxing by itself is often legal, lowering the cost of action. Once extremists release PII, especially in online spaces that promote ideologies that encourage violence, they intend for others to carry out acts of violence or intimidation.

Compared to demonstrations or in-person harassment, doxing as a single act is relatively inexpensive. An August 2023 article from 404 Media claimed that residential history from credit reports could be obtained from data brokers on Telegram for $15 in Bitcoin. Other sites compile user information from online data leaks. The detailed dox information posted by some neo-Nazi groups on Telegram suggests access to online information markets or doxing as a service. As an example of previous ties between the extreme right and dox sites, John William Kirby Kelley—a co-conspirator of John Cameron Denton, the former leader of the neo-Nazi accelerationist group Atomwaffen Division (AWD)—helped operate DoxBin, a doxing forum that facilitated swatting attacks.

Prominent Doxing Examples

In the past several years, extreme-right groups, individuals, and movements have doxed their perceived opponents and taken additional measures to intimidate them. Two notorious examples are the doxing efforts of the Terrorgram Collective and the Telegram channel Appalachian Archives, allegedly operated by a member of Patriot Front. 

Starting in 2021, individuals affiliated with the neo-Nazi accelerationist Terrorgram Collective, now listed by the U.S. as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, began releasing a dox list of high-value targets, including politicians, judges, journalists, the heads of civil rights organizations, business leaders, professors, researchers, doctors, and others. Home or business addresses of individuals were shared, along with exhortations to commit acts of violence, such as, “Remember change starts with you. No one is coming to save us,” posted alongside addresses and an image of a rifle. In addition to describing targets using racial, religious, and ethnic slurs, individuals were targeted for having “approved vaccines for kids.” Noah Lamb, an alleged Terrorgram associate, was charged in July 2025 with three counts of soliciting the murder of federal officials, three counts of doxing federal officials, and one count each of conspiracy and threatening communications for his purported contributions to the dox effort. For her role in compiling the dox list and exhorting others to commit acts of violence, Terrorgram leader Dallas Humber was sentenced on December 17, 2025, to 30 years in prison for soliciting hate crimes, soliciting the murder of federal officials, and conspiring to provide material support to terrorists. Another Terrorgram leader, Matthew Allison, has pleaded not guilty to the same charges. The hit list was posted on Telegram in both text and image formats and shared on digital libraries. The Terrorgram Collective also claimed to be working on a PDF version of their hit list, likely to be released widely on Telegram.

A Telegram channel known as Appalachian Archives doxed journalists, community leaders, and activists, including North Carolina-based journalist Jordan Green, who had written about white supremacist movements like Active Clubs and neo-Nazi accelerationists. On their channel, Appalachian Archives stated their intention to intimidate those who wrote or researched the extreme right and shared Terrorgram’s hit list. North Carolina members of the neo-Nazi group 2119 (a.k.a. Blood and Soil Crew) surveilled Green. Along with others, two Active Club chapter leaders from Tennessee and South Carolina sought to intimidate Green by appearing outside of his home, and members of a Russia-based neo-Nazi accelerationist group threatened Green and his family. Green and antifascist researchers revealed the likely individual behind Appalachian Archives, Kai Liam Nix, an alleged member of Patriot Front serving at the time in the U.S. Army, who is currently facing charges of firearms trafficking and lying to the government on a security clearance application.

Specialized Dox Entities

Appalachian Archives’ appearance of being operated by a single individual, but having links with Patriot Front, the Active Club movement, and sharing neo-Nazi accelerationist content, illustrates how established groups might want to appear unconnected to doxing entities. Groups and movements that seek a level of mainstream or countercultural appeal and publicly eschew violence or violent rhetoric may seek to distance themselves publicly from their own members sharing doxing information. Even though extreme-right groups and movements may have different strategies, tactics, and ideologies, they all benefit when those seeking to investigate and expose their activities face intimidation and violent threats.

In other instances, groups have distanced themselves from online activity meant to intimidate others. While not specifically a dox entity, in 2021 and 2022, members of the far-right militant group the Proud Boys supported and shared a specialized Telegram channel to spread gossip and rumors about journalists, researchers, and left-wing social media personalities. While the channel mainly appeared to have sought to encourage fights within the left, it also shared videos threatening specific journalists and researchers, as well as white supremacist and anti-Semitic content. The main Proud Boys Telegram channel shared a link to the rumor channel in January 2021, encouraging their followers to join and “help us take down the left.” Despite this connection, the rumor channel was linked to only twice in over 5,000 posts, suggesting a separation between the two channels.

Conclusion and Avenues for Further Research 

The fact that extreme-right entities participate in doxing tactics to prevent exposure is not a new phenomenon. Still, more research is needed on the process by which the extreme right and associated movements access PII, including doxing-as-a-service and potential links to cybercrime. Similarly, as new groups and movements emerge and current entities evolve, civil society must be aware of dox outfits that seek to camouflage their connections to the extreme right. This is highly relevant as certain groups and movements, such as Active Clubs, seek a more public presence, and potentially try to portray themselves as protectors of the relatively mainstream right or within an "Anti-Antifa" context. Ultimately, as the online and offline worlds become increasingly entwined and data becomes more accessible, doxing will remain an appealing strategy for those looking to intimidate perceived opponents.