March 2026

Introduction

Active Clubs (ACs) are a decentralized, transnational violent network of extreme-right/white supremacist groups that publicly promote combat-sports, fitness training, and white brotherhood.Counter Extremism Project. (2023). Hiding in Plain Sight: The Transnational Right-Wing Extremist Active Club Network. https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/2023-09/Hiding%20in%20Plain%20Sight_The%20Transnational%20Right-Wing%20Extremist%20Active%20Club%20Network_Sept%202023.pdf However, their own communications and several documented activities indicate that the AC-strategy actually aims to create a militant network of combat-ready men and small cells.Alexander Ritzmann. (2023). Don't Get Fooled: The Extreme Right Active Club Network is Not About Combat Sports. ACC Research. https://www.accresearch.org/shortanalysis/dont-get-fooledthe-extreme-right-active-club-network-is-not-about-combat-sports To avoid early scrutiny by law enforcement, they cultivate a mainstream-friendly fitness aesthetic to “hide in plain sight”.

This paper assesses the main strategic propaganda messages by AC co-founder and figurehead Robert Rundo since his public return in June 2025. Previously, he had served a two-year prison sentence in California for conspiracy to riot after a protracted legal battle involving dismissals, appeals, and extradition from Romania.U.S. Attorney's Office, Central District of California. (2025). Former Orange County Resident Linked to White Supremacy Group Sentenced to 2 Years in Prison. https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/former-orange-county-resident-linked-white-supremacy-group-sentenced-2-years-prison and Los Angeles Times. (2024). Co-founder of California White Supremacist Group RAM to be Freed. https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2024-12-13/cofounder-of-california-white-supremacist-group-ram-to-be-freed and Robert Rundo. Odysee. (2024). https://odysee.com/@will2rise:2/rundo1:3 The paper also provides an overview of key violent events associated with the AC network in 2025, the new AC affiliated youth groups, as well as a Classification Framework of what constitutes an AC, designed to aid practitioners, researchers, or law enforcement. In addition, the paper provides recommendations for government prevention and disruption strategies.

The number of ACs per country varies (see AC Classification Framework below). ACs also exist in North America Counter Extremism Project. (2023). Hiding in Plain Sight: The Transnational Right-Wing Extremist Active Club Network. https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/2023-09/Hiding%20in%20Plain%20Sight_The%20Transnational%20Right-Wing%20Extremist%20Active%20Club%20Network_Sept%202023.pdf and in South America.Based on profiles and content on Telegram, Active Clubs appear to exist in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico.

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Executive Summary

The public return of AC co-founder and key propagandist Robert Rundo in June 2025 has led to a significant uptake in strategic messaging. His posts and videos serve as de facto leadership guidance without operational command for this “leaderless” movement, signaling what to emphasize and operationalize at the local level. Rundo aims to harmonize and accelerate the AC network’s evolution by reinforcing core strategies (mainstream appearances, fitness, and brotherhood as recruitment, counterculture) while innovating by making infrastructure-building and violence-readiness a central objective. This combined message (lay low, build quietly, harden your community) can shape AC activities across multiple countries, potentially turning a currently loosely connected movement into a more disciplined, goal-driven network. Events in Lyon, France, in February 2026 have prompted a public call for violence-readiness.

Since the network’s creation in 2021, some ACs have demonstrated visible violent or violence-ready activity. Examples in 2025 include an alleged plot in the United States involving firearms and urban assault training foiled by the FBI, hate-crime assaults in Sweden, ETC. (2025). Tysk forskare larmar om Aktivklubbs beväpning: En skuggmilis. https://www.etc.se/inrikes/tysk-forskare-larmar-om-aktivklubbs-bevaepning-en-skuggmilis and alleged weapons stockpiling in Germany.BILD. (2025). Grosseinsatz in NRW: Razzia gegen bewaffnete Neonazi-Bande. https://www.bild.de/regional/nordrhein-westfalen/grosseinsatz-in-nrw-razzia-gegen-bewaffnete-neonazi-bande-68dc3013e12da109b804f877

There is a significant tension between the AC strategy of avoiding displaying firearms or Nazi-symbols to "hide in plain sight" and the multiple documented instances of members posing with firearms, SS-skulls, and tactical gear since the AC’s founding. Due to the absence of central operational leadership and the diversity of ACs in America and Europe, this can be understood either as disciplinary failures or evolutionary shifts.

Currently, the mapping of the ACs network is done by counting social media and messenger profiles that claim to represent ACs. However, differentiating between different categories of ACs and similar-looking groups based on intent, identity, and activity patterns can support in-depth strategy, activities, and threat assessment.

Key insights from recent officialThe “Will2Rise” and “AC X CENTRAL” channels on Telegram and Substack, as well as the Will2Rise Odysee video channel, reference each other and are considered the authoritative communication outlets where Robert Runo publishes frequently. AC communications include:

• Promotion of militant action: The killing of a 23-year-old French alleged right-wing extremist during clashes in Lyon, France, in early 2026 was used by Robert Rundo and affiliated AC channels to frame the death as a turning point. He is justifying violence and reinforcing the AC identity as fascist Blackshirts: “This is the turning. The nationalists aren’t asking permission anymore. They’re taking the field. From the cathedrals of old Europe to the concrete jungles of American cities, the black shirts rise again, not as cosplay, but as the vanguard.
  
  The calling for “black shirts (to) rise again” is a long-established violence-promoting narrative by Rundo.Counter Extremism Project. (2023). Hiding in Plain Sight: The Transnational Right-Wing Extremist Active Club Network. https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/2023-09/Hiding%20in%20Plain%20Sight_The%20Transnational%20Right-Wing%20Extremist%20Active%20Club%20Network_Sept%202023.pdfBlack Shirts were fascist paramilitary units that emerged post-World War I in Italy,Cohen, L. (2022). Fascist Masculinities and Their Afterlives: Italian Fascism and the Politics of Embodiment. Feminist Economics. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1354571X.2022.2045454#abstract the United Kingdom, Bret Rubin. (2010). The Rise and Fall of British Fascism: Sir Oswald Mosley and the British Union of Fascists. Intersections. https://depts.washington.edu/chid/intersections_Autumn_2010/Bret_Rubin_The_Death_of_British_Fascism.pdf Germany (called Brown Shirts),Olson, Samantha. (2023). Political Agitators to Ideological Enforcers: Representations of the Brownshirts in Germany. University of Victoria. https://www.uvic.ca/humanities/history/assets/docs/olson-sam.pdf and the United States (called Black Legion/Silver Shirts) North Carolina History Project. (n.d.). William Dudley Pelley (1885–1965). https://northcarolinahistory.org/encyclopedia/william-dudley-pelley-1885-1965/ and The Conversation. (2024). America Faced Domestic Fascists Before – and Buried That History. https://theconversation.com/america-faced-domestic-fascists-before-and-buried-that-history-268978. They were formed to protect fascist leaders and to violently attack political opponents.
   
• Infrastructure over spectacle: Rundo’s new messaging aims to shift the movement’s focus away from episodic, high-visibility stunts toward durable real-world infrastructure: establishing private gyms, businesses, and closed networking events. Will2Rise (Substack). (2025). The Difference Between the American and European Active Club. https://will2rise.substack.com/p/the-difference-between-the-american This reflects a strategic pivot from short-term propaganda wins (“headline activism”) to long-term capacity-building, presented as essential for the movement’s survival and future mobilization.
   
• Continued mainstreaming as a strategy: The continued emphasis on mainstream fitness culture and “brotherhood” content is a calculated tactic, not a sign of moderation. Counter Extremism Project. (2023). Hiding in Plain Sight: The Transnational Right-Wing Extremist Active Club Network. https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/2023-09/Hiding%20in%20Plain%20Sight_The%20Transnational%20Right-Wing%20Extremist%20Active%20Club%20Network_Sept%202023.pdf By (almost) looking like ordinary fitness clubs, ACs aim to reduce law-enforcement attention and broaden recruitment, all while quietly promoting extremist ideology and combat readiness for potential future violence.

• The emergence of “Youth Active Clubs” and youth-focused propaganda:  Recognizing that recruiting the next generation is critical for longevity, AC propagandists have tailored their messaging and infrastructure also to teenagers and very young adults.

  Policy Recommendations for Prevention and Disruption

  Treating ACs as combat-sports clubs or as mostly online propaganda groups would be a critical mistake. Their core strength lies in localized, real-world (offline) social networks that can rapidly activate members for targeted violence. A failure to recognize and monitor the associated “infrastructure of extremism”, e.g., private training facilities and movement-run businesses, will limit prevention efforts.

  In counter-terrorism terms, ACs can function as incubators, expanding the pool of radicalized, physically capable, violence-ready individuals. When or if a faction or member/associate decides “it’s time,” they can draw on that pool. The unevenness of current violence (some clubs are violent, others are not) should not breed complacency; it may simply reflect that different chapters are at different stages on a potential escalation ladder.

  Recommendations:

• Update threat assessments: Governments should account for the new AC focus on infrastructure and violence-readiness by expanding monitoring to local AC participation in violent events, as well as physical venues and economic activities. Particular attention should be paid to a possible increase in violent crimes in the areas where ACs are active, even if these crimes are not initially recognizable as politically motivated. While many right-wing extremist attackers leave manifestos after attacks, violence by ACs will likely remain hidden until their Day XDay X in this context references to a time where the network or group moves to open violent action. See: Counter Extremism Project. (2023). Hiding in Plain Sight: The Transnational Right-Wing Extremist Active Club Network. https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/2023-09/Hiding%20in%20Plain%20Sight_The%20Transnational%20Right-Wing%20Extremist%20Active%20Club%20Network_Sept%202023.pdf is declared.
   
• Enhance cross-border intelligence sharing and joint tracking: ACs network internationally, and so should governments. When there’s an indication of transnational meetups, use mechanisms like passenger name record (PNR) analysis and watchlisting to flag and share these movements.
   
• Engage with the fitness community and venues as partners: Gym owners, martial arts instructors, and combat-sport event organizers should be seen as allies. Governments (through law enforcement outreach or sporting federations) should provide discreet briefings about ACs’ modus operandi, including regular updates.
   
• Avoid stigmatizing lawful sport and association: Policies must be careful not to cast a net so wide as to infringe on civil liberties or antagonize communities unnecessarily. Setting clear criteria (as in the suggested Classification Framework) for what constitutes an AC can help here.
   
• Establish an escalation ladder for threat response: Not all AC activity warrants the same response; a spectrum approach is needed. By calibrating response to activity, authorities avoid under- or over-reacting.
   
• Prioritize monitoring and potential disruption of dedicated venues and network-linked enterprises. (For more information, please contact CEP)