Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Type of Organization:

Insurgent, non-state actor, religious, terrorist, transnational, violent

Ideologies and Affiliations:

Al-Qaeda affiliated group, Islamist, jihadist, Qutbist, Salafist, Sunni, takfiri

Place of Origin:

Algeria

Year of Origin:

2007

Founder(s):

Abdelmalek Droukdel, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Hassan Hattab (founder and former leader of GSPC), Sofiane El-Fassila (former leader)

Places of Operation:

Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Libya, Mauritania, Tunisia

Overview

Also known as:

Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)The United States and Italy Designate Twenty-Five New Financiers of Terror,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, August 29, 2002, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po3380.aspx; “Algeria (03/09): Profile,” U.S. Department of State, accessed December 5, 2014, http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/algeria/120715.htm; “Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: QE.T.14.01. The Organization of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,” United Nations Security Council, March 28, 2011, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE01401E.html.
Al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)The United States and Italy Designate Twenty-Five New Financiers of Terror,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, August 29, 2002, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po3380.aspx; “Algeria (03/09): Profile,” U.S. Department of State, accessed December 5, 2014, http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/algeria/120715.htm; “Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: QE.T.14.01. The Organization of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,” United Nations Security Council, March 28, 2011, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE01401E.html.
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)The United States and Italy Designate Twenty-Five New Financiers of Terror,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, August 29, 2002, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po3380.aspx; “Algeria (03/09): Profile,” U.S. Department of State, accessed December 5, 2014, http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/algeria/120715.htm; “Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: QE.T.14.01. The Organization of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,” United Nations Security Council, March 28, 2011, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE01401E.html.
Gruppo Islamico Armato (GIA)The United States and Italy Designate Twenty-Five New Financiers of Terror,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, August 29, 2002, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po3380.aspx; “Algeria (03/09): Profile,” U.S. Department of State, accessed December 5, 2014, http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/algeria/120715.htm; “Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: QE.T.14.01. The Organization of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,” United Nations Security Council, March 28, 2011, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE01401E.html.
Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM)Dario Cristiani, “Ten Years of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Evolution and Prospects,” Jamestown Foundation, May 5, 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/ten-years-al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-evolution-prospects/; Beligh Nabli, “L’unification du djihadisme sahelien,” L’Economiste, June 3, 2017, http://www.leconomistemaghrebin.com/2017/03/06/lunification-djihadisme-sahelien/.
Le Groupe Salafiste Pour La Predication Et Le Combat (GSPC)The United States and Italy Designate Twenty-Five New Financiers of Terror,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, August 29, 2002, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po3380.aspx; “Algeria (03/09): Profile,” U.S. Department of State, accessed December 5, 2014, http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/algeria/120715.htm; “Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: QE.T.14.01. The Organization of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,” United Nations Security Council, March 28, 2011, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE01401E.html.
Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)The United States and Italy Designate Twenty-Five New Financiers of Terror,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, August 29, 2002, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po3380.aspx; “Algeria (03/09): Profile,” U.S. Department of State, accessed December 5, 2014, http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/algeria/120715.htm; “Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: QE.T.14.01. The Organization of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,” United Nations Security Council, March 28, 2011, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE01401E.html.
Salafist Group for Call and CombatThe United States and Italy Designate Twenty-Five New Financiers of Terror,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, August 29, 2002, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po3380.aspx; “Algeria (03/09): Profile,” U.S. Department of State, accessed December 5, 2014, http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/algeria/120715.htm; “Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: QE.T.14.01. The Organization of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,” United Nations Security Council, March 28, 2011, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE01401E.html.
Salafist Group for Preaching and CombatThe United States and Italy Designate Twenty-Five New Financiers of Terror,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, August 29, 2002, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po3380.aspx; “Algeria (03/09): Profile,” U.S. Department of State, accessed December 5, 2014, http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/algeria/120715.htm; “Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: QE.T.14.01. The Organization of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,” United Nations Security Council, March 28, 2011, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE01401E.html.
Tanzim al-Qa’ida fi Bilad al-Maghrib al-IslamiyaThe United States and Italy Designate Twenty-Five New Financiers of Terror,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, August 29, 2002, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po3380.aspx; “Algeria (03/09): Profile,” U.S. Department of State, accessed December 5, 2014, http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/algeria/120715.htm; “Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: QE.T.14.01. The Organization of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,” United Nations Security Council, March 28, 2011, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE01401E.html.

Executive Summary:

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is a jihadist terrorist group based in North Africa. As a formal al-Qaeda affiliate, the group is dedicated to dismantling regional governments and implementing sharia (Islamic law) in areas where it operates, primarily in Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Libya, Tunisia, and Niger. In December 2015, AQIM linked up with its former offshoot, al-Mourabitoun, to carry out attacks throughout the Sahel region. The groups carried out a series of deadly terrorist attacks, including the November 2015 attacks in Mali, the January 2016 attacks in Burkina Faso, and the March 2016 attacks in Côte d’Ivoire.Caleb Weiss, “AQIM targets beach resort in Ivory Coast,” Long War Journal, March 13, 2016, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/03/aqim-claims-beach-attack-in-ivory-coast.php.

On March 2, 2017, AQIM merged with local Salafist groups Ansar al-Dine and al-Mourabitoun to form Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), led by Iyad Ag Ghali, Ansar al-Dine’s former emir.Dario Cristiani, “Ten Years of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Evolution and Prospects,” Jamestown Foundation, May 5, 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/ten-years-al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-evolution-prospects/; Beligh Nabli, “L’unification du djihadisme sahelien,” L’Economiste, June 3, 2017, http://www.leconomistemaghrebin.com/2017/03/06/lunification-djihadisme-sahelien/. While operating under a new name and new emir, JNIM appears to remain under the direction of AQIM and AQ central. Ghali pledged allegiance to both al-Qaeda central and AQIM emir Abu Musab Abdul Wadoud.Thomas Joscelyn, “Analysis: Al Qaeda groups reorganize in West Africa,” Long War Journal, March 13, 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/analysis-al-qaeda-groups-reorganize-in-west-africa.php. In 2017, al-Qaeda-linked groups were responsible for 276 attacks in Mali and West Africa, comparable to the number of attacks its affiliated groups launched in 2016.Caleb Weiss, “Al Qaeda maintains operational tempo in West Africa in 2017,” Long War Journal, January 5, 2018, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/01/al-qaeda-maintains-operational-tempo-in-west-africa-in-2017.php.

AQIM finds its roots in the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), an Islamist movement founded in Algeria in the early 1990s. GIA leader Hassan Hattab split from the GIA over ideological differences, and he later founded the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). In September 2006, GSPC merged with al-Qaeda, formally rebranding itself as AQIM in the months following. In Mali, AQIM is known for its de facto war with the French government beginning in 2013, as well as its extensive history of kidnapping and extortion.“Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Who is the terror group reportedly behind the Ivory Coast shooting?” Independent (London), March 13, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/al-qaeda-in-maghreb-aqim-terror-group-who-where-a6929276.html.

Doctrine:

AQIM aligns its movement with al-Qaeda’s broader goals to institute sharia (Islamic law) in all its areas of operation. Leader Abdelmalek Droukdel told the New York Times in 2008 that “Our first goal is the arbitration of the Lord of the world’s law [Sharia], and the achievement of the servitude to God. Our general goals are the same goals of Al Qaeda the mother, and you know them.”“An Interview with Abdelmalek Droukdal,” New York Times, July 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html?pagewanted=all.

AQIM perceives all non-Islamist governments as illegitimate and, accordingly, seeks to replace the various governments in the countries in which AQIM operates. According to Droukdel, these governments “are all secretions of the colonialism that invaded our country in the last two centuries, and enabled those regimes to govern. Therefore, they started governing for its account and on behalf of it. They implement its programs and protect its interests and fight Islam on its behalf.”“An Interview with Abdelmalek Droukdal,” New York Times, July 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html?pagewanted=all. Moreover, the group specifically targets what it sees as continued Western influence in the region. According to Droukedel, “We seek to liberate the Islamic Maghreb from the sons of France and Spain and from all symbols of treason and employment for the outsiders, and protect it from the foreign greed and the crusader’s hegemony.”“An Interview with Abdelmalek Droukdal,” New York Times, July 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html?pagewanted=all. Regarding attacks on American interests, Droukdel said that, “We will strive to strike them whenever we can.”“An Interview with Abdelmalek Droukdal,” New York Times, July 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html?pagewanted=all.

Organizational Structure:

Like all al-Qaeda outfits, AQIM has a distinct hierarchy, with leader Abdelmalouk Droukdel at its head. AQIM also has a central decision-making body, the Majlis al-Ayan (Council of Notables),Nazim Fethi, “Al-Qaeda Leader El-Abbes Surrenders in Algeria,” Magharebia, February 6, 2010, http://magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/features/2010/06/02/feature-01. its own media wing, Al-Andalus Media Productions, and a Sharia Council that governs Islamic legal matters.“Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb,” Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium, accessed February 10, 2015, http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/al-qaeda-lands-islamic-maghreb-aqim-salafist-group-preaching-and-fighting-see-separate-entry.

After al-Mourabitoun re-joined AQIM in 2015, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri allegedly ordered a regional division among his commanders. Droukdel was placed in charge of Algeria, al-Mourabitoun leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar of Libya, and Djame Okacha (a.k.a. Abu Yahya al-Hammam) of West Africa.Olivier Guitta, “The re-emergence of AQIM in Africa,” Al Jazeera, March 20, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/emergence-aqim-africa-160320090928469.html. The Tunisian branch of AQIM has carried out a series of attacks in recent years, particularly in Tunisia’s Kasserine region.Caleb Weiss, “Tunisian AQIM branch claims attack on troops in Kasserine,” Long War Journal, September 1, 2016, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/tunisian-aqim-branch-claims-attack-on-troops-in-kasserine.php. This regional division reflects the early organization of AQIM, which was divided in katibas (brigades) that both cooperated and competed with each other.Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, 2015, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb.

In March 2017, AQIM announced the formation of Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) in a merger that included Ansar al-Dine and al-Mourabitoun. JNIM announced Ansar al-Dine’s former emir, Iyad Ag Ghali, as its leader.Dario Cristiani, “Ten Years of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Evolution and Prospects,” Jamestown Foundation, May 5, 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/ten-years-al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-evolution-prospects/; Beligh Nabli, “L’unification du djihadisme sahelien,” L’Economiste, June 3, 2017, http://www.leconomistemaghrebin.com/2017/03/06/lunification-djihadisme-sahelien/. Ghali claimed that the factions had united “into one group” operating under “one emir” after al-Qaeda “sought unification according to Sharia law.”Thomas Joscelyn, “Analysis: Al Qaeda groups reorganize in West Africa,” Long War Journal, March 13, 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/analysis-al-qaeda-groups-reorganize-in-west-africa.php. While operating under a new name and new emir, JNIM appears to remain under the aegis of al-Qaeda. Ghali paid bayat (allegiance) to al-Qaeda central and AQIM emir Abu Musab Abdul Wadoud.Thomas Joscelyn, “Analysis: Al Qaeda groups reorganize in West Africa,” Long War Journal, March 13, 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/analysis-al-qaeda-groups-reorganize-in-west-africa.php. Thus, the relationship between AQIM and Ansar al-Dine and al-Mourabitoun has shifted from one of collaboration to a structured hierarchy with AQIM at the top.Dario Cristiani, “Ten Years of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Evolution and Prospects,” Jamestown Foundation, May 5, 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/ten-years-al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-evolution-prospects/.

Financing:

AQIM acquires a significant portion of its funding through kidnapping and extortion.Adam Nossiter, “Millions in Ransoms Fuel Militants’ Clout in West Africa,” New York Times, December 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/13/world/africa/kidnappings-fuel-extremists-in-western-africa.html?pagewanted=all. The State Department’s 2013 Country Reports on Terrorism noted that, in addition to kidnapping for ransom, the group also engages in criminal activities to finance its operations. Specifically, AQIM reportedly raises funds though “protection rackets, robbery, people and arms trafficking, money laundering and smuggling and increasingly, the facilitation of drug trafficking from South America into Europe.”“Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb,” Australian National Security, accessed June 27, 2014, http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Al-QaidaintheIslamicMaghrebAQIM.aspx. Lastly, AQIM also successfully fundraises globally. This includes supporters residing in Western Europe, who “provide limited financial and logistical support.”“Country Reports on Terrorism 2013,” U.S. Department of State, April 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224829.htm.

AQIM is also allegedly supported by foreign governments. According to the Anti-Defamation League, “The Algerian government has accused Iran and Sudan of funding the group. Al Qaeda also provides material and financial support to AQIM. In addition, AQIM has many members abroad, the majority located in Western Europe, who provide financial and logistical support.”"Militants Kill Soldiers in Algeria,” New York Times, April 20, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/world/africa/militants-kill-soldiers-in-algeria.html.

Recruitment:

An April 2007 report by Lianne Boudali of West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center suggested that the GSPC merged with al-Qaeda in part due to declining recruitment. Rebranding as AQIM and broadening their focus outside of Algeria and Tunisia made it easier for the group to recruit informants, logisticians, and militants.Lianne Boudali, “The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa’ida’s Global Jihad,” Combating Terrorism Center, April 2007, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA466539. As part of this plan, GSPC trained and sent fighters to join Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—then the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq—in 2005.Lianne Boudali, “The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa’ida’s Global Jihad,” Combating Terrorism Center, April 2007, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA466539. The increased scope and scale of attacks after 2007 suggests that AQIM successfully recruited some of these Iraqi fighters after Zarqawi’s death.Lianne Boudali, “The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa’ida’s Global Jihad,” Combating Terrorism Center, April 2007, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA466539.

As AQIM shifted its focus away from Algeria and toward the more vulnerable west African countries of Mali, Niger, and Côte d’Ivoire, it increased its recruitment efforts within these countries. By 2016, Malians had reportedly replaced Algerians as the most prominent nationality within the group.Olivier Guitta, “The re-emergence of AQIM in Africa,” Al Jazeera, March 20, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/emergence-aqim-africa-160320090928469.html. This change is visible in the March 2016 beach resort attack in Côte d’Ivoire, in which all of the terrorists involved were sub-Saharan Africans.Michael E. Miller, “Horror at the beach: 22 dead in terrorist attack on Ivory Coast resorts,” Washington Post, March 14, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/03/14/horror-at-the-beach-22-dead-in-terrorist-attack-on-ivory-coast-resorts/?utm_term=.41a7ad9cd104.

Training:

Most of AQIM’s leadership first trained alongside Osama bin Laden during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, 2015, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb. In the mid-2000s, GSPC trained recruits in the desert in temporary bivouacs which they moved after a few days.Lianne Boudali, The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa’ida’s Global Jihad, Combating Terrorism Center, April 2007, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA466539. However in 2006 reports emerged suggesting that AQIM had sent men to train with Hezbollah in Lebanon.Lianne Boudali, The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa’ida’s Global Jihad, Combating Terrorism Center, April 2007, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA466539. By the late 2000s, AQIM began training Boko Haram fighters in the construction of IEDs.Thomas Joscelyn, “Osama bin Laden’s files: AQIM commander recommended training Boko Haram’s members,” Long War Journal, February 18, 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/02/osama-bin-ladens-files-aqim-leader-recommended-training-boko-harams-members.php. According to internal documents seized from bin Laden’s compound, AQIM divides its training into two parts: “practical training and… theoretical training, which is less beneficial.”Thomas Joscelyn, “Osama bin Laden’s files: AQIM commander recommended training Boko Haram’s members,” Long War Journal, February 18, 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/02/osama-bin-ladens-files-aqim-leader-recommended-training-boko-harams-members.php.

Key Leaders

Iyad Ag Ghali

JNIM emir (leader)
Abdelmalek Droukdel

AQIM emir (leader), in charge of Algeria
Mokhtar Belmokhtar

Al-Mourabitoun emir, co-founder
Yahya Abu Hammam

Leader of Sahara-Sahel region
Yahia Djouadi

Former emir of the southern sector
Salah Mohamed

Head of media committee
Abdarrahmane al-Azawadi

Spokesman
Salah Mohamed

Head of media committee
Abu Abdul Ilah Ahmad

Head of media
Ahmed Deghdegh

Finance chief
Abu Ubayda Yousif al-Annabi

Member of Shura council
Mohamed Lahbous (a.k.a. Mohamed Ould Nouini)

Military commander of al-Mourabitoun and co-founder of JNIM (deceased)

History

Violent Activities

AQIM has been the most successful al-Qaeda affiliate when it comes to kidnapping and ransoming foreigners, collecting more than $90 million by the end of 2012.Adam Nossiter, “Millions in Ransoms Fuel Militants’ Clout in West Africa,” New York Times, December 12, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/13/world/africa/kidnappings-fuel-extremists-in-western-africa.html?pagewanted=all. AQIM also launches hundreds of small-scale attacks each year against United Nations, French, and local security forces, killing hundreds. However, AQIM is most notable for its large-scale terror attacks on a beach resort in March 2016 and a popular restaurant in August 2017, which combined killed 37 civilians.“Mali arrests third suspect in Ivory Coast beach attack,” France 24, April 17, 2016, http://www.france24.com/en/20160417-mali-arrests-suspect-ivory-coast-beach-terror-attack-aqim Caleb Weiss, “AQIM claims two attacks in northern Mali,” Long War Journal, November 30, 2016, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/11/aqim-claims-two-attacks-in-northern-mali.php; Caleb Weiss, “Jihadists strike across West Africa,” Long War Journal, August 15, 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/08/jihadists-launch-attacks-across-west-africa.php.

December 24, 1994: AQIM’s predecessor Armed Islamic Group (GIA) hijacks Air France flight 8969, with the objective of crashing the airplane into the Eiffel Tower in Paris. The plane is eventually diverted to Marseilles, where French commandos manage to free all but three passengers.Jonathan Schanzer, Al-Qaeda’s Armies: Middle East Affiliate Groups & the Next Generation of Terror (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004-2005), 106.
July-October 1995: GIA carries out numerous bombings in Paris, killing eight and wounding about 200.Jonathan Schanzer, Al-Qaeda’s Armies: Middle East Affiliate Groups & the Next Generation of Terror (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004-2005), 106.
January 1996: GIA declares war against the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)Jean-Pierre Filiu, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Algerian Challenge or Global Threat?” Carnegie Papers, October 2009, 3.
September 1998: GIA leader Hassan Hattab leaves the group, due to disagreement with its targeting of innocent civilians. He founds the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), AQIM’s predecessor, reportedly at the urging of Osama bin Laden.Jonathan Schanzer, Al-Qaeda’s Armies: Middle East Affiliate Groups & the Next Generation of Terror (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004-2005), 104..
September 9, 2001: Two Tunisians, reportedly sent to Afghanistan by bin Laden, pose as journalists and assassinate Ahmad Shah Masoud, leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.Jean-Pierre Filiu, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Algerian Challenge or Global Threat?” Carnegie Papers, October 2009, 3.
April 11, 2002: Al-Qaeda claims responsibility for a synagogue bombing in Djerba, Tunisia, that kills 19.“Al-Qaeda Claims Tunisia Attack,” BBC News, June 23, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2061071.stm.
February 2003: GSPC militants kidnap 32 European tourists in southern Algeria.“Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Anti-Defamation League, accessed June 28, 2014, http://archive.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/al_qaeda_maghreb.html#6.
December 10, 2006: GSPC bombs a bus carrying Haliburton employees, killing one.Jean-Pierre Filiu, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Algerian Challenge or Global Threat?” Carnegie Papers, October 2009, 3.
April 11, 2007: GSPC—now Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) following a formal merger with al-Qaeda—carries out two deadly attacks: one suicide attack against the prime minister’s office in Algiers and a second attack on a police station in the east of the capital. The attacks kill at least 30 and wound dozens.Craig S Smith, “Blasts by Qaeda Unit Are Deadliest Attack in Algiers in Years,” New York Times, April 12, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/12/world/africa/12algeria.html?pagewanted=all.
July 2007: A suicide bomber self-detonates in a car, killing 10 soldiers in a military encampment. AQIM claims responsibility for the attack.“Group with Ties to Al Qaeda Says It Was behind Blasts in Algeria,” New York Times, September 10, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/10/world/africa/10algeria.html.
September 6, 2007: AQIM sets off an explosion in a crowd waiting to greet Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. The president survives but the blast kills 22.“Group with Ties to Al Qaeda Says It Was behind Blasts in Algeria,” New York Times, September 10, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/10/world/africa/10algeria.html.
September 8, 2007: An AQIM operative detonates a car bomb in the northern town of Dellys, killing 28 coast guard officers.“Group with Ties to Al Qaeda Says It Was behind Blasts in Algeria,” New York Times, September 10, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/10/world/africa/10algeria.html.
December 11, 2007: AQIM car bombs in Algiers strike the United Nations offices and the Constitutional Court building, killing 41, including 17 U.N. employees.Jean-Pierre Filiu, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Algerian Challenge or Global Threat?” Carnegie Papers, October 2009, 3.
December 24, 2007: AQIM operatives shoot and kill four members of a French family vacationing in Mauritania.“Tourists Shot Dead in Mauritania,” BBC News, December 24, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7159420.stm.
August 19, 2008: An AQIM suicide car bomber explodes near a police academy in the Algerian town of Issers, killing 43 and wounding more than 45.Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda Suicide Attack Hits Police Center in Algeria,” Long War Journal, August 19, 2008, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/al_qaeda_suicide_att_1.php#.
May 31, 2009: AQIM executes kidnapped British citizen Edwin Dyer.Matthew Weaver, “British Hostage Edwin Dyer ‘Killed by Al-Qaida,’” Guardian (London), June 3, 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/jun/03/edwin-dyer-hostage-killed-al-qaida.
June 17, 2009: AQIM militants ambush a group of Algerian paramilitary policemen, killing 20.“Highlights in Terrorist Activity – June 1, 2009 to June 30, 2009,” CTC Sentinel 2, no. 2 (2009): 2.
June 23, 2009: AQIM militants kill American aid worker Christopher Legget in a kidnapping attempt in Nouakchott, Mauritania.Alex Thurston, “AQIM, Kidnapping, and Murder: A Brief History,” Christian Science Monitor, January 19, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/0119/AQIM-kidnapping-and-murder-a-brief-history.
November 25, 2009: AQIM kidnaps French citizen Pierre Camatte near Mali’s border with Niger. He is eventually returned in exchange for four AQIM militants.Alex Thurston, “AQIM, Kidnapping, and Murder: A Brief History,” Christian Science Monitor, January 19, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/0119/AQIM-kidnapping-and-murder-a-brief-history.
November 29, 2009: AQIM kidnaps three Spanish aid workers in Mauritania. The group releases all three workers on March 10, 2010, in exchange for a ransom payment between $6.3 million and $12.7 million from the Spanish government.Alex Thurston, “AQIM, Kidnapping, and Murder: A Brief History,” Christian Science Monitor, January 19, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/0119/AQIM-kidnapping-and-murder-a-brief-history.
December 18, 2009: AQIM kidnaps two Italian nationals in Mauritania, holding them for four months before they are released on April 16, 2010.Alex Thurston, “AQIM, Kidnapping, and Murder: A Brief History,” Christian Science Monitor, January 19, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/0119/AQIM-kidnapping-and-murder-a-brief-history.
April 19, 2010: AQIM kidnaps French national Michel Germaneau in northern Niger, and demands prisoner releases in exchange for his release. The group is reported to have killed Germaneau after French and Mauritanian forces launched an assault on AQIM in Mali.Alex Thurston, “AQIM, Kidnapping, and Murder: A Brief History,” Christian Science Monitor, January 19, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/0119/AQIM-kidnapping-and-murder-a-brief-history.
September 16, 2010: AQIM kidnaps five French nationals working for the nuclear company Areva in Niger. The men are held hostage for more than three years, and are released in October 2013.“Four French Hostages Kidnapped in Niger in 2010 Released,” National (Dubai), October 29, 2013, http://www.thenational.ae/world/africa/four-french-hostages-kidnapped-in-niger-in-2010-released.
January 7, 2011: AQIM kidnaps two French nationals in Niger. French and Nigerian forces attempt to free the men, but they are reportedly shot to death.Alex Thurston, “AQIM, Kidnapping, and Murder: A Brief History,” Christian Science Monitor, January 19, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/0119/AQIM-kidnapping-and-murder-a-brief-history.
April 15, 2011: AQIM militants attack a checkpoint in Tizi Ouzou Province, killing 17 Algerian soldiers.Andrew Lebovich, “AQIM Returns in Force in Northern Algeria,” CTC Sentinel 4, no. 9 (2011): 9.
August 26, 2011: AQIM launches two suicide attacks against “Algeria’s premier military academy,” Academie Militaire Interarmes, in Cherchell, killing 18.Andrew Lebovich, “AQIM Returns in Force in Northern Algeria,” CTC Sentinel 4, no. 9 (2011): 8.
November 2011: AQIM kidnaps four French nationals from a uranium compound in Niger, as well as three foreign nationals from the Netherlands, Sweden, and South Africa. The seven hostages are released in September 2013.“Al-Qaeda Releases Hostage Video of Seven Kidnapped Westerners,” Agence France-Presse, September 17, 2013, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/09/17/Al-Qaeda-releases-hostage-video-of-kidnapped-Westerners-.html. AQIM also captures French national Serge Lazarevic and Dutch national Sjaak Rijke and continues to hold them hostage as of December 2014.“Al Qaeda Branch Releases Video of French, Dutch Hostages,” France 24, last modified November 18, 2014, http://www.france24.com/en/20141118-qaeda-aqim-release-new-video-french-dutch-hostages-lazarevic/.
January 16, 2012: AQIM kidnaps the governor of the Illizi region in Algeria after attacking his convoy near the border with Libya. Libyan forces rescued the governor the next day.“Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb,” Australian National Security, accessed June 27, 2014, http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Al-QaidaintheIslamicMaghrebAQIM.aspx.
January 24, 2012: Militants from AQIM and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad reportedly massacre more than 100 Malian soldiers in Aguelhok. The soldiers allegedly run out of ammunition, and are then executed, some with their throats slit and others shot in the head.Jeremy Keenan, “Mali’s Tuareg Rebellion: What Next,” Al Jazeera, March 20, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/03/20123208133276463.html.
May 4, 2012: France sentences French-Algerian particle physicist Said Hicheur to five years in prison for allegedly intending to carry out terrorist attacks. The court claims that Hicheur exchanged numerous emails with AQIM representative Mustapha Debchi, and that Hicheur planned to attack “the French Alpine infantry battalion that was deployed in Afghanistan.”Scott Sayare, “Scientist Sentenced in French Terror Case,” New York Times, May 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/05/science/cern-scientist-adlene-hicheur-sentenced-to-4-years-in-french-terrorism-case.html?pagewanted=all.
September 11, 2012: According to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, individuals from AQIM are among those who planned the attacks against the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, that killed U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens.“Review of the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012,” U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2014): 40.
December 3, 2012: General Carter F. Ham, commander of U.S. Africa Command, says that AQIM is operating training camps in northern Mali and aiding Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram by equipping it with weapons, explosives, and money.Eric Schmitt, “American Commander Details Al Qaeda’s Strength in Mali,” New York Times, December 3, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/world/africa/top-american-commander-in-africa-warns-of-al-qaeda-influence-in-mali.html.
January 10, 2013: Fighters from the AQIM-allied MUJAO seize the northern Mali town of Konna, which Reuters describes as “the last buffer between the rebels and Mopti…the main town in the region [which is] seen as the gateway to the country’s north.””Tiemoko Diallo, “Mali Islamists Capture Strategic Town, Residents Flee,” Reuters, January 10, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/10/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE90912Q20130110.
January 16, 2013: AQIM splinter group al-Mulathamun seizes control of the In Amenas natural gas plant in Algeria.Adam Nossiter and Scott Sayare, “Militants Seize Americans and Other Hostages in Algeria,” New York Times, January 16, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/17/world/africa/islamists-seize-foreign-hostages-at-algeria-gas-field.html?pagewanted=all. The militants tie up dozens of Western workers and plant explosives throughout the facility. After four days of failed negotiations, Algerian forces storm the facility, killing and driving out the militants. At least 37 hostages die in the hostage crisis and ensuing rescue attempt.Amir Ahmed, “At Least 37 Hostages Killed in Algeria Gas Plant Standoff, Prime Minister Says,” CNN, January 23, 2013,http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/21/world/africa/algeria-hostage-crisis/.
March 19, 2013: AQIM announces that it beheaded French hostage Philippe Verdon, whom the group captured in November 2011.“Report of Hostage’s Beheading,” Reuters, March 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/20/world/africa/report-of-hostages-beheading.html.
November 2013: AQIM claims responsibility for kidnapping and murdering two French journalists—Ghislaine Dupont and Claude Verlon—in northern Mali. The group says that the journalists were killed because of French and African military crimes against Muslims in the Azawad region of Mali.Katarina Höije, “AQIM Claims Responsibility for Mali Killings,” CNN, November 6, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/06/world/africa/mali-journalists-deaths-arrests/.
April 20, 2014: Several days after Algeria’s presidential elections, AQIM ambushes Algerian soldiers who were returning from their voting stations near Tizi Ouzou, killing at least 14. “Militants Kill Soldiers in Algeria,” New York Times, April 20, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/world/africa/militants-kill-soldiers-in-algeria.html.
May 27, 2014: AQIM claims responsibility for an attack on the home of Tunisia’s interior minister that killed four policemen.“Al-Qaeda claims recent attack on Tunisian minister’s home,” Al Arabiya News, June 13, 2014, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/2014/06/13/Al-Qaeda-claims-recent-attack-on-Tunisian-minister-s-home-.html.
June 2014: AQIM claims responsibility for two separate attacks on U.N. vehicles in Mali.Bakari Gueye, “Al-Qaeda Claims Mali Peacekeeper Attacks,” Magharebia, September 3, 2014, http://magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/features/2014/09/03/feature-02.
July 2014: The Uqba Ibn Nafi Battalion launches an attack on the Tunisian military in the Chaambi Mountain region, killing 15 soldiers and wounding 20 others.Caleb Weiss, “Tunisian jihadist group posts pictures of spoils, claims attacks on Tunisian military,” Long War Journal, December 18, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/12/tunisian_jihadist_group_posts.php.
July 9, 2014: French authorities thwart an AQIM plot to target the Eiffel Tower, the Louvre, and a nuclear power plant in France.Henry Samuel, “Islamist plot to blow up Eiffel Tower, Louvre and nuclear power plant foiled, say French police,” Daily Telegraph (London), July 9, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/10956636/Islamist-plot-to-blow-up-Eiffel-Tower-Louvre-and-nuclear-power-plant-foiled-say-French-police.html.
August 16, 2014: A suicide bomber self-detonates on a patrol base in northern Mali, killing two and injuring nine.“Suicide Bomber Attacks U.N. Base in Northern Mali, Kills Two,” Reuters, August 16, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/16/us-mali-attacks-un-idUSKBN0GG0DL20140816. AQIM claims responsibility for the attack.Bakari Gueye, “Al-Qaeda Claims Mali Peacekeeper Attacks,” Magharebia, September 3, 2014, http://magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/features/2014/09/03/feature-02.
December 2014: AQIM claims two attacks on Tunisian forces in the Mount Chaambi region.Caleb Weiss, “Tunisian AQIM branch claims attack on troops in Kasserine,” Long War Journal, September 1, 2016, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/tunisian-aqim-branch-claims-attack-on-troops-in-kasserine.php.
January 5, 2015: AQIM claims responsibility for an attack in Bamako, Mali. According to an anonymous security official, six soldiers are killed and others injured.Associated Press, “Al-Qaida Militants Claim Responsibility for Attack in Mali,” New York Times, January 6, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/01/06/world/africa/ap-af-mali-violence.html?_r=0.
January 9, 2015: AQIM is the suspected perpetrator of an attack on a U.N. vehicle in Kidal, Mali, that wounds seven Senegalese U.N. peacekeepers.“Mali: UN Mission condemns attack that wounded seven peacekeepers,” UN News Centre, January 9, 2015, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49763#.VNUVtPnF-7V.
November 20, 2015: Al-Mourabitoun claims responsibility for a deadly gun and hostage attack on the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali, allegedly as part of a joint attack with AQIM. According to U.N. spokesman Olivier Salgado, 21 people were killed in the attack when gunmen stormed the hotel using counterfeit diplomatic license plates. Faith Karimi and Erin Burnett, "Mali hotel attack: Gunmen barged in, shot at 'anything that moved,'" CNN, November 22, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/21/africa/mali-hotel-attack/.
January 15, 2016: AQIM militants attack a hotel in Burkina Faso and a police station outside of the capital, killing 30 people of 18 nationalities.Nadia Khomami, "Burkina Faso hotel attack: 18 nationalities among dead," Guardian (London), January 16, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/15/security-forces-battle-suspected-jihadists-in-burkina-faso-capital;
Jason Burke, "Burkina Faso attack signals spread of Islamist menace," Guardian (London), January 16, 2016, ://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/16/burkina-faso-attack-signals-spread-of-islamist-menace;
Tim Lister, "Burkina Faso attack demonstrates al Qaeda revival in Africa," CNN, January 16, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/16/world/burkina-faso-attack-al-qaeda/; Drew Hinshaw and Zoumana Wonogo, “Al Qaeda Attacks in Burkina Faso Kill at Least 30,” Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/operation-ends-at-burkina-faso-hotel-seized-by-al-qaeda-1452936866.
March 13, 2016: AQIM gunmen open fire at a beach resort in Grand-Bassam, a coastal town located 25 miles east of Abidjan in Côte d’Ivoire. The attack—the first al-Qaeda attack in the country—leaves 19 people dead, including 16 civilians and three Ivorian soldiers. Among the killed are foreign citizens from France, Germany, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Cameroon.“Mali arrests third suspect in Ivory Coast beach attack,” France 24, April 17, 2016, http://www.france24.com/en/20160417-mali-arrests-suspect-ivory-coast-beach-terror-attack-aqim.
May 31, 2016: An al-Mourabitoun militant detonates a suicide bomb near the U.N. airport in Gao, Mali, killing a Chinese peacekeeper and three others.Caleb Weiss, “AQIM claims two attacks in northern Mali,” Long War Journal, November 30, 2016, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/11/aqim-claims-two-attacks-in-northern-mali.php.
August 29, 2016: AQIM’s branch in Tunisia, the Uqba bin Nafi Battalion, claims responsibility for an ambush on Tunisian forces in the Mount Sammama area of Kasserine Governorate, killing three soldiers and wounding seven others.Caleb Weiss, “Tunisian AQIM branch claims attack on troops in Kasserine,” Long War Journal, September 1, 2016, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/tunisian-aqim-branch-claims-attack-on-troops-in-kasserine.php.
September 19, 2016: AQIM is suspected of kidnapping two Italians and a Canadian in Southern Libya.“Al-Qaeda suspected of abducting three westerners in Libya,” Middle East Eye, September 23, 2016, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/expatriates-abducted-libya-aqim-suspected-563532115.
October 6, 2016: AQIM is suspected of attacking a refugee camp in Niger, killing 20 security forces.Caleb Weiss, “Suspected jihadists attack Nigerien refugee camp,” Long War Journal, October 6, 2016, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/10/suspected-jihadists-attack-niger-refugee-camp.php.
Nov 29, 2016: AQIM launches two attacks in Mali targeting the airports in the cities of Timbuktu and Gao with rockets and a suicide bomb. No deaths are reported.Caleb Weiss, “AQIM claims two attacks in northern Mali,” Long War Journal, November 30, 2016, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/11/aqim-claims-two-attacks-in-northern-mali.php.
January 18, 2017: Al-Mourabitoun claims responsibility for a suicide bombing on a military camp in northern Mali that kills 77.“Death toll from suicide blast at Gao army base rises,” Al Jazeera, January 19, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/suicide-blast-gao-army-base-170119112555093.html.
March 5, 2017: AQIM, under its new name Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen, attacks a military base in central Mali, killing 11 soldiers.“Mali “l’attaque contre la base militaire de Boulikessi revendiquée par l’organisation jihadiste d’Iyad Ag Ghali,” Jeune Afrique, March 10, 2017, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/411287/politique/mali-lattaque-contre-base-militaire-de-boulikessi-revendiquee-lorganisation-jihadiste-diyad-ag-ghali/.
March 24 2017: AQIM claims to have killed “dozens” of locals during communal clashes between Fulani herders and Bambara farmers in Mali.Caleb Weiss, “Al Qaeda entity involved in communal violence in central Mali,” Long War Journal, March 27, 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/al-qaeda-entity-involved-in-communal-violence-in-central-mali.php.
March 27, 2017: AQIM claims to have attacked a Malian vehicle with an IED. No casualties are reported.Caleb Weiss, “Al Qaeda entity involved in communal violence in central Mali,” Long War Journal, March 27, 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/al-qaeda-entity-involved-in-communal-violence-in-central-mali.php.
April 5, 2017: A JNIM IED kills a French soldier in Mali.Caleb Weiss, “JNIM claims number of attacks across Mali,” Long War Journal, April 18, 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/04/jnim-claims-number-of-attacks-across-mali.php.
June 18, 2017: AQIM kills at least two civilians and three members of security forces in an attack on a resort near the city of Bamako, Mali.Caleb Weiss, “Al Qaeda group claims assault near Mali capital,” Long War Journal, June 20, 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/06/al-qaeda-group-claims-assault-near-mali-capital.php.
July 8, 2017: JNIM wounds three French soldiers with an IED near Tessalit, Mali.Caleb Weiss, “JNIM claims series of attacks on French forces in Mali,” Long War Journal, August 3, 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/08/jnim-claims-series-of-attacks-on-french-forces-in-mali.php.
July 17, 2017: JNIM is suspected of firing mortars at a French-U.N. military base in Tessalit, Mali.Caleb Weiss, “JNIM claims series of attacks on French forces in Mali,” Long War Journal, August 3, 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/08/jnim-claims-series-of-attacks-on-french-forces-in-mali.php.
August 3, 2017: A JNIM IED wounds four French soldiers near Tessalit, Mali.Caleb Weiss, “JNIM claims series of attacks on French forces in Mali,” Long War Journal, August 3, 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/08/jnim-claims-series-of-attacks-on-french-forces-in-mali.php.
August 14, 2017: AQIM is suspected of orchestrating an attack on a restaurant in Burkina Faso that leaves 18 dead. The same day, U.N. troops in Mali are attacked in two different locations.Caleb Weiss, “Jihadists strike across West Africa,” Long War Journal, August 15, 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/08/jihadists-launch-attacks-across-west-africa.php.
October 23, 2017: JNIM attacks two separate police posts in the Segou region of Mali and ambushes a Malian vehicle near Tenenkou.Caleb Weiss, “JNIM claims string of attacks across Mali,” Long War Journal, October 27, 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/10/jnim-claims-string-of-attacks-across-mali.php.
October 25, 2017: JNIM attacks the French company SATOM, burning several trucks and killing both civilians and soldiers.Caleb Weiss, “JNIM claims string of attacks across Mali,” Long War Journal, October 27, 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/10/jnim-claims-string-of-attacks-across-mali.php.
October 26, 2017: Three U.N. peacekeepers are killed in an IED attack on to road between Aguelhok and Tessalit, Mali. JNIM claims responsibility.Caleb Weiss, “JNIM claims string of attacks across Mali,” Long War Journal, October 27, 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/10/jnim-claims-string-of-attacks-across-mali.php.
November 24, 2017: Four U.N. peacekeepers and a Malian soldier are killed in two separate attacks near Indelimane and Douentza, Mali. JNIM claims responsibility.“Four UN peacekeepers, one Malian soldier killed in Mali attacks,” France 24, November 25, 2017, http://www.france24.com/en/20171125-four-un-peacekeepers-one-malian-soldier-killed-mali-attacks.
December 28, 2017: Two IED attacks destroy at least one Malian army vehicle. JNIM claims responsibility.MENASTREAM, Twitter Post, January 3, 2018, 1:31pm, https://twitter.com/menastream/status/948622863208206336?lang=en.
March 2, 2018: Simultaneous attacks on the French Embassy and an Army headquarters in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, leave 7 Malian soldiers and 9 attackers dead. JNIM claims responsibility.“Former soldier suspected of involvement in Burkina Faso attacks,” France24, March 5, 2018, http://www.france24.com/en/20180305-burkina-faso-attacks-former-soldier-suspect-military.
April 14, 2018: Four JNIM suicide bombers attack the Timbuktu airport using vehicles disguised as U.N. and Malian military vehicles. One U.N. peacekeeper and at least 15 attackers are killed.Caleb Weiss, “JNIM claims four suicide bombers used in Timbuktu attack,” Long War Journal, April 27, 2018, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/04/jnim-claims-four-suicide-bombers-used-in-timbuktu-attack.php.
May 8, 2018: AQIM calls western companies operating in North and West Africa “legitimate targets,” threatening attacks and urging Muslims to boycott them.“Al Qaeda branch threatens attacks on Western companies in Africa,” Reuters, May 8, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-al-qaeda/al-qaeda-branch-threatens-attacks-on-western-companies-in-africa-idUSKBN1I93ES.
June 29, 2018: A suicide bomber and infantry attack the G5-Sahel headquarters in Sevare, Mali leaving six dead. No group officially claimed responsibility, but authorities suspect JNIM.Caleb Weiss, “Suicide assault targets African coalition military base in central Mali,” Long War Journal, June 29, 2018, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/06/suicide-assault-targets-african-coalition-military-base-in-central-mali.php.
July 1, 2018: A JNIM suicide bomber attacks a French military patrol in the city of Gao, killing two civilians and wounding dozens.Caleb Weiss, “Suicide car bombing hits French troops in northern Mali,” Long War Journal, July 1, 2018, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/07/suicide-bombing-targets-french-troops-in-northern-mali.php.
July 8, 2018: AQIM affiliate Katiba Uqba ibn Nafi carries out a grenade and small-arms attack in northwest Tunisia, killing six police officers.Caleb Weiss, “Al Qaeda wing ambushes police officers in northern Tunisia,” Long War Journal, July 9, 2018, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/07/al-qaeda-wing-ambushes-police-officers-in-northern-tunisia.php.
July 29, 2018: Militants attack polling stations and burn ballot boxes in several towns in northern and central Mali. Local officials accuse JNIM affiliate al-Mourabitoun.“Mali violence flares up on key election day,” ENCA, July 29, 2018, https://www.enca.com/africa/mali-violence-flares-up-on-key-election-day.
July 30, 2018: JNIM fires 10 mortars at a polling station in the Northern Mali town of Aguelhok, temporarily disrupting voting for the presidential elections.Tim Cocks “Al Qaeda unit claims mortar attack that disrupted north Mali poll,” Reuters, July 30, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-election-alqaeda/al-qaeda-unit-claims-mortar-attack-that-disrupted-north-mali-poll-idUSKBN1KK14S.
October 3, 2018: Militants carry out an IED attack in Kasserine, Tunisia, killing one soldier and wounding five others. AQIM’s Katiba Uqba ibn Nafi claims responsibility.Caleb Weiss, “Al Qaeda branch claims IED attack on Tunisian soldiers,” Long War Journal, October 4, 2018, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/10/al-qaeda-branch-claims-ied-on-tunisian-soldiers.php.
January 20, 2019: Suspected AQIM gunmen ambush a base in Aguelhok, northern Mali. The militants kill at least ten United Nations peacekeepers and injure an additional 25.“Mali: 10 UN peacekeepers killed in attack on Aguelhok base,” Defense Post, January 20, 2019, https://thedefensepost.com/2019/01/20/mali-8-un-peacekeepers-killed-aguelhok/.
April 17, 2019: AQIM’s branch in Tunisia, the Uqba bin Nafi Battalion (KUBN), claims responsibility for two separate IED attacks in the Mount Chaambi region near the border with Algeria. No casualties are reported in both events.Caleb Weiss, “Al Qaeda group claims bombings in Tunisia,” Long War Journal, April 17, 2019, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/04/al-qaeda-group-claims-bombings-in-tunisia.php.
April 21, 2019: A landmine explosion in the southwestern province of Gafsa kills four civilians. Dozens of AQIM terrorists have been hiding in mountainous areas in Tunisia and have planted hundreds of landmines to prevent the advance of the army and security forces.Mu Xuequan, “4 wounded in landmine blast in southwestern Tunisia,” Xinhua, April 21, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/21/c_137994070.htm.
April 27, 2019: AQIM’s Tunisian branch, the Uqba bin Nafi Battalion (KUBN), detonates an IED on a Turkish, Israeli-made armored vehicle KIRPI in the Mount Chaambi region. The attack kills one soldier and injures three others.“Tunisia soldier killed in IED explosion on Mount Chambi,” Defense Post, April 27, 2019, https://thedefensepost.com/2019/04/27/tunisia-soldier-killed-ied-mount-chambi/.
August 19, 2019: Suspected AQIM militants on motorbikes and pickup trucks ambush soldiers in northern Burkina Faso. More than a dozen soldiers are killed.“Burkina Faso troops killed in 'major attack' by ‘terrorist armed groups’,” France 24, August 20, 2019, https://www.france24.com/en/20190820-burkina-faso-troops-killed-attack-terrorist-armed-groups.
August 30, 2019: AQIM affiliate, the Group to Support Islam and Muslims (JNIM), attacks soldiers in Tongomayel, Burkina Faso. One soldier is injured in the attack. The militants claim to capture vehicles, weapons and ammunition as well as blow up the barracks.“Burkina Faso soldier killed in Soum ambush,” Defense Post, September 6, 2019, https://thedefensepost.com/2019/09/06/burkina-faso-soldier-killed-diomsogui-soum/.
September 6, 2019: JNIM rebels ambush an army patrol in Soum province, Burkina Faso. One soldier and five assailants are killed.Mu Xuequan, “6 killed in ambush on army patrol in northern Burkina Faso,” September 6, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/06/c_138368860.htm.

Designations

Designations by the U.S. Government:


September 24, 2001: The Department of the Treasury designates GSPC as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (under Executive Order 13224).“Terrorism: What You Need to Know about U.S. Sanctions,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, accessed December 4, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/terror.txt.	March 27, 2002: The Department of the Treasury designates GSPC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act).“Terrorism: What You Need to Know about U.S. Sanctions,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, accessed December 4, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/terror.txt.
October 24, 2003: The Department of the Treasury designates Mokhtar Belmokhtar as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (under Executive Order 13224).“U.S. Designates Three Individuals And One Organization Involved In Terrorism In Algeria,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 24, 2003, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js944.aspx.	February 21, 2008: The Department of the Treasury designates AQIM as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (under Executive Order 13224).“Treasury Targets Al Qaida-Affiliated Terror Group in Algeria,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 17, 2008, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1085.aspx.
July 17, 2008: The Department of the Treasury designates Ahmed Deghdegh as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (under Executive Order 13224).Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Treasury Targets Al Qaida Affiliated Terror Group in Algeria,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 17, 2008, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1085.aspx.	July 17, 2008: The Department of the Treasury designates Abid Hammadou as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (under Executive Order 13224).Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Treasury Targets Al Qaida Affiliated Terror Group in Algeria,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 17, 2008, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1085.aspx.
September 7, 2011: The Department of the Treasury designates ‘Abd al-Rahman Ould Muhammad al-Husayn Ould Muhammad Salim as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (under Executive Order 13224).“Treasury Targets Three Senior Al-Qa'ida Leaders,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 7, 2011, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1289.aspx.	February 14, 2013: The Department of the Treasury designates Yahya Abu Hammam as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (under Executive Order 13224).Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Treasury Designates an Additional Senior Leader of Al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, February 14, 2013, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1855.aspx.
September 5, 2018: The Department of State designates JNIM as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (under Executive Order 13224).“State Department Terrorist Designation of Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM),” U.S. Department of State, September 5, 2018, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/09/285705.htm.	July 16, 2019: The Department of the Treasury designates Bah Ag Moussa as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13244.“Treasury Targets Al-Qa’ida in Mali,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 16, 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm730.; Caleb Weiss, “US sanctions leaders of al Qaeda in Mali,” Long War Journal, July 16, 2019, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/07/us-sanctions-leaders-of-al-qaeda-in-mali.php.

Designations by Foreign Governments and Organizations:


United Nations—listed GSPC as a terrorist organization on October 6, 2001.“Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: QE.T.14.01. The Organization of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,” United Nations Security Council, last modified September 9, 2014, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE01401E.shtml.	United Nations—listed AQIM as a terrorist organization on April 26, 2007.“Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: QE.T.14.01. The Organization of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,” United Nations Security Council, last modified September 9, 2014, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE01401E.shtml.
Australia—listed GSPC as a terrorist organization on November 14, 2002.“Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb,” Australian National Security, accessed June 27, 2014, http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Al-QaidaintheIslamicMaghrebAQIM.aspx.	United Kingdom—listed GSPC as a terrorist organization on October 10, 2001.“Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets in the UK,” HM Treasury (UK), last modified June 16, 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/320559/alqaida.pdf.
Canada—listed GSPC as a terrorist organization on July 23, 2002.Public Safety Canada, “Currently Listed Entities,” Government of Canada, accessed July 1, 2014, http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-eng.aspx#http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-eng.aspx#2008.	New Zealand—listed GSPC as a terrorist organization on October 17, 2002.“Designated Individuals and Organizations,” New Zealand Police, updated June 26, 2014, http://www.police.govt.nz/advice/personal-community/counterterrorism/designated-entities.

Associations

Ties to Extremist Entities:

AQIM has either verbally or materially supported a plethora of Salafi terrorist and extremist groups across the region. AQIM officials have issued clear statements on their attempts to strengthen ties with al-Qaeda subgroups in Yemen, Syria, and East Africa.Casey Britton, “AQIM : Answers to Open Meeting with Sheikh Abu Abdul Ilah Ahmad,” WorldAnalysis.net, April 19, 2013, http://worldanalysis.net/modules/news/article.php?storyid=2197. They have also cooperated with, trained, or equipped other extremist groups in North Africa, including al-Mourabitoun and Boko Haram.SITE Intel Group, Twitter post, March 16, 2016, 10:56 a.m., https://twitter.com/siteintelgroup/status/710162802565062656; Felipe Pathé Duarte, “Maghrebian Militant Maneuvers: AQIM as a Strategic Challenge,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, September 28, 2011, http://csis.org/publication/maghrebian-militant-maneuvers-aqim-strategic-challenge.

Ahrar al-Sham AQIM has posted on Twitter in solidarity with Ahrar al-Sham and other Syrian-based jihadist groups: “The stance of AQIM from the Jihadi groups like… Ahrar Al-Sham Brigades and the other Jihad groups is alliance and support and searching for the ways of cooperation in goodness and piety to bring our Muslim Ummah out from the state of backwardness and humiliation which it fell in to after the fall of the Khilafah.”Casey Britton, “AQIM : Answers to Open Meeting with Sheikh Abu Abdul Ilah Ahmad,” WorldAnalysis.net, April 19, 2013, http://worldanalysis.net/modules/news/article.php?storyid=2197.	Al-Mouraibtoun Al-Mourabitoun (“The Sentinels”) formed after the 2013 merger of AQIM offshoots al-Mulathamun (“The Masked Men”) Battalion (AMB) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). Al-Mourabitoun reaffirmed its allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2015 and formally rejoined the group that December after a joint attack in Bamako, Mali. Led by notorious Algerian terrorist Mokhtar Belmokhtar, al-Mourabitoun seeks to establish an Islamic state in West Africa.Olivier Guitta, “The re-emergence of AQIM in Africa,” Al Jazeera, March 20, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/emergence-aqim-africa-160320090928469.html. Since rejoining the AQIM banner, al-Mourabitoun is still believed to retain some autonomy. For instance, of the three gunmen named in the attacks at Grand-Bassam, two—Hamza al-Fulani and Abu Adam al-Ansari—were reportedly associated with al-Mourabitoun whereas the third—Abdul Rahman al-Fulani—was reportedly a member of AQIM proper.SITE Intel Group, Twitter post, March 16, 2016, 10:56 a.m., https://twitter.com/siteintelgroup/status/710162802565062656.
Al-Qaeda AQIM clarified its ties to al-Qaeda when AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel said in 2008, “We [AQIM] and Al Qaeda are one body. It’s normal that they get stronger by us and we get stronger by them. They back us up and we back them up. They supply us and we supply them with any kind of support, loyalty, advice and available support.”“An Interview With Abdelmalek Droukdal,” New York Times, July 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html.	Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) According to AQIM, the group’s relationship with AQAP is “a relation of love, brotherhood, alliance, support and cooperation to retrieve the lost glory of this Ummah....”Casey Britton, “AQIM : Answers to Open Meeting with Sheikh Abu Abdul Ilah Ahmad,” WorldAnalysis.net, April 19, 2013, http://worldanalysis.net/modules/news/article.php?storyid=2197.
ISIS AQIM has a controversial relationship with ISIS in light of the strain and ultimate rift between ISIS and al-Qaeda in February 2014. AQIM leaders have expressed support for the group despite the break and AQIM’s official allegiance to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahri. On July 1, 2014, for example, AQIM posted an official message of congratulations to ISIS in light of the group’s military gains.Thomas Joscelyn, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb calls for reconciliation between jihadist groups,” Long War Journal, July 2, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/07/al_qaeda_in_the_isla.php. In the statement, however, AQIM tempers its congratulations with calls for reconciliation between ISIS and al-Qaeda as well as its affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra. The statement also explicitly defers to al-Zawahri, calling him as “Our Sheikh and Emir.”Thomas Joscelyn, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb calls for reconciliation between jihadist groups,” Long War Journal, July 2, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/07/al_qaeda_in_the_isla.php. Two weeks later, AQIM posted a statement officially rejecting ISIS’s declaration of a caliphate. In the statement, AQIM refused to swear allegiance to ISIS leader and self-proclaimed caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.Thomas Joscelyn, “AQIM Rejects Islamic State’s Caliphate, Reaffirms Allegiance to Zawahiri,” Long War Journal, July 14, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/07/aqim_rejects_islamic.php. Some analysts have pointed to these two contradictory statements as evidence of internal rifts emerging within AQIM’s leadership over ISIS’s controversial declaration of caliphate.“Al-Qaeda Group Divided on Islamic State,” Al Monitor, July 21, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/07/separate-statements-highlight-possible-rift-in-aqim.html; “ISIS Divides Maghreb al-Qaeda (AQIM),” African Armed Forces, August 19, 2014, http://www.aafonline.co.za/news/isis-divides-maghreb-al-qaeda-aqim. In September 2014, AQIM and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula released a joint statement calling on ISIS to reconcile with al-Qaeda.Thomas Joscelyn, “Al Qaeda Branches Urge Jihadist Unity Against US,” Long War Journal, September 16, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/09/al_qaeda_branches_ur.php. Also in September, some AQIM members are reported to have splintered from the group to pledge allegiance to ISIS under a new name, “the Caliphate Soldiers in Algeria.”Lamine Chikhi, “Splinter group breaks from al Qaeda in North Africa,” Reuters, September 15, 2014, http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/09/14/algeria-security-idINL6N0RF0F020140914.	Boko Haram Although AQIM does not have a public relationship with Boko Haram, there are numerous reports of support between the two groups. In January 2010, AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel declared unconditional support for Boko Haram, pledging support in the form of training, weapons, equipment, and personnel.Felipe Pathé Duarte, “Maghrebian Militant Maneuvers: AQIM as a Strategic Challenge,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, September 28, 2011, http://csis.org/publication/maghrebian-militant-maneuvers-aqim-strategic-challenge. In 2012, AQIM is reported to have given Boko Haram $250,000, and trained its members in kidnapping as a way to raise further money.Tim Cocks, “Boko Haram Too Extreme for 'al Qaeda in West Africa' Brand,” Reuters, May 28, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/28/us-nigeria-bokoharam-analysis-idUSKBN0E81D320140528. According to intelligence officials, members of Boko Haram have met Algerian brigades of AQIM fighters for training and weapons. The alleged mastermind of the August 2011 UN bombing is reported to have trained with AQIM and a number of operatives in the region have reported ties to both Boko Haram and AQIM. Tim Cocks, “Boko Haram Too Extreme for 'al Qaeda in West Africa' Brand,” Reuters, May 28, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/28/us-nigeria-bokoharam-analysis-idUSKBN0E81D320140528; “Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Abubakar Mohammed Shekau, Ansaru to Its Sanctions List,” United Nations Security Council, June 26, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11455.doc.htm. Al-Qaeda has not made formal links with Boko Haram, and Ayman al-Zawahiri has made no explicit mention of the group.Tim Cocks, “Boko Haram Too Extreme for 'al Qaeda in West Africa' Brand,” Reuters, May 28, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/28/us-nigeria-bokoharam-analysis-idUSKBN0E81D320140528; Robin Simcox, “Boko Haram and Defining the ‘Al-Qaeda Network,’” Al Jazeera, June 6, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/06/boko-haram-al-qaeda-201463115816142554.html. Nonetheless, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan has claimed that Boko Haram is an “al-Qaeda operation,” and one reporter for news outlet Al Jazeera says that the group’s ties to al-Qaeda and its affiliates are “now so numerous that they are impossible to ignore.”Robin Simcox, “Boko Haram and Defining the ‘Al-Qaeda Network,’” Al Jazeera, June 6, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/06/boko-haram-al-qaeda-201463115816142554.html.
Iran AQIM has not made a statement on the group’s relationship with the Iranian government or al-Qaeda’s overarching relationship with Iran. When asked to clarify the relationship between al-Qaeda and Iran, AQIM’s representative responded, “We are authorized to speak on behalf of AQIM only, and the answer of that question exceeds our authority, so excuse us.”Casey Britton, “AQIM : Answers to Open Meeting with Sheikh Abu Abdul Ilah Ahmad,” WorldAnalysis.net, April 19, 2013, http://worldanalysis.net/modules/news/article.php?storyid=2197.	Al-Shabab As of April 2013, AQIM pursued a relationship with Somalian group al-Shabab. AQIM has described its relationship with al-Shabab as “what we aspire to achieve not only with al-Qaeda in the East Africa but also with all the branches of al-Qaeda Al-Jihad in the world and that is a normal matter for each organization.”Casey Britton, “AQIM : Answers to Open Meeting with Sheikh Abu Abdul Ilah Ahmad,” WorldAnalysis.net, April 19, 2013, http://worldanalysis.net/modules/news/article.php?storyid=2197.
Nusra Front AQIM has declared its support for the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. As AQIM’s head of media stated in 2013, “The stance of AQIM from the Jihadi groups like Jabhat Al-Nusra and Ahrar Al-Sham Brigades and the other Jihad groups is alliance and support.”Casey Britton, “AQIM : Answers to Open Meeting with Sheikh Abu Abdul Ilah Ahmad,” WorldAnalysis.net, April 19, 2013, http://worldanalysis.net/modules/news/article.php?storyid=2197.

Media Coverage

Rhetoric

View All

Abdelmalek Droukdel, July 1, 2008

“Why shouldn’t we join our brothers while almost all these nations got united against the Muslims and separated them, and divided their land, and took away Al Aksa mosque out of their hands, and consumed their goodness, and destroyed their morals?” “An Interview With Abdelmalek Droukdal,” New York Times, July 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html.

Abdelmalek Droukdel, July 1, 2008

“[L]ook at the crimes that happen in Gaza and Iraq and Afghanistan, and Somalia and others places. These crimes are committed by the Jew-crusader ally.” “An Interview With Abdelmalek Droukdal,” New York Times, July 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html.

Abdelmalek Droukdel, July 1, 2008

“Unity is a reason of strength and victory. This is a universal norm that even the infidels are aware of.” “An Interview With Abdelmalek Droukdal,” New York Times, July 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html.

Abdelmalek Droukdel, July 1, 2008

“We hope that we got our God’s pleasure, and the confidence of our nation, and that we made terrorized our enemy.” “An Interview With Abdelmalek Droukdal,” New York Times, July 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html.

Abdelmalek Droukdel, July 1, 2008

“[M]ost of the Muslims including those residing in Europe are against the crusade war lead by America, and they hate the Arab regimes that are working as agents and that crushed their people and sold the Palestinian cause in the give-up market.” “An Interview With Abdelmalek Droukdal,” New York Times, July 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html.

Abdelmalek Droukdel, July 1, 2008

“European government started judging the Muslims about their intentions and their sympathy with the Muslims’ causes. This comes from the crusade’s religious hate that moves the West, and that blew up all the bright slogans that they hold dear, such as freedom, forgiveness, human rights and justice, those slogans that they hurt our hearing with for years.” “An Interview With Abdelmalek Droukdal,” New York Times, July 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html.

Abdelmalek Droukdel, July 1, 2008

“God says, “And fight them on until there is no more persecution, and religion becomes God’s in its entirety.” (Chapter 8, Verse 39) Our first goal is the arbitration of the Lord of the world’s law, and the achievement of the servitude to God.” “An Interview With Abdelmalek Droukdal,” New York Times, July 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html.

Abdelmalek Droukdel, July 1, 2008

“[W]e seek to liberate the Islamic Maghreb from the sons of France and Spain and from all symbols of treason and employment for the outsiders, and protect it from the foreign greed and the crusader’s hegemony.” “An Interview With Abdelmalek Droukdal,” New York Times, July 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html.

Pages

RETURN TO TOP

September 24, 2001: The Department of the Treasury designates GSPC as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (under Executive Order 13224).“Terrorism: What You Need to Know about U.S. Sanctions,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, accessed December 4, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/terror.txt.

March 27, 2002: The Department of the Treasury designates GSPC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act).“Terrorism: What You Need to Know about U.S. Sanctions,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, accessed December 4, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/terror.txt.

October 24, 2003: The Department of the Treasury designates Mokhtar Belmokhtar as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (under Executive Order 13224).“U.S. Designates Three Individuals And One Organization Involved In Terrorism In Algeria,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 24, 2003, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js944.aspx.

February 21, 2008: The Department of the Treasury designates AQIM as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (under Executive Order 13224).“Treasury Targets Al Qaida-Affiliated Terror Group in Algeria,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 17, 2008, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1085.aspx.

July 17, 2008: The Department of the Treasury designates Ahmed Deghdegh as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (under Executive Order 13224).Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Treasury Targets Al Qaida Affiliated Terror Group in Algeria,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 17, 2008, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1085.aspx.

July 17, 2008: The Department of the Treasury designates Abid Hammadou as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (under Executive Order 13224).Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Treasury Targets Al Qaida Affiliated Terror Group in Algeria,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 17, 2008, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1085.aspx.

September 7, 2011: The Department of the Treasury designates ‘Abd al-Rahman Ould Muhammad al-Husayn Ould Muhammad Salim as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (under Executive Order 13224).“Treasury Targets Three Senior Al-Qa'ida Leaders,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 7, 2011, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1289.aspx.

February 14, 2013: The Department of the Treasury designates Yahya Abu Hammam as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (under Executive Order 13224).Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Treasury Designates an Additional Senior Leader of Al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, February 14, 2013, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1855.aspx.

September 5, 2018: The Department of State designates JNIM as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (under Executive Order 13224).“State Department Terrorist Designation of Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM),” U.S. Department of State, September 5, 2018, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/09/285705.htm.

July 16, 2019: The Department of the Treasury designates Bah Ag Moussa as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13244.“Treasury Targets Al-Qa’ida in Mali,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 16, 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm730.; Caleb Weiss, “US sanctions leaders of al Qaeda in Mali,” Long War Journal, July 16, 2019, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/07/us-sanctions-leaders-of-al-qaeda-in-mali.php.

United Nations—listed GSPC as a terrorist organization on October 6, 2001.“Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: QE.T.14.01. The Organization of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,” United Nations Security Council, last modified September 9, 2014, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE01401E.shtml.

United Nations—listed AQIM as a terrorist organization on April 26, 2007.“Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: QE.T.14.01. The Organization of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,” United Nations Security Council, last modified September 9, 2014, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE01401E.shtml.

Australia—listed GSPC as a terrorist organization on November 14, 2002.“Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb,” Australian National Security, accessed June 27, 2014, http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Al-QaidaintheIslamicMaghrebAQIM.aspx.

United Kingdom—listed GSPC as a terrorist organization on October 10, 2001.“Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets in the UK,” HM Treasury (UK), last modified June 16, 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/320559/alqaida.pdf.

Canada—listed GSPC as a terrorist organization on July 23, 2002.Public Safety Canada, “Currently Listed Entities,” Government of Canada, accessed July 1, 2014, http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-eng.aspx#http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-eng.aspx#2008.

New Zealand—listed GSPC as a terrorist organization on October 17, 2002.“Designated Individuals and Organizations,” New Zealand Police, updated June 26, 2014, http://www.police.govt.nz/advice/personal-community/counterterrorism/designated-entities.

Search form

FEATURED NEWS AND MEDIA

RESOURCES

EXTREMIST GROUPS View All Groups

FEATURED ANALYSIS

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)