Houthis

Executive Summary:

The Houthis—officially known as Ansar Allah (Partisans of God)—are an Iranian-backed, Shiite Muslim military and political movement in Yemen.Yara Bayoumy and Mohammed Ghobari, “Iranian support seen crucial for Yemen's Houthis,” Reuters, December 15, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-houthis-iran-insight-idUSKBN0JT17A20141215; Saeed Al Batati, “Who are the Houthis in Yemen?,” Al Jazeera, March 29, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/yemen-houthis-hadi-protests-201482132719818986.html; Zachary Laub, “Yemen in Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 19, 2016, http://www.cfr.org/yemen/yemen-crisis/p36488. Its members, who subscribe to the minority Zaidi sect of Shiite Islam, advocate regional autonomy for Zaidis in northern Yemen. The group has waged a series of bloody insurgencies against the Yemeni government since 2004, overthrowing it and seizing power in Sanaa in 2015.Ahmed al-Haj, “Yemen Shiite Rebels Harden Their Protest Demands,” Associated Press, August 25, 2014, https://wtop.com/news/2014/08/yemen-shiite-rebels-harden-their-protest-demands/; Rod Nordland, “Rebels in Yemen Say They Intend to Form a New Government,” New York Times, February 6, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/07/world/middleeast/yemen-rebels-say-they-will-dissolve-parliament.html?_r=1. In 2016, the group announced the formation of a government.“Formation of New Houthi Government Does Not Help Yemen: U.N. Envoy,” Reuters, November 29, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-un-idUSKBN13O2K1. As of 2023, nearly six million Yemenis have been displaced by the conflict and more than 23.4 million need humanitarian assistance.“Yemen Crisis Explained,” UNHCR, July 14, 2022, https://www.unrefugees.org/news/yemen-crisis-explained/.

The Houthi movement began as an effort to maintain tribal autonomy in northern Yemen and protest Western influence in the Middle East. Today, the Houthis seek a greater role in the Yemeni government and continue to advocate Zaidi minority interests.“5 Things to Know About the Houthis of Yemen,” Dick Streuly, Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2015, http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2015/02/12/5-things-houthis-yemen/. The movement is known for its virulently anti-American and anti-Semitic rhetoric, including the group’s ubiquitous slogan: “God is great! Death to America! Death to Israel! Curse upon the Jews! Victory to Islam!”Noah Browning and Mohammed Ghobari, “Yemen Houthis Launch ‘Martyr’ Videos to Raise Morale,” Reuters, March 9, 2015, archived August 9, 2019, at the Wayback Machine, https://web.archive.org/web/20190809020603/https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-yemen-security-videos-idUKKBN0M51M020150309. Several of the group’s leaders have been designated as terrorists by the United States.“Yemen Designations,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, April 14, 2015, archived April 17, 2015, at the Wayback Machine, https://web.archive.org/web/20150417172620/https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20150414_33.aspx; “Treasury Sanctions Political Spoilers Threatening the Peace, Security and Stability of Yemen,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, November 10, 2014, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2693.aspx.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is closely associated with the group, providing training and military equipment to the Houthis.Warren Strobel and Mark Hosenball, “Elite Iranian Guards Training Yemen’s Houthis: U.S. Officials,” Reuters, March 27, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/27/us-yemen-security-houthis-iran-idUSKBN0MN2MI20150327. The Iranian ship Jihan I was seized allegedly en route to Yemen in 2013 with arms meant for the Houthis.Yara Bayoumy and Mohammed Ghobari, “Iranian Support Seen Crucial for Yemen’s Houthis,” Reuters, December 15, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/15/us-yemen-houthis-iran-insight-idUSKBN0JT17A20141215.

The Houthis’ roots trace back to the 1990s, when Houthis founder Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi created the al-Shabab al-Mumanin (Believing Youth) movement in an effort to combine religious revivalism with anti-imperialism.Adam Taylor, “Who Are the Houthis, the Group That Just Toppled Yemen’s Government?,” Washington Post, January 22, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2015/01/22/who-are-the-houthis-the-group-that-just-toppled-yemens-government/. The movement sought to educate local youth about Zaidism’s long history in Saada Governorate, northern Yemen.  To that end, the al-Houthi family launched a network of associations, sports clubs, and summer camps.Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010), 6, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG962.pdf. The al-Houthis also sought to protect Zaidism from perceived encroachment of Salafism and Wahhabism from Saudi Arabia into northern Yemen, where Zaidism has been dominant for centuries.Farea al-Muslimi, “The Houthi Paradox,” Middle East Institute, January 16, 2014, http://www.mei.edu/content/houthi-paradox.

God is great! Death to America! Death to Israel! Curse upon the Jews! Victory to Islam!Houthis slogan

The Houthi movement grew increasingly politically engaged in 2003, in reaction and opposition to Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s support for the U.S-led war in Iraq.Zachary Laub, “Who Are Yemen’s Houthis?,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 25, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/yemen/yemens-houthis/p36178. Domestically, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi continued to seek autonomy for Saada Governorate from Yemen’s Sunni-dominated central government.

After Saleh dispatched troops in a failed attempt to arrest al-Houthi in 2004, the Houthis launched an insurgency against the government. Al-Houthi was killed during clashes with the government in 2004, but the movement has continued in his name, waging a series of intermittent wars against the government, with Saudi forces intervening to support Sanaa in the years since.Zachary Laub, “Yemen in Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 8, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/yemen/yemen-crisis/p36488.

During these wars, Saleh repeatedly sought to appease the Houthis by issuing amnesties to their prisoners and even pardoning Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi in 2005, but al-Houthi rejected the pardon and the periodic fighting continued.Christopher Boucek, “War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2010, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/war_in_saada.pdf. In 2007, Qatar brokered a brief cease-fire called the Doha Agreement, but the deal failed to satisfy the parties and fighting resumed that year.Christopher Boucek, “War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2010, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/war_in_saada.pdf. In 2009, with the Saleh government launched the massive Operation Scorched Earth, which sought to crush the insurgency for good, and was backed by financial, political, and military support from the Saudis.Christopher Boucek, “War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2010, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/war_in_saada.pdf. However, the campaign failed, and intermittent fighting continued.Christopher Boucek, “War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2010, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/war_in_saada.pdf.

During the Arab Spring in 2011, mass protests began against the Yemeni government, and Saleh stepped down in 2012 pursuant to an internationally negotiated transition agreement.Angus McDowell and Lisa Barrington, “Timeline: Yemen’s Slide into Political Crisis and War,” Reuters, March 21, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-timeline/timeline-yemens-slide-into-political-crisis-and-war-idUSKCN1R20HO. The Houthis participated in a National Dialogue Conference but continued fighting against government forces.Sama’a Al-Hamdani, “Understanding the Houthi Faction in Yemen,” Lawfare, April 7, 2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/understanding-houthi-faction-yemen.

The Houthis made significant territorial gains in 2014-2015. In September 2014, the group  captured Yemen’s capital, Sanaa,Mohammed Ghobari, “Houthis tighten grip on Yemen capital after swift capture, power-sharing deal,” Reuters, September 22, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/22/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0HH2BQ20140922. resulting in the resignation of President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi in January 2015.Mark Mazzetti and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Saudi Arabia Leads Air Assault in Yemen,” New York Times, March 25, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/26/world/middleeast/al-anad-air-base-houthis-yemen.html?_r=0; “Yemen president quits, throwing country deeper into chaos,” Reuters, January 22, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-houthis-idUSKBN0KV0HT20150122. The following month, the Houthis officially announced the dissolution of Hadi’s parliament and the institution of their interim government, known as the Supreme Revolutionary Committee (SRC).Rod Nordland, “Rebels in Yemen Say They Intend to Form a New Government,” New York Times, February 6, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/07/world/middleeast/yemen-rebels-say-they-will-dissolve-parliament.html?_r=1.

The United Nations began facilitating peace talks between the Houthis and the Yemeni government in October 2015, but the talks ended without an agreement in early August 2016.“Yemeni President Dismisses Houthi Concessions as ‘Maneuver,’” Reuters, October 8, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/09/us-yemen-security-politics-idUSKCN0S21GC20151009; “Yemen’s Hadi Launches Military Operation East of Sanaa, Peace Talks End,” Reuters, August 6, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/yemens-hadi-launches-military-operation-east-of-sanaa-peace-talks-end-idUSKCN10H0B4. The government of Saudi Arabia has also made multiple attempts to negotiate with the Houthis, launching the first talks in March 2016.Mohammad al-Kibsi and Asa Fitch, “Saudi Arabia, Houthi Rebels Hold Direct Talks on Yemen War,” Wall Street Journal, March 9, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/yemen-rebels-saudi-arabia-begin-peace-talks-to-end-nearly-year-long-war-1457520050; Haytham Mouzahem, “Yemen Peace Talks Stuck in Stalemate," Al Monitor, May 20, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/yemen-talks-kuwait-war-saudi-arabia-houthis-hadi-government.html. As of 2023, multiple iterations of peace talks have so far only resulted in stalemates.Muhammed Semiz, “Yemen's Houthi rebels announce breakdown of talks with Saudi Arabia,” Anadolu Agency, July 24, 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemens-houthi-rebels-announce-breakdown-of-talks-with-saudi-arabia/2952532; “Saudi, Omani envoys hold peace talks with Houthi leaders in Yemen,” Al Jazeera, April 9, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/9/saudi-omani-envoys-in-yemen-for-peace-talks-with-houthi-leaders; Vivian Nereim and Shuaib Almosawa, “What Do Peace Talks in Yemen Mean for Its 8-Year War?,” New York Times, April 10, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/10/world/middleeast/yemen-peace-talks.html.

In August 2016, the SRC handed its authority to the Supreme Political Council (SPC), a government body formed by the July 2016 merger between the Houthis and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh.“SRC Hands Over Authority to SPC,” Yemen News Agency, August 15, 2016, http://sabanews.net/en/news437023.htm. The alliance ended in December 2017 after Saleh offered to reconcile with Saudi Arabia, leading to the assassination of Saleh at the hands of Houthi forces shortly after.Hakim Almasmari, Tamara Qiblawi, and Hilary Clarke, “Yemen’s Former President Ali Abdullah Saleh Killed Trying to Flee Sanaa,” CNN, December 4, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/04/middleeast/yemen-former-president-ali-abdullah-saleh-killed-intl/index.html; Marwan Bishara, “Analysis: Yemen’s Ex-president Saleh’s Killing Was ‘Revenge,’” Al Jazeera, December 4, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/analysis-yemens-ex-president-salehs-killing-revenge-171204135213663.html.

Following a week of U.N.-sponsored peace talks in Sweden, all parties tentatively agreed to an immediate cease-fire in the Red Sea port of Hodeidah on December 13, 2018.Patrick Wintour and Bethan McKernan, “Yemen: ceasefire agreed for port city of Hodeidah,” Guardian (London), December 13, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/13/yemen-ceasefire-agreed-for-vital-port-city-of-hodeidah. However, few of the conditions agreed upon were implemented by either side. Fighting continued until February 17, 2019, when the Houthis and Yemeni government finally withdrew their forces from the city of Hodeidah.Patrick Wintour, “Time running out to turn Yemen ceasefire into peace, says Hunt,” Guardian, February 13, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/13/time-running-out-to-turn-yemen-ceasefire-into-peace-says-hunt; “Yemen and Houthi rebels agree to withdrawal deal,” Guardian (London), February 17, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/17/yemen-and-houthi-rebels-agree-to-withdrawal-deal. Since 2017, the Houthis have also repeatedly attacked Saudi Arabia with missiles and drones and ramped up strikes in the spring and summer of 2019.Dion Nissenbaum and Warren P. Strobel, “Mideast Insurgents Enter the Age of Drone Warfare,” Wall Street Journal, May 2, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/mideast-insurgents-enter-the-age-of-drone-warfare-11556814441?mod=article_inline; Jared Malsin, “Iran-Allied Houthis Expose Holes in Saudi Arabia’s Missile Defense,” Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-allied-houthis-expose-holes-in-saudi-arabias-missile-defense-11561455002?redirect=amp#click=https://t.co/UFfZ7eqUCa.

On August 27, 2019, the U.S. government was reportedly preparing to initiate negotiations with Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in an effort to bring the civil war in Yemen to an end, but the attempt did not result in significant progress.Dion Nissenbaum and Warren P. Strobel, “U.S. Plans to Open Direct Talks With Iran-Backed Houthis in Yemen,” Wall Street Journal, August 27, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-plans-to-open-direct-talks-with-iran-backed-houthis-in-yemen-11566898204. Saudi Arabia presented another ceasefire plan to the Houthis in March 2021, which the militants rejected unless Saudi Arabia fully lifted its blockade of northern Yemen and ceased targeting Houthi positions.Aziz El Yaakoubi, “Saudi Arabia proposes ceasefire in Yemen, Houthis sceptical,” Reuters, March 22, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-saudi-idUSKBN2BE228; Mohammed Hatem and Dana Khraiche, “Yemen’s Houthis Say Ready for Peace But Won’t Bargain Over Siege,” Bloomberg, March 25, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-25/houthi-rebels-say-ready-for-peace-only-if-saudi-ends-attacks. The Saudi-led coalition then promised to stop carrying out attacks against the movement to facilitate peace talks in June 2021.“Yemen Raids Halted to Push Peace Efforts: Saudi-Led Coalition,” Defense Post, June 10, 2021, https://www.thedefensepost.com/2021/06/10/yemen-raids-halted-peace-efforts/; Ahmed Al-Haj, “Yemeni news agency: Rebel missiles hit key city, killing 8,” Washington Post, June 10, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/yemeni-news-agency-rebel-missiles-hit-key-city-killing-8/2021/06/10/9a7c22f0-ca1e-11eb-8708-64991f2acf28_story.html.

On June 21, 2021, the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis attempted to negotiate a peace deal with the help of U.N. envoy Martin Griffiths and U.S. envoy Tim Lenderking. However, the Houthis’ chief negotiator, Mohammed Abdulsalam, noted that the Houthis wanted to ensure reopening access to Sanaa airport and Hodeidah port before discussing a comprehensive ceasefire.Aziz Yaakoubi, “End of Yemen quagmire? Saudi-led coalition, Houthis near peace deal,” Reuters, June 21, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/end-yemen-quagmire-saudi-led-coalition-houthis-near-peace-deal-2021-06-21/. By providing the Iranian-backed Houthis with open access to Sanaa and Hodeidah, Riyadh would intentionally be putting Saudi Arabia’s domestic security at risk by allowing Iran access to the region.Abubakr Al-Shamahi, “‘Bitter pill to swallow’: Saudis grapple with Yemen peace deal,” Al Jazeera, June 29, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/29/oman-takes-on-ambitious-mediator-role-in-yemen-conflict.

The Houthis began an offensive on Marib, capturing Rahabah district, on September 8, 2021.Abubakr Al-Shamahi, “Yemeni government forces again on the backfoot,” Al Jazeera, September 14, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/14/are-yemeni-government-forces-once-again-on-the-backfoot. Local tribes fought to repel the Houthis, but the Houthis continued to advance throughout Marib. Given the ongoing offensive, more than ten thousand civilians have been displaced, with aid workers on the ground accusing the Houthis of committing genocide in Marib province by denying civilians access to medical and humanitarian aid, leading to the displacement and starvation of thousands.“Yemenis trapped, displaced by fierce fighting in Marib region,” Reuters, October 14, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemenis-trapped-displaced-by-fierce-fighting-marib-region-2021-10-14/; Ali Mahmood, “Humanitarian situation worsens in southern Marib following Al Abdiyah takeover,” National (Abu Dhabi), October 17, 2021, https://www.thenationalnews.com/gulf-news/2021/10/17/humanitarian-situation-worsens-in-southern-marib-following-al-abdiyah-takeover/; “Yemenis trapped, displaced by fierce fighting in Marib region,” Reuters, October 14, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemenis-trapped-displaced-by-fierce-fighting-marib-region-2021-10-14/. On October 12, 2021, the internationally recognized Yemeni government declared southern Marib a military zone following Houthi gains in the area. By November 2021, the Saudi-led coalition had killed more than 2,000 Houthis around Marib city since early October.“More than 150 Houthis killed, injured in Yemen’s Abedia: Arab coalition,” Arab News, October 18, 2021, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1950341/middle-east; “Yemeni authorities issue fresh plea to rescue civilians trapped in Houthi-besieged district,” Levant, October 12, 2021, https://thelevantnews.com/en/2021/10/yemeni-authorities-issue-fresh-plea-to-rescue-civilians-trapped-in-houthi-besieged-district/; “Yemenis trapped, displaced by fierce fighting in Marib region,” Reuters, October 14, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemenis-trapped-displaced-by-fierce-fighting-marib-region-2021-10-14/; “More than 85 Houthis killed near Yemen’s Marib: Arab coalition,” Arab News, October 26, 2021, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1955751/middle-east; “Coalition says 218 Houthis killed in airstrikes around Marib city,” Arab News, November 1, 2021, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1958871/middle-east.

Despite continued fighting, on March 8, 2022, U.N. Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg launched consultations in Amman, Jordan, between the Houthis and Yemeni government on the prospects of launching a peace process. However, the Houthis renewed attacks on government troops on the Al-Balaq mountain range outside Marib city. The Houthis reportedly failed to achieve any territorial gains after government forces repelled their attacks. On March 28, the United Nations began brokering prisoner-swap negotiations between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia.Saeed Al-Batati, “Fighting rages outside Yemen’s Marib as UN envoy meets leaders,” Arab News, March 13, 2022, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2041846/middle-east; “Welcoming the Launch of UN Consultations on Yemen,” U.S. Department of State, March 8, 2022, https://www.state.gov/welcoming-the-launch-of-un-consultations-on-yemen/; “Gulf states hold Yemen talks despite boycott by the Houthis,” Al Jazeera, March 29, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/29/gulf-states-to-hold-yemen-talks-despite-boycott-by-houthi-rebels; “Yemen warring parties discuss possible prisoner swap including 16 Saudis,” Reuters, March 28, 2022, “https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/houthi-official-says-new-prisoner-swap-deal-includes-16-saudis-brother-yemen-2022-03-27/.

A month after launching negotiations, on April 1, 2022, the Houthis and the Saudi-led military agreed to a U.N.-brokered two-month truce, the first coordinated cessation of hostilities since 2016. The parties agreed to halt all offensive military air, ground, and maritime operations inside Yemen and across its borders in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The ceasefire proved successful and was extended for an additional two months on June 2. However, on July 17, 2022, the Iran-backed Houthis stated they will not renew the U.N.-brokered truce with the Saudi-led military in Yemen. According to the movement’s SPC, international calls to extend the truce “affect the sovereignty, security and stability of Yemen” and were the reason behind the group’s decision to not renew the ceasefire.Mostafa Salem and Lianne Kolirin, “Saudi-led coalition and Houthis agree on truce in Yemen, raising hopes for the 'start of a better future',” CNN, April 1, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/01/middleeast/yemen-truce-un-intl/index.html; Saeed Al-Batati, “Yemen troops battle new Houthi attacks near Marib,” Arab News, April 9, 2022, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2059456/middle-east; Aziz El Yaakoubi, “Yemen warring parties agree to extend truce for two months -U.N.,” Reuters, June 2, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemen-warring-parties-agree-extend-truce-two-months-un-2022-06-02/; “Yemen’s Houthis ‘will not extend UN-brokered truce’,” Arab News, July 17, 2022, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2123966/middle-east; Aziz El Yaakoubi, “U.N. presses Yemen warring parties for six-month truce extension -sources,” Reuters, July 18, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-presses-yemen-warring-parties-six-month-truce-extension-sources-2022-07-18/.

The six-month-long ceasefire between the Houthis and the Yemeni government expired without prospects for renewal on October 2, 2022.“End of Yemen’s truce leaves civilians afraid dark days are back,” Al Jazeera, October 7, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/7/end-yemen-truce-leaves-civilians-afraid-dark-days-back. Relations were further strained when Yemen’s National Defense Council designated the Houthis as a terrorist group on October 22, given the movement’s continued violent activity against civilians.Zeynep Tüfekçi Gülay, “Yemen's National Defense Council labels Houthis as terror group,” Anadolu Agency, October 23, 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemens-national-defense-council-labels-houthis-as-terror-group/2718571. Later in February 2023, the Yemeni government warned of a “decisive” battle against the Houthis if peace efforts fail.Ali Rabah, “Yemen Demands Decisive Int’l Stance against Houthi Terrorism,” Asharq Al-Awsat, March 1, 2023, https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/4185916/yemen-demands-decisive-int%E2%80%99l-stance-against-houthi-terrorism.

In early April 2023, in the midst of Saudi Arabia and Iran agreeing to restore diplomatic relations, Saudi Arabia and the Houthis initiated peace negotiations in Sanaa. The consultations, which are separate from U.N. peace efforts, were mediated by Oman.“Saudi, Omani envoys hold peace talks with Houthi leaders in Yemen,” Al Jazeera, April 9, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/9/saudi-omani-envoys-in-yemen-for-peace-talks-with-houthi-leaders; Vivian Nereim and Shuaib Almosawa, “What Do Peace Talks in Yemen Mean for Its 8-Year War?,” New York Times, April 10, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/10/world/middleeast/yemen-peace-talks.html. Through the talks, Saudi Arabia sought to “stabilize the truce and cease-fire” that will lead to long-term political stability for Yemen. Additionally, the negotiations seemed to enforce the complete withdrawal of foreign forces from the country. However, Yemen’s internationally recognized government was excluded from the talks.“Saudi, Omani envoys hold peace talks with Houthi leaders in Yemen,” Al Jazeera, April 9, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/9/saudi-omani-envoys-in-yemen-for-peace-talks-with-houthi-leaders; Vivian Nereim and Shuaib Almosawa, “What Do Peace Talks in Yemen Mean for Its 8-Year War?,” New York Times, April 10, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/10/world/middleeast/yemen-peace-talks.html. However, on July 23, 2023, the Houthis announced that peace negotiations with Saudi Arabia have paused due to disagreements concerning the source of funds to pay the salaries of civil servants living in Houthi-controlled areas.Muhammed Semiz, “Yemen's Houthi rebels announce breakdown of talks with Saudi Arabia,” Anadolu Agency, July 24, 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemens-houthi-rebels-announce-breakdown-of-talks-with-saudi-arabia/2952532. The Houthis resumed attacks on Saudi Arabia nearly three years later, on July 13, 2026, after Saudi Arabia attacked the Sanaa International Airport in Yemen to prevent a Houthi delegation from landing after returning from the funeral of former Iranian Supreme leader Ali Khamenei. In retaliation, the Houthis fired missiles at Abha International Airport in southern Saudi Arabia, which air defenses intercepted.Bridget Toomey, “Saudi Arabia and Houthis trade attacks over restarting direct flights between Yemen and Iran,” Long War Journal, July 14, 2026, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/07/saudi-arabia-and-houthis-trade-attacks-over-restarting-direct-flights-between-yemen-and-iran.php On July 20, the Houthis declared a full maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia and subsequently claimed attacks on eight ships with Saudi ties in the Red Sea and on energy facilities in Yanbu and Jazan.Bridget Toomey, “Houthis escalate attacks in Red Sea and on Saudi Arabia, Riyadh evaluates options,” Long War Journal, August 6, 2026, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/08/houthis-escalate-attacks-in-red-sea-and-on-saudi-arabia-riyadh-evaluates-options.php.

The United States launched Operation Poseidon Archer on January 11, 2024, leading the United Kingdom, Australia, Bahrain, and the Netherlands in offensive operations to impair Houthi military capabilities.Garrett Nada, “Timeline: Houthi Attacks,” Wilson Center, July 26, 2024, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-houthi-attacks. Two months of strikes destroyed more than 150 missiles and launcher systems along with support structures, communications hubs, drone hangars, underground bunkers, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) ground control units. Houthi leader Abdul Malik al Houthi responded that U.S. pressure would not deter the campaign in the Red Sea, a region that handled roughly 12 percent of global trade.Mike Schuler, “Red Sea Crisis: A Timeline of Maritime Chaos Over the Past Year,” gCaptain, November 25, 2024, https://gcaptain.com/red-sea-crisis-a-timeline-of-maritime-chaos-over-the-past-year/.

Newly inaugurated U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order on January 25, 2025, directing the State Department to re-label the Houthis a Foreign Terrorist Organization, restoring a designation the Biden administration had revoked. Secretary of State Marco Rubio completed the redesignation on March 4, 2025.Dan Lamonthe, “Trump Administration Redesignates Houthis as Foreign Terrorist Organization,” Washington Post, March 4, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/03/04/houthi-trump-rubio-foreign-terrorist-designation/.

In March 2025, the Houthis resumed attacks on Israeli-linked shipping vessels and imposed a military blockade on Israeli shipping in the Red and Arabian seas, the Bab al Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden. Houthi Spokesman Yahya Sarea announced the actions in response to an Israeli pause in the delivery of aid into Gaza after Hamas rejected a ceasefire extension. The Houthis warned that they would target any Israeli vessels transiting those waters.Joe Truzman and Bill Roggio, “US military launches large-scale operation against Houthis in Yemen,” Long War Journal, March 16, 2025,  https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/03/us-military-launches-large-scale-operation-against-houthis-in-yemen.phpb.

The United States and Israel launched an attack on Iran on February 28, 2026, targeting Iranian military and nuclear infrastructure and killing Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The following month, Houthi spokesman Yahya Sarea claimed that the Houthis were prepared to enter the war in Iran if additional nations joined the United States and Israel in the conflict against Iran, or if the Red Sea waterways were weaponized to strike Iran. Houthi forces officially entered the conflict on March 28, 2026, after Sarea claimed missile attacks on “sensitive Israeli military sites in the south” on Al-Masirah.“Yemen’s Houthis say ‘fingers on the trigger’ as US-Israeli war on Iran widens,” Reuters, March 27, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-say-fingers-trigger-us-israeli-war-iran-widens-2026-03-27/; Samy Magdy, Aamer Madhani, and Jon Gambrell “Iran-backed Houthis enter the monthlong war and could further threaten global shipping,” Associated Press, March 28, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-israel-trump-lebanon-march-28-2026-0f919596403d2f851196451f4532717e.

In September 2026, the Houthis began a new campaign capturing strategic territory in Yemen. On September 10, 2026, the Houthis seized control of the Yemeni port city Mocha on the southern Red Sea coast. Located around 50 miles north of Bab al Mandeb, Mocha had a history as an important trade hub in the region. Before the Houthis took control of the city, it was also the base of operations for the National Resistance Forces (NRF), which used the city to monitor and intercept Houthi weapons smuggling and maritime activity.Bridget Toomey, “Houthis Take Yemen’s Red Sea Coast and Key Bab al Mandeb Islands,” FDD’s Long War Journal, September 14, 2026, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/09/houthis-take-yemens-red-sea-coast-and-key-bab-al-mandeb-islands.php. The next day, the Houthis took control over the remaining southern coastline and Perim island, as well as the Hanish archipelago located 100 miles north. Bridget Toomey, “Houthis Take Yemen’s Red Sea Coast and Key Bab al Mandeb Islands,” FDD’s Long War Journal, September 14, 2026, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/09/houthis-take-yemens-red-sea-coast-and-key-bab-al-mandeb-islands.php.

Together, the new front on the coast and islands gave the Houthis a direct hold on a chokepoint vital to international shipping.

Doctrine:

Unlike Sunni extremist groups in Yemen, the Houthis adhere to Zaidism, a doctrinally distinct off-shoot of mainstream “Twelver” Shiism.“Yemen Crisis: Who is Fighting Whom?,” BBC News, March 26, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423. While Zaidism ruled Yemen for approximately 900 years beginning in the 9th century, the country has been officially secular since 1962, when a military coup ended the rule of Imam Mohammed Al-Badr.Zachary Laub, “Yemen in Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 8, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/yemen/yemen-crisis/p36488; Asher Orkaby, “A Road Map to Chaos in Yemen,” Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2015,  http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-road-map-to-chaos-in-yemen-1428619669.

The Houthi movement has drawn attention for its anti-American, anti-Semitic slogan, “God is great! Death to America! Death to Israel! Curse upon the Jews! Victory to Islam!”Noah Browning and Mohammed Ghobari, “Yemen Houthis Launch ‘Martyr’ Videos to Raise Morale,” Reuters (UK), March 9, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/03/09/uk-yemen-security-videos-idUKKBN0M51M020150309. While some analysts maintain that the slogan does not reflect the group’s objectives, the Houthis have issued threats against Yemen’s Jewish community and attempted to force the U.S. ambassador from Yemen to leave.Madeleine Wells, “Yemen’s Houthi movement and the revolution,” Foreign Policy, February 27, 2012, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/27/yemens-houthi-movement-and-the-revolution/. The Jews living in Saada were threatened by the Houthis in 2007 and forced to relocate to Sanaa, where they were living under government protection as of early 2015.Sam Sokol, “Yemen Coup Could Spell Trouble for Local Jewish Community,” Jerusalem Post, January 21, 2015, http://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/Yemen-coup-could-spell-trouble-for-local-Jews-388495.

The Houthis have detained numerous foreign nationals, including at least five Americans. In June 2015, the Houthis released one American captive.Kareem Fahim, “U.S. Citizens Held in Yemen by Houthis,” New York Times, May 31, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/01/world/middleeast/us-citizens-held-in-yemen-by-houthis.html?_r=0; Elise Labott and Khushbu Shah, “One American held in Yemen released,” CNN, June 2, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/01/politics/yemen-four-americans-held-houthis/. On September 20, 2015, after the intercession of Oman’s government, the Houthis released three more hostages, including U.S. citizen Scott Darden, a logistics employee from Louisiana, and one other American. On November 10, 2015, U.S. officials reported that American contractor John Hamen, who had been detained sometime in October 2015, was dead. The announcement was followed by the release of three other Americans believed to be working for the United Nations.Associated Press, “3 Americans reportedly held captive in Yemen's capital freed, flown to Oman after negotiation,” U.S. News and World Report, November 19, 2015, http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/11/19/oman-news-agency-3-americans-flown-in-from-war-torn-yemen.

Organizational Structure:

The Houthi movement’s organizational structure is opaque. The movement began as a grassroots religious organization aimed at youth,Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010), 6, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG962.pdf. but over time it has entered politics and developed military capabilities. Following the killing of movement founder Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi by Yemeni forces in 2004, the Houthis were led by Hussein’s father, spiritual leader Badr al-Din al-Houthi. The movement’s current leader is Hussein’s younger brother, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi.“Yemen's Abd-al-Malik al-Houthi,” BBC News, October 3, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/monitoring/yemens-abd-almalik-alhouthi.

The organization revolves around a General Secretary, Fadhl Abu Talib, and has multiple “departments.” These departments include the political office—al-maktab al-siyasi—as well as the external relations office, health office, education office, social office, intelligence service, and the “media authority to counter the aggression.” However, the Houthis still have yet to make an organizational chart publicly available.“The Houthi Supervisory System,” ACAPS, June 17, 2020, https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20200617_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_the_houthi_supervisory_system.pdf.

Since December 2, 2017 after the death of President Saleh, the Houthis have ruled northern Yemen. In Houthi-controlled territories, formal state authorities exist alongside the Houthi supervisory system. Decision-making within the Houthi regime is not in the hands of those who are actors of the state—such as governors or ministers—but rather with Houthi supervisors.“The Houthi Supervisory System,” ACAPS, June 17, 2020, https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20200617_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_the_houthi_supervisory_system.pdf.

Houthi political leadership is organized around four “wings.” These wings include the military wing, which is headed by Abdullah al-Hakim; the tribal wing, which includes tribesmen; the ideological wing which is led by Abdulkarim al-Houthi; and the political wing, which is represented by Mahdi al-Mashat, the current president of the Supreme Revolutionary Committee (SPC).“The Houthi Supervisory System,” ACAPS, June 17, 2020, https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20200617_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_the_houthi_supervisory_system.pdf.

Financing:

Yemeni officials have long accused Iran’s Shiite Islamist regime of providing political, financial, and logistical support to the Houthi rebels and other secessionist movements in Yemen. Despite a 2015 U.N. report confirming Tehran’s support of the rebel group since at least 2009, Iran and the Houthis have historically denied engaging in past cooperation.Carole Landry, “Iran arming Yemen's Houthi rebels since 2009: UN report,” Middle East Eye, May 1, 2015, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-arming-yemens-huthi-rebels-2009-un-report-1170499355. Nevertheless, other reports subsequently confirmed Iranian support, including a Reuters article in December of 2014 confirming financial backing by Tehran. One source stated, “We think there is cash, some of which is channeled via Hezbollah and sacks of cash arriving at the airport.”Yara Bayoumy and Mohammed Ghobari, “Iranian support seen crucial for Yemen’s Houthis,” Reuters, December 15, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/15/us-yemen-houthis-iran-insight-idUSKBN0JT17A20141215. Only in 2015 did a Houthi official confirm that Iran provided “direct support” in the form of logistics, intelligence, and cash, to the Houthis rebels. According to the official, the group has received tens of millions of dollars from the Iranian regime in recent years.Jay Solomon, Dion Nissenbaum, and Asa Fitch, “In Strategic Shift, U.S. Draws Closer to Yemeni Rebels,” Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-strategic-shift-u-s-draws-closer-to-yemeni-rebels-1422576308. Experts place the amount of financial support from Iran at between $10 and $20 million per year, including at least one alleged payment of $3.7 million.Kellan Howell, “Iran spending billions on terrorists’ salaries: report,” Washington Times, September 5, 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/5/iran-spending-billions-on-terrorists-salaries-repo/;
“Yemen: Classified document reveals extent of Iranian support for Houthis,” Asharq al-Awsat, July 6, 2015, http://english.aawsat.com/2015/07/article55344262/yemen-classified-document-reveals-extent-of-iranian-support-for-houthis.

In addition to allegedly sending financial support to the Houthis, Iran also reportedly dispatches military personnel and weapons, including missiles, explosives, and small arms.Yara Bayoumy and Phil Stewart, “Exclusive: Iran steps up weapons supply to Yemen's Houthis via Oman - officials,” Reuters, October 20, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-iran-idUSKCN12K0CX. American intelligence officials have claimed that the Houthis receive considerably less support from Iran than some have alleged.Matthew Rosenberg and Mark Mazzetti, New York Times, “U.S. Ship Off Yemen Fires Missiles at Houthi Rebel Sites,” October 12, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/13/world/middleeast/yemen-rebels-missile-warship.html?_r=0. Nonetheless, on March 28, 2016, the U.S. Navy reportedly intercepted weapons from Iran believed to be headed for Houthi rebels.“U.S. Navy says it seized weapons from Iran likely bound for Houthis in Yemen,” Reuters, April 4, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-usa-yemen-arms-idUSKCN0X12DB. Among the weapons intercepted were 1,500 AK-47 rifles, 200 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and 21 .50-caliber machine guns, according to Reuters.“U.S. Navy says it seized weapons from Iran likely bound for Houthis in Yemen,” Reuters, April 4, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-usa-yemen-arms-idUSKCN0X12DB.

A 2018 U.N. report accused Iran of supplying missiles and drones to the Houthis.Edith M. Lederer, “UN experts: Fuel from Iran is financing Yemen rebels’ war,” Associated Press, January 19, 2019, https://apnews.com/article/b406265e1c6642fd9a614416270263b6. In January 2019, the U.N.’s Panel of Experts on Yemen reported that they had “traced the supply to the Houthis of unmanned aerial vehicles and a mixing machine for rocket fuel and found that individuals and entities of Iranian origin have funded the purchase.Ahmed Himmiche, Fernando Rosenfeld Carvajal et al, “Letter Dated 25 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council, January 25, 2019, 40, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2019_83.pdf. In June 2020, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres reported to the Security Council that cruise missiles used attacks on Saudi oil facilities and an international airport in Saudi Arabia in November 2019 and February 2020 were of Iranian origin.“Missiles used to attack Saudi Arabia of ‘Iranian origin’: UN,” Al Jazeera, June 12, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/12/missiles-used-to-attack-saudi-arabia-of-iranian-origin-un.

Though Iran has provided military and financial support to the Houthis, Iran had previously neither confirmed nor denied recognition of the Houthi government in Sanaa. In August 2019, the Houthis appointed Ibrahim al-Dulaimi, director-general of Houthi-run Al Masirah TV station, as ambassador of the Houthi government to Iran.“Government outraged as Yemen rebels make TV boss ‘ambassador’ to Iran,” National (Abu Dhabi), last updated March 1, 2020, https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/government-outraged-as-yemen-rebels-make-tv-boss-ambassador-to-iran-1.899666. Iran accepted the appointment and transferred Yemen’s official diplomatic residence in Tehran to Dulaimi. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has since met with Dulaimi and the Iranian government has recognized the legitimacy of the Houthi government. In October 2020, Iran appointed its own ambassador, Hassan Eyrlou, to the Houthi government.“Tehran Boosts Support for Houthis by Appointing Ambassador to Sanaa,” Asharq al-Awsat (London), October 18, 2020, https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2571116/tehran-boosts-support-houthis-appointing-ambassador-sanaa.

On June 10, 2021, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on 12 individuals and entities who comprise a smuggling network responsible for providing tens of millions of dollars of funds to the Houthis. The individuals and entities—who allegedly are in cooperation with IRGCs Quds Force senior officials—sell commodities, such as Iranian petroleum, throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. The revenue from those sales have further supplemented the Houthis and their ongoing offensive on Yemeni soil. Among the most notorious of the designations is Sa’id Ahmad Muhammad al-Jamal, an Iran-based Houthi financial supporter, who directs the network of front companies and vessels. Al-Jamal also maintains connections to Hezbollah as he works with the group to send millions of dollars to support the Houthis and their operations.Aziz Yaakoubi, “U.S. sanctions Houthi military leaders as peace efforts stall,” Reuters, May 20, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-imposes-sanctions-two-houthi-military-leaders-2021-05-20/.

In late February 2023, the Yemeni government warned two shipping companies it would revoke their licenses if the companies were found cooperating with the Houthis, including sending shipments through the Houthi-controlled Hodeidah Port.“Yemen Threatens to Punish Shipping Companies Cooperating with Houthis,” Asharq al-Awsat (London), February 26, 2023, https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/4180296/yemen-threatens-punish-shipping-companies-cooperating-houthis. Under the terms of the December 2018 Stockholm Agreement, ports revenues are to be used to support civil service salaries.Patrick Wintour and Bethan McKernan, “Yemen: Ceasefire Agreed for Port City of Hodeidah,” Guardian (London), December 13, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/13/yemen-ceasefire-agreed-for-vital-port-city-of-hodeidah; “A YEAR AFTER THE STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT: WHERE ARE WE NOW?,” U.N. Office of the Special Envoy  of the Secretary for Yemen, December 2019, https://osesgy.unmissions.org/year-after-stockholm-agreement-where-are-we-now. A March 2023 U.N. report accused the Houthis of diverting billions of Yemeni riyals from oil, taxes, and other levies. According to the United Nations, between April 2, 2022, and November 30, 2022, 69 tankers delivered 1,810,498 tons of oil derivatives to the Houthi-controlled Hodeidah Port, generating 271.935 billion Yemeni rials (approximately $271 million) for the Houthis. The Houthis either pocketed the money themselves or used it to finance their military activities. The United Nations accused Houthi leaders’ families of amassing vast personal fortunes.Saeed al-Batati, “Houthis pocket millions of dollars of public funds say UN experts,” Arab News, March 1, 2023, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2260541/middle-east.

Recruitment:

According to Houthi officials in 2018, the rebels maintained a force of 60,000 fighters, while outside estimates have placed the number between 15,000 and 50,000.Maggie Michael, “Children as young as 10 fight, kill and die in Yemen’s war,” Associated Press, December 19, 2018, https://apnews.com/article/082c0b7b6253468e97da5ee0c3f43066. The Houthis’ primary area of recruitment is the northern provinces of Yemen, its heartland of ideological support.Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010), 30, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG962.pdf. In February 2016, al-Arabiya reported that the group had expanded recruitment beyond its traditional political base by inducing “mercenaries” from African countries.“Yemeni official: Houthis recruiting African fighters,” al-Arabiya, February 29, 2016, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2016/02/29/Top-Yemeni-officials-Houthis-recruiting-mercenaries-.html. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG962.pdf. In May 2020, Yemeni Information Minister Muammar Al-Iryani warned that the Houthis were increasingly recruiting civilians in areas under Houthi control.“Yemeni minister warns of forced war recruitment operations in Houthi areas,” Arab News, May 5, 2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1669861/middle-east.

Houthi recruitment efforts inside Yemen have benefitted from the unpopularity of the Yemeni government.Sarah Phillips, “Cracks in the Yemeni System,” Middle East Research and Information Project, July 28, 2005, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero072805; Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010), 327, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG962.pdf. Since the 2011 uprising that removed President Ali Abdullah Saleh from power, the Houthis have increasingly attracted potential recruits to anti-government public protests in support of the movement.Mohammed Ghobari, Angus McDowall, “Countries backing shaky Yemen transition warn Houthis against violence,” Reuters, August 19, 2014, http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/08/19/yemen-houthis-idINKBN0GJ1IL20140819. In the summer of 2014, the group gained noticeable traction when it protested the Yemeni government’s decision to cut popular fuel subsidies. Houthi-led protests attracted tens of thousands of supporters, including not only Zaidis but also Sunnis, to Yemen’s capital, Sanaa.Mohammed Ghobari, Angus McDowall, “Countries backing shaky Yemen transition warn Houthis against violence,” Reuters, August 19, 2014, http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/08/19/yemen-houthis-idINKBN0GJ1IL20140819.

Since the 1990s, Houthi recruitment has reached out to its target Zaidi audience through social connections and networking, proselytizing through religious sermons, the dissemination of written materials, audio and videotapes, and online recruitment.Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010), 216, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG962.pdf. The Houthis began paramilitary activities in 2004 and began distributing military training videos electronically and in person where possible.Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010), 220, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG962.pdf.

The Houthis have also revived local Zaidi rituals, including events where potential recruits can socialize with pro-jihadi Houthi militia men, with the intention of encouraging new recruits to join the veterans.Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010), 254, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG962.pdf. A pro-Houthi youth movement called Shabab al-Sumud (Steadfast Youth) has also provided support, including by managing a tent in Maydan Taghayr (Change Square) in 2012 where members of the public could enter and watch pro-Houthi videos.Madeleine Wells, “Yemen’s Houthi movement and the revolution,” Foreign Policy, February 27, 2012, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/27/yemens-houthi-movement-and-the-revolution/.

The group is also active on the Internet, including on YouTube channels where it posts pro-Houthi videos, as well as web forums to promote the Houthi movement.Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010), 219-220, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG962.pdf. The Houthis operate the TV channel Al Masirah,Saeed al Batati, “Violence Erupts in Yemen Capital After Weeks of Rallies,” New York Times, September 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/10/world/middleeast/violence-erupts-in-yemen-capital-after-weeks-of-rallies.html. which publishes pro-Houthi videos, including poems and songs.Mohammad Al-Khayat, “Houthi Poetry and Songs: Propaganda, Art or Both?,” Yemen Times (Sanaa), December 4, 2014, http://www.yementimes.com/en/1839/report/4657/Houthi-poetry-and-songs-Propaganda-art-or-both.htm. In 2007, group leader Abdel Malik founded the Al Minbar website,Ahmed Mamdou, “Abdel Malik Al Houthi: the Shiite Thorn on Yemen’s Side,” Al-Bawaba (Amman), http://www.albawabaeg.com/52258. which published press statements, editorials, speeches, videos, and images to promote its message.Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010), 219, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG962.pdf; Ahmed Mamdouh, “Abdul Malik Al Houthi: The Shiite Thorn on Yemen’s Side,” AlBawaba, March 25, 2015, http://www.albawabaeg.com/52258. The group has also released statements through website Ansar Allah (Supporters of Allah).Madeleine Wells, “Yemen’s Houthi movement and the revolution,” Foreign Policy, February 27, 2012, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/27/yemens-houthi-movement-and-the-revolution/. Houthi officials also maintain Twitter accounts disseminating pro-Houthi material. For example, in May 2016, Houthi spokesman Mohammed Abdul Salam posted comments accusing the Yemeni government of lying and time-wasting.Mohammed Ghobari, “Yemen officials say peace talks suspended after Houthis seize base,” Reuters, May 1, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0XS0WT.

Since the start of Yemen’s civil war in 2014, the Houthis have reportedly conscripted more than 30,000 child soldiers, all under the age of 15.“Yemen Rights Group Reveals over 30,000 Child Soldiers Recruited by Houthis,” Asharq al-Awsat (London), June 10, 2020, https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2326876/yemen-rights-group-reveals-over-30000-child-soldiers-recruited-houthis. According to a February 2021 study by the Switzerland-based SAM for Rights and Liberties, the Houthis “deliberately used the education system to incite violence and indoctrinate students with the group's ideologies,” particularly by giving children lectures on sectarian content and promoting military victories.Militarized Childhood – A report on the Houthis’ recruitment of Yemeni children during war, Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor SAM for Rights and Liberties, February 2021, 7, https://samrl.org/pdf/455childrenyemenrepen.pdf. Houthis have also exploited the extreme poverty rampant in Yemen by offering financial incentives to children whose families’ main providers had been killed.Militarized Childhood – A report on the Houthis’ recruitment of Yemeni children during war, Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor SAM for Rights and Liberties, February 2021, 8, https://samrl.org/pdf/455childrenyemenrepen.pdf. Houthi officials have admitted to conscripting at least 18,000 child soldiers as young as 10 years old, though officially the Houthis say they do not recruit children.Maggie Michael, “Children as young as 10 fight, kill and die in Yemen’s war,” Associated Press, December 19, 2018, https://apnews.com/article/082c0b7b6253468e97da5ee0c3f43066. In June 2020, news publication Asharq Al-Awsat revealed that local sources in Sanaa claimed that Houthi forces had launched a recruitment campaign to persuade children and young men to join its ranks. The campaign operates under the guise that recruits will be provided with protection from the COVID-19 pandemic. Upon enlistment, young recruits are asked to save themselves by joining the fighting front, which the Houthis claim is safer than crowded cities and areas.“Children Recruited by Houthis Contract COVID-19 in Yemen’s Saada,” Asharq al-Awsat (London), June 18, 2020, https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2340811/children-recruited-houthis-contract-covid-19-yemens-saada. According to the human rights organization the Yemeni Coalition of Independent Women (CIY), child abduction is also widespread and occurs daily in Houthi-controlled areas, especially in Sanaa and the governorates of Ibb, Amran, Hajjah, Mahwit, and Dhamar. However, reports released later in June claim that the Houthis failed to implement necessary health measures to prevent the spread of the virus at indoctrination schools and institutes, leading to dozens of children being infected by COVID-19.“Yemen Rights Group Reveals over 30,000 Child Soldiers Recruited by Houthis,” Asharq al-Awsat (London), June 10, 2020, https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2326876/yemen-rights-group-reveals-over-30000-child-soldiers-recruited-houthis; “Houthis launch recruitment campaign in conjunction with disappearance of dozens of children,” Middle East Monitor, June 4, 2020, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200604-houthis-launch-recruitment-campaign-in-conjunction-with-disappearance-of-dozens-of-children/.

The Houthis have used child soldiers to plant and clear landmines, as well as act as guards. There are also reports of the Houthis sending children to the frontlines to fight.Militarized Childhood – A report on the Houthis’ recruitment of Yemeni children during war, Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor SAM for Rights and Liberties, February 2021, 11, https://samrl.org/pdf/455childrenyemenrepen.pdf. As the Houthis continued an offensive in Marib in March 2021, the Houthis reportedly took heavy losses and sought to replenish their ranks with child soldiers. Houthi forces allegedly conscripted at least 85 child soldiers that month alone. The minors received a week of training before they were sent to fight in Marib.“Houthis Draft, Deploy 85 Child Soldiers from Yemen’s Ibb,” Asharq al-Awsat (London), March 29, 2021, https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2888001/houthis-draft-deploy-85-child-soldiers-yemen%E2%80%99s-ibb. To further the indoctrination of Yemeni youth, the Houthis have created summer camps that reportedly enroll thousands of children in Houthi-held territory. According to Houthi officials, children are educated to Houthi ideology and “immunized from false cultures” during 45-day sessions at the camps, which culminate with graduation ceremonies attended by the children’s families as well as Houthi officials.Saeed Al-Batati, “Thousands of Yemeni children brainwashed in Houthi ‘summer camps,’” Arab News, August 17, 2021, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1912296/middle-east. The children also receive combat training. Parents who refuse to send their children to the Houthi camps are reportedly blacklisted in their communities.Saeed Al-Batati, “Thousands of Yemeni children brainwashed in Houthi ‘summer camps,’” Arab News, August 17, 2021, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1912296/middle-east.

The Houthis have also conscripted civil servants from areas under their control. Al-Arabiya reported in 2017 that the Houthis were forcibly subjecting civil servants to two-week “brain washing” sessions before conscripting them.“Houthi militia coercively recruit senior civil servants,” Al Arabiya, last updated May 20, 2020, https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2017/03/10/Houthi-militia-coercively-recruit-senior-civil-servants. In 2021 in Ibb, the Houthis ordered all civil servants to enlist in the armed forces and spend at least 14 days on the battlefield.“Houthis Draft, Deploy 85 Child Soldiers from Yemen’s Ibb,” Asharq al-Awsat (London), March 29, 2021, https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2888001/houthis-draft-deploy-85-child-soldiers-yemen%E2%80%99s-ibb. The Yemeni Teachers Syndicate has accused the Houthis of conscripting thousands of teachers to the frontlines. According to local media reports, the Houthis claim they are “mobilizing job sectors” by recruiting civil servants to fight for their cause.“A new Houthi recruitment campaign … civil servants to the front,” EG 24 News, June 13, 2020, https://www.eg24.news/2020/06/a-new-houthi-recruitment-campaign-civil-servants-to-the-front.html.

Training:

The Houthis have historically trained their fighters in Yemen’s mountainous north.Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010), 27, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG962.pdf. The Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has trained Houthis in Yemen and Iranian military leadership is also believed to be present in Yemen to provide strategic military advice.Yara Bayoumy and Mohammed Ghobari, “Iranian support seen crucial for Yemen’s Houthis,” Reuters, December 15, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/15/us-yemen-houthis-iran-insight-idUSKBN0JT17A20141215. In March 2015, Saudi foreign minister Adel al-Jubair also alleged that Hezbollah operatives were advising the Houthis.Warren Strobel and Mark Hosenball, “Elite Iranian guards training Yemen’s Houthis: U.S. officials,” Reuters, March 27, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/27/us-yemen-security-houthis-iran-idUSKBN0MN2MI20150327. In the same month, Syrian military officials were reportedly present in Yemen assisting the Houthis as well.“Syrian regime coordinates military training with Yemeni Houthis,” ARA News, March 9, 2015, http://aranews.net/2015/03/syrian-regime-coordinates-military-training-with-yemeni-houthis/.

In early 2015, U.S. officials reported that the IRGC’s training of Houthi rebels covered the use of advanced weapons, which the Houthis seized from Yemeni military bases.Warren Strobel and Mark Hosenball, “Elite Iranian guards training Yemen’s Houthis: U.S. officials,” Reuters, March 27, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/27/us-yemen-security-houthis-iran-idUSKBN0MN2MI20150327. A January 2020 U.N. report claims that Iran continues to provide the Houthis with advanced weaponry and high-tech components for their ammunition systems. According to the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies, the IRGC has its own special forces units in Yemen, with some of those units specializing in missiles and others in drones. There are also units specifically focusing on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The IRGC allegedly has multiple operation rooms throughout Yemen, with one located in Hodeidah and another on the west coast of Yemen that secures the arrival of military forces and weapons.Ahmed Eleiba, “Strategic Shift: Iran’s role in Sanaa between Proxy Management and Direct Involvement,” Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies, November 7, 2020, https://www.ecsstudies.com/en/strategic-shift-irans-role-in-sanaa-between-proxy-management-and-direct-involvement/; Farzin Nadimi, “The UN Exposes Houthi Reliance on Iranian Weapons,” Washington Institute, February 13, 2020, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-un-exposes-houthi-reliance-on-iranian-weapons.; Trevor Johnston, Matthew Lane, Abigail Casey, Heather J. Williams, Ashley L. Rhoades, James Sladden, Nathan Vest, Jordan R. Reimer, Ryan Haberman, “Could the Houthis Be the Next Hizballah?,” RAND Corporation, 2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2551.html. Following the October 28, 2020 appointment of Hassan Eyrlou—an IRGC-Quds Force officer—as ambassador of Iran to the Houthi militia, it is likely that the IRGC will move from providing not just logistical support to the Houthis, but will also direct the way in which the Houthis will manage the Yemeni crisis.Saeed al-Batali, “US slams Iran for ‘smuggling’ envoy into Yemen,” Arab News, October 22, 2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1752651/middle-east.

The Houthis have also sought to impose their ideology on the areas of Yemen they have captured. In mid-April 2021, Houthi militants evicted 20 academics and their families from university housing in Sanaa. The Houthis reportedly seek to install academics loyal to their cause within area universities.“Houthis Evict Academics from University Housing in Sanaa,” Asharq al-Awsat (London), April 19, 2021, https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2927566/houthis-evict-academics-university-housing-sanaa. According to media reports, the Houthis have replaced 90 percent of school principals with pro-Houthi individuals. The Houthis have also sought to inculcate hatred of the group’s enemies by printing and distributing images of dead children allegedly killed by anti-Houthi forces. Houthi propaganda also positively highlights drone strikes on Saudi Arabia and a hatred of Israel. A member of the Yemeni Teachers Syndicate has claimed the Houthis are enforcing a “policy of cultural colonialism” and the “ideology of the Khomeinist revolution in Yemen through public education,” effectively brainwashing Yemen’s children.Joseph Haboush, “Millions of Yemeni youth being educated with violent, anti-Semitic propaganda: Report,” Al Arabiya, April 15, 2021, https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2021/04/15/Millions-of-Yemeni-youth-being-educated-with-violent-anti-Semitic-propaganda-Report.

Also Known As:

  • Type of Organization:
    Insurgent, religious, social services provider, territory-controlling, violent
  • Ideologies and Affiliations:
    Arab nationalist, jihadist, Islamist, Shiite, Zaidi
  • Place of Origin:
    Saada, Yemen
  • Year of Origin:
    1990s (as the Believing Youth movement); renamed the Houthi rebel movement in 2004
  • Founder(s):

    Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi

  • Places of Operation:

    Yemen

Abdul-Malik al-Houthi

Spiritual, military, and political leader; brother of founder Hussein Badr-al-Din al-Houthi

Youssef al-Midani

Deputy leader; brother-in-law of Abdul-Malik al-Houthi (reported deceased October 2015)

Yahia Badr-al-Din al-Houthi

Senior leader, former lawmaker, brother of founder Hussein Badr-al-Din and current leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi

Abdul-Karim Badr-al-Din Al-Houthi

Senior leader, brother of founder Hussein Badr-al-Din and current leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi

Mohamed Abdul Salam

Spokesman

Faris Manna

Houthi-appointed governor of Saada between 2011 and December 2014; alleged former arms dealer whose assets were frozen by the U.N. Security Council and the U.S. Treasury Department

Mohammed Ali al-Houthi

Member of the Supreme Political Council and former president of the Supreme Revolutionary Committee

Ali al-Qahoum

Member of Houthi political bureau

Violent activity by the Houthis has consisted mainly of armed rebellion against the Yemeni government, leading to clashes with security forces. Thousands have been killed and displaced as a result of the fighting. The Houthis also briefly fought Saudi forces on the northern border in late 2009, and have battled al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) for several years. In October 2016, the rebels took direct action against the United States by conducting a series of failed missile attacks against the U.S. Navy presence in the region.Ryan Browne and Angela Dewan, “US strikes Yemen after missiles launched on warship,” CNN, October 13, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/12/politics/pentagon-us-strikes-hit-radar-sites-in-yemen/. The Houthis had previously kidnapped several American citizens, including a teacher, journalist, humanitarian aid worker.“American English teacher detained in Yemen, officials say,” Fox News, September 22, 2016, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/09/22/american-english-teacher-detained-in-yemen-officials-say.html; Jay Solomon, U.S. Met Secretly With Yemen Rebels,” Wall Street Journal, June 1, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-citizen-held-hostage-in-yemen-released-by-houthi-rebels-1433178829; Houthi Rebels Free 5 Hostages Including 2 Americans, in Yemen,” Voice of America, September 20, 2015, http://www.voanews.com/a/houthi-rebels-free-five-hostages-including-two-americans-in-yemen/2971468.html. U.S. ships are not the only vessels the rebels have targeted. Prior to the attacks on the U.S. Navy, a UAE civilian ship was damaged by Houthi missiles that same month.“Yemen conflict: UAE says Houthis attacked civilian ship,” BBC News, October 5, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37561749. Starting in 2017, the Houthis have repeatedly attacked Saudi Arabia with missiles and drones, and have ramped up strikes in 2019, often targeting Saudi airports and oil fields.Dion Nissenbaum and Warren P. Strobel, “Mideast Insurgents Enter the Age of Drone Warfare,” Wall Street Journal, May 2, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/mideast-insurgents-enter-the-age-of-drone-warfare-11556814441?mod=article_inline; Jared Malsin, “Iran-Allied Houthis Expose Holes in Saudi Arabia’s Missile Defense,” Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-allied-houthis-expose-holes-in-saudi-arabias-missile-defense-11561455002?redirect=amp#click=https://t.co/UFfZ7eqUCa.

Attacks on Israel and Israeli interests

On November 19, 2023, the Houthis seized the British-owned and Japanese-operated cargo ship the Galaxy Leader in the southern Red Sea, taking 25 crew members hostage. The Houthis described the ship as Israeli. The vessel is owned by a company registered under Isle of Man-headquartered Ray Car Carriers, which is a unit of Tel Aviv-incorporated Ray Shipping.“Houthis seize ship in Red Sea with link to Israeli company,” Reuters, November 20, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-says-houthis-seize-ship-red-sea-no-israelis-among-owners-or-crew-2023-11-19/; Agence France-Presse and Times of Israel staff, “Houthis say Israeli ships ‘legitimate target,’ as threat to global shipping grows,” Times of Israel, November 20, 2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/yemens-houthis-say-israeli-ships-legitimate-target-as-threats-to-shipping-grow/; Jon Gambrell, “Analysis: Iran-backed Yemen rebels’ helicopter-borne attack on ship raises risks in crucial Red Sea,” Associated Press, November 21, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-red-sea-ship-yemen-houthis-65b611ff878a411900037e7c9a8ee17b; Jonathan Saul, “Two ships divert course away from Red Sea area after vessel seized by Houthis,” Reuters, November 21, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/two-ships-divert-course-away-red-sea-area-after-vessel-seized-by-houthis-2023-11-20/; “Yemen’s Houthis release video footage showing armed men seizing ‘Israeli-linked ship,’” Reuters, November 21, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-release-video-footage-showing-armed-men-seizing-israeli-linked-2023-11-20/; Isabel Debre and Jon Gambrell, “Yemen’s Houthi rebels hijack an Israeli-linked ship in the Red Sea and take 25 crew members hostage,” Associated Press, last updated November 20, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/israel-houthi-rebels-hijacked-ship-red-sea-dc9b6448690bcf5c70a0baf7c7c34b09. In a statement released on X, formerly Twitter, Houthi spokesman Yahya Sarea called all Israeli ships legitimate targets.Yahya Sarea, Twitter post, November 19, 2023, 11:34 a.m., https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1726277654544785788. The seizure was part of an ongoing Houthi offensive against Israeli interests following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel that killed at least 1,200 people. The Houthis praised the attack and began launching drones and missiles toward Israel as the Jewish State targeted Hamas infrastructure in the Gaza Strip. On October 19, a U.S. warship near the Red Sea shot down four cruise missiles and 15 drones over a period of nine hours. A Pentagon spokesman accused the Houthis of firing the projectiles “potentially towards targets in Israel.”Oren Liebermann, “Incident involving US warship intercepting missiles near Yemen lasted 9 hours,” CNN, October 20, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/20/politics/us-warship-intercept-missiles-near-yemen/index.html. Israel accused the Houthis of responsibility for an October 27 drone attack that wounded six people in the Egyptian Red Sea towns of Taba and Nuweiba.Ahmed Mohamed Hassan and Dan Williams, “Drone blasts hit two Egyptian Red Sea towns, Israel points to Houthi,” Reuters, October 27, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/explosion-heard-egyptian-red-sea-town-near-israeli-border-witness-2023-10-27/. After Israel intercepted a surface-to-surface missile from the Red Sea area on October 30, Sarea claimed the Houthis were responding to “Israeli aggression” and would continue their attacks.“Yemen’s Houthis say they launched missiles, drones at Israel,” Reuters, October 31, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-warns-possible-hostile-aircraft-near-red-sea-city-eilat-2023-10-31/. The Houthis claimed multiple missile and drone attacks against Israeli interests throughout October and November.

In response to continue Houthi aggression in the Red Sea, on December 18, 2023, the United States announced Operation Prosperity Guardian, a multinational taskforce to defend against Houthi attacks in the region. The task force operates under the umbrella of the Combined Maritime Forces and the leadership of its Task Force 153, which focuses on security in the Red Sea. The force includes the United Kingdom, Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Seychelles, and Spain.“Statement from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on Ensuring Freedom of Navigation in the Red Sea,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 18, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3621110/statement-from-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-ensuring-freedom-of-n/. The United States and its allies have since bombed weapons sites throughout Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. Further, on January 17, 2024, the United States announced it would re-designate the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group. The designation went into effect on February 16, 2024.“Statement from National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on the Terrorist Designation of the Houthis,” White House, January 17, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/17/statement-from-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-the-terrorist-designation-of-the-houthis/; Michael Crowley, “U.S. Designates the Houthis a Terror Group,” New York Times, February 16, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/16/world/middleeast/houthis-terror-group.html.

Violent Activities:

  • Designations
  • Associations
  • Rhetoric

Designations by the U.S. Government:

    • April 14, 2015: The U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Houthi leader “Abdul Malik al-Houthi” as a Specially Designated National (SDN).“Treasury Sanctions Instigators of the Violent Takeover of Yemen,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, April 14, 2015, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl10021.aspx.
    • The U.S. Department of the Treasury designated former commander of Yemen’s Republican Guard “Ahmed Ali Saleh” as a Specially Designated National (SDN).“Treasury Sanctions Instigators of the Violent Takeover of Yemen,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, April 14, 2015, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl10021.aspx.
    • The U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Sultan Zabin pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Executive Order for being a foreign person who is a leader or official of an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, serious human rights abuse relating to their tenure on December 10, 2020.“Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International Human Rights Day,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 10, 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1208.
    • The U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Abdul Rahab Jarfan pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Executive Order for being a foreign person who is a leader or official of an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, serious human rights abuse relating to their tenure on December 10, 2020.“Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International Human Rights Day,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 10, 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1208.
    • The U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Motlaq Amer al-Marrani pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Executive Order for being a foreign person who is a leader or official of an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, serious human rights abuse relating to their tenure on December 10, 2020.“Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International Human Rights Day,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 10, 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1208.
    • The U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Qader al-Shami pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Executive Order for being a foreign person who is a leader or official of an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, serious human rights abuse relating to their tenure on December 10, 2020.“Treasury Sanctions Serious Human Rights Abusers on International Human Rights Day,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 10, 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1208.
    • The U.S. Department of State designated Ansarallah, a.k.a. the Houthis, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on January 19, 2021. The government revoked the designation on February 16, 2021.“Terrorist Designation of Ansarallah in Yemen,” U.S. Department of State, January 10, 2021, https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designation-of-ansarallah-in-yemen/; “Issuance of Counter Terrorism General Licenses and related FAQs; Counter Terrorism Designations; Venezuela-related Designations; CAATSA - Russia-related Designations; Yemen-related Designations Updates,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 19, 2021, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20210119; “Revocation of the Terrorist Designations of Ansarallah,” U.S. Department of State, February 12, 2021, https://www.state.gov/revocation-of-the-terrorist-designations-of-ansarallah/; “Revocation of Counter Terrorism General Licenses; Counter Terrorism Designations Removal and Updates; Yemen-related Designations Updates,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, February 16, 2021, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20210216.
    • The U.S. Department of State designated Abdul Malik al-Houthi as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on January 19, 2021.“Terrorist Designation of Ansarallah in Yemen,” U.S. Department of State, January 10, 2021, https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designation-of-ansarallah-in-yemen/; “Issuance of Counter Terrorism General Licenses and related FAQs; Counter Terrorism Designations; Venezuela-related Designations; CAATSA - Russia-related Designations; Yemen-related Designations Updates,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 19, 2021, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20210119.
    • The U.S. Department of State designated Yusuf Hassan al Madani as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on January 19, 2021.“Terrorist Designation of Ansarallah in Yemen,” U.S. Department of State, January 10, 2021, https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designation-of-ansarallah-in-yemen/; “Issuance of Counter Terrorism General Licenses and related FAQs; Counter Terrorism Designations; Venezuela-related Designations; CAATSA - Russia-related Designations; Yemen-related Designations Updates,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 19, 2021, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20210119.
    • The U.S. Department of State designated Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on January 19, 2021.“Terrorist Designation of Ansarallah in Yemen,” U.S. Department of State, January 10, 2021, https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designation-of-ansarallah-in-yemen/; “Issuance of Counter Terrorism General Licenses and related FAQs; Counter Terrorism Designations; Venezuela-related Designations; CAATSA - Russia-related Designations; Yemen-related Designations Updates,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 19, 2021, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20210119.
    • The U.S. Department of State designated Abdullah Yahya al Hakim as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on January 19, 2021.“Terrorist Designation of Ansarallah in Yemen,” U.S. Department of State, January 10, 2021, https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designation-of-ansarallah-in-yemen/; “Issuance of Counter Terrorism General Licenses and related FAQs; Counter Terrorism Designations; Venezuela-related Designations; CAATSA - Russia-related Designations; Yemen-related Designations Updates,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 19, 2021, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20210119.
    • The U.S. Department of State designated Ansarallah, a.k.a. the Houthis, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group on February 16, 2024.Michael Crowley, “U.S. Designates the Houthis a Terror Group,” New York Times, February 16, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/16/world/middleeast/houthis-terror-group.html.
    • The U.S. Department of State redesignates the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 4, 2025.“Designation of Ansarallah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,” U.S. Department of State, March 4, 2025, https://www.state.gov/designation-of-ansarallah-as-a-foreign-terrorist-organization/.
    • The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designates seven high-ranking Houthi political and military leaders accused of involvement in smuggling and procuring weapons on March 5, 2025. The designated individuals are Oman-based spokesman Mohammad Abdulsalam; Eshaq Abdulmalek Abdullah Almarwani, a high-ranking operative and aid to Abdulsalam; Mahdi Mohammed Hussein Al-Mashat, chair of the Houthi-aligned Supreme Political Council (SPC); Mohamed Ali Al-Houthi, a member of the SPC and former chair of the SPC’s predecessor, the Supreme Revolutionary Committee; Ali Muhammad Muhsin Salih Al-Hadi, head of the Houthi-aligned Sanaa Chamber of Commerce; senior Houthi operative Abdulmalek Abdullah Mohammed E Alagri; and Houthi operative Khaled Hussein Saleh Gaber.“Treasury Targets Houthi Leaders Involved in Smuggling and Procuring Weapons,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, March 5, 2025, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0041.

Designations by Foreign Governments and Organizations:

Ties to Extremist Entities:

  • Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

    Houthi militants have engaged in violent clashes with al-Qaeda’s Yemeni branch, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). While the Houthis are opposed to Salafist encroachment in their stronghold, analysts have noticed that the two groups have at times appeared to enter in an alliance against the Yemeni government.Steven Erlanger, “Yemen’s Chaos Aids the Evolution of a Qaeda Cell,” New York Times, January 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/03/world/middleeast/03yemen.html.

  • Badr Organization

    No known cooperative links exist between the Houthis and Iraqi Shiite paramilitary group the Badr Organization. Badr members have, however, rallied in Iraq in support of the Houthi rebels.“Iraq’s Badr Organization Offers to Join Yemen’s Ansarullah in War against S. Arabia,” Fars News Agency, April 1, 2015, http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940112000339.

  • Hamas

    Higher-ups in the Houthi movement have expressed support for Hamas. Before he was killed in 2004, Houthis founder Hussein al-Houthi made it a point to praise Hamas for its wars against Israel.Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010), 304, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG962.pdf.In October 2014, a member of the Houthis political party stated that the Houthis and Hamas share “a common stand vis-a-vis Israel” and the United States. “Q&A: What do the Houthis want?,” Al Jazeera, October 2, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/10/qa-what-do-houthis-want-2014101104640578131.html. Hamas maintains a representative in Houthi-held territory in Yemen who maintains a relationship with the Houthi rebels. In June 2021, Houthi Supreme Political Council member Mohammad al-Houthi met with Hamas representative Moath Abu Shamala to express support for Hamas’s cause and extend greetings to Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. Abu Shamala presented al-Houthi with the shield of Hamas in recognition of his support to the Palestinian cause.“Al-Houthi meets Hamas representative,” Yemen News Agency (SABA), June 6, 2021, https://www.saba.ye/en/news3142870.htm.

    On March 3, 2025, after Hamas rejected a ceasefire extension, Israel paused the delivery of aid into Gaza. On March 7, Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al Houthi imposed a four-day deadline on Israel to resume aid flowing into Gaza before the Houthis would resume naval action against Israel. Four days later, on March 11, Houthi spokesman Yahya Sarea stated that Houthi naval operations resumed following an expiration of the deadline imposed on Israeli aid efforts. Sarea claimed the Houthis had imposed a military blockade of Israeli ships in the Red and Arabian seas, as well as the Bab al Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden. Sarea also included that Israeli ships navigating those areas would be targeted.Joe Truzman and Bill Roggio, “US military launches large-scale operation against Houthis in Yemen,” Long War Journal, March 16, 2025,  https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/03/us-military-launches-large-scale-operation-against-houthis-in-yemen.phpb.

    On October 8, 2025, Hamas and Israel agreed to a ceasefire proposed by U.S. President Donald Trump. The deal was contingent on Hamas’s return of 48 hostages held in Gaza, 20 of whom were believed to be alive. In exchange, Israel was to release 250 Palestinian prisoners serving life sentences, and 1,700 detainees from Gaza.Seth Frantzman, “Israel, Hamas Agree to Gaza Deal in Egypt,” Long War Journal, October 9, 2025, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/10/israel-hamas-agree-to-gaza-deal-in-egypt.php. Israeli forces were also expected to relinquish control of territory in Gaza, making an initial reduction from an original 70 to 80 percent control to 53 percent.Seth Frantzman, “Israel, Hamas Agree to Gaza Deal in Egypt,” Long War Journal, October 9, 2025, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/10/israel-hamas-agree-to-gaza-deal-in-egypt.php. The Houthis threatened to continue missile and drone attacks against Israel if the ceasefire collapsed. Houthi Chief of Staff Yusuf Hassan al Madani claimed that any renewed attack on Gaza would result in a resumption of both military strikes within Israeli territory and a renewed ban on Israeli ships in the Red and Arabian Seas. On October 9, Houthi leader Abdulmalik al Houthi praised Hamas and asserted that the ceasefire represented an Israeli and American failure to eliminate Hamas’s military and governing authority. He claimed that the Houthis planned to use the ceasefire to upgrade its military technology and prepare for inevitable future rounds of conflict with Israel and the United States. Bridget Toomey, “Houthis Signal Pause in Attacks on Israel After Gaza Ceasefire, Detail Attacks During the Conflict,” Long War Journal, October 16, 2025, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/10/houthis-signal-pause-on-attacks-on-israel-after-gaza-ceasefire-detail-attacks-during-the-conflict.php.

    By mid-November 2025, the Houthis had indicated a pause of their attacks against Israel and Red Sea shipping. In an undated letter to Hamas’s Qassam Brigades, Houthi military chief of staff Yusuf Hassan al Madani warned that any renewed aggression in Gaza would result in the return of long-range missile strikes against Israel and a reinstatement of the maritime restrictions on Israeli and commercial shipping in the Red Sea.“Yemen’s Houthis signal they’ve stopped attacks on Israel and Red Sea shipping,” Times of Israel, November 11, 2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/yemens-houthis-signal-theyve-stopped-attacks-on-israel-and-red-sea-shipping/.

  • Hezbollah

    Saudi officials allege that Hezbollah has provided training to the Houthi rebels.“Iran and Hezbollah trained Houthis to ‘harm Yemenis,’” Al Arabiya, April 7, 2015, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/04/07/Iran-and-Hezbollah-trained-Houthis-to-harm-Yemenis-.html. According to the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, the “first thing the Houthis did when they entered and occupied Sanaa was to free Iranian Revolutionary Guards operatives and Hezbollah operatives from the jails.”Warren Strobel and Mark Hosenball, “Elite Iranian guards training Yemen’s Houthis: U.S. officials,” Reuters, March 27, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/27/us-yemen-security-houthis-iran-idUSKBN0MN2MI20150327. Moreover, Houthi rhetoric as early as 2004 indicates the group looks up to Hezbollah due to its anti-American, anti-Israel stance.Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010), 121, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG962.pdf. According to a number of analysts, the Houthis may also have modeled their organization after Hezbollah.Robert F. Worth, “Yemen, Hailed as Model, Struggles for Stability,” New York Times, February 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/world/middleeast/yemen-hailed-as-a-model-struggles-for-stability.html;
    Reuters, “Saudi Arabia Fears Yemeni Tumult May Boost Its Main Foe Iran,” New York Times, October 2, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2014/10/02/world/middleeast/02reuters-yemen-security-saudi.html.
    In October 2014, the Associated Press reported that the Houthis were “poised to become Yemen’s version of the Shiite Hezbollah in Lebanon—top powerbrokers dominating the government and running a virtual state-within-a-state.”“Shiite Rebels Are Yemen’s New Masters,” Washington Post, October 5, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/shiite-rebels-are-yemens-new-masters/2014/10/05/fce4fbca-4c07-11e4-b72e-d60a9229cc10_story.html. In June 2021, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi declared the Yemeni people were “an integral part of the equation announced by” Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and part of the “framework of the axis of resistance.”“Leader of Revolution: Shouting “Death to America, death to ‘Israel’” slogan is practical trend in confronting US-Israeli plots,” Yemen News Agency (SABA), June 3, 2021, https://www.saba.ye/en/news3142470.htm. A December 2021 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies noted Hezbollah has continued to provide the Houthis with training and weapons.Gordon Lubold, “Iran-Backed Houthis Doubled Attacks This Year on Saudi Arabia, Report Says,” Wall Street Journal, December 21, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-backed-houthis-doubled-attacks-this-year-on-saudi-arabia-report-says-11640084403.

  • Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

    The Houthis have received training and military equipment from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). According to the Saudi ambassador to the United States, the “first thing the Houthis did when they entered and occupied Sanaa was to free Iranian Revolutionary Guards operatives and Hezbollah operatives from the jails.”Warren Strobel and Mark Hosenball, “Elite Iranian guards training Yemen's Houthis: U.S. officials,” Reuters, March 27, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/27/us-yemen-security-houthis-iran-idUSKBN0MN2MI20150327. In December 2020, the United States levied financial sanctions on Hasan Irlu, whom the government accused of being Iran’s envoy to the Houthis. The U.S. government accuses Iran of being the only nation to officially recognize, and appoint formal representation to, the Houthis. According to the U.S. government, Irlu is a member of the IRGC’s Quds Force who has provided advanced weapons and training to the Houthis through coordinated support from other Quds Force leaders.“Treasury Sanctions Iran’s Envoy in Yemen and University Facilitating Recruitment for Qods Force,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 8, 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1205.

    The Iranian ship Jihan I was seized allegedly en route to Yemen in 2013 with arms meant for the Houthis. The cache, as Reuters reported in December 2014, included, “Katyusha rockets M-122, heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles, RPG-7s, Iranian-made night vision goggles and ‘artillery systems that track land and navy targets 40km away’”as well as “silencers, 2.66 tonnes of RDX explosives, C-4 explosives, ammunition, bullets and electrical transistors.”Yara Bayoumy and Mohammed Ghobari, “Iranian support seen crucial for Yemen’s Houthis,” Reuters, December 15, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/15/us-yemen-houthis-iran-insight-idUSKBN0JT17A20141215.

    During a late August 2021 engagement between Houthi fighters and pro-government forces in and around Marib, government-aligned military officials claimed Iran sent military experts and fighters from the IRGC, Iraq, and Lebanon to provide reinforcements to the Houthis. Yemeni officials further accused the IRGC of firing ballistic missiles and drones inside and outside of Yemen.Saeed Al-Batati, “Scores of Houthis killed in foiled attacks in Yemen’s Marib,” Arab News, August 31, 2021, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1920446/middle-east; “Dozens of Saudi coalition forces killed in Marib,” Mehr News Agency, August 31, 2021, https://en.mehrnews.com/news/178049/Dozens-of-Saudi-coalition-forces-killed-in-Marib; Xinhua, “More than 11 soldiers killed in Houthi attacks against Yemen's Marib,” AhramOnline, August 30, 2021, https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/422097/World/Region/More-than--soldiers-killed-in-Houthi-attacks-again.aspx.

  • Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

    Higher-ups in the Houthi movement have expressed support for Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a member of the Houthis political party, has stated that the Houthis and PIJ share “a common stand vis-a-vis Israel” and the United States.“Q&A: What do the Houthis want?,” Al Jazeera, October 2, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/10/qa-what-do-houthis-want-2014101104640578131.html.

Yahya Sarea, Houthi spokesman, December 9, 2023

“3- Out of concern for the safety of maritime navigation, we warn all ships and companies to avoid dealing with Israeli ports.” (Tweet)“Yahya Sare’e,” Twitter post, December 9, 2023, 12:23 p.m., https://twitter.com/Yahya_Saree/status/1733537956655251731.

Yahya Sarea, Houthi spokesman, December 9, 2023

“2-The Yemeni Armed Forces announce that they will prevent navegating all the ships heading to the Zionist entity from any nationality, if the food and medicine keep not accessing the Gaza Strip , and the will become a legitimate target for our armed forces.” (Tweet)“Yahya Sare’e,” Twitter post, December 9, 2023, 12:23 p.m., https://twitter.com/Yahya_Saree/status/1733537920449982498.

Yahya Sarea, Houthi spokesman, December 9, 2023

“Following the success of the Yemeni Armed Forces in imposing its decision to prevent Israeli ships from navigating in the Red and Arab Seas, and as a result of the Zionist enemy’s ongoing  horrific massacres, genocide, and siege against Palestinians in Gaza.” (Tweet)“Yahya Sare’e,” Twitter post, December 9, 2023, 12:23 p.m., https://twitter.com/Yahya_Saree/status/1733537821120487850.

Yahya Sarea, Houthi spokesman, December 3, 2023

“The Yemeni armed forces continue to prevent Israeli ships from navigating the Red Sea (and Gulf of Aden) until the Israeli aggression against our steadfast brothers in the Gaza Strip stops. The Yemeni armed forces renew their warning to all Israeli ships or those associated with Israelis that they will become a legitimate target if they violate what is stated in this statement.”Jon Gambrell, “3 commercial ships hit by missiles in Houthi attack in Red Sea, US warship downs 3 drones,” Associated Press, last updated December 4, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/red-sea-houthi-yemen-ships-attack-israel-hamas-war-gaza-strip-716770f0a780160e9abed98d3c48fbde; “Houthi Attacks on Commercial Shipping in International Water Continue,” U.S. Central Command, December 3, 2023, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3605010/houthi-attacks-on-commercial-shipping-in-international-water-continue/.

Yahya Sarea, Houthi spokesman, November 30, 2023

“5-The Yemeni Armed Forces confirms that their military operations will only stop as soon as the Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people in the #Gaza Strip stops.” (Tweet)Yahya Sarea, Twitter post, November 30, 2023, 3:45 p.m., https://twitter.com/Yahya_Saree/status/1730327318336258133.

Yahya Sarea, Houthi spokesman, November 30, 2023

“4-The Yemeni Armed Forces continues to block Israeli ships in the #Red_Sea and will take further steps to ensure that this decision is fully implemented.” (Tweet)Yahya Sarea, Twitter post, November 30, 2023, 3:45 p.m., https://twitter.com/Yahya_Saree/status/1730327227999400394.

Yahya Sarea, Houthi spokesman, November 30, 2023

“3-The Yemeni Armed Forces: We will not hesitate to expand our military operations against the Israeli entity and to include targets that it may not be expected on land or at sea.” (Tweet)Yahya Sarea, Twitter post, November 30, 2023, 3:45 p.m., https://twitter.com/Yahya_Saree/status/1730327169061077348.

Yahya Sarea, Houthi spokesman, November 30, 2023

“In compliance with the instructions of Al Sayyed Abdul-Malik al-Houthi and in response to the demands of our great Yemeni people as well as the calls of free people of our Arab and Islamic nations to fully support the Palestinian people’s and the free resistance choices.” (Tweet)Yahya Sarea, Twitter post, November 30, 2023, 3:44 p.m., https://twitter.com/Yahya_Saree/status/1730327060894089376.

Yahya Sarea, Houthi spokesman, November 19, 2023

Statement after the Houthis seize an Israel-linked ship in the Red Sea:

“The Yemeni armed forces renew their warning to all ships belonging to the Israeli enemy or dealing with it that they will become a legitimate target for the armed forces.

…

“The Yemeni armed forces confirm that they will continue to carry out military operations against the Israeli enemy until the aggression against the Gaza Strip stops and the heinous crimes that continue until this moment against our Palestinian brothers in Gaza and the West Bank stop.

“They also confirm that whoever threatens the security and stability of the region and international corridors is the Zionist entity, and society. If the international community is concerned about the security and stability of the region and not expanding the conflict, it should stop the Israeli aggression against Gaza.” (Tweet)Yahya Sarea, Twitter post, November 19, 2023, 11:34 a.m., https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1726277654544785788.