Executive Summary:

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is a jihadist group in Southeast Asia that seeks to establish a caliphate in the region through violent means. One of JI’s precursors was Darul Islam, an insurgent movement that gave rise to three separate revolts against the Indonesian government in the 1950s and 1960s. JI first raised its global profile after carrying out bombings in Bali in 2002 and 2005, killing 202 and 20 people (mostly foreign tourists), respectively.“Timeline: Attacks and plots blamed on Jemaah Islamiah in Asia,” Reuters, September 17, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/17/us-indonesia-militants-timeline-sb-idUSTRE58G29X20090917; Paul Toohey, “Paradise for terrorists: 36 Bali bombers that killed 92 Australians are walking free,” Daily Telegraph (Sydney), May 4, 2014, http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/paradise-for-terrorists-36-bali-bombers-that-killed-92-australians-are-walking-free/story-fni0cx12-1226904341271. Among other violent operations, JI is known for its links to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing as well as the 1995 failed “Bojinka” plot, an attempt to bomb 12 U.S. commercial airlines in the span of two days.National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (Washington, D.C.): National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Ch5.pdf. JI has links to al-Qaeda and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a Philippines-based terrorist organization.Yanina Goldburt, “An In-Depth Look at the Jemaah Islamiyah Network,” al Nakhlah (Fall 2004), http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Al-Nakhlah/Archives/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/al%20Nakhlah/archives/pdfs/golburt.ashx. JI’s co-founder and former leader Abu Bakar Bashir pledged loyalty to ISIS in July 2014. However, some reports claim that JI does not support ISIS and remains tied to al-Qaeda.“The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah,” Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, April 27, 2017, 1, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/04/IPAC_Report_36.pdf. Nonetheless, regional authorities, including Australian intelligence officials, are concerned that JI is loyal to ISIS and could increase terrorist activities in the region.Sarah Dean, David Martosko et al, “‘Truly sickening and utterly evil’: Tony Abbott warns of Aussie beheadings as it’s revealed Indonesian terrorists Jemaah Islamiyah has sided with ISIS killers who beheaded James Foley,” Daily Mail(London), August 20, 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2730480/PM-Tony-Abbott-warns-Australians-new-threats-Indonesian-terror-group-Jemaah-Islamiyah-calls-James-Foleys-beheading-truly-sickening.html.

In July 2008, Bashir established a new group called Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), which has since been implicated in numerous terrorist attacks.“JEMMAH ANSHORUT TAUHID (JAT),” United Nations Security Council, July 17, 2018, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/jemmah-anshorut-tauhid. Bashir had sought to revive the “Islamic movement” in Indonesia through public outreach and education. In order to serve this purpose, he established JAT as an “open and above-ground” organization, as opposed to the “underground” characteristic of groups such as JI.Amy Chew, “Indonesia’s arrest of Jemaah Islamiah leader involved in Bali bombings exposes active recruitment to create caliphate,” South China Morning Post, July 1, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3016833/indonesias-arrest-ji-leader-para-wijayanto-exposes. JAT’s establishment caused a rift within JI, with some members following Bashir and others remaining committed to the original group. JI and JAT disagreed over strategy and tactics, and eventually JI leaders demanded that anyone who joined JAT must leave JI.“Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT),” International Crisis Group, July 6, 2020,  https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b107-indonesia-the-dark-side-of-jama-ah-ansharut-tauhid-jat.pdf. JI named Para Wijayanto as its leader in 2008, owing to his experience in the group and operational knowledge. Wijayanto had been involved in the terrorist group’s most notorious bombings dating as far back as 2000, according to Indonesian police.Amy Chew, “Indonesia’s arrest of Jemaah Islamiah leader involved in Bali bombings exposes active recruitment to create caliphate,” South China Morning Post, July 1, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3016833/indonesias-arrest-ji-leader-para-wijayanto-exposes.

In 2014, analyst J.M. Berger wrote that JI is defunct.J.M. Berger, “The Islamic State vs. al Qaeda: Who’s winning the war to become the jihadi superpower?” Foreign Policy, September 2, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/02/the-islamic-state-vs-al-qaeda/. Nevertheless, the group remains a threat given its extensive network and alleged ties to both ISIS and al-Nusra Front (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham). Australian authorities in particular have expressed concern about JI foreign fighters returning to the region. This danger is exacerbated by Indonesia’s relatively lax immigration laws, which allow Indonesian citizens to travel in and out of conflict zones. Consequently, Indonesian jihadists who have fought in Iraq and Syria do not face the threat of criminal charges upon returning home.Michael Edwards, “Islamic State jihadists returning from Iraq sparks rejuvenated terror threat from Indonesia, experts warn,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation News, March 11, 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-11/expert-warns-of-rejuvenated-terror-threat-in-indonesia-because-/6297700. Interviews conducted in February 2016 with current and former JI extremists revealed that the terror group has become more active since the start of the conflict in Syria and is recruiting. Indonesian police believe that JI poses a significant security threat because it maintains a sophisticated training and organizational structure in the country.“As Indonesia hunts down Islamic State, homegrown jihadis regroup – Jemaah Islamiyah active again, recruiting and collecting funds,” Kuwait Times, February 15, 2016, https://news.kuwaittimes.net/website/as-indonesia-hunts-down-islamic-state-homegrown-jihadis-regroup/.

Numerous reports indicate a resurgent threat from JI.Daniel Flitton, “Special envoy calls as Australians join Syria fight,” Sydney Morning Herald, March 30, 2015, http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/special-envoy-call-as-australians-join-syria-fight-20140330-35s42.html; Michael Edwards, “Islamic State jihadists returning from Iraq sparks rejuvenated terror threat from Indonesia, experts warn,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation News, March 11, 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-11/expert-warns-of-rejuvenated-terror-threat-in-indonesia-because-/6297700; Sarah Dean, David Martosko et al, “‘Truly sickening and utterly evil’: Tony Abbott warns of Aussie beheadings as it’s revealed Indonesian terrorists Jemaah Islamiyah has sided with ISIS killers who beheaded James Foley,” Daily Mail (London), August 20, 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2730480/PM-Tony-Abbott-warns-Australians-new-threats-Indonesian-terror-group-Jemaah-Islamiyah-calls-James-Foleys-beheading-truly-sickening.html. Indonesian authorities fear militant and radicalized Indonesian-citizen jihadists returning home after training with JI.Sri Lestari, “Does Islamic State ideology threaten Indonesia,” BBC News, August 11, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28700983. Analyst Sidney Jones claims that “We’re all concerned that with probably close to 200 fighters or supporting personnel in Syria and Iraq from Indonesia that we could see a real boost to the terrorist movement if they return.”Michael Edwards, “Islamic State jihadists returning from Iraq sparks rejuvenated terror threat from Indonesia, experts warn,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation News, March 11, 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-11/expert-warns-of-rejuvenated-terror-threat-in-indonesia-because-/6297700. Terrorism analyst Taufik Andrie has stated that returning Indonesian foreign fighters could also aggravate tensions between Indonesia’s Sunni majority and Shiite minority.“Indonesians joining rebels in Syria, Iraq,” Manila Times, June 20, 2012, http://www.manilatimes.net/indonesians-joining-rebels-in-syria-iraq/105529/.

JI has reportedly sought to rebuild its military wing since 2010.“The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah,” Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, April 27, 2017, 3, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/04/IPAC_Report_36.pdf. JI has supposedly kept its military activity underground in anticipation of a future confrontation. However, the group has advised its recruits against any violent action. According to the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, such a dynamic could lead to dissent within JI and the splintering off of a more violent organization.“The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah,” Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, April 27, 2017, 12, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/04/IPAC_Report_36.pdf.

Indonesian police believe that a “Neo-JI”—a younger generation of JI militants—has emerged.Asia News Network, “Indonesian court sentences Jemaah Islamiah leader to 7 years’ jail for inciting terrorism,” Inquirer.net, July 12, 2020, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1309831/indonesian-court-sentences-jemaah-islamiah-leader-to-7-years-jail-for-inciting-terrorism. The new faction developed after the organization’s leadership suffered heavy losses between 2009 and 2014, as a result of deaths and arrests. Neo-JI is believed to have maintained ties to al-Qaeda in Syria.Mona Kanwal Sheikh, “Islamic State and al-Qaeda in a thriving Indonesian democracy,” Global Jihad in South East Asia: Examining the Expansion of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, ed. Mona Kanwal Sheikh (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2019), 39-57, https://www.diis.dk/en/research/global-jihad-in-south-east-asia. In 2019, former Indonesian police spokesperson Dedi Prasetyo said that the faction continues to recruit members in order to achieve the group’s ultimate aim of establishing a caliphate in the country.Asia News Network, “Indonesian court sentences Jemaah Islamiah leader to 7 years’ jail for inciting terrorism,” Inquirer.net, July 12, 2020, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1309831/indonesian-court-sentences-jemaah-islamiah-leader-to-7-years-jail-for-inciting-terrorism. By some estimates, JI as a whole is comprised of between 2,000 to 3,000 members in Indonesia, and has many more supporters and sympathizers in the Muslim majority country.Mona Kanwal Sheikh, “Islamic State and al-Qaeda in a thriving Indonesian democracy,” Global Jihad in South East Asia: Examining the Expansion of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, ed. Mona Kanwal Sheikh (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2019), 39-57, https://www.diis.dk/en/research/global-jihad-in-south-east-asia.

Since 2018, JI members involved the 2002 Bali attacks have begun to be released from prison as they have completed their sentences. Their release has led to a reinvigorated JI with an expanded target base that includes not only government officials, security forces and western targets, but also religious and ethnic minorities—a tactic also employed by ISIS. Given JI’s new approach, Indonesian authorities must again contend with rounding up and countering the terror group’s activities.“Jemaah Islamiyah,” Australian National Security, April 9, 2022, https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/terrorist-organisations/listed-terrorist-organisations/jemaah-islamiyah-(ji); Bilveer Singh, “The Revival of Al Qaeda’s Affiliate in Southeast Asia: the Jemaah Islamiyah,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, May 2017, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26351517#metadata_info_tab_contents; Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, “Freeing of Indonesian radical cleric Abu Bakar Bashir will have repercussions, warn analyst,” Straits Times, January 20, 2019, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/freeing-of-indonesian-radical-cleric-abu-bakar-bashir-will-have-repercussions-warn.

On June 29, 2019, Indonesian counterterrorism police arrested JI leader Para Wijayanto on the outskirts of Jakarta. He reportedly attended a jihadist training camp in the Philippines in 2000 and was involved in the 2002 Bali bombings that killed more than 200 people.“Indonesian police arrest suspected leader of group behind Bali bombing,” Guardian, July 1, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/02/indonesian-police-arrest-suspected-leader-of-group-behind-bali-bombing. Wijayanto is believed to have become the leader of JI in 2008 and was known to have recruited and trained members to join extremist groups in Syria.“Indonesian police arrest suspected leader of group behind Bali bombing,” Guardian, July 1, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/02/indonesian-police-arrest-suspected-leader-of-group-behind-bali-bombing. During their investigation into Wijayanto, the Indonesian police discovered that JI was using two palm oil farms in Sumatra and Kalimantan to generate income, a new development in the group’s terror financing efforts.Sylvia Laksmi, “How do terrorists fund their activities? Some do it legally,” Jakarta Post, July 15, 2019, https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2019/07/15/how-do-terrorists-fund-their-activities-some-do-it-legally.html. The revelation sparked fears that JI is regaining strength.Adi Renaldi, “Terrorist Group Behind Bali Bombings Use Palm Oil Plantations to Fund Terrorist Activity,” Vice, July 11, 2019, https://www.vice.com/en_in/article/vb98k3/jemaah-islamiyah-suspected-of-running-a-palm-oil-plantation-to-fund-terrorist-activity. Wijayanto’s trial began on March 18, 2020 on charges of terrorism that carry a possible death penalty.“Suspected Jemaah Islamiyah leader on trial in Indonesia,” Associated Press, March 18, 2002, https://apnews.com/7e0896beb6103e2c9c2f504e3b345333. On July 20, 2020, he was sentenced to seven years in prison on the charge of inciting others to commit an act of terrorism.Asia News Network, “Indonesian court sentences Jemaah Islamiah leader to 7 years’ jail for inciting terrorism,” Inquirer.net, July 12, 2020, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1309831/indonesian-court-sentences-jemaah-islamiah-leader-to-7-years-jail-for-inciting-terrorism.

On December 10, 2020, Indonesia’s counterterrorism police arrested Aris Sumarsono, also known as Zulkarnaen, during a raid on a house in East Lampung district on the island of Sumatra. Zulkarnaen, considered by Indonesian police to be JI’s military commander, had evaded arrest for more than 18 years. Since May 2005, Zulkarnaen has been on the U.N. Security Council’s al-Qaeda sanctions list for his ties to the global terrorist network, as well as association with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. The U.S. State Department’s Rewards for Justice program also offered $5 million for Zulkarnaen’s arrest. Authorities said he was one of the first Indonesian militants to receive military training in Afghanistan during the 1980s and then spent a decade running a militant training camp in the southern Philippines. In Indonesia, Zulkarnaen allegedly masterminded several deadly terrorist plots in the early 2000s and built explosives for other attacks, including those used in the 2002 Bali bombings and the 2003 attack on the JW Marriott in Jakarta.“Indonesian Police Arrest Militant Leader Associated with al-Qaida,” Voice of America, December 13, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/indonesian-police-arrest-militant-leader-associated-al-qaida; Niniek Karmini, “Indonesia police: Top terror suspect mastermind of attacks,” Associated Press, December 14, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-indonesia-counterterrorism-jakarta-islamic-state-group-6bab71a7261501d065e2a8f9de46c207; Associated Press, “Indonesian Police Move Top Terror Suspect for Investigation,” Voice of America, December 16, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/indonesian-police-move-top-terror-suspect-investigation. On January 19, 2022, Zulkarnaen was sentenced to 15 years in prison after he was found guilty of withholding information and sheltering an extremist figure. The three-judge panel abstained from issuing a charge related to the Bali bombings because the statute of limitations had expired.Agustinus Beo Da Costa and Stanley Widianto, “Indonesia jails militant from group blamed for Bali bombings,” Reuters, January 19, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesian-militant-linked-bali-bombings-given-15-year-jail-term-judge-2022-01-19; Niniek Karmini, “Indonesian militant gets 15 years in jail over Bali attacks,” Associated Press, January 19, 2022, https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/indonesian-militant-15-years-jail-bali-attacks-82344879.

In October 2022, a director at the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) claimed that JI had been “quietly infiltrating public institutions and almost every aspect of civilian lives, recruiting members, raising funds and spreading its ideology in secret.” Indonesian police have continued to crackdown on charities linked to JI. Nivell Rayda, “‘Quietly infiltrating public institutions’: 20 years after Bali bombings, Jemaah Islamiyah threat remains,” Channel News Asia, October 11, 2022, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-bali-bombings-2002-jemaah-islamiyah-para-wijayanto-current-threat-2970101. Ahead of Indonesia’s February 2024 general elections—which decided who holds power in the executive and legislative branches—Nikkei Asia reported that JI was seeking to infiltrate political parties. Analysts and a former militant claimed that JI sought influence to change Indonesia’s system of governance with the objective of establishing a caliphate and upholding sharia law.Amy Chew, “Indonesia militants adopt political tactics ahead of 2024 polls,” Nikkei Asia, August 25, 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Indonesia-militants-adopt-political-tactics-ahead-of-2024-polls.

Doctrine:

JI aims to establish an Islamic state (Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara) in Southeast Asia. Initially, the state would encompass Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mindanao (southern Philippines), and later absorb southern Thailand, Singapore, and Brunei.“The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism,” Ministry of Home Affairs, Republic of Singapore, January 2003, http://www.mha.gov.sg/Newsroom/speeches/Documents/English.pdf.

JI’s history indicates that the group pursues a three-phase strategy of violent jihad to establish a caliphate. The first phase of jihad targets local government. The second targets regional governments through a conflagration of attacks in countries such as Singapore and Philippines. The third phase is global jihad. This latter phase developed as a result of association with al-Qaeda, which seeks a global jihad, as opposed to JI’s initial localized jihad.“Jemaah Islamiyah Remains Active and Deadly,” The World’s Most Threatening Terrorist Networks and Criminal Gangs, eds. Barry R. Schneider, Jerrold M. Post et al (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 187-189.

When Indonesia declared independence from the Netherlands, Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar founded JI to overthrow the secular Indonesian state through political disruption and violence.Majlis Qiyadah Markaziyah Al Jamā‘ah Al Islāmiyyah, PUPJI: General Guidelines for the Struggle of Al Jamā‘ah Al Islāmiyah (n.p.: Majlis Qiyadah Markaziyah Al Jamā‘ah Al Islāmiyyah, 1996), accessed May 4, 2015,https://archive.org/stream/Pupji-GeneralGuidelinesForTheStruggleOfJamaahIslamiyah/Pupji-englishRevision4#page/n0/mode/2up/. One of JI’s precursors was Darul Islam, an insurgent movement that gave rise to three separate revolts against the Indonesian government in the 1950s and 1960s.Sidney Jones, “Darul Islam’s Ongoing Appeal,” International Crisis Group, August 18, 2010, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/op-eds/jones-darul-islams-ongoing-appeal.aspx. Both Bashir and Sungkar were involved in Darul Islam, which was too ideologically fractured to move forward as an organization. However, during this time, they became involved in subversive activities against President Suharto’s government. Sungkar and Bashir later left Indonesia to join the jihad in Afghanistan and then Pakistan. It is in these two countries where they associated with Afghanis who espoused extremist ideology and foreign fighters who had also sought to join jihad. It is during this period that they developed the ideological and operational underpinnings of JI.David Gordon and Samuel Lindo, “Jemaah Islamiyah,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 2011, http://csis.org/files/publication/111101_Gordon_JemaahIslamiyah_WEB.pdf.

JI’s ideological and tactical manual is titled General Guidelines of the Struggle of Al Jemā‘ah Al Islāmiyah (PUPJI).“The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism,” Ministry of Home Affairs, Republic of Singapore, January 2003, http://www.mha.gov.sg/Newsroom/speeches/Documents/English.pdf. PUPJI states that one of the group’s main objectives is to develop the resources and capabilities of its members and the organization as a whole, including by teaching skills like bomb-making and acting as a “networking” organization.Mohamed Bin Ali, “Identifying Key Concerns of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Singapore Context,” Social Resilience in Singapore: Reflections from the London Bombings, ed. Norman Vasu (Singapore: Select Books, 2007), 68-80.

JI’s doctrine is based on five founding principles: iman (belief), hijrah (emigration), i’dad (preparation to struggle in the way of God), jihad (struggle in the way of Allah), and al wala wal bara (division of the world into friends and enemies).Mohamed Bin Ali, “Identifying Key Concerns of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Singapore Context,” Social Resilience in Singapore: Reflections from the London Bombings, ed. Norman Vasu (Singapore: Select Books, 2007), 68-80. JI’s ideology is influenced by al-Qaeda’s political theology, including works like Abu Musab al-Suri’s “Call to Worldwide Islamic Resistance,” Abu Bakr Naji’s “The Management of Savagery,” and Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif’s “Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World.”“Jemaah Islamiyah,” Mapping Militant Organizations, Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, February 2012, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/251.

Schisms within JI have formed over disagreements on what the group’s goals should be. One camp wanted to slowly progress into a caliphate through radical proselytizing and education, building an Islamic community, and increasing adherence to Islamic law. The other group advocated the use of violent jihad. The latter group, though smaller, was ultimately successful in setting JI’s goals. This more violent group was led by former JI military leader Riduan Isamuddin, a.k.a. Hambali, who encouraged a shift toward al-Qaeda–style tactics, resulting in a surge of attacks against Western assets in Indonesia in 2003.Majlis Qiyadah Markaziyah Al Jamā‘ah Al Islāmiyyah, PUPJI: General Guidelines for the Struggle of Al Jamā‘ah Al Islāmiyah (n.p.: Majlis Qiyadah Markaziyah Al Jamā‘ah Al Islāmiyyah, 1996), accessed May 4, 2015,https://archive.org/stream/Pupji-GeneralGuidelinesForTheStruggleOfJamaahIslamiyah/Pupji-englishRevision4#page/n0/mode/2up/. These attacks displayed JI’s tactical shift from targeting government and law enforcement to focusing on soft targets, such as tourist attractions, using car and suicide bombings.Majlis Qiyadah Markaziyah Al Jamā‘ah Al Islāmiyyah, PUPJI: General Guidelines for the Struggle of Al Jamā‘ah Al Islāmiyah (n.p.: Majlis Qiyadah Markaziyah Al Jamā‘ah Al Islāmiyyah, 1996), accessed May 4, 2015,https://archive.org/stream/Pupji-GeneralGuidelinesForTheStruggleOfJamaahIslamiyah/Pupji-englishRevision4#page/n0/mode/2up/.

Organizational Structure:

JI’s structure is outlined in the group’s ideological and tactical manual, General Guidelines of the Struggle of Al Jemā‘ah Al Islāmiyah (PUPJI). JI divides its areas of operation into regional units that serve different administrative and operational purposes, each of which is called a mantiqi. Each mantiqi is in turn divided into smaller districts, each of which is called a wakalah.

JI is headed by an emir (commander or prince), who appoints and presides over councils for governance, theology, fatwa (Islamic jurisprudence), and discipline.“Jemaah Islamiyah Remains Active and Deadly,” The World’s Most Threatening Terrorist Networks and Criminal Gangs, eds. Barry R. Schneider, Jerrold M. Post et al (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 193. The governing council includes a central command that makes policy and determines tactical and strategic operations. For instance, the central command approves plans for future offensives and controls the leaders of the four mantiqi and the heads of their respective wakalah.

Mantiqi I operates in Singapore and Malaysia and serve as JI’s source of financing for operations, i.e. to terror attacks and training. Mantiqi II covers Indonesia, the main area in which JI carries out terrorist activities such as launching attacks on government and law enforcement targets. Mantiqi III includes the Philippine island of Mindanao, the Malaysian state of Sabah on the island of Borneo, and the Indonesian island of Sulawesi, where cells are responsible for training. Mantiqi IV, which includes Australia and the West Papua province of Indonesia, focuses on fundraising.James C. “Chris” Whitmire, “Jemaah Islamiyah Remains Active and Deadly,” The World’s Most Threatening Terrorist Networks and Criminal Gangs, eds. Barry R. Schneider, Jerrold M. Post et al (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 194.

In accordance with the PUPJI’s guidelines, from 2000 to 2001 JI was governed by a five-member Regional Advisory Council chaired by Riduan Isamuddin, a.k.a. Hambali. Before his arrest in 2003, Hambali supervised the mantiqi.“Bruce Vaughn, Emma Chanlett-Avery et al, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Congressional Research Service, October 16, 2009, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf.

Despite the hierarchy outlined in the PUPJI, JI became more decentralized in practice during the early 2000s.“Bruce Vaughn, Emma Chanlett-Avery et al, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Congressional Research Service, October 16, 2009, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf. Regional leaders have developed a certain degree of autonomy and many cells are even completely isolated from one another.“Bruce Vaughn, Emma Chanlett-Avery et al, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Congressional Research Service, October 16, 2009, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf. This structure allows JI to remain active even when top leaders are arrested or killed. Small bands have been able to congregate in mountainous areas of Sulawesi, for example, where authorities fear they are trafficking weapons from neighboring countries.“Chapter 2. Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific Overview,” U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2014, www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/. According to an October 2009 Congressional Research Service report, JI’s core membership at its peak consisted of between 500 and several thousand persons, with countless more given radical educations in the JI-run pesantrens.“Bruce Vaughn, Emma Chanlett-Avery et al, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Congressional Research Service, October 16, 2009, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf. As of October 2019, there were an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 core JI members.Mona Kanwal Sheikh, “Islamic State and al-Qaeda in a thriving Indonesian democracy,” Global Jihad in South East Asia: Examining the Expansion of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, ed. Mona Kanwal Sheikh (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2019), 39-57, https://www.diis.dk/en/research/global-jihad-in-south-east-asia.

Following the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, the Indonesian government cracked down on the group and a number of senior JI leaders and active members were either killed or arrested. The degradation of JI’s leadership led to a shift in the group’s structure.“Bruce Vaughn, Emma Chanlett-Avery et al, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Congressional Research Service, October 16, 2009, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf. During a meeting in 2008, remaining senior JI leaders and younger members—many whom received JI’s religious education—formed a new central command, markaziyah, which oversaw the group’s shift to religious outreach.“The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah,” Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, April 27, 2017, 3, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/04/IPAC_Report_36.pdf. At that same meeting, JI senior leaders appointed Para Wijayanto as the group’s new emir.“The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah,” Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, April 27, 2017, 3, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/04/IPAC_Report_36.pdf. In 2009, JI created the Majelis Dakwah Umat Islam (MDUI) to serve as its public-facing organization, with the objective of spreading JI’s ideology and encouraging Muslims to enforce Islamic law.“The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah,” Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, April 27, 2017, 4, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/04/IPAC_Report_36.pdf. This recent iteration of JI leadership also sought to rebuild the group’s separate military wing in 2010, which had lapsed into inactivity following the Indonesian police crackdown of the early 2000s.“The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah,” Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, April 27, 2017, 5, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/04/IPAC_Report_36.pdf. JI’s MDUI would operate openly and focus on religious education, while the military wing would remain clandestine.“The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah,” Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, April 27, 2017, 5, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/04/IPAC_Report_36.pdf. The military wing is reportedly based on the original PUPJI structure.“The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah,” Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, April 27, 2017, 5, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/04/IPAC_Report_36.pdf.

Indonesian police believe that a faction of JI reconstituted into a “Neo-JI”—a term coined by law enforcement to refer to a younger generation of JI militants. In 2019, former Indonesian police spokesperson Dedi Prasetyo said that the faction continues to recruit members in order to achieve its aim of establishing a caliphate in the country.Asia News Network, “Indonesian court sentences Jemaah Islamiah leader to 7 years’ jail for inciting terrorism,” Inquirer.net, July 12, 2020, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1309831/indonesian-court-sentences-jemaah-islamiah-leader-to-7-years-jail-for-inciting-terrorism. Neo-JI has also been linked to al-Qaeda in Syria.Mona Kanwal Sheikh, “Islamic State and al-Qaeda in a thriving Indonesian democracy,” Global Jihad in South East Asia: Examining the Expansion of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, ed. Mona Kanwal Sheikh (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2019), 39-57, https://www.diis.dk/en/research/global-jihad-in-south-east-asia.

At the time of JI leader Para Wijayanto’s arrest in 2019, the organization had approximately 6,000 members, according to the Indonesia-based Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict.“The Impact of the Taliban Victory on Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiyah,” Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, September 7, 2021, 6, http://cdn.understandingconflict.org/file/2021/09/IPAC_Report_73_JI.pdf. Other reports estimate that JI as a whole is comprised of between 2,000 to 3,000 members. The group has an unidentified number of supporters and sympathizers in the Muslim majority country.Mona Kanwal Sheikh, “Islamic State and al-Qaeda in a thriving Indonesian democracy,” Global Jihad in South East Asia: Examining the Expansion of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, ed. Mona Kanwal Sheikh (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2019), 39-57, https://www.diis.dk/en/research/global-jihad-in-south-east-asia.

Financing:

JI fundraises through membership donations and criminal and business activities, according to the U.S. State Department.“Chapter 2. Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific Overview,” U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2014, www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/. The group has received financial, ideological, and logistical support from other groups in its network, such as al-Qaeda’s core and other Middle Eastern contacts.Yanina Goldburt, “An In-Depth Look at the Jemaah Islamiyah Network,” al Nakhlah (Fall 2004), http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Al-Nakhlah/Archives/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/al%20Nakhlah/archives/pdfs/golburt.ashx. While some analysts believe al-Qaeda is JI’s main source of revenue, others note the group’s ability to exploit charities and divert resources away for terror operations.Yanina Goldburt, “An In-Depth Look at the Jemaah Islamiyah Network,” al Nakhlah (Fall 2004), http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Al-Nakhlah/Archives/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/al%20Nakhlah/archives/pdfs/golburt.ashx.

Additional sources of money for JI include cash remittances from individuals of the Indonesian diaspora, profits from hawala (informal money-lender networks), weapons smuggling, and extortion.Yanina Goldburt, “An In-Depth Look at the Jemaah Islamiyah Network,” al Nakhlah (Fall 2004), http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Al-Nakhlah/Archives/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/al%20Nakhlah/archives/pdfs/golburt.ashx. It is unclear how much money the group has in its coffers and how these funds are distributed to operatives. After around 2009, JI’s attacks have lacked the sophistication of previous JI attacks, leading analysts to believe that the group suffered from a lack of funding.“Jemaah Islamiyah (a.k.a. Jemaah Islamiah),” Council on Foreign Relations, June 19, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/indonesia/jemaah-islamiyah-k-jemaah-islamiah/p8948.

The group also appears to use charitable organizations as fronts for the organization. On September 4, 2014, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated the Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI) for sending multiple groups of JI terrorist fighters to Syria for providing funds, military training, and recruits to JI. HASI, ostensibly JI’s humanitarian wing, has been active as a non-governmental organization in Indonesia since 2011.“Treasury Designates Twelve Foreign Terrorist Fighter Facilitators,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 24, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2651.aspx.

During their investigation into alleged JI leader Para Wijayanto, the Indonesian police discovered a new development in the terrorist group’s financing effort: JI was profiting from two palm oil farms in Sumatra and Kalimantan.Sylvia Laksmi, “How do terrorists fund their activities? Some do it legally,” Jakarta Post, July 15, 2019, https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2019/07/15/how-do-terrorists-fund-their-activities-some-do-it-legally.html. The group used income from the palm oil businesses to fund their activities and pay salaries to leaders and other members in the network, said a police spokesperson.Adi Renaldi, “Terrorist Group Behind Bali Bombings Use Palm Oil Plantations to Fund Terrorist Activity,” Vice, July 11, 2019, https://www.vice.com/en_in/article/vb98k3/jemaah-islamiyah-suspected-of-running-a-palm-oil-plantation-to-fund-terrorist-activity.

Following the arrest of two dozen suspected JI members in late 2020, Indonesian police discovered a JI funding scheme that involved more than 20,000 cash donation boxes across Indonesia. The boxes, typically used by charities in the country, were planted outside of minimarkets, gas stations, restaurants, and other businesses. The boxes were registered to the Abdurrahman bin Auf (ABA) Charity Foundation, an apparent front organization that diverted funds collected in the boxes to JI. Police said the money was used to purchase weapons, explosives, and to finance training for JI members in Syria.Aisyah Llewellyn, “Indonesians unknowingly fund hardline group behind Bali bombings,” Al Jazeera, January 7, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/7/indonesian-alms-boxes-ji.

Recruitment:

JI relies largely on social outreach efforts to recruit new followers.Zachary Abuza, “Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model,” Middle East Quarterly (Winter 2009), http://www.meforum.org/2044/jemaah-islamiyah-adopts-the-hezbollah-model. For example, JI provided relief to victims of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in order to attract support for its cause.Jeff Lewis and Belinda Lewis, Bali’s Silent Crisis: Desire, Tragedy, and Transition, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009), https://books.google.com/books?id=l9OW7W-HgZUC&lpg=PR1&pg=PR4#v=onepage&q&f=false. While some JI recruits come from poorer backgrounds, many recruits are well-educated and attracted to “charismatic” preachers.Yanina Goldburt, “An In-Depth Look at the Jemaah Islamiyah Network,” al Nakhlah (Fall 2004), http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Al-Nakhlah/Archives/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/al%20Nakhlah/archives/pdfs/golburt.ashx. In recent years, JI has attracted recruits from other Islamist groups in the region, including Indonesia-based Darul Islam, JI’s ideological predecessor.“JI recruiting from new sources,” Korea Herald (Seoul), April 6, 2010, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20050711000009.

JI also recruits members through its Islamic schools and the family networks created by marriages in the community. The Al Mukmin school in Ngruki, Indonesia, is part of a network of pesantren for children of JI members.Yanina Goldburt, “An In-Depth Look at the Jemaah Islamiyah Network,” al Nakhlah (Fall 2004), http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Al-Nakhlah/Archives/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/al%20Nakhlah/archives/pdfs/golburt.ashx. The schools are meant to serve JI by perpetually replenishing the group’s ranks. According to Sidney Jones of the Jakarta-based Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, only some 40 pesantren in the country are associated with terrorist activities, while others focus on creating “upstanding citizens.”Pallavi Aiyar, “In Indonesia, Madrassas of Moderation,” New York Times, February 10, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/11/opinion/in-indonesia-madrassas-of-moderation.html.

According to an April 2017 report on JI, the group has increased efforts to recruit on university campuses. In 2014, Indonesian police obtained a PowerPoint presentation from JI’s education wing showing that JI had reached 1,988 male university students and 862 females during 2013, though they did not necessarily become members.“The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah,” Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, April 27, 2017, 9, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/04/IPAC_Report_36.pdf.

Between late February and early March 2021, Indonesian counterterrorism police arrested 22 suspected JI members across East Java province. Among the suspects was known militant Usman bin Sef, also known as Fahim, who had led a JI cell that had recruited at least 50 new members in the province in the past five years, according to police.Andi Jatmiko and Niniek Karmini, “Indonesian police say new JI cell was recruiting, training,” Associated Press, March 18, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/java-counterterrorism-jakarta-indonesia-arrests-6d0710ad59a920c595f94a3bae056043.

Training:

During the 1980s, members of JI’s predecessor, Darul Islam, trained in Afghanistan.Carlos H. Conde, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s tie to rebels grows: Manila peace talks face a rising threat,” New York Times, July 14, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/14/news/14iht-rebels.html. Since the 1990s, JI training has continued in Pakistan with assistance from the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).David Gordon and Samuel Lindo, “Jemaah Islamiyah,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 2011, http://csis.org/files/publication/111101_Gordon_JemaahIslamiyah_WEB.pdf. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) helped with JI’s training in the Philippines using training camps in the southern island of Mindanao.The National Counterterrorism Center, “Jemaah Islamiyah (JI),” accessed March 31, 2015, http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/ji.html. Training camp activities include indoctrination studies and weapons and explosives training.Yanina Goldburt, “An In-Depth Look at the Jemaah Islamiyah Network,” al Nakhlah (Fall 2004), http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Al-Nakhlah/Archives/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/al%20Nakhlah/archives/pdfs/golburt.ashx.

In January 2021, Indonesian police uncovered a compilation video allegedly showing an elite force of JI members engaged in weapons and physical training as well as kidnapping simulations between 2013 and 2018. The video was found on the laptop of a recently-arrested JI member. According to Indonesian police, the members were between 19 and 23 years old and received seven months of training before being sent to fight in Syria. The terrorist training camps were run in 12 locations in Indonesia and involved seven different groups comprised of up to 15 recruits. A former JI trainer claimed that the trainings cost approximately $6,000 per month. Additionally, JI reportedly spent at least $28,000 to send 120 fighters to train in Syria.Cindy Wockner and Komang Erviani, “Video of terrorist training camp unearthed,” Australian Associated Press, January 2, 2021, https://au.news.yahoo.com/video-terrorist-training-camp-unearthed-203007241--spt.html.

In March 2021, Indonesian counterterrorism police announced that they had arrested 22 members of a JI cell that had been conducting military-style training in East Java’s Malang district. The JI fighters were allegedly plotting to attack police. Among the suspects was Fahim, who is suspected of leading the cell that recruited and trained new members in East Java. During the counterterrorism raids, Indonesian authorities also uncovered a bunker for weapons and bombmaking, as well as jihadist books.Andi Jatmiko and Niniek Karmini, “Indonesian police say new JI cell was recruiting, training,” Associated Press, March 18, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/java-counterterrorism-jakarta-indonesia-arrests-6d0710ad59a920c595f94a3bae056043.

As Known As: