Radicalization
Several extremist organizations operate in Afghanistan. A 2015 study by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) found extensive activity by extremist and Islamist groups within the schools. According to AREU researcher Ali Mohammad Ali, Islamist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, Jamiat-e-Islah, and Tehrik-e-Islami recruit teachers who then recruit students. The AREU study found that high school students are turning to radical groups out of frustration with unemployment, a slow economy, and the dysfunctional Afghan educational system. The AREU recommended lifting the government ban on political activism in high schools in order to allow in non-radical groups to act as a counter balance. (Sources: CTC Sentinel, Tolo News)
Afghan authorities have cited the proliferation of unregistered mosques and madrassas (Islamic religious schools) as a cause of radicalization in the country. The Afghan government requires mosques to register with the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Education. Nonetheless, only 50,000 of the country’s estimated 160,000 mosques are registered. Almost two-thirds of Afghanistan’s 1,500 madrassas are also not registered, according to government officials. Afghan officials have further pointed to unregistered madrassas in neighboring Pakistan as a source of militancy in Afghanistan. More than 5,000 Afghans study in the Balochistan region of Pakistan alone, and Afghan and U.S. intelligence assert that the Afghan Taliban has exerted control over unregistered madrassas in Pakistan. The U.S. State Department has identified “lack of oversight over religious activities at mosques” as a source of concern. (Sources: U.S. Department of State, Voice of America, Rawa News)
Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai has criticized Pakistan for not confronting radicalization within its borders, and accused Pakistani radicals of being responsible for the flow of foreign fighters into Afghanistan. According to Karzai, the 1980s war to drive out Soviet forces from Afghanistan allowed religious radicalization to flourish in Afghanistan. Islamic fighters equated “jihad” with Afghan liberation, he said. “Extremism and terrorism was one of the most important tools” used to undermine Afghan society after the Soviet withdrawal, according to Karzai. The former president has called for “sincere cooperation” between the United States, Russia, China, India, and Iran as the only way to stop the spread of extremism. (Sources: Afghanistan Times, Afghanistan Times)
Soviet-Afghan War and Afghan Civil War
The Soviet-Afghan war began in December 1979 and lasted until February 1989. The communist People’s Democratic Party took control of the Afghan government during an April 1978 coup and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. That December, the communist government signed a treaty with the Soviet Union, which led the Soviet Union to provide large amounts of military aid to Afghanistan the following year. Multiple Islamic resistance groups—calling themselves mujahideen, warriors—began to fight against the Soviet-backed government. Pakistan-based fighters fought to capture territory in Afghanistan and encouraged Afghan soldiers to defect. In September 1979, the Soviet-backed Afghan government requested Soviet troops to help combat the growing Islamic insurgency. That December, Soviet forces arrived in Afghanistan to bolster Afghan forces. (Sources: BBC News, New York Times)
As many as 20,000 foreign fighters passed through bin Laden’s network, according to media estimates.
In the first half of 1980, the Soviet Union moved 80,000 troops into Afghanistan to fight the mujahideen, which were then receiving military and financial aid from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. In 1982, the U.N. General Assembly called for the USSR to withdraw from Afghanistan. The United States also increased its arms supply to the mujahideen to fight the U.S. Cold War enemy. For example, in 1986, the United States provided the insurgents with Stinger missiles with which to shoot down Soviet helicopters. (Source: BBC News)
The Afghan conflict attracted Islamic fighters from around the world. Among them was Osama bin Laden, who arrived in Afghanistan in the early 1980s to finance and support the mujahideen—as well as directly participate in the fighting—against the Soviets. In 1984, bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam set up guesthouses in Pakistan to host incoming foreign fighters on their way to Afghanistan. Bin Laden also reportedly financed training camps in northern Pakistan near the Afghan border for Islamic foreign fighters going to Afghanistan. As many as 20,000 foreign fighters passed through bin Laden’s network, according to media estimates. Bin Laden reportedly spent $25,000 a month to subsidize the fighters. Bin Laden reportedly described Afghanistan as where he “set up my first camp where these volunteers were trained by Pakistani and American officers.” (Sources: PBS, Washington Post, New York Times, CNN)
By 1985, more than 5 million Afghans had been displaced, and many sought refuge in Iran and Pakistan. That year, the various mujahideen factions assembled in Pakistan to form an alliance against Soviet forces. (Sources: BBC News, BBC News)
The Soviet Union began withdrawing troops in 1988 after signing a peace accord with the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Soviet forces completed their withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989. More than one million Afghans and 13,000 Soviet troops died during the 10-year war. The Afghan civil war, however, continued until the 1992 overthrow of formerly Soviet-backed Afghan President Mohammed Najibullah. Control of Afghanistan was divided between the mujahideen forces. (Sources: BBC News, PBS, PBS, Council on Foreign Relations)
Bin Laden and other Arab and Muslim fighters from the Afghan war returned to their home countries emboldened by their perceived triumph over the Soviet forces. The “myth of the superpower was destroyed,” Bin Laden reportedly said. Bin Laden believed that the support network he had built to funnel fighters into the Afghan jihad could serve another purpose. The network reportedly kept a database of foreign fighters coming to Afghanistan in order to alert their families in case of their death. That database became an early recruitment tool for al-Qaeda. In August 1988, bin Laden and eight others met in Peshawar, Pakistan, to create al-Qaeda’s advisory council, membership requirements, and pledge of allegiance. In a 1995 interview with a French journalist, bin Laden said, “I discovered that it was not enough to fight in Afghanistan, but that we had to fight on all fronts against Communism or Western oppression. The urgent thing was Communism, but the next target was America.” (Sources: New York Times, Intelwire)
Taliban
The Taliban (Pashto for “students”) are the jihadist insurgent group operating in Afghanistan against the current Western-backed government. The Taliban are the predominant umbrella group for the Afghan insurgency, including the semi-autonomous Haqqani network. (The Taliban’s offspring across the border, the Pakistani Taliban, share the ideology and objectives of its namesake but operate independently and focus on overthrowing the Pakistani government.) January 2018 estimates by Afghan and U.S. officials gauged that the Taliban included at least 60,000 fighters. These forces have allowed the Taliban to remain a credible fighting force with the ability to win and hold territory. (Sources: NBC News, Voice of America, CNBC)
The Taliban were founded in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 1994 by Mullah Mohammed Omar. The group soon absorbed more than 15,000 students and clerics from western Pakistan and began implementing sharia in Afghan territory. By the end of 1994, the Taliban had complete control over Kandahar and Helmand province, the center of opium cultivation. During this time, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency secretly funneled money to the Taliban in Afghanistan. (Sources: New Yorker, The Looming Tower, Lawrence Wright, p. 259, Council on Foreign Relations)
Between 1995 and 1996, the Taliban gained public support in Kandahar and expand into other regions of Afghanistan. On April 4, 1996, Omar declared himself emir ul-momineen, “commander of the faithful”—the legitimate spiritual leader of Muslims in Afghanistan. After seizing the Afghan capital of Kabul in September 1996 and cementing their control of Afghanistan’s government, the Taliban announced their aims to impose order, disarm the Afghan population (especially rival ethnic groups), enforce sharia, and defend the Islamic character of the “Emirate of Afghanistan.” The Taliban banned most sporting events and forms of entertainment, from poetry and music to kites. They closed all girls’ schools and prohibited women from appearing in public except under strict supervision by a male relative. Even when women were in their respective homes, the windows were painted black to prevent passersby from glimpsing women in their private quarters. (Sources: The Looming Tower, Lawrence Wright, p. 259, SF Gate, BBC News, Council on Foreign Relations, Taliban, Ahmed Rashid, p. 22, 90)
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, U.S. President George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban turn over all al-Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan; release all imprisoned foreign nationals; protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers; immediately close every terrorist training camp, and hand over every terrorist and their supporters; and give the United States full access to terrorist training camps for inspection. After the Taliban refused U.S. demands, the United States and United Kingdom launched airstrikes to dislodge the Taliban from power. British Prime Minister Tony Blair said the Taliban and al-Qaeda had “effectively merged.” (Sources: Telegraph, CNN, Telegraph, Washington Post, CNN, Weekly Standard, Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. Department of Defense)
The U.S.-led coalition forced the Taliban to relinquish its control on Afghan territory and the government. Between late 2001 and early 2002, approximately 30,000 Taliban fighters were killed. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared the end of “major combat activity” in Afghanistan in May 2003. Afghanistan held its first democratic presidential elections after the fall of the Taliban in October 2004, electing the U.S.-backed Hamid Karzai, who had been Afghanistan’s transitional leader since December 2001. (Sources: Telegraph, CNN, Telegraph, Washington Post, CNN, Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. Department of Defense, Guardian, New York Times)
The Taliban have since operated as an insurgent force in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, attempting to expel NATO forces from Afghanistan and defeat the democratically-elected Afghan government. Attacks on Afghanistan’s security forces have increased as Western forces have begun to withdraw from the country in recent years. As government authority has weakened, Taliban forces have sought to fill the vacuum. The Taliban captured the northern Afghan city of Kunduz in September 2015. It was the first major city to fall into Taliban hands since the United States deposed the Taliban government in 2001. By December 2015, vast swathes of Helmand Province had fallen back under Taliban control. U.S. Special Operations forces responded by covertly committing additional ground troops and air support to halt this advance. Helmand politician and television commentator Toofan Waziri told the New York Times that the U.S. presence has helped rally Afghan forces against the Taliban. Nonetheless, the Taliban remain in control of parts of Helmand Province and maintained a shadow government there. As of August 2016, the Taliban controlled four of Helmand’s 14 districts, while the Afghan government reportedly believed that only two of Helmand’s districts were securely under its control. (Sources: New York Times, BBC News, New York Times, Long War Journal, Bloomberg News, CBS News)
As of January 2018, the Taliban controlled or threatened 70 percent of Afghanistan, according to estimates by BBC News. The BBC estimated that the Taliban fully controlled 14 Afghan districts, or 4 percent of the country. The BBC further estimated that the Taliban “have an active and open physical presence” in an additional 263 districts, or 66 percent of Afghanistan. That same month, Bill Roggio of the Long War Journal estimated that the group controlled 45 percent of Afghanistan. In October 2017, the U.S.-led coalition estimated that the Taliban controlled 44 percent of Afghanistan. All of the estimates represent a significant increase since September 2016 when the group reportedly controlled just 10 percent of the country. On May 1, 2019, U.S. military command in Afghanistan reported that they would discontinue monitoring how many people and districts the government and insurgents controlled as the assessments “limited decision-making value” for commanders. (Sources: BBC News, NBC News, Reuters, Reuters, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, New York Times)
January 2018 estimates by Afghan and U.S. officials gauged that the Taliban included at least 60,000 fighters, up from 2014 U.S. estimates of 20,000 fighters. The quality of these new recruits, however, may not be of the same caliber as the Taliban’s older fighters. The Taliban has even allegedly resorted to luring children into their ranks with sweets and then training them to become suicide bombers. The U.S. government does not release official numbers of the Taliban’s ranks. (Sources: NBC News, Voice of America, Al Jazeera, YNet News)
The United States remains entrenched in the fight against Taliban forces, which has cost the United States more than $700 billion since 2001. In July 2016, U.S. President Barack Obama announced that more than 8,000 U.S. troops would remain in Afghanistan through the end of his term in 2017. The president cited Afghanistan’s “precarious” security situation as necessitating continued U.S. involvement. Obama had also recently adjusted the U.S. rules of engagement to allow troops to directly confront the Taliban, in addition to training Afghan forces. President Donald Trump raised U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan to 14,000 by the end of 2017. The Taliban has demanded direct negotiations with the United States on ending the conflict in Afghanistan and the Taliban’s future role. In January 2018, Trump rejected future peace talks with the Taliban. That July, however, the Trump administration ordered U.S. diplomats to pursue direct negotiations with the Taliban. That month, U.S. and Taliban officials met to begin discussions on peace talks to end the war in Afghanistan with the understanding that the Taliban and Afghan government should lead the process. The Qatari government agreed to mediate between the Taliban and the Afghan government. By August 2019, the United States and Taliban had reached a framework agreement that included a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and intra-Afghan negotiations from the Taliban. While the Taliban and Afghan government officials have yet to meet in a formal capacity, Qatar and Germany sponsored a two-day intra-Afghan meeting in Doha where Afghan leaders and Taliban representatives could have an informal forum to discuss Afghanistan’s future. The “ice-breaker” talks proved promising, with representatives from both sides calling for a “roadmap for peace” to reduce civilian casualties to zero. Sources: Reuters, Military Times, Bloomberg News, New York Times, New York Times, Associated Press, Wall Street Journal, Wall Street Journal, Al Jazeera)
According to a 2012 leaked NATO report, Pakistan’s ISI provided funding and training to the Taliban both in their takeover of Afghanistan in the 1990s and after the 2001 U.S. invasion. The report—based on 27,000 interrogations of 4,000 captured Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other foreign fighters—alleged that senior Taliban officials maintain homes in Pakistan close to ISI headquarters, and “Pakistan's manipulation of the Taliban senior leadership continues unabatedly.” Admiral Mike Mullen, former chair of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, credited Pakistan’s support of the Taliban to the infiltration of the religious right in the Pakistani army and Pakistan’s desire to expand its regional influence through “proxies.” In response to the NATO report, Pakistan denied interference in Afghanistan. (Sources: Time, Brookings Institution)
In April 2017, U.S. General John Nicholson, who commands U.S. forces in Afghanistan, said the U.S. military had received reports that Russia is arming the Taliban. Other U.S. military officials corroborated the reports and said that Russia had increased its supply of small arms to the Taliban in the past 18 months. Russia denied the allegations. A Taliban video released in late July 2017 claimed that the Russian government has provided the terrorist group with snipers, heavy machine guns, and other weapons. Nicholson has previously criticized Russia for providing “legitimacy” to the Taliban. (Sources: Washington Post, Daily Mail, CNN, Reuters)
Since the rise of ISIS, the Taliban have emphasized preserving pan-Islamic unity. Following al-Qaeda’s example, the Taliban have advised ISIS to “avoid extremism” that risks splintering the violent Islamist movement across the broader Middle East. Deceased Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar in particular reaffirmed the Taliban’s priority of establishing a unified Islamist movement to expel the “far enemy” (the Western powers). Omar referred to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as a “fake caliph” who “just wanted to dominate what has so far been achieved by the real jihadists of Islam after three decades of jihad. A pledge of allegiance to him is ‘haram.’” Despite these warnings, hundreds of Taliban members have purportedly joined ISIS’s Pakistani branch. (Sources: National Review, Rudaw, NBC News)
Afghan security officials have claimed to possess evidence that both Russia and Iran are providing financial, military, and material support to the Taliban. According to Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, chief of Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security, Iran and Russia have both increased their ties to the Taliban under the guise of fighting ISIS. Iran has supported the Taliban since 2006, according to the U.S. State Department. A 2012 U.S. Department of Defense report to Congress stated that Iran’s support was part of a “grand strategy” to challenge U.S. influence. A May 2016 U.S. drone strike killed Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour in Pakistan shortly after he crossed the border from Iran. Mansour had made multiple trips to Iran because of “ongoing battle obligations, according to Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid. In July 2018, the Afghan government reported that Taliban forces have admitted to receiving training in Iran. According to Taliban sources, Iran provided the training on the condition that the Taliban increase its attacks on American and NATO forces. (Sources: Times, U.S. Department of State, Long War Journal, Federation of American Scientists, Pakistan Forward)
On February 29, 2020, following an agreed seven-day reduction in violence period, U.S. and Taliban representatives meeting in Doha, Qatar, signed an agreement for a U.S. troop withdrawal. The United States agreed to draw its forces down from 13,000 to 8,600 in the next three to four months, with the remaining U.S. forces withdrawing in 14 months. In exchange, the Taliban agreed to renounce al-Qaeda and prevent al-Qaeda and other groups from using Afghanistan as a base for terrorism against the United States. The Taliban also agreed to negotiate a permanent ceasefire with other Afghan militants and the Afghan government. The U.S. troop drawdown is dependent on the Taliban maintaining its commitments. The agreement also called for permanent ceasefire and power-sharing talks that March between Afghan militant groups as well as between the Taliban and the Afghan government. After Afghan forces killed a senior al-Qaeda leader in Afghanistan’s Ghazni province in October 2020 and a senior regional leader in Farah province the following November, Afghan officials accused the Taliban of continuing to harbor al-Qaeda. (Sources: Associated Press, Voice of America, Al Jazeera, U.S. Department of State, Reuters)
Given the Taliban-U.S. peace agreement, there were reports on June 9, 2020 that a group of Taliban militants broke off from the mainstream Taliban to form the Hezb-e Walayat-e Islami (Party of Islamic Guardianship) in defiance of the peace negotiations. According to an Afghan intelligence official, the group has yet to be “officially announced,” but it is alleged that the group has close ties to Iran—a country which the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency reported in November 2019 as having provided financial, political, training, and military support to the Taliban. Members of the splinter group include radical Taliban commanders and members of other Taliban factions. Despite the formation of Hezb-e Walayat-e Islami, the Taliban has begun to put together an agenda for negotiations with the Afghan government. Sediq Sediqi, a spokesman for President Ashraf Ghani, claims the president would like for the talks to commence in July 2020. (Sources: Radio Free Europe, Military Times)
The Taliban and the Afghan government conducted limited negotiations via video conferencing in March 2020. On March 25, the Taliban announced the Afghan government had agreed to an initial prisoner release, while Afghanistan’s National Security Council said face-to-face discussions would soon begin. The Afghan government announced the formation of a negotiating team for talks with the Taliban the following day. On March 30, the government canceled the release of 100 Taliban prisoners scheduled for the following day after the deaths of at least 28 Afghan security personnel in multiple attacks over the preceding two days. The government blamed the Taliban for the attacks, though the group did not immediately claim responsibility. By early May, the Afghan government had released 933 Taliban prisoners in exchange for dozens of captive Afghan security personnel. (Sources: Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, Agence France-Presse, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Reuters, Agence France-Presse)
The global pandemic caused by COVID-19 has also affected Afghan-Taliban relations. Afghanistan had recorded more than 4,400 cases of the virus by the beginning of May 2020. On May 1, the Taliban accused the Afghan government of intentionally spreading the coronavirus in the country’s prisons in order to pressure the militant group in negotiations. In early May, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission accused the Taliban of hijacking five truckloads of food aid sent by Turkmenistan amid the pandemic. (Sources: Anadolu Agency, NPR)
Because of ongoing negotiations between the Taliban and the United States, NATO’s Resolute Support mission stopped releasing data on the number of Taliban attacks. According to a Resolute Support assessment, the Taliban refrained from attacking coalition forces in March 2020 but increased attacks on Afghan forces. On April 30, 2020, the U.S. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) released a quarterly assessment that called Taliban attacks in March “above seasonal norms.” The Afghan National Security Council found that the Taliban had carried out an average of 55 attacks per day since March 1. According to the council, the Taliban has continued its “campaign of terror against Afghans” and done nothing for peace. U.S. military leaders called on the Taliban to reduce attacks or face a response. In late April 2020, the Taliban rejected calls from the Afghan government for a ceasefire during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. However, on May 23, 2020, the Taliban announced a three day Eid ceasefire to which the Afghan government reciprocated. (Sources: NBC News, Washington Post, Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera)
Despite initiatives by both the Afghan government and the Taliban to commence conditional peace negotiations, on June 22, 2020, the National Security Council reported that the Taliban killed at least 291 Afghan security personnel and wounded 550 others in the previous week—the “deadliest” week of the entire Afghan war. Despite the increase in violence, Ghani claimed he will continue with a Taliban prisoner release—about an additional 2,000 Taliban inmates on top of the already freed 3,000—a condition the Afghan government must satisfy in order to begin peace negotiations with the Taliban. (Source: Gandhara)
On July 8, 2020, Afghan authorities reported that they would not follow through with the release of over 600 Taliban prisoners deemed “too dangerous.” However, under the conditions of the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban peace deal, Kabul pledged to release over 5,000 Taliban prisoners in exchange for 1,000 Afghan security force captives. According to Javid Faisal, the spokesman for the National Security Council, the prisoners the Taliban asked to be released still had “serious criminal cases” against them. Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, claimed the criminal cases against the specific prisoners were fabricated, but Faisal stated that the Afghan government will continue with the release of other Taliban prisoners, but only those considered not as significant of a threat. (Source: Military.com)
Al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda has been operating in Afghanistan for more than two decades, during which time the terror group maintained close ties with the Taliban. Osama bin Laden swore allegiance to deceased Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar in 1996. In August 2015, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri swore allegiance to Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, the now-deceased Taliban leader who replaced Omar after his death in 2013. After Mansour’s death, al-Zawahiri pledged allegiance to his replacement, Mullah Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada. In August 2016, al-Zawahiri issued a call for Afghans to reject ISIS, which “seeks to split the ranks of the mujahideen” in Afghanistan, and support the Taliban. (Sources: Long War Journal, Long War Journal)
Al-Qaeda’s central command, which includes al-Zawahiri and his top aides, has traditionally been headquartered in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaeda established several training camps in Afghanistan, including the sprawling Tarnak Farms, where Osama bin Laden allegedly plotted the 9/11 attacks. The CIA recorded footage of al-Qaeda fighters conducting military drills and firing at targets, as well as of bin Laden within the walled confines of Tarnak Farms. Al-Qaeda’s Afghanistan training camps have hosted notable terrorists such as Sahim Alwan, one of the “Lackawanna Six” from Buffalo, New York, who were convicted of supporting al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda maintained its training camps in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 2001 U.S. invasion. In May 2009, U.S. and Afghan forces discovered several training camps in Afghanistan’s Baghran district in the Helmand Province that were used by al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters. In August 2015, the United States bombed two al-Qaeda camps in the southern Afghan province of Kandahar. One of the camps encompassed nearly 30 square miles. (Sources: MI5, NBC News, Wall Street Journal, Weekly Standard, Long War Journal, Long War Journal)
After fighting in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, bin Laden returned to his native Saudi Arabia in 1989 following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia revoked bin Laden’s citizenship and expelled him in 1991. The Taliban provided a safe haven for al-Qaeda insurgents in Afghanistan prior to the September 11, 2001, terror attacks. In May 1996, bin Laden returned to Afghanistan. During a meeting that October with Taliban leader Mullah Omar, bin Laden pledged “unconditional support and financial backing” in exchange for the Taliban’s protection. That same year, bin Laden established al-Qaeda’s 55th Arab Brigade to fight alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan. Leaked memos from the U.S. military Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF) describe the brigade as bin Laden’s “primary battle formation supporting Taliban objectives.” According to the JTF, bin Laden remained “closely in the command and control of the brigade.” (Sources: Long War Journal, CNN, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, Steve Coll, p. 9, Council on Foreign Relations, Institute for Middle Eastern Democracy, Guardian, Weekly Standard)
After the 1998 al-Qaeda attacks on U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, the United States launched cruise missiles at suspected al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. Following the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, al-Qaeda and the Taliban fled to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, where both organizations began to regroup and retool. After coalition forces destroyed the 55th Arab Brigade in late 2001, bin Laden and al-Qaeda rebuilt the organization as Lashkar al Zil, “the Shadow Army,” recruiting from jihadist groups in Pakistan to fight against Pakistani forces there and against coalition forces in Afghanistan. According to U.S. intelligence in 2009, Lashkar al Zil had been “instrumental” in Taliban victories in eastern and southern Afghanistan. Lashkar al Zil’s activities have decreased since the death of the group’s leader, Ilyas Kashmiri, in a June 2011 U.S. drone strike, but the group remains active. (Sources: PBS, Council on Foreign Relations, Weekly Standard, Long War Journal, BBC News, Jamestown Foundation)
Al-Qaeda maintained a close relationship with the Taliban following the U.S. invasion. A U.S. intelligence report from Guantanamo Bay acquired by journalists Bill Roggio and Thomas Joscelyn described “a newly-conceived ‘unification’ of Al Qaeda and Taliban forces within Afghanistan.” The same report indicated that Mullah Omar and bin Laden “envisioned this new coalition” during a meeting in Pakistan in early spring 2003. Guantanamo detainee Haroon al Afghan reported an August 2006 meeting during which commanders of the Taliban and al-Qaeda “decided to increase terrorist operations in the Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman, and Nangarhar provinces, including suicide bombings, mines, and assassinations.” (Source: Weekly Standard)
In an October 2010 letter, bin Laden ordered al-Qaeda operatives to relocate to Afghanistan’s eastern provinces because of U.S. airstrikes in Pakistan. U.S. forces have killed several high-level al-Qaeda commanders in Afghanistan since. For example, a December 2013 airstrike in Nangarhar killed two al-Qaeda military commanders, along with members of the Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban. An October 2014 airstrike killed al-Qaeda leader Abu Bara al-Kuwaiti while he was at the home of al-Qaeda commander Abdul Samad Khanjari, who was also the Taliban’s shadow governor for the Achin district in Nangarhar. (Sources: Long War Journal, Long War Journal)
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the men who eventually created al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2009—Nasir al-Wuhayshi, Said al-Shihri, Qasim al-Raymi, and Mohamed al-Awfi—traveled to Afghanistan and spent time at al-Qaeda-sponsored training camps. Al-Wuhayshi served as Osama bin Laden’s personal secretary in Afghanistan between 1998 until about late 2001, when the two were separated during the U.S.-led Battle of Tora Bora. U.S. forces captured al-Shihri in Afghanistan in 2001 and transferred him to Guantanamo Bay. Al-Awfi was sent to Guantanamo Bay in 2002 and released to Saudi Arabia’s custody in 2007 to undergo deradicalization. After helping found AQAP, al-Awfi returned to Saudi Arabia, where he remained as of 2010, providing intelligence on al-Qaeda from a Saudi prison. Al-Raymi took over AQAP in June 2015 after al-Wuhayshi died in a U.S. drone strike. (Sources: CTC Sentinel, New York Times, USA Today, BBC News)
Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) also maintains a presence in Afghanistan. AQIS was founded in September 2014 at the behest of al-Zawahiri, who appointed Asim Omar as emir of the new affiliate. The affiliate allegedly operates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Burma, Bangladesh, and Kashmir. Al-Zawahiri stated that AQIS seeks to “rescue” the subcontinent’s Muslim population from “injustice, oppression, persecution, and suffering.” Harakat-ul-Mujahidden, a Pakistani Islamist terrorist organization long linked to al-Qaeda and now to AQIS, reportedly operates training camps in Afghanistan. A joint U.S.-Afghan mission in October 2015 destroyed an AQIS training camp in the Kandahar Province and killed dozens of trainees. (Sources: Long War Journal, Long War Journal, U.S. Department of State)
ISIS
In January 2015, ISIS declared Afghanistan and Pakistan to be one region called the Khorasan Province (Wilayat Khorasan or ISIS-K). That same month, a group of Afghan and Pakistani militants released a video in which they pledged allegiance to ISIS and promised to increase their domestic operations. The militants introduced Hafez Sayed Khan Orakzai—a commander in the Pakistani Taliban who pledged allegiance to ISIS in October 2014—as their regional leader. In April 2015, ISIS claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Jalalabad, its first major attack in Afghanistan. Since then, ISIS has increasingly targeted Shiite targets in Afghanistan. ISIS suicide bombers attacked a July 2016 demonstration by the predominately Shiite Hazara minority group, killing 80. And ISIS attacked two Shiite sites in October 2016, on the Shiite holy day of Ashura, killing more than 30 people. (Sources: Wall Street Journal, NBC News, Wall Street Journal, Diplomat, Reuters, Deutsche Welle)
According to an April 2019 assessment by an unnamed senior U.S. intelligence official, ISIS-K poses the top threat for so-called spectacular attacks on the United States. According to that official, ISIS-K has been emboldened by its success in Afghanistan and has targeted its recruitment at college graduates who have been unable to find employment. Another U.S. intelligence official told CNN that ISIS-K is using social media to establish contacts within the United States and is capable of striking within the country. According to retired U.S. Central Command commander General Joseph Votel, ISIS-K requires complete eradication because its fighters are ideologically committed. (Sources: USA Today, CNN)
ISIS fighters in Afghanistan have also used the country as a launching pad for attacks on neighboring Pakistan. After a February 17, 2016, ISIS suicide bombing killed at least 83 people in Pakistan, the Pakistani government blamed Jamaat-ur-Ahrar (JuA) for the attack. JuA is a faction of the Taliban that reportedly also has links to ISIS. Pakistani officials accused the Afghan government of allowing JuA to operate freely in Afghanistan and responded by launching overnight raids into Afghanistan, reportedly destroying a JuA training camp. (Sources: Reuters, Nation, BBC News)
In 2016, ISIS operated in only one Afghan province, Nangarhar. A September 2017 U.N. report revealed that ISIS had expanded its presence in Afghanistan to all of the country’s seven provinces. (Source: Voice of America)
On July 11, 2017, a U.S. airstrike killed ISIS Khorasan leader Abu Sayed in the group’s headquarters in Kunar province. He was the third ISIS-Khorasan leader to be killed within a year. Previous ISIS leader Abdul Hasib was killed in a joint U.S.-Afghan operation in Afghanistan’s Nangahar province on April 27, 2017. His predecessor Hafiz Saeed Khan was killed in a July 2016 U.S. drone strike. (Sources: CNN, Reuters)
There were approximately 1,300 ISIS fighters in Afghanistan as of September 2016, according to General John Nicholson, the highest ranking U.S. military commander in the country. Nicholson said on September 23, 2016, that ISIS leaders in Syria provide the Afghanistan fighters with money, guidance, and communications support. According to Nicholson, ISIS’s fighters are largely former members of the Pakistan Taliban and primarily based in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar region. On January 3, 2017, Najibullah Mani, head of the Interior Ministry’s Counterterrorism Department, said ISIS is active in “at least 11” of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. As of March 1, 2017, U.S.-backed Afghan forces had reduced the number of ISIS fighters in the country to approximately 700, according to the U.S. military. (Sources: Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, Voice of America)
Afghan media reported in December 2015 that ISIS had launched a Pashto-language radio station in Afghanistan called Voice of the Caliphate, which reportedly broadcasted anti-government and anti-Taliban messages. The Afghan government shut down the station later that month, but the station returned soon after using alternate frequencies. U.S. airstrikes reportedly destroyed the eastern Afghanistan broadcasting station in February 2016.(Sources: U.S. Department of State, Long War Journal, Fox News)
According to the U.S. State Department, the majority of the extremist groups active in Afghanistan have shunned the ISIS affiliate. The exception is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which operates in northern Afghanistan near Uzbekistan as well as along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The group broke its alliance with the Taliban to ally with ISIS’s Khorasan Province in August 2015. (Sources: U.S. Department of State, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty)
As a result of ISIS’s encroachment on its territory, the Taliban have become more direct in opposing ISIS. The two terrorist groups have violently clashed on several occasions. In June 2015, the Taliban’s deputy leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour sent a missive to al-Baghdadi, warning ISIS’s caliph that “jihad against the Americans and their allies [in Afghanistan] must be conducted under one flag and one leadership.” ISIS and the Taliban reportedly agreed to a ceasefire in eastern Afghanistan in early August 2016, according to media reports. (Sources: Diplomat, Wall Street Journal, Wall Street Journal)
ISIS claimed a July 31, 2017, attack on the Iraqi embassy in Kabul, as well as an attack the following day on a Shiite mosque in Herat. The attacks came three weeks after U.S.-backed Iraqi forces recaptured the Iraq’s second city of Mosul from ISIS, prompting Afghan security officials to question whether ISIS was increasing its activity in Afghanistan in response to its losses in Iraq. (Sources: Reuters, CNN, Reuters)
On May 30, 2019, a suicide bomber targeted the Marshal Fahim National Defense University in Kabul. At least six people were killed and another six were wounded. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack stating its fighters attacked “trainees in the Afghan army.” It is suspected that ISIS is increasing its presence in Afghanistan as the U.S. and the Taliban are in the process of brokering a peace deal. On August 1, 2019, ISIS released a video of its members publicly beheading a member of the Taliban. According to the Middle East Media Research Institute, “ISIS considers Taliban members to be apostates who can thus be lawfully killed.” ISIS claimed responsibility for a March 25, 2020, attack on a Sikh temple in Kabul that killed at least 25. (Sources: Defense Post, Washington Times, Reuters)
In the first half of 2020, ISIS claimed responsibility for a spate of attacks in Afghanistan. On March 6, ISIS gunmen killed 32 and wounded 58 at a memorial in Kabul. ISIS militants launched a rocket attack on Afghanistan’s presidential palace on March 9. Another ISIS attack on a Sikh temple in Kabul, on March 25, killed at least 25. On May 11, Afghan forces arrested ISIS-K leader Zia-ul Haq, a.k.a. Shaikh Abu Omer al-Khorasani. (Sources: Al Jazeera, Associated Press, Reuters, New York Times, Guardian, Newsweek, New York Times)
Haqqani Network
The Haqqani network is a militant Islamist group operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is considered a branch of the Afghan Taliban, but operates independently from the organization and has a more diffuse command structure. It originated in the late 1970s but rose to prominence in the resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. After the 1989 Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Jalaluddin Haqqani formed an alliance with the Taliban and supported the growth of al-Qaeda. When the Taliban violently assumed de facto control of Afghanistan in 1996, the group appointed Haqqani as minister of tribal affairs. Ever since, the Haqqani network has been subsumed under the larger Taliban, although the Haqqanis preserve distinct command and control. (Sources: New York Times, Asia Times Online, Institute for the Study of War)
The Haqqani network seeks to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan and Afghanistan and build a caliphate under Islamic law. Like the Taliban, the Haqqani network endorses an austere and radical interpretation of sharia (Islamic law), positing that Muslims must aspire to live in accordance with the actions of the Salaf, the first generation of Muslim leaders after the Prophet Muhammad. (Source: Economist)
Since the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, the Haqqani network has been a lethal and sophisticated arm of the Afghan insurgency against the Western-backed government in Kabul. Although it has cooperated with and even praised al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network focus is regional, not global like al-Qaeda’s. Indeed, according to declassified U.S. intelligence, the Haqqanis enjoyed close ties with the United States from the time of anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s until September 11, 2001. (Sources: Christian Science Monitor, Economist)
Haqqani fighters first acquired battlefield experience during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. Members later honed their combat capabilities through cooperation with al-Qaeda and the Taliban, especially after 2001. For a period, the Haqqani network was regarded by both the U.S. and Afghan governments as the most dangerous outfit operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan. By 2011, Haqqani operations accounted for 10 percent of attacks on coalition forces and about 15 percent of casualties. Since 2011, the group has sustained heavy casualties from the Pakistani military as well as from U.S. drone strikes, but it remains a formidable fighting force in the region. (Sources: Foreign Policy, Heritage Foundation)
In September 2011, senior U.S. military officer Mike Mullen told a Senate panel that the Haqqani network “acts as a veritable arms of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI).” According to Mullen, Haqqani militants had ISI support for an attack on the U.S. embassy and NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) headquarters in Kabul earlier that month. Pakistan, however, denied that it works with militant groups. (Source: BBC News)
Hezb-i-Islami
Hezb-i-Islami is reportedly the second largest insurgent faction in Afghanistan after the Taliban. It was created in the late 1970s by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to fight against the Soviets. After the withdrawal of Soviet forces, Hekmatyar gained a reputation for firing hundreds of rockets at civilian targets during Afghanistan’s civil war as Islamist groups fought for control of the country. Hekmatyar’s attacks killed thousands of civilians, earning him the nickname “the Butcher of Kabul.” (Sources: CNN, New York Times, New York Times, Voice of America)
Following the 2001 overthrow of the Taliban government, Hezb-i-Islami split into a political wing that worked with the government, and a militant wing led by Hekmatyar. The militant faction launched numerous attacks against coalition forces. For example, a May 2013 Hezb-i-Islami suicide bombing in Kabul killed 16 people, including six U.S. military advisers. A spokesman for the group said that Hezb-i-Islami decided to increase its attacks after it realized “that American invaders have the devil intention of staying in Afghanistan.” Kabul University political scientist Tahir Hashimi told the New York Times that the group’s main goal “was to make sure that whichever side wins the war, Hezb-i-Islami would be part of it.” (Sources: CNN, New York Times, New York Times, Voice of America, New York Times)
Hezb-i-Islami signed a draft treaty with the Afghan government on September 22, 2016. The final agreement grants Hekmatyar amnesty and stipulates that the Afghan government will lobby international actors to lift sanctions on the group. (Sources: CNN, Voice of America)
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization based primarily in Uzbekistan and northern Afghanistan. The group’s leadership largely operates in northern Afghanistan near Uzbekistan as well as along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. According to the U.S. State Department, the IMU has ties to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Pakistani Taliban. When the IMU emerged in 1998, it sought to overthrow Uzbekistan’s communist President Islam Karimov. Following a violent crackdown by Karimov, the IMU expanded into Afghanistan in 1999 and reportedly shifted its focus from central Asia to an “international jihadism,” according to a regional expert cited by the Wall Street Journal. The Taliban government granted the IMU safe haven in Afghanistan in exchange for foreign fighters, according to the Institute for the Study of War. The IMU fought alongside the Taliban after the 2001 U.S. invasion. Following heavy losses to coalition forces, the IMU reorganized in Pakistan. The IMU also clashed with local tribesmen, resulting in IMU fighters moving to Afghanistan. In 2009, NATO reported an increase in IMU foreign fighters in Afghanistan. IMU leaders “have integrated themselves into the Taliban’s shadow government in Afghanistan’s northern provinces,” according to the U.S. State Department. The group has also carried out attacks on international forces in Afghanistan, such as an October 15, 2011, suicide attack on a U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Team, killing two Afghan civilians. In April 2015, the IMU released a video reportedly of the beheading of an Afghan soldier. The IMU threatened in the video to also behead members of Afghanistan’s Shiite Hazara minority. (Sources: U.S. Department of State, Institute for the Study of War, Wall Street Journal)
[IMU leaders] have integrated themselves into the Taliban’s shadow government in Afghanistan’s northern provinces.U.S. State Department
In early August 2015, the IMU released a statement declaring that the Taliban cannot be trusted because they concealed the death of their leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar. The IMU also accused the Taliban of collaborating with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence. A few days later, the group pledged allegiance to ISIS and declared itself part of its caliphate. According to IMU leader Usmon Ghazi, the IMU is no longer “just a movement, we are a state.” He further said that IMU fighters should be considered ISIS fighters from Khorasan, referring to ISIS’s branch in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In June 2016, an IMU breakaway faction—continuing to call itself the IMU—disavowed ISIS and reasserted its loyalty to the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other jihadist groups in the region. According to the statement, the IMU fractured after the 2015 declaration of loyalty to ISIS. The pro-Taliban IMU faction pledged to “continue its Islamic activities with the grace of Allah against the enemies of religion and stand shoulder to shoulder with [believers] and Muslim brothers of Afghanistan.” (Sources: Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, Long War Journal)
Foreign Fighters
Since the 1980s, Afghanistan has been a destination for foreign fighters. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have set up training camps for foreign fighters to fight either against the Soviet occupation or the U.S. coalition. These fighters reportedly sometimes go on to other conflicts. According to the Soufan Group, some 50 Afghans were fighting in Syria as of January 2015. (Sources: The Soufan Group, Al Jazeera, Washington Post)
Since the 2001 fall of the Taliban government, foreign fighters have continued to arrive in Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban and other militant groups. According to Afghan officials, foreign fighters are entering Afghanistan from Pakistan, Chechnya, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Gul Muhamad Bedar, the deputy governor of Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province, told Al Jazeera that 400 foreign fighters and their families have joined some 100 Afghan Taliban fighters, and they are “spreading rapidly.” In April 2015, media reported that hundreds of Pakistani jihadists were fleeing into Afghanistan to escape a government crackdown. (Sources: Al Jazeera, Washington Post)