

Badr Organization

Name: Badr Organization

Type of Organization:

- Militia
- political party
- religious
- social services provider
- terrorist
- transnational
- violent

Ideologies and Affiliations:

- Iranian-sponsored
- Islamist
- jihadist
- Khomeinist
- Shiite

Place of Origin:

Iraq

Year of Origin:

1983

Founder(s):

Iraqi Shiites loyal to the al-Hakim Shiite clerical dynasty, with the help of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

Places of Operation:

Iraq, Syria

Overview

Executive Summary:

The Badr Organization is a Shiite political party and paramilitary force that acts as "Iran's oldest proxy in Iraq," according to Reuters.¹ Reuters notes that the group's military wing is considered "perhaps the single most powerful Shi'ite paramilitary group" fighting in Iraq.² One Iraqi, in 2015, official described the Badr Organization as "easily" the most powerful force in Iraq, stronger even than Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.³ Given the group's deep ties to Iran and its political and military preeminence, analysts have compared the Badr Organization in Iraq to [Hezbollah](#) in Lebanon.⁴ The militia stands accused of gross human rights violations by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.⁵

Formed in 1983 under the name "the Badr Brigades," the group originally served as the military wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), an Iraqi Shiite political party aimed at bringing Iran's Islamic Revolution to Iraq. During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, SCIRI's Badr Brigades fought alongside Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) against the Iraqi military. From 1983 to 2003, the Badr Brigades continued to operate out of Iran, carrying out intermediary attacks in southern Iraq.⁶ In 2009, the U.S. government designated then-current leader of Badr [Jamal Jaafar Ibrahim](#), a.k.a Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.⁷ Ibrahim died in a January 3, 2020, U.S. drone strike in Iraq that also killed [Qasem Soleimani](#), commander of Iran's Quds Force. Badr and other Iranian-sponsored Iraqi militias vowed revenge on the United States.⁸

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In 2003, the Badr Brigades returned to Iraq to take advantage of the political vacuum there following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. That year, the group formally rebranded, changing its name to "the Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development" and publicly pledging to abstain from violent attacks. From 2004 to 2006, however, the Badr Organization launched a brutal sectarian war on Iraq's Sunni population.⁹ During this period, Badr leader [Hadi al-Amiri](#) personally stands accused of ordering attacks on up to 2,000 Sunnis.¹⁰ According to a leaked cable from the U.S. State Department, "One of [Amiri's] preferred methods of killing allegedly involved using a power drill to pierce the skulls of his adversaries."¹¹

In 2007, the Badr Organization's political wing rebranded, changing its name from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) as part of an effort to de-emphasize the party's ties to the Islamic Republic of Iran. In 2012, the Badr Organization branched off from ISCI, operating as a political party of its own in addition to its capacity as a militia. As ISIS gained control over large swaths of territory in 2013 and 2014, the Badr Organization overtly mobilized, recruited, and fought [ISIS](#) alongside other Shiite militias and the Iraqi army.

Today, the Badr Organization is the most powerful militia within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an alliance of predominantly Shiite militia groups in Iraq that often fights alongside the Iraqi army. Reuters reported that in the March 2015 fight for Tikrit, Badr militiamen and the regular army drove identical tanks with only an army logo differentiating the two forces.¹² Some units in Iraq's army, including Iraq's 5th and 20th Battalions, have reportedly answered to Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri.¹³ As of early 2017, the Badr Organization claims to command between 10,000 and 50,000 militants.¹⁴ Washington Institute for Near East Policy fellow Michael Knights assessed Badr's strength to be between 18,000 and 22,000 fighters as of August 2019.¹⁵ As ISIS lost traction in Iraq, Reuters described the Badr Organization's role in Iraq as "ascendant."¹⁶

The Badr Organization constitutes an active political force in Iraq in addition to operating as a militia. From 2011 to 2014, Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri served as Iraq's transportation minister. From October 2014 to July 2016, another Badr member, Mohammed Ghabban, served as Iraq's interior minister.¹⁷ As of late 2016, the Badr Organization held 22 seats in Iraq's parliament.¹⁸ The group has long been criticized for its hold over Iraq's Interior Ministry.¹⁹ In January 2018, the Badr Organization, [Kata'ib Hezbollah](#) (KH), and [Asaib Ahl al-Haq](#) (AAH), joined with other PMF units to form the Fatah Alliance political party ahead of Iraq's May 2018 elections.²⁰ The alliance won 48 parliamentary seats in the election, of which 21 belong to Badr, and in June it allied with Muqtada al-Sadr's Sairoon Alliance after Sadr's party won the Iraq elections.²¹ The Badr Organization led the second-largest political bloc in the Iraqi parliament until the October 2021 parliamentary elections, which saw Shiite parties drop to only 14 seats as Sadr's party claimed victory.²² On July 13, 2018, Iraqi protesters in the country's south attacked the political offices of Badr and other Iran-backed groups as they called for Iran to withdraw from Iraq.²³

Although the Badr Organization's political arm portrays itself as welcoming and conciliatory to Sunnis, the areas where the group fights ISIS have seen "some of the most high-profile Sunni-Shiite violence of the current conflict," according to the *Washington Post*.²⁴ This is particularly true in Iraq's Diyala province, where Amiri has been leading military operations.²⁵ According to one Human Rights Watch employee, "We've documented widespread burning and destruction of homes. That's something we've recorded in literally every place where militias are leading the fight against ISIS. In some instances, we have documented them carrying out summary executions of people... the [militias] that we've documented the most abuses by are definitely Badr Organization."²⁶ During the fight to retake Mosul beginning in late 2016, Human Rights Watch urged that Iraq ban abusive Shiite militias from partaking in the operation.²⁷ More recently, the group has also recruited former ISIS members in the Diyala province, who are used to stoke anti-Kurdish violence in the areas under its control.²⁸

The Badr Organization emerged during Iraq's civil war. The group is implicated in the torture and murder of thousands of Sunni Muslims.²⁹ The Badr Organization has directly attacked American forces in Iraq, and U.S. officials have warned that the group would resume its attacks on U.S. interests after the military defeat of ISIS in Iraq.³⁰ In November 2017, Amiri called on U.S. forces to leave Iraq, warning that his group would not allow a single American to remain.³¹

On July 1, 2019, Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi issued a decree ordering the militias of the PMF to choose between full integration into the Iraqi armed forces or disarmament by July 31. The prime minister's decree stated that the PMF factions have to choose between either political or paramilitary activity and if they choose politics, they are not allowed to carry weapons.³² The decree was an attempt by Abdul Mahdi at curtailing the autonomy of Iranian-backed militias, which boast more than 120,000 fighters. Some critics suggested the United States and Saudi Arabia instigated the decree after U.S. officials concluded that drone attacks on Saudi Arabia's oil pipeline in May 2018 were launched from Iraq, not Yemen, which raised concerns over the activities of Iran-backed militias in Iraq.³³

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U.S. officials want the Iraqi government to do more to rein in Iranian-allied militias that have grown in power since they helped win the war against ISIS, including preventing them from using Iraqi territory as a launchpad for attacks against the American military or its allies. According to Mahdi's decree, all PMF factions must abandon their old names and receive new names in compliance with the regulations of the Iraqi army. The decree forbade political parties and parliamentary blocs from having ties with the PMF. Also, all the headquarters, economic offices, and checkpoints manned by militias are to be shut down.³⁴ Abdul Mahdi issued a new decree in September 2019 that restructured the PMF's leadership.³⁵ In June 2020, the Republican Study Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives recommended designating the Badr Organization and its leader, Hadi al-Amiri, as terrorists. The recommendation also included other PMF factions Kataib al-Imam Ali, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Liwa Abu al-Fadhal al-Abbas, and Jund al-Islam.³⁶

Doctrine:

For years, the Badr Organization served as the military wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), a political party committed to bringing Iran's revolutionary brand of Shiite Islamism to Iraq.³⁷ However, when SCIRI reemerged in Iraq in March 2003, the group insisted that it was not pushing for an Iranian-style government, despite the group's name and ongoing ties to Tehran.³⁸

Since 2003, Shiism and Iranian-influenced Islamism have remained central elements of the Badr Organization's identity. In 2011, Badr members celebrated the end of the U.S. military presence in Iraq by plastering the walls of government buildings with posters of Iran's supreme leader, [Ayatollah Ali Khamenei](#), and his predecessor, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.³⁹ The following year, Badr split from SCIRI—now called the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCRI)—in order to maintain its ties to Iran.⁴⁰ In early 2015, Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri reaffirmed his support for Iran's supreme leader, saying that Khamenei “has all the qualifications as an Islamic leader. He is the leader not only for Iranians but the Islamic nation. I believe so and I take pride in it.”⁴¹

With the fight against ISIS in Iraq and the rapid growth of the PMF, Badr experienced a surge of support and influence.⁴² Nonetheless, many Iraqis remained suspicious of whether or not Badr would put the interests of Iraq before those of Iran. Amiri sought to turn the popular support for the PMF into a political victory for Badr and moved to draw a distinction between Badr's political and military wings. In December 2017, Amiri ordered his fighters to withdraw from the cities they occupied, cut ties with Badr's political wing, and follow the commands of the Iraqi National Army.⁴³

Still, Amiri rebuked calls by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi for the PMF to abandon its heavy weapons and join the Iraqi Army.⁴⁴ Amiri pledged in April 2018 to personally “take up arms” to defend Iraq from “any danger” regardless of any political position he may hold.⁴⁵ He also applauded Iran's support for Badr and other PMF units when ISIS first swept into Iraq, stating in 2017, “We commend the support of the Islamic Republic...In the beginning, the international coalition did not support Iraq. It was only the Islamic Republic of Iran that stood with us in the beginning.”⁴⁶

In January 2018, Badr formed the Fatah Alliance, a political bloc of Iran-backed PMF factions including [Kata'ib Hezbollah](#) (KH) and [Asaib Ahl al-Haq](#) (AAH) and led by Badr's Amiri.⁴⁷ After Fatah received second place in Iraq's May 2018 parliamentary elections, a Fatah leader named Karim al-Nuri signaled that the party would not seek to change Iraq's post-2003 policy of working with both Iran and the United States.⁴⁸ In June 2020, Fatah Alliance member Fadhil Fatlawi told Iranian media that the Iraqi parliament was committed to expelling U.S. forces from Iraq.⁴⁹

Organizational Structure:

Hadi al-Amiri leads the Badr Organization's military and political wings, but his influence extends beyond the group's confines. Amiri was given command over Iraq's army and police in Diyala province.⁵⁰ An August 2019 assessment of Badr Organization's main areas of operations placed the group throughout the bulk of Diyala province, from the eastern suburbs of Baghdad to Iran and from Zurbatiyah in the south to Tikrit in the north.⁵¹ Then Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi had also reportedly entrusted Amiri with control over the Iraqi Army's 20th Brigade, according to the brigade's commander, General Ali al-Wazir.⁵² Badr also controls PMF Brigades 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 30, 52, 55, and 110 and has the allegiance of additional PMF brigades and several Iraqi Army brigades operating in Diyala.⁵³ One Human Rights Watch employee said that Amiri “is an extremely powerful figure and he's essentially acting with total impunity now. It's not really the government leading the militias; it's the other way around.”⁵⁴

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In his capacity as leader of the Badr Organization's militia, Amiri claimed that he presented the group's military plans to Abadi for approval.⁵⁵ However, in April 2015, Abadi ordered that all Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) militias, including the Badr Organization, be placed under his office's direct command.⁵⁶

Although Amiri appeared to act without much Iraqi government oversight, reports suggested he answered to the leader of Iran's IRGC-Quds Force, [Qasem Soleimani](#). In the 2015 fight to retake Tikrit from ISIS militants, Soleimani "was directing operations on the eastern flank from a village about 55km (35 miles) from Tikrit," according to a Reuters report.⁵⁷ Another Reuters report noted that "Soleimani also directed Iranian-trained Shi'ite militias—including the Badr Brigade."⁵⁸ RAND Corporation analyst Alireza Nader has written that the Badr Organization "appear[s] to be taking direct orders from Tehran."⁵⁹ This assertion is supported by the historic ties between Iran and Badr, which spent the first two decades of its existence as a direct military arm of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and was led by Iranian officers.⁶⁰ Amiri has continued working directly alongside the IRGC since returning to Iraq, including working side-by-side with Soleimani during the battle for Mosul.⁶¹ Amiri was photographed outside the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad on December 31, 2019, as protesters threw stones and torched a security post at the embassy, prompting suspicions that he was encouraging the violence. After the attack, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called Amiri an Iranian "proxy" aiding terrorists.⁶²

In addition to his capacity as the Badr Organization's military leader, Amiri also heads the group's political wing, which maintains an office in east Mosul.⁶³ Since it split from political party ISCI in 2012, the Badr Organization has emerged as a prominent political party within Iraq. In December 2010, then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki appointed Amiri as Iraq's transportation minister.⁶⁴ In October 2014, Prime Minister Abadi appointed a Badr member, Mohammed Ghabban, as interior minister. At the time of Ghabban's appointment, the *Washington Post's* Loveday Morris wrote that "there is little doubt that Hadi al-Amiri, head of the [Badr Organization] party and its military wing, will wield the real power in the ministry."⁶⁵ Ghabban announced his resignation from the post in July 2016 but was replaced by another Badr member, Qasim al-Araji, in January 2017.⁶⁶ Araji, a former member of the Quds Force, was twice arrested by U.S. forces for working with the anti-American insurgency during the U.S. war in Iraq. Prior to joining the Badr parliamentary bloc, Araji had been involved in smuggling and distributing explosives that were intended for use against U.S. forces, according to leaked documents.⁶⁷

In January 2018, Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH), Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), and the Badr Organization joined with other PMF units to form the Fatah Alliance political party in preparation for Iraq's May 2018 elections.⁶⁸ Prior to the elections, Qais al-Khazali, secretary-general of AAH, claimed that "the next prime minister will be someone chosen by the Fateh Alliance or selected in accordance with conditions set by the Fateh Alliance."⁶⁹ In May, the alliance exceeded expectations, winning 47 parliamentary seats in the election. The following month, Iraq's parliament ordered a manual recount of the 11 million votes amid claims of fraud.⁷⁰ Notwithstanding, on June 11, the Fatah Alliance formed a coalition government with Muqtada al-Sadr's Sairoon Alliance, which received the largest number of parliamentary seats in the elections. The coalition placed Amiri and Fatah in a position to obtain high level government positions and have a final say in who will be Iraq's next prime minister.⁷¹ However, while Fatah as a whole made large electoral gains, Badr won only 22 parliamentary seats, the same number of seats it won in 2014.⁷²

On June 1, 2020, Amiri resigned from parliament and as leader of the Fatah Alliance. He gave no reason for his resignation, but Iraqi sources suspected he was vying for the leadership of the PMF. Amiri was replaced in the parliament by his deputy, Abdulkarim Younis Elan.⁷³

Financing:

The Badr Organization is backed by Iran, and Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri has confirmed that his group receives support from Iran.⁷⁴ Senior Badr official Muen al-Kadhimi has said that Iran "helped the group with everything from tactics" to "drone and signals capabilities, including electronic surveillance and radio communications."⁷⁵ Badr-controlled areas of Diyala province have also reportedly served as transit points for Iranian arms supplies entering Iraq.⁷⁶

After ISIS was expelled from Iraq, Badr reportedly took control of the Safra border crossing between the Baghdad-controlled parts of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government. Local sources claim that the Badr Organization receives between \$12 and \$15 million each month in customs tariffs and taxes on the goods traded through Safra.⁷⁷

Recruitment and Training:

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Since April 2014, the Badr Organization has established numerous city-based “popular committees” to recruit fighters for its military wing.⁷⁸ After Iraq’s most influential Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, issued a fatwa in July 2014 calling on Iraqis to fight ISIS, one Badr Organization recruiter claimed to have received 7,000 applications.⁷⁹ The militia reportedly operates training facilities in Hillah, central Iraq.⁸⁰

Also Known As:

- Badr Brigade⁸¹
- Badr Brigades⁸²
- Badr Corps⁸³
- Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development⁸⁴
- Badr Organisation in Iraq⁸⁵
- Martyr Mohamed Baqir al-Sadr Forces⁸⁶
- Martyr Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr Forces⁸⁷
- Munathammat Badr⁸⁸
- Quwet Shahid Baqir Sadr (BOQSBS)⁸⁹

¹ Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Special Report: The fighters of Iraq who answer to Iran,” Reuters, November 12, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/12/us-mideast-crisis-militias-specialreport-idUSKCN0IW0ZA20141112>;

Susannah George, “Breaking Badr,” *Foreign Policy*, November 6, 2014, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/06/breaking-badr/>.

² Ned Parker, Babak Dehghanpisheh, and Isabel Coles, “Special Report: How Iran’s military chiefs operate in Iraq,” Reuters, February 24, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/24/us-mideast-crisis-committee-specialreport-idUSKBN0LS0VD20150224>.

³ Ned Parker, Babak Dehghanpisheh, and Isabel Coles, “Special Report: How Iran’s military chiefs operate in Iraq,” Reuters, February 24, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/24/us-mideast-crisis-committee-specialreport-idUSKBN0LS0VD20150224>.

⁴ Jack Watling, “The Shia Militias of Iraq,” *Atlantic*, December 22, 2016, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/12/shia-militias-iraq-isis/510938/>; Patrick Martin, “Analysis of the Badr Organization,” *Globe and Mail*, February 25, 2015, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/analysis-of-the-badr-organization/article23208662/>.

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⁷ Othman al-Mukhtar, “Fugitive from international justice now militia leader in Iraq,” *al-Araby al-Jadeed*, January 4, 2015, <http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/politics/2015/1/4/fugitive-from-international-justice-now-militia-leader-in-iraq#sthash.Cmu7vyP5.dpuf>; Bill Roggio and Caleb Weiss, “US Inspector General acknowledges Iran-backed militias obtained Abrams tanks,” *Long War Journal*, February 12, 2018, <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/02/us-inspector-general-acknowledges-iran-backed-militias-obtained-abrams-tanks.php>.

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⁹ Patrick Martin, “Analysis of the Badr Organization,” *Globe and Mail*, February 25, 2015, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/analysis-of-the-badr-organization/article23208662/>.

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¹³ Holly Williams, “Armed with U.S. weapons, infamous militia beating ISIS,” *CBS News*, February 2, 2015, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/armed-with-u-s-weapons-ruthless-militia-beating-isis-in-iraq/>; Eli Lake, “Iran’s Militias Are Taking Over Iraq’s Army,” *Bloomberg View*, February 3, 2015, <http://www.bloombergvew.com/articles/2015-02-03/exclusive-iran-s-militias-are-taking-over-iraq-s-army>;

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
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Badr Organization

Key Leaders



Hadi al-Amiri

Leader and secretary-general



Muen al-Kadhimi

Deputy leader; leader in western Baghdad



Qasim al-Araji

Iraq's Minister of Interior; former parliamentary bloc leader; former IRGC member and Badr commander



Mohammed Ghabban

Iraq's former interior minister and a subordinate to Hadi al-Amiri



Karim al-Nouri

Former spokesman



Ali al-Allaq

Senior member



Kareem Alewi al-Mohamadawi

Spokesman



Jaafar al-Quraishi

Media spokesman

**COUNTER
EXTREMISM
PROJECT**

Badr Organization



Haji Jawdat

Media officer



Hassan al-Kaabi

Badr parliamentary bloc leader



Mohamad Mahdi Bayati

Leader of Badr's Northern Axis



Talib al-Musawi

Commander of all PMF operation
in Diyala province and member of
Badr Organization

Badr Organization

History:

- Amiri hosts other Iraqi Shiite leaders at his home in an effort to break Iraq's political deadlock.
Iraq's supreme court ratifies the election results on December 27. Sadr's supporters in the parliament align with him under the Sadrist bloc with 72 seats while the Shiite parties and other opponents align under the banner of the Coordination Framework with 59 seats. Sources: "Iraq's Supreme Court ratifies October election results," Al Jazeera, December 27, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/27/iraq-court-rejects-bid-to-annul-election-results-by-ex-paramilita>; Ali Mamouri, "Shiite leaders gather in Baghdad to break political deadlock," Al-Monitor, December 3, 2021, <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/12/shiite-leaders-gather-baghdad-break-political-deadlock>.
- Iraq holds parliamentary elections on October 10, which are marked by a record low voter turnout of 41 percent.
Shiite factions win only 14 seats in the elections, dropping from 48 seats in the 2018 election. That evening, leaders of the Iran-backed militias and other Shiite factions meet at the home of former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki to discuss how to respond to what they call a "British-American plot" and a "coup" by Sadr, whose party placed first in the elections. The factions reportedly call to "escalate" their activities in Iraq. On October 12, Amiri rejects the election results on behalf of Iraq's Shiite parties. He calls the results a "fabrication" and threatens to "defend the votes of our candidates and voters with full force." Sources: Qassim Abdul-Zahra, "Iraq's militias seek to consolidate political power in vote," Associated Press, October 5, 2021, <https://apnews.com/article/hezbollah-baghdad-iran-middle-east-iraq-c30340c8ce4e98be2cf652e9abc18470>; Bel Trew, "'We want real change': Iraqis vote in early election seen as test of democracy," *Independent* (London), October 10, 2021, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraq-baghdad-elections-democracy-reforms-b1935610.html>; Suadad al-Salhy and Alex MacDonald, "Iraq elections 2021: Shia parties reject results as armed group threatens violence," Middle East Eye, October 12, 2021, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iraq-elections-shia-parties-reject-results-militia-threatens-violence>; Dilan Sirwan, "Iraq election results see giant parties fall, unexpected victories," Rudaw, October 12, 2021, <https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/121020212>; "Pro-Iranian groups reject early Iraq election results as 'scam,'" Al Jazeera, October 12, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/12/iraqi-pro-iranian-groups-reject-elections-a-scam>.
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The new UAVs are capable of striking other countries in the region, including Israel. Source: Robert Tollast, "Iran-backed militias display long-range drone power in regional escalation," National (Abu Dhabi), June 14, 2021, <https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/iran-backed-militias-display-long-range-drone-power-in-regional-escalation-1.1240825>.
- **May 24, 2021:** Iran-backed Iraqi militias declare they are ending the unofficial truce they had announced in October 2020 and would resume attacks on U.S. forces.
The militias make the decision because of "the lack of seriousness of the Iraqi and US governments in scheduling the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq," one commander tells international media. Source: Suadad al-Salhy, "Iraq: Armed factions end truce with US over failure to withdraw troops," Middle East Eye, May 24, 2021, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iraq-armed-factions-truce-us-over-vow-increased-attacks>.
- On December 3, U.S. Representative Joe Wilson introduces a bill in the House of Representatives to designate the Badr Organization as a terrorist group.
Wilson accuses Badr of working "directly with Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Kataib Hezbollah, [Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq], and many other designated terrorist organizations to push forward its campaign of terror." U.S. President Donald Trump reportedly seeks to designate the Badr Organization before the end of his term the following month. Sources: Adam Kredo, "Congress Considers First-Ever Sanctions on Top Iranian Terror Group," *Washington Free Beacon*, December 3, 2020, <https://freebeacon.com/national-security/congress-considers-first-ever-sanctions-on-top-iranian-terror-group/>; Maria Maalouf, "Trump determined to designate pro-Iran groups as terrorist," Arab News, December 9, 2020, <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1774956>.
- - : In late September, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo calls upon the Iraqi government to act against Iranian-sponsored militias or else the United States will close its embassy in Baghdad.
On October 11, Iran-backed Shiite militias announce a conditional ceasefire and agree not to target U.S. interests on the condition that the Iraqi government work toward a full U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly ordered the factions to stand down. Sources: Ali Mamouri, "Following US warning, Iraq steps up pressure on outlawed militias," Al-Monitor, September 28, 2020, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/09/iraq-iran-us-pmu-security.html?utm_source=iterable&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1566950; Edward Wong, Lara Jakes, and Eric Schmitt, "Pompeo Threatens to Close U.S. Embassy in Iraq Unless Militias Halt Attacks," *New York Times*, September 29, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/29/us/politics/pompeo-embassy-baghdad-iraq.html>; John Davison, "Iraqi militias say they have halted anti-U.S. attacks," Reuters, October 11, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-iraq-militias/iraqi-militias-say-they-have-halted-anti-us-attacks-idUSKBN26W0IT?utm_source=iterable&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1604119; "We'll cut the ground from under Americans: Iraqi resistance leader," *Tehran Times*, October 28, 2020, <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/454043/We-ll-cut-the-ground-from-under-Americans-Iraqi-resistance-leader>; Suadad al-Salhy, "EXCLUSIVE: Iran's Khamenei ordered end to Iraqi attacks on US interests," Middle East Eye, October 22, 2020, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-khamenei-iraq-attacks-us-interests-end>.
- Senior Badr Organization leader Mohammed Mahdi al-Bayati accuses the United States and Saudi Arabia of attempting to revive ISIS in Iraq.
According to Bayati, the United States and Saudi Arabia are directly aiding ISIS terrorism in the country. Other PMF leaders accuse the United States and Saudi Arabia of providing ISIS fighters with new equipment. Source: "US, Saudi Seeking to Reactivate Daesh in Iraq: Badr Organization," Tasnim News Agency, May 3, 2020, <https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2020/05/03/2256317/us-saudi-seeking-to-reactivate-daesh-in-iraq-badr-organization>.
- KH announces that KH commander Abdul Aziz al-Mohammedawi, a.k.a. Abu Fadak, will become the new military chief of the PMF.
Factions within the PMF and within KH reportedly oppose Mohammedawi's appointment. Badr is also split between factions supporting and opposing Mohammedawi. Source: John Davison and Ahmed Rasheed, "Fractures grow among Iraq militias, spell political retreat," Reuters, April 1, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-militias/fractures-grow-among-iraq-militias-spell-political-retreat-idUSKBN21J5EZ>.
- Badr joins with other Iranian-sponsored Iraqi militias in calling for revenge against the United States after the January 3 deaths of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani and Kata'ib Hezbollah leader Jamal Jaafar Ibrahim, a.k.a. Abu Mahdi al-Mohandes, in a U.S. airstrike in Iraq.
Amiri reportedly begins a series of meetings in Iran with powerful Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and the heads of other Iraqi political parties to negotiate an end to Iraq's political stalemate and agree on a new prime minister. Sources: Simon Kerr, Chloe Cornish, and Andrew England, "Middle East braced for backlash after killing of Qasem Soleimani," Financial Times, January 3, 2020, <https://www.ft.com/content/52a2fce4-2e0f-11ea-a126-99756bd8f45e>; Shelly Kittleson, "Iraqi armed factions vow revenge for Shiite commanders' killings," Al-Monitor, January 5, 2020, <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/01/soleimani-assassination-iran-iraq-us-pmu.html>; Suadad al-Salhy, "REVEALED: The deal made in Iran that brought Iraq's new PM to power," Middle East Eye, February 5, 2020, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/revealed-deal-made-iran-brought-iraqs-new-pm-power>.

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- **December 29, 2019 - December 31, 2019:** On December 27, more than 30 missiles are fired at an Iraqi military base in Kirkuk, killing a U.S. contractor and wounding U.S. troops.
On December 31, protesters throw stones and torch a security post at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. Amiri is photographed outside the embassy during the protests. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo calls Amiri an Iranian “proxy” aiding terrorists. Sources: Barbara Starr, Kevin Bohn, and Ross Levitt, “US strikes 5 facilities in Iraq and Syria linked to Iranian-backed militia,” CNN, December 29, 2019, <https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/29/politics/us-strikes-iran-backed-militia-facilities-in-iraq-syria/index.html>; Ghassan Adnan, Isabel Coles, and Michael Gordon, “Trump Blames Iran After Militia Supporters Try to Storm U.S. Embassy in Baghdad,” *Wall Street Journal*, December 31, 2019, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/protesters-attempt-to-storm-u-s-embassy-in-baghdad-11577787978>; Seth J. Frantzman, “Pompeo names Iraqi Badr militia leader Hadi al-Amiri as Iranian proxy,” *Jerusalem Post*, January 2, 2020, <https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Pompeo-names-Iraqi-Badr-militia-leader-Hadi-al-Amiri-as-Iranian-proxy-612751>.
- **July 28, 2019:** Three explosions occur at Camp Ashraf, Badr’s main base in Iraq.
U.S. and Iraqi analysts believe the base holds Iranian missile systems. Source: Michael Knights and Alexandre Mello, “Militias Are Threatening Public Safety in Iraq,” Washington Institute, August 14, 2019, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/militias-are-threatening-public-safety-in-iraq>.
- **July 21, 2019:** A senior commander in the Badr Organization accuses the U.S. of the July 20 drone attack on a joint Badr Organization and Turkmen Brigade base in northern Iraq.
At least one Iranian IRGC member was reportedly killed in the attack. Sources: “Iran-backed militia claims US behind drone attack on Iraqi base,” *Kurdistan 24*, July 21, 2019, <https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/0a52588a-0114-43be-bcb6-06a73cb1eeb7>; Amir Toumaj & Caleb Weiss, “Iranian killed at PMF base in Iraq,” *Long War Journal*, July 24, 2019, <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/07/iranian-killed-at-pmf-base-in-iraq.php>.
- **July 16, 2019:** Joan Polaschik, the acting principal deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, tells the U.S. Senate that some Iran-backed PMF groups “plot against U.S. interests and plan operations that could kill Americans, coalition partners and Iraqis.”
Source: “Statement by Joan A. Polaschik,” United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 16, 2019, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/071619_Polaschik_Testimony.pdf.
- **July 1, 2019:** Iraq’s Prime Minister Adil Mahdi issues a decree ordering the country’s PMF militias to choose between full integration into the Iraqi armed forces or disarmament.
The decree is Mahdi’s latest attempt at gaining influence over the Iran-backed militias, which boast more than 120,000 fighters. However, KH vehemently opposes the decree while other factions choose to support integration. The prime minister’s decree stated that the PMF factions have to choose between political and paramilitary activity and remain within the state army. If they choose politics, they are not allowed to carry weapons. Sources: Jared Szuba, “Mahdi orders full integration of Shia militias into Iraq’s armed forces,” July 3, 2019, <https://thedefensepost.com/2019/07/03/iraq-mahdi-orders-popular-mobilization-units-integration/>; “Shia militia agrees to integrate into Iraq state army,” *Middle East Monitor*, July 3, 2019, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190703-shia-militia-agrees-to-integrate-into-iraq-state-army/>.
- **April 13, 2019:** Hundreds of current and former members of the Badr Organization protest in downtown Baghdad demanding long-overdue financial compensation for their combat service against Saddam Hussein, whose regime was toppled in 2003.
However, security forces affiliated with the party’s leader, Hadi al-Amiri, use violence to deter protesters, and a number of demonstrators are jailed for days. The protests failed to get coverage in local Iraqi newspapers and media outlets because of Amiri’s political influence, according to participants and organizers. Source: Omar al-Jaffal, “Badr strongman Amiri faces dissent within his group’s ranks,” *Al Monitor*, May 4, 2019, <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/05/iraq-hadi-amiri-badr-organization-pmu-iran.html>.
- **April 11, 2019:** Iraq’s prime minister assigns Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri to oversee construction and protection initiatives in Basra’s Majnoon Oil Field.
Source: “Hadi al-Amiri appointed ‘czar’ of Basra,” *Iraq Oil Report*, April 11, 2019, <https://www.iraqoilreport.com/news/hadi-al-amiri-appointed-czar-of-basra-39293/>.
- **March 11, 2019:** A former senior Badr Organization official reportedly states that officials in Iraq’s financial system, headed by Central Bank of Iraq governor Ali Al-‘Alaq, were operating in service of Iran’s IRGC and participating in counterfeiting money and money-laundering for the IRGC and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The claims have not been confirmed, although Al Arabiya has obtained reports on counterfeit funds seized at airports that correlates to the activity the senior official claims occurred. Source: “Senior Former Hashd Al-Sha’bi Official To Saudi Alarabiya.net: Iraqi Central Bank Governor Is Collaborating With Iran In Counterfeiting, Money-Laundering – As Part Of Iran’s Efforts To Circumvent U.S. Sanctions,” *Middle East Media Research Institute*, March 28, 2019, https://www.memri.org/reports/senior-former-hashd-al-shabi-official-saudi-alarabiyanet-iraqi-central-bank-governor#_edn4.
- **February 28, 2019:** A large section of the Badr Organization’s political movement breaks away, forming a new party called the Patriotic Badr Movement (Badr al-Wataniya).
The group claims that Amiri failed “to preserve the legacy of the martyrs, achieving the interests of the country, and fulfilling the ambitions of the people and their hopes, not to mention those of its own members.” Source: Hamzeh Hadad, “BADR: THE LATEST SPLINTERING OF A MAJOR PARTY IN IRAQ,” *1001 Iraqi Thoughts*, March 1, 2019, <http://1001iraqithoughts.com/2019/03/01/badr-the-latest-splintering-of-a-major-party-in-iraq/>.
- **September 18, 2018:** Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri withdraws his candidacy for Iraqi prime minister.
Source: “Iraq Shi’ite paramilitary leader al-Amiri withdraws candidacy for PM,” *Reuters*, September 18, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-politics-amiri/iraq-shiite-paramilitary-leader-al-amiri-withdraws-candidacy-for-pm-idUSKCNILYOST>.
- **September 6, 2018:** Protesters set fire to dozens of mostly pro-Iran political party offices of in the city of Basra, including the offices of the Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata’ib Hezbollah.
The following day the Fatah Alliance, of which Badr is the leading member, demands that Iraqi Prime Minister Hadi al-Abadi step down due to his inability to rein in the protesters. Source: Ali Mamouri, “Mortars hit Iraq’s Green Zone as violent protests continue,” *Al-Monitor*, September 7, 2018, <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/09/iraq-basra-green-zone-us-pmu-iran.html#ixzz5ixxo8DX2>.
- **July 13, 2018:** Shiite protesters in southern Iraq attack the political offices of Badr, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata’ib Hezbollah as they call for Iraq to withdraw from Iraq.
Source: Seth J. Frantzman, “Mass Protests Sweep Iraq, Target Pro-Iran Militias and Parties,” *Jerusalem Post*, July 16, 2018, <https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Mass-protests-sweep-Iraq-target-pro-Iran-militias-and-parties-562597>.

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- **June 12, 2018:** Badr's Fatah Alliance enters a coalition agreement with Muqtada al-Sadr's Sairoon Alliance after Sadr's party wins the Iraq elections.
However, a leader within Fatah states that the new coalition will not alter Iraq's standing relations with Iran or the United States. Source: Ali Mamouri, "Sadr allies with Iran-backed coalition to form government in Iraq," Al-Monitor, June 14, 2018, <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/06/iraq-election-muqtada-sadr-sairoon-fatah-hadi-amiri-iran.html>.
- **May 21, 2018:** Badr wins 22 parliamentary seats in Iraqi elections, the same number of seats it won in 2014.
Source: Phillip Smyth, "Iranian Militias in Iraq's Parliament: Political Outcomes and U.S. Response," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 11, 2018, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iranian-militias-in-iraqs-parliament-political-outcomes-and-u.s.-response>.
- Several PMF militias join Badr to form the Fatah Alliance, a political party running in the May 2018 parliamentary elections.
Amiri leads the alliance, which also includes the terror group Kata'ib Hezbollah. Source: Ahmad Majdyar, "Iraqi Hezbollah calls on Baghdad government to set up US exit timeline," Middle East Institute, March 6, 2018, <http://www.mei.edu/content/ia/iraqi-hezbollah-calls-baghdad-government-set-us-exit-timeline>.
- Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri states that the group might be willing to disarm or separate its political and militant activities while participating in Iraqi politics.
Amiri is reportedly in the process of establishing a new political alliance called Mujahideen that may run in Iraq's March 2018 general elections. Sources: Tamer El-Ghobashy and Mustafa Salim, "Top Iraqi Shiite cleric calls for scaling back militia influence, backing prime minister," *Washington Post*, December 15, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/top-shiite-cleric-calls-for-scaling-back-militia-influence-backing-prime-minister/2017/12/15/8834eb0e-e192-11e7-9eb6-e3c7ecfb4638_story.html?utm_term=.b8596e21b2d2; "Badr Organization militia to form party for Iraq elections," *The New Arab*, December 3, 2017, <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2017/12/3/badr-organisation-militia-to-form-party-for-iraq-elections>.
- The Badr Organization participates in an operation against Kurdish forces in Kirkuk. The Kurdish forces surrender on October 16.
Source: Jennifer Cafarella, "Iran's Role in the Kirkuk Operation in Iraq," Institute for the Study of War, November 9, 2017, <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran%E2%80%99s-role-kirkuk-operation-iraq>.
- **January 30, 2017:** Badr commander Qasim al-Araji is confirmed as Iraq's Minister of Interior, replacing former interior minister Mohammed Ghabban.
Araji is a former member of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force and was twice arrested by U.S. forces for working with the insurgency during the U.S. war in Iraq. According to leaked documents, prior to joining the Badr parliamentary bloc, Araji had been involved in smuggling and distributing explosives that were intended for use against U.S. forces. Sources: "New Iraqi Minister of Interior: from pro-Saddam to pro-Iran," Al-Arabiya, January 31, 2017, <https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2017/01/31/New-Iraqi-Minister-of-Interior-from-pro-Saddam-to-pro-Iran.html>; Emily Anagnostos, "The Campaign for Mosul: January 24-31, 2017," Institute for the Study of War, January 31, 2017, <http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/campaign-mosul-january-24-31-2017>; Callum Patton, "Iraq's Powerful Interior Minister, Now Leading Fight Against ISIS, Was Held Twice by U.S. Forces After 2003," *Newsweek*, <http://www.newsweek.com/trained-iran-and-arrested-smuggling-explosives-iraqs-interior-minister-was-us-596161>.
- The Badr Organization participates in the operation to retake Mosul from ISIS militants.
Human Rights Watch has called upon Iraq to ban the abusive militia due to human rights abuses by the Badr Organization and other Shiite militia groups. Source: "Iraq: Ban Abusive Militias from Mosul Operation," Human Rights Watch, July 31, 2016, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/31/iraq-ban-abusive-militias-mosul-operation>.
- The Badr Organization engages in a series of abductions and killings targeting Sunnis throughout the month, which Human Rights Watch characterizes as "serious violations of international humanitarian law."
Source: "Attacks on Iraq's Sunnis could constitute war crimes: rights group," Reuters, January 31, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-abuses-idUSKCN0V90DA>.
- The Badr Organization claims to have regained control of over half of Iraq's Baiji refinery from ISIS.
Source: "Iraq Badr Organization: 50 percent of Baiji refinery held by Iraqi forces," Rudaw, December 5, 2015, <http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/120520151>.
- **April 7, 2015:** After Iraqi and Shiite paramilitary forces take back Tikrit from ISIS forces, Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi orders that all popular mobilization forces be placed under his office's direct command.
According to a *New York Times* article, Hadi al-Amiri has led the "collective popular mobilization," whose fighters stand accused of looting and killing prisoners in and around Tikrit. Source: Rod Nordland, "After Victory Over ISIS in Tikrit, Next Battle Requires a New Template," *New York Times*, April 7, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/world/middleeast/iraq-isis-anbar-sunni-shiite.html>.
- **March 31, 2015:** In Baghdad, Badr members rally to support the Houthi rebels in Yemen.
Source: "Iraq's Badr Organization Offers to Join Yemen's Ansarullah in War against S. Arabia," FARS News Agency, April 1, 2015, <http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940112000339>.
- The Iraqi military, the Badr Organization, and other Shiite paramilitary forces launch a campaign to retake Tikrit from ISIS militants.
The U.S. military launches airstrikes against ISIS in Tikrit on March 25, allegedly "after receiving assurances from the Iraqi government that the Shiite militias had withdrawn from Tikrit and that the ground operation would be led by the Iraqi military, and not Iranian generals and their militia proxies." Sources: Thayer al-Sudani, "Insight: From eastern flank, Iran-backed force advances on Tikrit," Reuters, March 4, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/04/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-front-insight-idUSKBN0M01MV20150304>; Agence France-Presse, "Iraq militia chief slams army 'weaklings' over Tikrit strikes," Yahoo News, March 22, 2015, <http://news.yahoo.com/iraq-militia-chief-slams-army-weaklings-over-tikrit-142811365.html>; Bill Roggio, "US continues airstrikes in Tikrit despite involvement of Iranian-backed Shiite militias," *Long War Journal*, March 28, 2015, <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/03/us-continues-airstrikes-in-tikrit-despite-involvement-of-iranian-backed-shiite-militias.php>.
- **February 3, 2015:** Iraq's human rights minister reveals that the Iraqi government has asked the United Arab Emirates to remove the Badr Organization from its list of designated terrorist organizations.
Source: Fahd Al-Zayabi, "Iraq asks UAE to remove Badr Organization and Sadr militia from terror list," *Asharq Al-Awsat* (London), February 4, 2015, <http://www.aawsat.net/2015/02/article55341129/iraq-asks-uae-to-remove-badr-organization-and-sadr-militia-from-terror-list>.
- Hadi al-Amiri allegedly meets with U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Stuart Jones, who offers U.S. air support to al-Amiri's ground campaign.

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When questioned about the alleged meeting with Amiri, a spokesman for the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad stated, “We don’t confirm the details of our conversations. Our policy is that we support the [Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)] with air strikes and we have urged that the militias be under the command and control of the ISF.” Source: Eli Lake, “Iran’s Militias Are Taking Over Iraq’s Army,” Bloomberg View, February 3, 2015, <http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-02-03/exclusive-iran-s-militias-are-taking-over-iraq-s-army>.

- - : The Sunni governor of Iraq’s Diyala province and other officials accuse Shiite militants and security forces in Diyala (under the control of Hadi al-Amiri) of executing at least 72 unarmed civilians in Diyala’s eastern province in January. Al-Amiri denies these claims. The Badr Organization refuses to take journalists to the village of Barwana, where the Sunni men were found shot dead “execution-style,” according to the *Washington Post*. Sources: Ned Parker and Stephen Kalin, “Iraqi commander denies paramilitary groups involved in killings,” Reuters, February 9, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/09/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-amiri-idUSKBN0LD17B20150209>; Liz Sly, “Pro-Iran militias’ success in Iraq could undermine U.S.,” *Washington Post*, February 15, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraqs-pro-iranian-shiite-militias-lead-the-war-against-the-islamic-state/2015/02/15/5bbb1cf0-ac94-11e4-8876-460b1144cbc1_story.html.
- **December 29, 2014:** Hadi al-Amiri threatens residents of the district of Muqdadiyya in Diyala province, saying, “The day of judgment is coming” and “We will attack the area until nothing is left. Is my message clear?” In January, 72 civilians will be killed in Barwana, Muqdadiyya. Hadi al-Amiri and the Badr Organization are suspected of responsibility. Sources: “Iraq: Militias Escalate Abuses, Possibly War Crimes,” Human Rights Watch, February 15, 2015, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/15/iraq-militias-escalate-abuses-possibly-war-crimes>; Ned Parker and Stephen Kalin, “Iraqi commander denies paramilitary groups involved in killings,” Reuters, February 9, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/09/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-amiri-idUSKBN0LD17B20150209>.
- ISIS and the Badr Organization clash in the Iraqi town of Mukayshfah, on the highway between Samarra and then-ISIS-held Tikrit. Source: Bill Roggio and Caleb Weiss, “Islamic State overruns Badr Brigade position near Samarra,” *Long War Journal*, December 11, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/12/islamic_state_overru_5.php.
- The United Arab Emirates adds the Badr Organization to its list of designated terrorist organizations. Source: “List of groups designated terrorist organisations by the UAE,” *National* (Abu Dhabi), November 16, 2014, <http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/list-of-groups-designated-terrorist-organisations-by-the-uae>.
- **October 18, 2014:** Iraq’s parliament votes to elect Mohammed Ghabban, a Badr member, as interior minister. According to reports, the Badr Organization had been advocating for its leader Hadi al-Amiri to receive the post, but Prime Minister Abadi had resisted pressure to nominate al-Amiri because of the group’s history of sectarian violence. After allegedly receiving threats from the Badr Organization to withdraw from the government if one of their members was not nominated, Abadi ultimately chose to appoint the lesser-known Ghabban. Nonetheless, Loveday Morris of the *Washington Post* writes, “[T]here is little doubt that Hadi al-Amiri, head of the [Badr Organization] party and its military wing, will wield the real power in the ministry.” Sources: Loveday Morris, “Appointment of Iraq’s new interior minister opens door to militia and Iranian influence,” *Washington Post*, October 18, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/appointment-of-iraqs-new-interior-minister-opens-door-to-militia-and-iranian-influence/2014/10/18/f6f2a347-d38c-4743-902a-254a169ca274_story.html; Kirk Semple, “After Delay, Iraq Appoints Two to Posts for Security,” *New York Times*, October 18, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/world/middleeast/after-delay-iraq-appoints-two-to-posts-for-security.html?_r=0.
- **October 14, 2014:** ISIS claims credit for a suicide bombing attack in Baghdad that kills Iraqi MP and senior Badr commander Ahmed al-Khafaji. Source: Bill Roggio, “Islamic State suicide bomber kills Badr militia leader in Baghdad,” *Long War Journal*, October 14, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/10/islamic_state_suicide_bomber_k.php.
- **September 1, 2014:** Anti-ISIS forces, including the Badr Organization, retake Amerli from ISIS control. Source: Shashank Bengali, “In Iraq, residents of Amerli celebrate end of militant siege,” *Los Angeles Times*, September 1, 2014, <http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iraq-amerli-siege-20140902-story.html>.
- **August 21, 2014 - August 31, 2014:** The Badr Organization fights to retake the Shiite town of Amerli in northern Iraq. Source: Abigail Hauslohner, “Gunmen kill dozens at Sunni mosque in Iraq, raising fears of sectarian war,” *New York Times*, August 22, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/gunmen-kill-dozens-at-sunni-mosque-in-iraq-raising-fears-of-sectarian-war/2014/08/22/d4de2c86-2a07-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html.
- Human Rights Watch accuses the Badr Organization of killing Sunni prisoners. Also in July, the Badr Organization comes under criticism for allegedly employing child soldiers. One Badr recruiter says he has seen 16-year-old fighters and “also boys younger than that. Some are still in training, and some have already taken part in the fight.” A Badr senior member denies that the group employs child soldiers, saying, “We are the most prominent group in liberating areas so far, so some young people may be bragging that they are fighting for us. But that is not true.” Sources: Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Special Report: The fighters of Iraq who answer to Iran,” Reuters, November 12, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/12/us-mideast-crisis-militias-specialreport-idUSKCN01W0ZA20141112>; Maggie Fick, “Underage fighters drawn into Iraq sectarian war,” Reuters, July 11, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/11/us-iraq-security-teenagers-insight-idUSKBN0FG1UG20140711>.
- **June 7, 2014:** The Badr Organization releases a statement threatening any group that damages shrines in the Iraqi city of Samarra. Source: Phillip Smyth, “Iranian Proxies Step Up Their Role in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 13, 2014, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iranian-proxies-step-up-their-role-in-iraq>.
- Amer al-Qalamouni, director of the Syrian opposition-affiliated Qalamouni media center, says that Badr “is taking the lead in the field in the number of fighters [near Yabroud, Syria], now over 1,000 men, after it arrived in Syria recently.” Al-Qalamouni quotes Syrian military sources who say that around “2,000 fighters from the Badr Organization arrived in Syria on Saturday [March 1, 2014] to fight alongside the Syrian government forces.” The Badr Organization denies that fighters have the group’s permission to fight in Syria. Source: Nazeer Rida, “Iraqi fighters lead attack on the town of Yabroud, say Syrian activists,” *Asharq Al-Awsat* (London), March 4, 2014, <http://www.aawsat.net/2014/03/article55329651/iraqi-fighters-lead-attack-on-the-town-of-yabroud-say-syrian-activists>.
- **November 20, 2013:** Analyst Phillip Smyth testifies before Congress that Iranian proxy groups, including the Badr Organization, “are the main contributors of Shia fighters through Syria.”

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According to Smyth, “[W]hile initially claiming that they were dropping their armed capability, Badr has become a key Iraqi Shi’a Islamist militia in Syria. Through their ‘Armed Wing,’ Badr has claimed to have sent some 1,500 members to Syria as part of their expeditionary unit called *Quwet al-Shahid Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr* (the Martyr Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr Forces).” Source: *Terrorist Groups in Syria: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives*, 113th Cong. 17-24 (2013) (statement of Phillip Smyth, Middle East research analyst, University of Maryland), <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg85643/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg85643.pdf>.

- **July 28, 2013:** The Badr Organization announces the name of its military wing in Syria, “Quwet al-Shahid al-Sadr.” The Badr Organization will later refer to its Syrian front as “Quwet al-Shahid Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr” (BO-QSMBS). As part of the announcement, the Badr Organization mourns one of its fighters killed in Syria. Source: Phillip Smyth, “The Badr Organization’s Syrian Expeditionary Force: Quwet al-Shahid Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr,” *Jihadology*, October 18, 2013, <http://jihadology.net/2013/10/18/hizballah-cavalcade-the-badr-organizations-syrian-expeditionary-force-quwet-al-shahid-muhammed-baqir-al-sadr/>.
- **July 21, 2013:** The Badr Organization announces its first casualty in Syria. Source: Phillip Smyth, “The Badr Organization’s Syrian Expeditionary Force: Quwet al-Shahid Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr,” *Jihadology*, October 18, 2013, <http://jihadology.net/2013/10/18/hizballah-cavalcade-the-badr-organizations-syrian-expeditionary-force-quwet-al-shahid-muhammed-baqir-al-sadr/>.
- **July 13, 2013:** The Badr Organization announces on Facebook that it has 1,500 militants operating in Syria. Source: Phillip Smyth, “The Badr Organization’s Syrian Expeditionary Force: Quwet al-Shahid Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr,” *Jihadology*, October 18, 2013, <http://jihadology.net/2013/10/18/hizballah-cavalcade-the-badr-organizations-syrian-expeditionary-force-quwet-al-shahid-muhammed-baqir-al-sadr/>.
- Reuters reports that “[m]ost of those fighting in Syria are former members of the Mehdi army of anti-U.S. cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, or from the Badr Organization.” Source: Suadad al-Salhy, “Iraqi Shi’ites flock to Assad’s side as sectarian split widens,” Reuters, June 19, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/19/us-iraqi-syria-militants-idUSBRE9510ZA20130619>.
- - : Badr and KH dispatch a contingent of fighters—Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS)—to support the Assad regime in Syria. Source: Heshmat Alavi, “What is Iran’s ‘national treasure’ in Iraq?” *Al Arabiya English*, December 19, 2016, <https://english.alarabiya.net/en/features/2016/12/19/What-is-Iran-s-national-treasure-in-Iraq-.html>.
- The Badr Organization officially splits from ISCI to act as its own political party. Source: Ahmed Hussein, “URGENT—SIIC, Badr Organization announce their official split,” *Iraqi News*, March 11, 2012, <http://www.iraqinews.com/baghdad-politics/urgent-siic-badr-organization-announce-their-official-split/>.
- **December 30, 2011:** Badr members celebrate the end of the U.S. military presence in Iraq by plastering the walls of government buildings with posters of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and his predecessor, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Source: Associated Press, “Iraqi Leader Calls for Unity and Political Stability After U.S. Troop Departure,” *Fox News*, January 1, 2012, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/01/01/iraqi-leader-calls-for-unity-and-political-stability-after-us-troop-departure/>.
- **December 12, 2011:** Hadi al-Amiri visits the White House, sparking protest from survivors of the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, as well as relatives of the victims. Source: “Terror Attack Victim ‘Sick’ Over Iraqi Minister Hadi al-Ameri’s Visit to White House,” *Fox News Insider*, December 16, 2011, <http://insider.foxnews.com/2011/12/16/terror-attack-victim-sick-over-iraqi-minister-hadi-al-ameris-visit-to-white-house>.
- Hadi al-Amiri is appointed as Iraq’s transportation minister. Source: Michael Eisenstadt, Michael Knights, and Ahmed Ali, “Iran’s Influence in Iraq: Countering Tehran’s Whole-of-Government Approach,” *Policy Focus* 111 (April 2011), <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus111.pdf>.
- Nouri al-Maliki retakes Basra from Sadrist with the help of government forces, the Badr Organization, and others. Sources: Campbell Robertson, “Iraqi Forces Raid Mosque With Links to Sadrists,” *New York Times*, July 12, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/12/world/middleeast/12iraq.html>; James Glanz and Alissa J. Rubin, “Iraqi Army Takes Last Basra Areas From Sadr Force,” *New York Times*, April 20, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/world/middleeast/20iraq.html?_r=1>=pay; Nazar Janabi, “Who Won the Battle for Basra?” *Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, April 10, 2008, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/who-won-the-battle-for-basra>.
- The U.N. human rights chief in Iraq reports that hundreds of Iraqis were being tortured and executed by death squads working for Iraq’s interior ministry. According to the *Independent*, “Many of the 110,000 policemen and police commandos under the ministry’s control are suspected of being former members of the Badr Brigade.” Source: “Iraq’s death squads: On the brink of civil war,” *Independent* (London), February 26, 2006, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraqs-death-squads-on-the-brink-of-civil-war-467784.html>.
- - : The Badr Organization infiltrates the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), embedding itself in the gendarmerie of Iraq’s national police force. Sources: Kenneth Katzman, “CRS Report for Congress: Iran-Iraq Relations,” Congressional Research Service, April 15, 2010, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA520775>; Federal Police (FP), “GlobalSecurity.org,” GlobalSecurity.org, accessed April 24, 2015, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iraq/fp.htm>.
- U.S. soldiers raid a police building in Baghdad, uncovering secret prisons that hold 168 abused and mistreated prisoners. The Badr Organization is accused of covering up human rights abuses against the prisoners. Source: Ned Parker, “Torture by Iraqi militias: the report Washington did not want you to see,” Reuters, December 14, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-iraq-militias/>.
- - : Hadi al-Amiri plays “a leading role in organizing attacks by the Badr Corps militia...against Sunnis,” according to a leaked cable from the U.S. State Department. The cable indicates Amiri “may have personally ordered attacks on up to 2,000 Sunnis.” It continues: “One of [Amiri’s] preferred methods of killing allegedly involved using a power drill to pierce the skulls of his adversaries.” Sources: Loveday Morris, “Appointment of Iraq’s new interior minister opens door to militia and Iranian influence,” *Washington Post*, October 18, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/appointment-of-iraqs-new-interior-minister-opens-door-to-militia-and-iranian-influence/2014/10/18/t6f2a347-d38c-4743-902a-254a169ca274_story.html; “Election Law Crisis Fosters Sunni-shia Cooperation,” *WikiLeaks*, September 1, 2011,

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<https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=09BAGHDAD3175&q=amiri%20badr%20drill>.

- **September 9, 2003:** Coalition forces ban party militias.
The Badr Brigades change their name to “the Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development” and pledge to lay down their arms. However, SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim maintains that the Badr Organization will continue to serve a purpose by “maintaining security and stability.” Sources: Lionel Beehner, “Iraq’s Militia Groups,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 26, 2006, <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraqs-militia-groups/p11824#p6>; “Who’s who in Iraq: Sciri,” BBC News, June 17, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3769991.stm; “Shiite Arabs,” PBS Frontline, accessed April 15, 2015, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/beyond/etc/pop_shiite.html.
- **August 8, 2003:** A bomb explodes outside the shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf, Iraq, killing SCIRI founder Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim. His brother and then-leader of the Badr Brigades, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, assumes leadership of SCIRI. Sources: “Shiite Arabs,” PBS Frontline, accessed April 15, 2015, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/beyond/etc/pop_shiite.html; Lawrence Joffe, “Obituary: Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim,” *Guardian* (London), August 29, 2003, <http://www.theguardian.com/news/2003/aug/30/guardianobituaries.iraq>; Mahan Abedin, “Dossier: The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),” *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, 5 (October 2003):10, http://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0310_iraqd.htm.
- **March 3, 2003:** Following the U.S. invasion in Iraq, Hadi al-Amiri returns from neighboring Iran “to lead the Badr Brigade that waged a vicious sectarian war on Iraqi Sunnis,” reports the *Globe and Mail*.
Sources: Patrick Martin, “Analysis of the Badr Organization,” *Globe and Mail*, February 25, 2015, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/analysis-of-the-badr-organization/article23208662/>; “Shiite Arabs,” PBS Frontline, accessed April 15, 2015, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/beyond/etc/pop_shiite.html.
- **June 6, 1996:** A bomb explodes near a housing complex in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. Air Force servicemen.
Hadi al-Amiri is linked to the attack through a U.S. federal indictment. Source: “Terror Attack Victim ‘Sick’ Over Iraqi Minister Hadi al-Ameri’s Visit to White House,” Fox News Insider, December 16, 2011, <http://insider.foxnews.com/2011/12/16/terror-attack-victim-sick-over-iraqi-minister-hadi-al-ameris-visit-to-white-house>.
- Badr Brigades forces cross the border from Iran into Iraq during the Shiite uprising, but are quickly crushed by the Iraqi army.
Source: Mahan Abedin, “Dossier: The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),” *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, 5 (October 2003):10, http://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0310_iraqd.htm.
- - : The Badr Brigades attack targets in southern Iraq.
Source: Susannah George, “Breaking Badr,” *Foreign Policy*, November 6, 2014, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/06/breaking-badr/>
- - : The Badr Brigades fight as a pro-Iranian militia during the Iran-Iraq War.
Source: Ahmed Rasheed and Ned Parker, “Shi’ite militias expand influence, redraw map in central Iraq,” Reuters, December 31, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/31/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-idUSKBN0K909K20141231>.

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Violent history:

- **July 19, 2019:** An attack occurs at the PMF base near Amerli which causes a substantial explosion and subsequent fire that damages an ammunition depot. The base belongs to either the Turkmen Brigades or the Badr Organization. Two paramilitary fighters are killed and an unreported number are injured in the attack. Rumors circulate that the attack is from drone strikes conducted by the United States or ISIS. Mahdi Taqi al Amerli—an Iraqi Turkmen regional deputy affiliated with the Badr Organization—states that the base was definitely hit by either a missile or a drone strike. Mohamad Mahdi Bayati, director of the Badr Organization’s Northern Axis, claims “the technique used in the bombing is not a Da’esh [ISIS] one but an American invention and the bombing is their work.”⁹⁰
- **December 24, 2018:** Members of the Yazidi Peshmerga unit Ezidkhan accuse the Badr Organization of arresting 30 of their members in Sinjar. The men were reportedly released after 12 hours.⁹¹
- **January 5, 2018:** Locals and human rights organizations accuse the Badr Organization and other Shiite militias of looting, arson, and bombing Kurdish homes in the mixed Iraqi town of Tuz Khurmatu, which the militias occupy as part of their fight against ISIS.⁹²
- **January 2016:** The Badr Organization engages in a series of abductions and killings targeting Sunnis throughout the month, which Human Rights Watch characterizes as “serious violations of international humanitarian law.”⁹³
- **January-February 2015:** The Sunni governor of Iraq’s Diyala province and other officials accuse Shiite militants and security forces in Diyala (under the control of Hadi al-Amiri) of executing at least 72 unarmed civilians in Diyala’s eastern province in January. Amiri denies these claims.⁹⁴ However, the Badr Organization refuses to take journalists to the village of Barwana, where the Sunni men were found shot dead “execution-style,” according to the *Washington Post*.⁹⁵
- **December 29, 2014:** Hadi al-Amiri threatens residents of the district of Muqdadiyya in Diyala province, saying, “The day of judgment is coming” and “We will attack the area until nothing is left. Is my message clear?”⁹⁶ In January, 72 civilians will be killed in Barwana, Muqdadiyya. Hadi al-Amiri and the Badr Organization are suspected of responsibility.⁹⁷
- **December 2014:** ISIS and the Badr Organization clash in the Iraqi town of Mukayshfah, on the highway between Samarra and then-ISIS-held Tikrit.⁹⁸
- **September 1, 2014:** Anti-ISIS forces, including the Badr Organization, take Amerli.⁹⁹
- **Late August 2014:** The Badr Organization fights to retake the Shiite town of Amerli in northern Iraq.¹⁰⁰
- **July 2014:** Human Rights Watch accuses the Badr Organization of killing Sunni prisoners.¹⁰¹ Also in July, Badr comes under criticism for allegedly employing child soldiers. One Badr recruiter says he has seen 16-year-old fighters and “also boys younger than that. Some are still in training, and some have already taken part in the fight.”¹⁰² A Badr senior member denies that the group employs child soldiers, saying, “We are the most prominent group in liberating areas so far, so some young people may be bragging that they are fighting for us. But that is not true.”¹⁰³
- **November 20, 2013:** Analyst Phillip Smyth testifies before Congress that Iranian proxy groups, including Badr, “are the main contributors of Shia fighters through Syria.” According to Smyth, “[W]hile initially claiming that they were dropping their armed capability, Badr has become a key Iraqi Shi’a Islamist militia in Syria. Through their ‘Armed Wing,’ Badr has claimed to have sent some 1,500 members to Syria as part of their expeditionary unit called Quwet al-Shahid Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr (the Martyr Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr Forces).”¹⁰⁴
- **July 13, 2013:** Badr announces on Facebook that it has 1,500 militants operating in Syria.¹⁰⁵
- **June 2013:** Reuters reports that “[m]ost of those fighting in Syria are former members of the Mehdi army of anti-U.S. cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, or from the Badr Organization.”¹⁰⁶
- **2006:** The U.N. human rights chief in Iraq reports that hundreds of Iraqis were being tortured and executed by death squads working for Iraq’s interior ministry. According to the *Independent*, “Many of the 110,000 policemen and police commandos under the ministry’s control are suspected of being former members of the Badr Brigade.”¹⁰⁷
- **2004-2006:** Hadi al-Amiri plays “a leading role in organizing attacks by the Badr Corps militia...against Sunnis,” according to a leaked cable from the U.S. State Department. The cable indicates that Amiri “may have personally ordered attacks on up to 2,000 Sunnis.” It continues: “One of [Amiri’s] preferred methods of killing allegedly involved using a power drill to pierce the skulls of his adversaries.”¹⁰⁸
- **June 25, 1996:** A bomb explodes near a housing complex in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. Air Force servicemen. Hadi al-Amiri is linked to the attack through a U.S. federal indictment.¹⁰⁹
- **1991:** Badr Brigades forces cross the border from Iran into Iraq during the Shiite uprising, but are quickly crushed by the Iraqi army.¹¹⁰

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- **1990s:** The Badr Brigades attack targets in southern Iraq.¹¹¹
- **1980s:** The Badr Brigades fight as a pro-Iranian militia during the Iran-Iraq War.¹¹²

- ⁹⁰ Amir Toumaj and Caleb Weiss, "Iranian killed at PMF base in Iraq," Long War Journal, July 24, 2019, <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/07/iranian-killed-at-pmf-base-in-iraq.php>; "Iran-backed militia claims US behind drone attack on Iraqi base," Kurdistan 24, July 21, 2019, <https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/0a52588a-0114-43be-bcb6-06a73cb1eeb7>.
- ⁹¹ Sangar Ali, "Iraqi militia releases 30 Yezidi Peshmerga, after detaining them for 12 hours," Kurdistan 24, December 24, 2018, <http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/d13b5659-ef16-459a-8386-de37641441bb>.
- ⁹² "Shiite leader promises to withdraw Hashd forces from Tuz Khurmatu," Rudaw, January 5, 2018, <http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/050120185>.
- ⁹³ "Attacks on Iraq's Sunnis could constitute war crimes: rights group," Reuters, January 31, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-abuses-idUSKCN0V90DA>.
- ⁹⁴ Ned Parker and Stephen Kalin, "Iraqi commander denies paramilitary groups involved in killings," Reuters, February 9, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/09/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-amiri-idUSKBN0LD17B20150209>.
- ⁹⁵ Liz Sly, "Pro-Iran militias' success in Iraq could undermine U.S.," *Washington Post*, February 15, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraqs-pro-iranian-shiite-militias-lead-the-war-against-the-islamic-state/2015/02/15/5bbb1cf0-ac94-11e4-8876-460b1144cbc1_story.html.
- ⁹⁶ "Iraq: Militias Escalate Abuses, Possibly War Crimes," Human Rights Watch, February 15, 2015, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/15/iraq-militias-escalate-abuses-possibly-war-crimes>.
- ⁹⁷ Ned Parker and Stephen Kalin, "Iraqi commander denies paramilitary groups involved in killings," Reuters, February 9, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/09/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-amiri-idUSKBN0LD17B20150209>.
- ⁹⁸ Bill Roggio, "Islamic State suicide bomber kills Badr militia leader in Baghdad," *Long War Journal*, October 14, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/10/islamic_state_suicide_bomber_k.php.
- ⁹⁹ Source: Shashank Bengali, "In Iraq, residents of Amerli celebrate end of militant siege," *Los Angeles Times*, September 1, 2014, <http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iraq-amerli-siege-20140902-story.html>.
- ¹⁰⁰ Abigail Hauslohner, "Gunmen kill dozens at Sunni mosque in Iraq, raising fears of sectarian war," *New York Times*, August 22, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/gunmen-kill-dozens-at-sunni-mosque-in-iraq-raising-fears-of-sectarian-war/2014/08/22/d4de2c86-2a07-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html.
- ¹⁰¹ Babak Dehghanpisheh, "Special Report: The fighters of Iraq who answer to Iran," Reuters, November 12, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/12/us-mideast-crisis-militias-specialreport-idUSKCN0IW0ZA20141112>.
- ¹⁰² Maggie Fick, "Underage fighters drawn into Iraq sectarian war," Reuters, July 11, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/11/us-iraq-security-teenagers-insight-idUSKBN0FG1UG20140711>.
- ¹⁰³ Maggie Fick, "Underage fighters drawn into Iraq sectarian war," Reuters, July 11, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/11/us-iraq-security-teenagers-insight-idUSKBN0FG1UG20140711>.
- ¹⁰⁴ Terrorist Groups in Syria: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, 113th Cong. 17-24 (2013) (statement of Phillip Smyth, Middle East research analyst, University of Maryland), <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg85643/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg85643.pdf>.
- ¹⁰⁵ Phillip Smyth, "The Badr Organization's Syrian Expeditionary Force: Quwet al-Shahid Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr," *Jihadology*, October 18, 2013, <http://jihadology.net/2013/10/18/hizballah-cavalcade-the-badr-organizations-syrian-expeditionary-force-quwet-al-shahid-muhammed-baqir-al-sadr/>.
- ¹⁰⁶ Suadad al-Salhy, "Iraqi Shi'ites flock to Assad's side as sectarian split widens," Reuters, June 19, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/19/us-iraq-syria-militants-idUSBRE95I0ZA20130619>.
- ¹⁰⁷ "Iraq's death squads: On the brink of civil war," *Independent* (London), February 26, 2006, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraqs-death-squads-on-the-brink-of-civil-war-467784.html>.
- ¹⁰⁸ Loveday Morris, "Appointment of Iraq's new interior minister opens door to militia and Iranian influence," *Washington Post*, October 18, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/appointment-of-iraqs-new-interior-minister-opens-door-to-militia-and-iranian-influence/2014/10/18/f6f2a347-d38c-4743-902a-254a169ca274_story.html; "Election Law Crisis Fosters Sunni-shia Cooperation," WikiLeaks, September 1, 2011, <https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=09BAGHDAD3175&q=amiri%20badr%20drill>.
- ¹⁰⁹ "Terror Attack Victim 'Sick' Over Iraqi Minister Hadi al-Ameri's Visit to White House," Fox News Insider, December 16, 2011, <http://insider.foxnews.com/2011/12/16/terror-attack-victim-sick-over-iraqi-minister-hadi-al-ameris-visit-to-white-house>.
- ¹¹⁰ Mahan Abedin, "Dossier: The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)," *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, 5 (October 2003):10, http://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0310_iraqd.htm.
- ¹¹¹ Susannah George, "Breaking Badr," *Foreign Policy*, November 6, 2014, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/06/breaking-badr/>.
- ¹¹² Ahmed Rasheed and Ned Parker, "Shi'ite militias expand influence, redraw map in central Iraq," Reuters, December 31, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/31/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-idUSKBN0K909K20141231>.

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Designations:

Designations by Foreign Governments and Organizations:

- The United Arab Emirates designated “The Badr Organisation in Iraq” as a terrorist organization in November 2014.¹¹³

¹¹³ “List of groups designated terrorist organisations by the UAE,” *National* (Abu Dhabi), November 16, 2014, <http://www.thenational.ae/government/list-of-groups-designated-terrorist-organisations-by-the-uae>.

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Associations:

Ties to Extremist Entities:

- **Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH)**

The Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH) are known as “Iran’s three big Iraqi militias.”¹¹⁴ Each group is part of the anti-ISIS popular mobilization forces (PMF), an umbrella organization of Shiite militias. The coalition was formed in June 2014 after Iraq’s then–prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, called for its establishment and Iraq’s highest Shiite authority, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, issued a fatwa urging Iraqis to fight the extremist group ISIS.¹¹⁵ In battles, there is some degree of cooperation between the PMF militias, though each militia leader within the PMF ultimately retains his autonomy.¹¹⁶ Deceased IRGC-Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani reportedly coordinated military operations for all three militias before his death in January 2020.¹¹⁷
- **Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)**

The Badr Organization and Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), along with Asaib Ahl al-Haq, comprise Iraq’s anti-ISIS popular mobilization forces (PMF).¹¹⁸ In battles against ISIS there is some degree of cooperation between the militias, though each militia leader ultimately retains his autonomy.¹¹⁹ IRGC-Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani reportedly coordinated military operations for all three militias before his death in January 2020.¹²⁰ The United States launched airstrikes against KH targets around Baghdad on March 12, 2020, in response to what it called the “threat posed by Iranian-backed Shia militia groups ... who continue to attack bases hosting ... coalition forces.”¹²¹
- **Iran**

Reuters writes that the Badr Organization is “Iran’s oldest proxy in Iraq.”¹²² According to senior Iraqi politicians, Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri is the commander closest to Iran on the battlefield.¹²³ Amiri has not denied his group’s relationship with the Iranian regime, once saying, “Iran supported us very well. They gave us weapons, they gave us ammunition, they gave us their military experience.”¹²⁴ The Badr Organization has close ties to Iran’s military, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and its external branch, the Quds Force.
- **Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)**

The Badr Brigades militia was formed, trained, and equipped by Iran’s IRGC in 1983, according to the Congressional Research Service.¹²⁵ As of 2015, Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri retains a close relationship with the leader of IRGC’s Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani, and the Badr Organization itself has reportedly been under Soleimani’s command.¹²⁶ The Quds Force is Iran’s external military branch, charged with spreading Iran’s Islamist ideology and system of governance beyond the country’s borders.¹²⁷

Ties to Extremist Individuals:

- **Bashar al-Assad**

In his tenure as Iraq’s transportation minister, Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri “allegedly allowed Iranian overflights to supply [Assad] with weapons during the regime’s brutal crackdown” on dissidents, according to journalist Susannah George.¹²⁸ The group has reportedly sent thousands of Shiite fighters to Syria. In November 2013, analyst Phillip Smyth testified before Congress that the Badr Organization is “the main contributors of Shia fighters through Syria.” Smyth stated that the Badr Organization is a “key Iraqi Shi’a Islamist militia in Syria. Through their ‘Armed Wing’, Badr has claimed to have sent some 1,500 members to Syria as part of their expeditionary unit called *Quwet al-Shahid Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr* (the Martyr Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr Forces).”¹²⁹ In March 2014, the group allegedly sent an additional 2,000 fighters to Syria.¹³⁰
- **Qasem Soleimani**

Badr leader Hadi al-Amiri was public about his relationship with the deceased leader of Iran’s IRGC-Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani, calling him “a friend, a good man and a good fighter.”¹³¹ In 1991, Soleimani reportedly “played a part in planning and administering the military operations of the Badr forces in the Shiite uprising against” Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.¹³² A Reuters report from February 2015 describes Soleimani as having directed the Badr Organization.¹³³ Amiri was previously photographed with Soleimani as the two discussed battle strategy and celebrated victories.¹³⁴ Soleimani died in a January 2020 U.S. airstrike.¹³⁵

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Rhetoric:

Hadi al-Amiri, Badr Organization leader, August 2022

Statement during the August 5-7 confrontation between Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Israel:

“We condemn the cowardly aggression of the Zionist regime against Palestinians. The Zionist enemy continues its crimes amid the silence and submission of the region’s despots, and collaboration of the regimes that support the bogus regime.”¹³⁶

Hadi al-Amiri, Badr Organization leader, June 2019

“There is no doubt that ISIS is a bastard child of the United States. I and my comrades will never surrender to the involvement of the United States and its allies in Iraq, and this was our position from the beginning.... [ISIS’s] main designers and the creators were the United States and their master, Israel.”¹³⁷

Hadi al-Amiri, Badr Organization leader, August 2018

“We will not allow you to interfere in the political affairs of Iraq and do not accept the imposition of names [by the United States] for the prime minister...If you impose any name on us, then I will overthrow his government within two months.”¹³⁸

Hadi al-Amiri, Badr Organization leader, November 2017

“We will adopt a parliamentary decision to pull out all American troops [from Iraq].”¹³⁹

Hadi al-Amiri, Badr leader, November 9, 2016

“Tal Afar will be the cemetery of Turkish soldiers should Turkey attempt to take part in the battle.”¹⁴⁰

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