



# FINAL PROGRAM REPORT CAPPTAN

Counter Extremism Project

July 2018

**COUNTER  
EXTREMISM  
PROJECT**

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## ACRONYMS

CAPPTAN: Community Awareness Program for Preventing Violent Extremism in Tanzania  
CCM: Chama Cha Mapinduzi  
CEP: Counter Extremism Project  
CSO: Civil Society Organization  
CUF: Civic United Front  
FBO: Faith-Based Organization  
GOT: Government of Tanzania  
GPF: Global Peace Foundation  
IRCPT: Inter-Religious Council for Peace Tanzania  
NCTC: National Counterterrorism Center  
LHRC: Legal and Human Rights Centre  
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization  
NWG: National Working Group  
PVE: Preventing Violent Extremism  
RWG: Regional Working Group  
UN: United Nations  
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme  
VE: Violent Extremism  
YUNA: Youth of United Nations Association

## I. INTRODUCTION

Over the course of 18 months, the Counter Extremism Project (CEP)'s *Community Awareness Program for Preventing Violent Extremism in Tanzania (CAPPTAN)* convened Tanzanian civil society organizations (CSOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs), local government representatives, and global experts for training, networking, and mentorship with the ultimate aim of preventing violent extremism (PVE) in Tanzania. This unique, multilevel program has equipped stakeholders with the tools to identify and prevent the drivers of violent extremism (VE) within their communities. Financed by the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Counterterrorism, CAPPTAN has provided technical assistance to address three specific drivers of VE in Tanzania: 1) the misuse of religion; 2) the unique vulnerabilities of marginalized communities; and 3) youth radicalization. This pilot initiative brought together civil society actors and local government representatives to learn about and discuss VE and its drivers the first time in Tanzania.

Using a two-tiered approach, CAPPTAN has engaged one group of partners at the national level in Dar es Salaam and four groups of partners at the regional level in Arusha, Morogoro, Tanga, and Zanzibar.

*CAPPTAN partners are now familiar with concepts such as push and pull factors, counter-narrative campaigns, the warning signs of radicalization, and the dangers of online propagandizing and recruitment. Most importantly, partners have ideas for community-level efforts their organizations can employ to mitigate the threat from local and/or regional VE elements.*

Members of the national working group (NWG) took part in a seminar series that included ten topic-specific trainings conducted by selected content experts between March 2017 and October 2017. Training topics included PVE through education; the media's responsibility in PVE; women's roles in VE and PVE; the misuse of religion; religious engagement in PVE; the unique vulnerabilities of marginalized communities; the case of Somalia and al-Shabab; national and regional PVE strategies; and methods of enhancing community resilience. Expert trainers also guided trainees in conceiving and developing relevant PVE initiatives to launch or incorporate into existing programming. After the seminar series, members of the NWG convened for three follow-

up dialogue days between November 2017 and February 2018 to continue discussions within the established network of partners.

Beginning in June 2017, CAPPTAN began to train and mentor stakeholders in Arusha, Morogoro, Tanga, and Zanzibar through the establishment of regional working groups (RWGs). Designed to serve as sustainable communication networks between local stakeholders, CEP hopes the RWGs will work to spread a broad base of VE knowledge within each region. The purpose of working at the regional level is multifaceted: (1) facilitate a region-specific dialogue among members of each RWG with regard to each training topic; (2) equip regional communities with the knowledge and skills to address individual drivers of VE; and (3) empower RWGs to voice VE concerns unique to their community.

The RWGs have participated in three training cycles, with each cycle comprising one Regional Exchange attended by all RWGs, two follow-up trainings in each region, and one dialogue day in each region. This structure has allowed RWG members to learn about VE from a macro and micro perspective. During each Regional Exchange, RWGs were exposed to broad P/VE topics by expert trainers while also having the opportunity to network across regions. During follow-up trainings and dialogue days, RWGs met in their individual regions to analyze and discuss how broad P/VE concepts apply to their respective communities.

At the conclusion of the national and regional trainings, the NWG and the RWGs collaborated with the Tanzania-based CEP team to create a comprehensive document detailing extensive PVE recommendations for government, civil society, and private sector stakeholders in Tanzania. These recommendations were enumerated and elucidated in a formal report and presented to the U.S. State Department, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and NWG and RWG partners at an event in June 2018 in Dar es Salaam.



Figure 1: CAPPTAN's Areas of Operation

CEP's diverse, knowledgeable, and committed NWG and RWG partners have inarguably defined CAPPTAN's success. Under the guidance of global PVE experts, national and regional partners have unearthed the vulnerabilities and strengths of Tanzanian communities and have laid the foundation for sustained resilience to VE threats. It is through partners' insightful contributions that CAPPTAN has been able to carve a pathway for future PVE efforts in Tanzania.

## II. CAPPTAN KEY ACHIEVEMENTS

**OBJECTIVE 1** Trainees at the national level in Dar es Salaam will have an increased ability to counter VE threats, direct future research on VE drivers, and expand international partnerships for future PVE programming.

- **Growth in Number of Trainees.** CEP began with 14 national partner organizations at the time of program launch in March 2017 and ended with 19 national partner organizations at the time of training completion in February 2018.
- **Attendance.** The NWG's two-day trainings, running from March to November 2017, saw an increase in attendance. Trainings one through five drew an average of 17 attendants per training day, while trainings six through ten drew an average of 21 attendants per training day. CEP's three, one-day dialogue days in November, January, and February drew 20, 15, and 21 participants, respectively.
- **Research on VE.** Since CAPPTAN's launch, national partners have directed research on VE drivers throughout Tanzania. Notably, the Inter-Religious Council for Peace Tanzania (IRCPT) has conducted research on extremism in Lindi and Mtwara as part of the organization's PVE program. In addition, the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) has carried out research on VE drivers in Arusha and Tanga—leading to its implementation of programming to address those drivers in early-mid 2018.
- **Expanding International Partnerships.** National partners have gained visibility and made connections within the international PVE sphere. A CAPPTAN beneficiary from the Global Peace Foundation (GPF) represented her organization at a CVE summit in Kigali, Rwanda, in May 2018. In addition, a member of Youth of United Nations Association (YUNA) was selected as a Peace Ambassador by the One Young World Peace Ambassador Programme due to his involvement with the CAPPTAN NWG as well as the Commonwealth Peace Ambassadors Network.

**OBJECTIVE 2** Regional stakeholders will have an increased ability to identify, isolate, and counter regionally-specific drivers of VE radicalization within their communities.

- **Formation of RWG.** To gain community-level insight into VE, CEP formed RWGs comprised of local CSOs, FBOs, and government officials in four at-risk regions of Tanzania—Arusha, Morogoro, Tanga, and Zanzibar.

- **Hosting Regional Exchange Events.** Regional partners attended three RWG Exchanges, which were led by international PVE specialists and covered the following VE topics: misuse of religion, marginalized communities, and youth radicalization.
- **Conduct Follow-up Trainings.** Following the Exchanges, each RWG received follow-up trainings led by CEP staff to gain supplementary information on the PVE topic at hand and apply it to the local context.
- **Participate in Dialogue Days.** Each RWG engaged in three dialogue days which allowed partners to discuss pervasive VE-related issues that were affecting the region and devise recommendations to address such grievances.
- **Identify Push/Pull Factors.** As a result of CAPPTAN, 40 stakeholders were successfully trained to recognize regionally-specific push and pull drivers of VE radicalization.
  - Arusha:
    - Political Tensions between Chadema and Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)
    - Fringe Religious Ideologies Encouraging Violence
  - Morogoro:
    - Land Conflicts Between Pastoralists and Farmers
    - Lack of Economic Opportunity
  - Tanga:
    - Faulty Governance
    - Conflict with Law Enforcement
  - Zanzibar:
    - Political Tensions between CCM and Civic United Front (CUF)
    - Religious and Social Ties with External Influencers
- **Discuss Regionally-Specific Concerns.** CEP partners identified regionally-specific concerns pertaining to VE that (1) validates its existence in the region, and/or (2) could serve as a radicalizing factor if left unaddressed.
  - Arusha:
    - Surge in Religiously Motivated Attacks
    - Worsening Relations between CCM and Chadema
  - Morogoro:
    - Islamic Extremists Hiding in Rural Areas
  - Tanga:
    - Porous Border with Kenya
    - Purported Religious Extremists Residing in the Amboni Caves
  - Zanzibar:
    - Youths Traveling to Somalia
    - History of Separation between Zanzibar and Mainland Tanzania

**OBJECTIVE 3** Creation of a sustainable, country-wide PVE network composed of civil society and faith-based organizations equipped to launch their own PVE programming and contribute PVE recommendations to the UNDP's National Action Plan for PVE in Tanzania.

- **Increase in CAPPTAN Trainees.** CAPPTAN began with 54 partner organizations and ended with 59.
- **Communication via WhatsApp.** A WhatsApp group created for communication between NWG participants has 29 members. Each of the four RWGs has its own WhatsApp group for coordination and resource-sharing.
- **PVE Programming.** At least 45 of 59 partner organizations (76.27%) have begun to plan or implement PVE-related activities and projects.
- **PVE Across Sectors.** Organizations now involved in PVE activities come from the following sectors: economic development, gender equality, health, human rights, interfaith, legal, local government, media, peace, religious, and youth empowerment.
- **PVE Recommendations.** CEP partners have provided PVE recommendations to UNDP in the areas of government, religion, economy, youth, media, education, gender, and cyber matters, as well as recommendations specific to extremism in Arusha, Morogoro, Tanga, and Zanzibar.

### III. CAPPTAN OVERVIEW, BY OBJECTIVE

#### OBJECTIVE 1

##### Overview

**Objective 1:** *Trainees at the national level in Dar es Salaam will have an increased ability to counter VE threats, direct future research on VE drivers, and expand international partnerships for future PVE programming.*

Through CAPPTAN, CEP formed and trained a network of civil society actors in Dar es Salaam (i.e. the National Working Group, or NWG)—fostering their capability to identify drivers of extremism and launch PVE programming in their organizations and communities. Trainings have helped participants to identify push and pull factors, carry out topical formative research, apply a gendered perspective to PVE, and develop compelling counter narratives to extremist messaging, among other skills. CAPPTAN modules have fostered national partners’ ability to identify extremism and build resilience to the threat—a key pillar of Objective 1.

CAPPTAN trainings have also inspired national partners to undertake research on VE drivers. In June 2017, IRCPT received funding to launch its own PVE programming in Lindi and Mtwara Regions which included formative research. Based on its research findings suggesting the existence of weak interfaith ties, the dangers of youth radicalization, and the lack of a civil-security relationship, IRCPT implemented

community dialogues, formed interfaith committees, trained those interfaith committees in conflict resolution tactics, developed a PVE manual for religious communities and security committees, and created peace education manuals to be taught in schools, madrasas, and Sunday schools.

Another partner, LHRC, began conducting formative research in December 2017 on the state of extremism in the regions of Arusha and Tanga where it operates field offices. LHRC found that factors leading to extremism may include poor relationships between boda boda drivers and police officers, lack of youth engagement and empowerment, poor relationships between civilians and security personnel, and economic strain compounded with a lack of opportunity. To address these factors, LHRC launched a number of activities in both regions, such as boda boda driver and police officer football matches, youth forums, dialogues between security leaders and civilians, and trainings in entrepreneurship and business development.

Finally, national trainees have begun to form international partnerships in order to strengthen PVE programming. In May 2018, an NWG partner was invited to represent her organization, GPF, at a CVE workshop in Kigali, Rwanda. At the event, participants were encouraged to discuss existing CVE strategies within East Africa and the Horn of Africa and, as a result, developed new strategies to be included in a document titled *Undermining Violent Extremist Narratives in East and Horn of Africa: A How-To Guide*. In addition, a representative from YUNA was selected to be a One Young World Peace Ambassador due to his involvement with the CAPPTAN NWG as well as the Commonwealth Peace Ambassadors Network. With regard to PVE programming, CEP has aided CAPPTAN trainees to draft concepts note and budgets for their own unique PVE programming. The Mwinyi Barak Islamic Foundation, Tanzania Media Foundation, and Global Network and Religions for Children all have concept notes and budgets ready for review by international funders.

As a major component of CAPPTAN programming, national partners have assisted in the development of PVE policy recommendations for implementation by the national and regional governments, public institutions, the private sector, and civil society. National partners are prepared to promote the adoption of these recommendations in order to create a more resilient Tanzanian society.

## Description of National Partners

### *Formation of NWG*

In December 2016, CEP's began researching CSOs based in Dar es Salaam that worked with vulnerable communities and had an established presence in Tanzania. CEP first met with organizations who conducted programming at the community level and also had experience operating in multiple regions of Tanzania to ensure their relevance as a significant PVE stakeholder. Through discussions with these prospective partners, CEP was given an overview of the PVE work that had previously or was currently being done, as well as a sense of these organizations' perceptions of possible internal and external VE threats to Tanzanian. During these meetings, organizations referred other civil society groups to CEP



who were already working with key populations and would benefit from participation in the CAPPTAN program. CEP provided all organizations with an overview with the CAPPTAN training program and a description of program objectives to see if CAPPTAN aligned with each organization's needs and interests. Organizations who were interested in participation signed a Terms of Reference with CAPPTAN and were invited to attend the program launch event on March 9, 2017, solidifying their commitment and establishing their role as an NWG partner for the duration of CAPPTAN's 16-month training series.

### *Partner Summaries*

The NWG is composed of 21 Dar es Salaam-based CSOs, FBOs, and local government offices. These organizations work in a variety of sectors including youth empowerment, faith, media, gender, and peace promotion. The following table provides a summary for each of the 21 partners:

<b>1. BAKWATA</b>
The National Muslim Council of Tanzania (Baraza Kuu La Waislam Wa Tanzania, or BAKWATA), is a prominent Islamic organization founded in 1968. It seeks to uphold the rights of Tanzanian Muslims and runs mosques, madrasas, and universities throughout the country, both on mainland Tanzania and the Zanzibar archipelago.
<b>2. Christian Social Services Commission (CSSC)</b>
CSSC is an ecumenical body established in 1992 by the Christian Council of Tanzania and the Tanzanian Episcopal Conference in order to coordinate and facilitate the delivery of health and education services by member churches to the Tanzanian public. CSSC works with a network of 900 churches and their health facilities, which predominantly serve rural populations and comprise 13.7% of all health facilities in Tanzania.
<b>3. Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRAGG)</b>
CHRAGG is an independent government department established to strengthen the adherence to good governance and human rights by both the state and citizens of Tanzania. Established in 2001, CHRAGG accepts complaints from individuals regarding the violation and contravention of good governance via formal reporting, online reporting, and SMS technology. Additionally, CHRAGG plays a key role in helping to ensure that the Government of Tanzania's (GOT) National Human Rights Action Plan is implemented.
<b>4. Foundation for Civil Society (FCS)</b>
FCS is a Tanzanian grants foundation that technically and financially supports CSOs throughout the country. Founded in 2002, FCS seeks to a) provide mentorship support to nascent CSOs and b) fund mature CSOs focusing on health, education, youth, good governance, women and land rights, and peacebuilding—with the overall goal of raising the standard of living among Tanzanians.
<b>5. Global Network of Religions for Children (GNRC)</b>

GNRC is a unique global interfaith network of organizations and individuals dedicated to the holistic development of children and youth. GNRC Tanzania works primarily on building and strengthening peace through an intercultural and interfaith program for ethics education as well as youth mentorship on leadership and entrepreneurship.

#### **6. Global Peace Foundation (GPF)**

Founded in 2009, GPF is an international non-sectarian, non-partisan, nonprofit organization, which promotes an innovative, values-based approach to peace building, guided by the vision of One Family under God. GPF engages and organizes a global network of public and private sector partners who develop community, national, and regional peace building models as the foundation for ethical and cohesive societies. GPF's Tanzania chapter has run programming focused on youth development, environmental action, and PVE.

#### **7. Inter-Religious Council for Peace in Tanzania (IRCPT)**

IRCPT is an umbrella organization composed of multiple faith-based institutions operating across Tanzania. IRCPT uses interfaith approaches to promote social resilience and conflict prevention, working to identify and examine major threats to peace and implement preventative early warning mechanisms when necessary. IRCPT facilitates the planning and implementation of collaborative peacebuilding programs across the country.

#### **8. Junior Chamber International (JCI)**

JCI is a non-profit, international non-governmental organization composed of young people between 18 and 40 years old. Founded in St Louis, USA in 1915, JCI encourages young people to become active citizens and to participate in efforts toward social and economic development, as well as international co-operation, good-will, and understanding. JCI's Tanzania branch implements peace dialogues, trainings, national conferences, and peace rallies. It has operations in Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, Dodoma, Mwanza, Mbeya, and Kagera Regions.

#### **9. Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC)**

LHRC is an autonomous, non-governmental, non-partisan, and non-profit organization that seeks to empower the people of Tanzania to promote, reinforce, and safeguard human rights and good governance. LHRC's broad objective is to create legal and human rights awareness among the public and in particular the underprivileged section of society through legal and civic education, advocacy linked with legal aid provision, research, and human rights monitoring.

#### **10. Mwinyi Baraka Islamic Foundation (MBIF)**

MBIF is a non-governmental Islamic organization established in 2000. MBIF provides guidance and resources to support the betterment of Muslim youth living in difficult conditions throughout Tanzania. It promotes education as a key to a better life, and collaborates with both religious and secular institutions to increase poor Muslim youths' access to learning institutions. MBIF currently manages an orphanage center, as well as madrassas and mosques in Dar es Salaam and Pwani Regions.

#### **11. Restless Development**

Restless Development is a youth-led organization that puts young people at the forefront of change. The organization works to ensure that young people have a voice, economic opportunity, and sexual rights. Whether that means supporting communities to end child marriage or prevent HIV, Restless Development works with young people to change their lives and the lives of people in their communities. Founded in 1993, its work is led by hundreds of young people each year.

#### **12. Tanzania Bora Initiative (TBI)**

Through media and arts, TBI engages the Tanzanian community in civic education programs and projects focused on effective leadership, democracy and accountability, good governance, human rights, peacebuilding, and development issues. TBI seeks to promote a culture of democracy by encouraging good governance practices among Tanzania's leaders and citizens, particularly youth and women.

#### **13. Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP)**

TGNP seeks to build a movement for social transformation and women's empowerment. The organization's goal is to increase engagement among local women's groups with regard to gender and social justice issues. TGNP does this through education, research, analysis, and activism. TGNP's Communications Team and Gender Training Institute also promote awareness of relevant issues as well as women's leadership development.

#### **14. Tanzania Media Foundation (TMF)**

TMF promotes an independent, quality, diverse, and vibrant media in Tanzania by supporting investigative and public interest journalism and facilitating critical reflection and learning. TMF's vision is of a strong and independent media sector promoting accountability. Through funding and learning activities, TMF seeks to support quality journalism that better informs the public, contributes to debate and thereby increases public demand for greater accountability across Tanzania.

#### **15. Tanzania Women Interfaith Network (TWIN)**

TWIN is the one of the departments of IRCPT. This department was established in 2006 by female religious leaders from different religious institutions. TWIN works to build peace, launch sustainable development initiatives, and foster patriotism through Women IR-VICOBAs,<sup>1</sup> interfaith dialogues, and trainings.

#### **16. Tanzania Youth Alliance (TAYOA)**

TAYOA is a non-profit, non-governmental organization that embraces creativity and innovation through Information Communication Technology (ICT) on projects ranging from HIV prevention, leadership and governance, employability, and entrepreneurship. Through the use of ICT, TAYOA serves youth across urban and rural areas. TAYOA's mission is to coordinate and build capacity of youth in Tanzania to acquire knowledge and skills for disease prevention, entrepreneurship, and good governance.

#### **17. Tanzania Youth Interfaith Network (TYIN)**

TYIN is an interfaith network comprised of youth from different faith organizations in Tanzania. Its members are committed to engaging in peacebuilding in order to further national unity and development. Founded in 2016, TYIN's programs are focused on peacebuilding and sustainable development. TYIN collaborates with IRCPT.

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<sup>1</sup> Inter-Religious Village Community Banks

#### **18. Tanzania Youth Vision Association (TYVA)**

TYVA was formed to build the capacity of local youth-led organizations and to address the lack of youth participation in these initiatives. TYVA works with youth organizations in civic and socioeconomic spheres, focusing on bringing about self-realization and empowerment to young people in Tanzania. TYVA also conducts youth trainings, dialogues, workshops, and seminars focusing on gender inclusion, environmental issues, and the protection of vulnerable youth.

#### **19. Youth of United Nations Association (YUNA)**

YUNA Tanzania is the youth-driven body of the United Nations Association, which promotes the United Nations' (UN) work and furthers its objectives among people and youth. Operating since 1996, YUNA is a non-governmental, non-profit organization devoted to furthering the purpose and principles of the UN Charter. YUNA Tanzania has the largest youth network in the country—composed of more than 35,000 members from UN Clubs and Chapters in Schools and Colleges and Universities.

### **Description of National Launch and Training Events**

CEP celebrated the inauguration of the CAPPTAN program by holding a launch event for its national-level trainings in March 2017. Between then and November 2017, CEP held ten trainings for national partners in Dar es Salaam. It then convened three dialogue days on the topics of religion, marginalized communities, and youth radicalization in November 2017, January 2018, and February 2018, respectively.

#### *National Launch*

CEP held the first CAPPTAN activity in March 2017. This launch event was attended by 28 participants from 20 different organizations in Tanzania. The CAPPTAN Country Director presented CAPPTAN's Terms of Reference, discussing the training activities and dialogue days to take place in Dar es Salaam, Arusha, Tanga, Morogoro, and Zanzibar. A U.S. Embassy representative gave an overview on CAPPTAN funding and the necessity of PVE funding in the region as well as a member of UNDP who outlined the organization's three-year PVE program to draft a National Action Plan for PVE in Tanzania.

Participants asked many questions about UNDP's program, including why certain regions were selected for program implementation as well as the level of cooperation between UNDP and the Tanzanian government. The UNDP official explained that UNDP is working closely with the Tanzanian government's National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) which is part of the Ministry of Home Affairs and that UNDP has complete buy-in from the government.

Finally, participants discussed the overlap between CAPPTAN and UNDP's programs. CEP facilitators explained that due to the evolution of CAPPTAN from an initiative resulting in a National Action Plan on PVE to an initiative that will build community awareness and knowledge around PVE, the programs will be complementary. The UNDP official echoed this by stating that CAPPTAN recommendations, particularly those aimed at civil society, would feed into UNDP's National Action Plan.

## Training Events

CEP held ten NWG trainings—facilitated by visiting PVE experts—between March and November 2017. Between November 2017 and February 2018, the NWG convened for three “dialogue days” to deeply explore the topics of 1) misuse of religion, 2) marginalized communities, and 3) youth radicalization. A timeline and description of training sessions are detailed in the table below.

<p><b>Training 1: PVE Through Education and Research</b> <b>Trainer: Hassan Ndugwa</b> <b>Dates: March 14-15, 2017</b></p> <p>Trainer Hassan Ndugwa introduced partners to participatory education and research approaches to identify, understand, document, and address issues related to VE and radicalization among youth. Ndugwa helped to develop participants’ negotiation, mediation, and conflict resolution skills, and to heighten partners’ abilities to work with multi-stakeholder groups with diverse needs and agendas. The roles of government and civil society in PVE—through the lens of education and research—were highlighted throughout the training.</p>
<p><b>Training 2: Media and Radicalization</b> <b>Trainer: Hassan Ndugwa</b> <b>Dates: April 5-6, 2017</b></p> <p>CEP’s second NWG training focused on the use of media to challenge violent extremism, including how to design effective communication campaigns to challenge and disrupt extremist messaging. Participants learned about the misuse of traditional and social media with regard to radicalization, and how to quell tensions driven by religion, culture, and economic and political marginalization. Participants explored PVE methods such as including the stories of victims of terrorism in the counter narrative context, as well as utilizing authentic and credible voices from within individual communities as a way to counter hateful ideology. Finally, trainees were led through the steps of creating an effective counter-narrative media campaign.</p>
<p><b>Training 3: Women, CSOs, and VE</b> <b>Trainer: Fatima Zaman</b> <b>Dates: April 27-28, 2017</b></p> <p>Through this training, PVE specialist Fatima Zaman helped trainees to conceptualize what VE propaganda is, how it is spread, and how it helps to form an extremist narrative. She also equipped partner organizations with practical support on how to embed PVE measures into their programming. As the primary focus throughout the training, participants explored the push and pull factors for women to violent extremism, the ways that women are uniquely vulnerable to radicalization, and how government and authorities must be aware of the gender component when developing PVE strategies. The training closed out with a discussion on best PVE practices for the government and CSOs.</p>

**Training 4: Religion and VE****Trainer: Dr. Muli Peleg****Dates: May 17-18, 2017**

This training focused on the meaning of extremism and violence in the context of seeking socio-political change. There was an emphasis on religiously-motivated extremism and its origins, methods, and potential for mobilization and violence. The training distinguished between religion and the politicization of religion, and explored ways in which religion and politics can negatively interact. The training involved a discussion on diagnosis (how to identify and comprehend religiously-motivated VE) and prognosis (once we understand, what are we to do). The discussion underlined social inclusion and interfaith and intercultural dialogue as means of coping with VE.

**Training 5: Religious Engagement in PVE****Trainer: Hassan Ndugwa****Dates: June 7-8, 2017**

This training equipped participants with knowledge and skills for religious engagement as a strategy for PVE, and utilized specific case studies to analyze the role played by religious leaders in the prevention of youth radicalization. Youth involvement in religious programs, the role of interfaith dialogue in the promotion of peace, and the tactics to refute violent extremist ideologies based on religion were also discussed. This training included information for partnering with religious institutions and communities to strengthen religious commitment to pro-social norms, offered religious challenges to the moral legitimization of violence, and addressed the marshalling of religious resources to assist in early warning and response systems. Best practices in religious engagement in the East African region was discussed throughout the training.

**Training 6: Marginalized Communities and VE****Trainer: Adam Matan****Dates: July 12-13, 2017**

This training addressed the needs and challenges of marginalized groups in East Africa using Somalia as a case study. Trainer Adam Matan, a Somali native, helped partners understand the socioeconomic factors of marginalized groups, the additional challenges facing women within marginalized groups, and the grievances of marginalized individuals that drive them to join extremist organizations to find belonging, self-worth, and revenge. The deeply-rooted unfair and discriminatory treatment toward marginalized groups was addressed and the training concluded with strategies for inclusivity, tolerance, understanding and shared values.

**Training 7: Personalized Radicalization and PVE****Trainer: Adam Matan****Dates: August 2-3, 2017**

Through this session, trainer Adam Matan helped partners understand tribalism and associated VE challenges in the context of Somalia. Partners also learned about ways in which al-Shabab lures young people to its ranks, including by exploiting neglect and discrimination by government and majority clans, the fear of continued victimization, and youths' desire for revenge. Extremists' ability to use social media to recruit fighters was addressed as well as ways for local CSOs to secure the necessary resources

and expertise to prevent grassroots extremism.

**Training 8: The Role of Women in PVE**

**Trainer: Hajer Sharief**

**Dates: August 30-31, 2017**

Trainer Hajer Sharief helped partners grasp the importance of women's involvement in assessing, supplying recommendations, and implementing policies to address the gendered experience of push and pull factors, radicalization, and VE membership. There was also discussion on women's roles in identifying early symptoms of radicalization and how women can counter drivers of radicalization at the local level. This training identified the roles that women play in VE groups, discussed push and pull factors through a gendered lens, and introduced best practices for women and PVE at large.

**Training 9: The Role of CSOs in Implementing National and Regional PVE Strategies**

**Trainer: Fatma Ahmed**

**Dates: October 4-5, 2017**

This training focused on national and regional PVE strategies in East Africa and analyzed regional examples of National Action Plans for PVE (i.e. in Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti). Through this training, partners gained insight into the Intergovernmental Authority on Development's Center of Excellence in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and conceptualized what roles their organization(s) might play with regard to PVE at the national level.

**Training 10: Community Resilience and PVE**

**Trainer: Hashim Pondeza**

**Dates: November 1-2, 2017**

Through this training, participants gained an understanding of how to build resilience to VE in local communities and were guided in designing a locally-driven action plan. Hashim Pondeza, a Zanzibari native, discussed potential challenges and solutions to PVE strategies and identified measures to enhance youth engagement in PVE programming.

*Attendance*

	Day 1	Day 2
Training 1	22	16
Training 2	14	16
Training 3	19	18
Training 4	16	17
Training 5	12	15
Training 6	17	14

Training 7	22	26
Training 8	25	21
Training 9	23	19
Training 10	20	20

CEP's three, one-day dialogue days in November, January, and February drew 20, 15, and 21 participants, respectively.

### National-Level Monitoring

CEP administered four qualitative interviews to NWG participants in order to gain feedback about the NWG trainings. The interviews took place in May 2017, July 2017, September 2017, and December 2017. Partner feedback was solicited in order to understand the needs and motivations of the NWG partners and to make adjustments to CEP's NWG activities in order to best meet those needs. Below are key findings from each of the four qualitative interviews, which sought open-ended answers from participants:

#### Feedback Interview #1: May 2017

*From your perspective, what is the main purpose of CEP's NWG?*

Response	Frequency (# of people)
Increase awareness and understanding of VE and PVE	10
Share perspectives within the NWG and with VE experts	4
Empower CSOs to reach high numbers of individuals in communities	2
Increase advocacy for PVE	2
Improve CSOs' capacity to PVE	2
Educate communities on PVE	1
Increase community engagement	1
Networking	1

*Why did you join CEP's NWG?*

Response	Frequency (# of people)
The objectives of the NWG are aligned with organization's mission	10
To apply knowledge to organizational activities (i.e. train journalists)	3
Collaboration and knowledge building	2
Responsibility as religious leader	1
Get global perspectives and skills	1
Personal experience as a victim of VE	1



*What do you hope to achieve and how will you benefit from participation in the NWG?*

<b>Response</b>	<b>Frequency (# of people)</b>
Knowledge and experience on topic of PVE	12
Networking and collaboration	10
Skills and tools to PVE	7
Ability for TOT in organization on PVE	2
Increase capacity to educate communities about PVE	2
Increase awareness about what's happening in E. Africa region	1
Increased ability to pursue grant proposals	1

## **Feedback Interview #2: July 2017**

*How has participation in the NWG benefited your organization?*

<b>Response</b>	<b>Frequency (# of people)</b>
Improved understanding of VE content and VE in current events	7
Increased networking with local partners and facilitators	5
Improved ability to engage local communities and religious leaders in P/CVE	5
Improved techniques to P/CVE in current programs for youth and women	3
Led to the development of specific P/CVE programming	3
Increased participation from members within organization	2
Have used the content for training journalists about how to cover VE	1

*How have you used the material provided through CEP trainings in your current initiatives?*

<b>Response</b>	<b>Frequency (# of people)</b>
Shared with staff, community members, and friends	11
Used content in programming with youth and women	3
Will use materials in the future	2
Increased ability to identify early warning signs of radicalization	1
Have used materials in the development of questionnaires for police officers	1

*Has the NWG prepared you to engage in PVE in your community?*

<b>Response</b>	<b>Frequency (# of people)</b>
Yes, by increasing ability to share information on the topic of VE and P/CVE	12
Yes, by teaching about push/pull factors and specific challenges facing youth	3

Yes, by knowing who to contact in community if signs of extremism are witnessed	1
Yes, by increasing tolerance for others	1

### Feedback Interview #3: September 2017

*Is VE an important issue in Tanzania? Please explain.*

Response	Frequency (# of people)
Yes, there are incidents of violence in the country that may be examples of VE	9
Yes, there are many push and pull factors present in Tanzania, including unemployment, social marginalization, and misrepresentation of religion.	5
Yes, the Tanzanian government is not addressing the issue of VE	2
Yes, it is a concern regionally in East Africa	1
Yes, VE is an issue that needs to be addressed globally	1
Yes, there is poor media coverage of VE which can amplify the problem	1
Yes, it is not widely understood or discussed in Tanzania	1

*Have you applied lessons from the NWG trainings to your professional work? How?*

Response	Frequency (# of people)
Yes, shared training material with colleagues	5
Yes, in my organization's current PVE-related program or initiative	5
Yes, indirectly through youth and women's empowerment programs	2
Yes, used training material to conduct a review of VE coverage in media for future program	1
Yes, used training material to inform a social media campaign to fight VE	1
Yes, used training material to inform organization's approach to violence in communities	1
Yes, used training material to inform discussion on VE with Prime Minister in Tanzania	1
Not yet	1

*How can the Tanzanian government engage with CSOs for PVE?*

Response	Frequency (# of people)
Establish a PVE network to link CSOs and other stakeholders from across the country, establishing a platform for information sharing, dialogue, and training	7
Give CSOs an advisory role on PVE policy and regulation development	5
Use CSOs to train police officers, security, and GOT ministries in PVE	5
Give CSOs freedom and guidance to work on and discuss PVE openly	4

Build accountability and trust with CSOs	3
Include PVE initiatives in the GOT budget and assign personnel to work on issue	2
Use CSOs to help regulate extremist media content on the internet	1

#### Feedback Interview #4: December 2017

*Considering all NWG trainings, which topic did you find the most useful for your organization? Why?*

Response	Frequency (# of people)
PVE and education <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training addressed youth- focused grievances such as unemployment</li> <li>• Training demonstrated how to educate youth on P/VE in religious schools, government schools, and out of school settings</li> <li>• Training offered PVE specific information rather than only focusing on peacebuilding</li> <li>• Training emphasized using education as a tool for PVE</li> </ul>	7
CSOs and PVE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training showed how CSOs can collaborate with other CSOs and/or government on PVE-related initiatives</li> <li>• Training taught CSOs how to approach communities and discuss P/VE</li> </ul>	6
Misuse of religion <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training material was adaptable to utilize in organizational initiatives</li> <li>• Training illustrated the difference between political and religious extremism and how they can be linked</li> <li>• Training explained how CSOs can take an interfaith approach to PVE</li> <li>• Training gave examples of Islamic scriptures being misused for recruitment to VE</li> <li>• Training showed how CSOs can have a role in media and public awareness campaigns for PVE</li> </ul>	6
Community resilience and PVE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training demonstrated how CSOs can teach communities to be PVE advocates</li> <li>• Training illustrated CSOs' roles in educating communities about resilience and P/VE</li> </ul>	5
Women's roles in P/VE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training showed how women should have a powerful role in PVE but are often marginalized, leaving them either vulnerable to radicalization or underutilized as PVE leaders</li> <li>• Training illustrated how women can be leveraged in PVE efforts as community leaders and influencers of youth</li> <li>• Training explained the importance of valuing women's power in Tanzanian because it is often limited culturally</li> </ul>	5
Media and PVE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training focused on importance of responsible VE reporting</li> </ul>	1
All topics useful	1

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Organization's programming covers a broad range of issues related to gender, youth, media, and religion</li> </ul>	
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*What is your greatest concern related to VE in Tanzania?*

<b>Response</b>	<b>Frequency (# of people)</b>
Political grievances in communities, often connected to economic or religious issues	9
Youth who are disenfranchised, lack economic opportunity, are easily manipulated and not involved in PVE efforts	6
Lack of national PVE strategy, laws, and policies that are current and enforceable	5
Lack of government and community understanding of and action against VE in Tanzania	4
Insecure borders and openness of Tanzanians to outside influence	2
Radicalization and VE training of young men in mosques and madrassas	2
Lack of inter and intra-faith discussions about VE	1
PVE interventions are not tailored to fit the needs of communities	1
Gender inequality and gender based violence as a push factor to radicalization	1

*What is the greatest obstacle you currently face in starting a PVE program in Tanzania?*

<b>Response</b>	<b>Frequency (# of people)</b>
Obtaining funding, either related to sensitivities to PVE work, general lack of available grants, or donor focus on other objectives	12
Lack of government support including denial or disinterest in involving civil society in PVE work	11
Lack of community understanding of VE	3
Lack of organizational capacity, including limited staff and limited understanding of PVE	3
Reaching rural communities who are most in need of PVE programs	2

*Which other bodies (either government, public, or private sector) would you recommend CEP provide PVE training to?*

<b>Response</b>	<b>Frequency (# of people)</b>
Government officials (national, regional, and district level)	12
Government officials (village and ward level)	5
Security sector (police, prison, etc.)	5
Education sector (curriculum development officials, school leaders, teachers)	4

Community groups and members including youth, women, and boda associations	3
Religious and community leaders	2
Private sector companies and CSOs who can fund PVE initiatives and educate communities	2
Young political leaders	1
University program officials (educating future government officials, lawyers, teachers, etc.)	1
Entertainment sector (artists, musicians, etc.) who influence communities	1

During the interviews, participants identified several challenges presented by the Tanzanian government with regard to PVE work. Overwhelmingly, participants reported that the GOT has been unwilling to openly acknowledge the existence of VE in Tanzania. According to respondents, not only has the GOT granted CSOs and the media little-to-no freedom to speak openly about the issue of VE, the GOT has cracked down on media outlets, such as Jamii Forums when its users have discussed the issue of VE in Tanzania. Respondents also said that the GOT primarily focuses on short-sighted security solutions while refusing to engage with local leaders who have influence and knowledge of developments at the community level. Respondents said there is a lack of trust and respect between CSOs and the GOT, hindering the chance of either side to peruse a working relationship to prevent VE. Additionally, partners mentioned that many Tanzanians view extremism as an issue solely within the Islamic community, which may be preventing a broader approach to PVE.

By the end of CEP's ten-round national-level seminar series, all participants had been trained on a range of PVE topics and had engaged in numerous discussions about P/VE in their own communities. While PVE and education was considered the most useful topic by the largest number of participants, nearly all topics were highly rated. With this quarterly feedback, CEP was able to understand which PVE-focused topics were most useful to participants, their greatest concerns related to PVE programming in Tanzania, and the way forward for future programming and support.

### Description and Outcome of Dialogue Days

Between November 2017 and February 2018, CEP convened three dialogue days for the Dar es Salaam-based NWG on the topics of the misuse of religion, marginalized communities, and youth radicalization. During the sessions, partners were prompted with approximately five, open-ended discussion questions—resulting in unique conversations that were shaped and run by the participants. Dialogue days provided partners with a space to voice opinions, concerns, and anecdotes about VE in their country. They also served as brainstorming sessions during which partners conceived and developed PVE recommendations for implementation by the national and regional governments, private sector, public institutions, and civil society.

## *Misuse of Religion*

CEP held its first dialogue day for the NWG on November 30, 2017. The dialogue day drew 20 NWG partners who had recently completed the ten-session NWG training series on PVE. The first of three dialogue days, the November 30 session sought to deepen partners' involvement with concepts related to the **misuse of religion** in the context of VE and PVE in Tanzania. Partners' discussion was based on the following questions:

- 1. In your understanding, has religion ever been used as a tool of persecution or as a justification for violence in Tanzania?** Can you describe the event or actors involved? By reflecting on previous CEP trainings, can you identify which factors may have driven/inspired these individuals? Which strategies might be applied to mitigate religiously-motivated VE?
- 2. Have you heard of individuals who have joined or wanted to join VE movements domestically or abroad?** Which factors made these individuals vulnerable to extremism and are there any common links between these stories? If funding was available, do you think your CSO would be equipped to design and implement a PVE program in Tanzania?
- 3. In which institutions do you think VE is developing in Tanzania?** For each example, what are specific vulnerabilities that may lead to the spread of VE?
- 4. Why do you think Tanzania has remained a more peaceful country compared to neighboring countries such as Uganda and Kenya?** What are characteristics of Tanzanian communities that have made them resilient to VE? Are there any steps being taken by local actors (either CSOs, FBOs, religious leaders, etc.) that have led to PVE?
- 5. What are plausible recommendations to be included in the National Action Plan for PVE—with regard to religiously-motivated VE—to be implemented by the government of Tanzania?**

Key findings from the discussion during Dialogue Day One are shared below:

- Overall, partners noted that instances of religiously-motivated VE in Tanzania include:
  - Violence between Muslims and Christians over the right to slaughter animals;
  - Attacks on churches by Muslims attempting to avenge Islam for perceived injustices;
  - Attacks on moderate Muslim leaders by coreligionists subscribing to an extreme interpretation of the faith;
  - Violence waged by members of Uamsho, the Islamist separatist movement in Zanzibar.
- Partners believe that strict ideology, charismatic local preachers, religious discrimination in primary schools, economic grievances, and unemployment are all factors driving or inspiring actors in Tanzania to carry out acts of religiously-motivated VE.
- Common links between stories of Tanzanians traveling to join VE movements (both domestically and abroad) include: the prominent role of social media, the power of compelling religious narratives, an individual's identity crisis, and his/her associated desire for meaning.
- Tanzanians who receive Islamic education in countries such as Yemen, Pakistan, and Sudan often preach a hardened, extreme interpretation of their faith in Tanzanian mosques upon their return—leading to the indoctrination of both mosque-goers and general acquaintances.

- Partners believe that VE is developing in the following types of institutions in Tanzania: political, religious, the media, police, and prisons.
- Tanzanian communities may be more resilient to VE activity than neighboring countries due to the Tanzanian government's inclusive, anti-tribal, socialist structure established in the decades following independence.
- Partners overwhelmingly recommend that to prevent violent extremism, the Tanzanian government should:
  - Support the provision of PVE trainings and/or curriculums to religious leaders, youth, and civilians at the community level;
  - Foster PVE-focused dialogue between government personnel, security officers, youth, and religious leaders—with a focus on empowering youth and community members to air grievances to security forces;
  - Ensure the inclusion of women in religious institutions and programming.

### *Marginalized Communities*

CEP held its second dialogue day for the NWG on January 31, 2018. The dialogue day—dedicated to the topic of marginalized communities—drew 15 NWG participants who engaged in a discussion centered on five, targeted questions prepared beforehand by CEP trainers. Specifically, the questions were intended to stimulate partner identification of domestic **marginalized communities**, the vulnerabilities they face, and how these communities are rendered susceptible to VE ideology and messaging. Partners' discussion was based on the following questions:

- 1. In your opinion, are there specific geographical areas in Tanzania that are believed to be systematically marginalized (such as the Kibera slums in Nairobi)?** Why and how are they marginalized? How do you see this marginalization leaving the individuals susceptible to radicalization?
- 2. Are there specific tribes or groups in Tanzania that are believed to be systematically marginalized (such as the Maasai in the Arusha Region)?** Why and how are they marginalized? How do you see this marginalization leaving communities susceptible to radicalization?
- 3. In your opinion, which power structures in Tanzania continue to marginalize communities within the country?** How do they continue to marginalize these communities? How do you see this marginalization leaving the individuals susceptible to radicalization?
- 4. What protections or actions have been taken by the government or other groups to protect certain marginalized communities?** How have these protections deterred marginalized groups from engaging in violent extremism? How can these protections be extended to other marginalized groups?
- 5. What are plausible recommendations to be included in the National Action Plan for PVE—with regard to marginalized communities—to be implemented by the government of Tanzania?**

Key findings from the discussion during Dialogue Day Two are shared below:

- Partners identified the following geographic areas as being marginalized by the Tanzanian government: Zanzibar, Kigoma, Mtwara, and Bagamoyo.
- The Kurya and Yao tribes are culturally and economically marginalized, according to partners.
- Marginalized groups throughout Tanzania include women, homeless people or “street people,” youth, individuals with disabilities, individuals with albinism, members of the political opposition, and pastoralists and farmers, according to partners.
- Partners identified the government, judiciary, prisons, and religious systems as power structures that continue to marginalize groups of people within Tanzanian society.
- The government has worked to protect marginalized communities through the Youth Development Fund, country-wide public education, subsidiaries for farmers, and employment protection for individuals with disabilities.
- CSOs have worked to protect youth and women through targeted programming. Specifically, a CSO called Under the Same Sun has launched education and advocacy initiatives for individuals with albinism.
- Partners overwhelmingly recommend that to prevent violent extremism, the Tanzanian government should:
  - Improve CSOs’ accessibility to the Youth Development Fund (i.e. review terms and conditions regarding funding for youth-focused programming);
  - Ensure that individuals working in the national government’s youth desk are between the ages of 18-35;
  - Economically and logistically support youth to attend summits, conferences, workshops, and symposiums within the country and abroad to gain exposure and network;
  - Launch faith-based rehabilitation programming for prisoners who may be susceptible to radicalization;
  - Work with religious communities to erect education centers that provide civic resilience training and life skills to youth;
  - Launch an awareness campaign regarding peace and the inclusion of marginalized communities, making sure to utilize local and national media outlets.

### *Youth Radicalization*

CEP held its third and final dialogue day for the NWG on February 28, 2018, dedicated to the topic of **youth radicalization**. The session drew 21 NWG participants who engaged in a lively discussion centered on five targeted questions prepared beforehand by CEP trainers. The questions were intended to stimulate partner identification of factors leaving Tanzanian youth vulnerable to radicalization, as well as existing resiliencies protecting youth from radicalization. The questions are presented below:



**1. Why might youth be more susceptible to VE than elders in Tanzania?** Which radical individuals are youth most influenced by, and how might these figures deliver VE messages to youth effectively? Do you know of Tanzanian youth engaging in VE either inside or outside of Tanzania?

**2. What are examples of Tanzanian communities with large youth populations that may be vulnerable to foreign or domestic extremist influence?** Which youth grievances may extremists be most likely to exploit in these communities?

**3. What are examples of resiliencies protecting youth from radicalization (i.e. structures, people) in your community?** For example, who would a youth speak to if he/she was worried about VE messaging or influence? What makes some youth less vulnerable to VE recruitment than others within the same community?

**4. What are your biggest concerns regarding youth radicalization on social media?** What are some social media outlets and forums on which Tanzanian youth have been exposed to radical messaging? What are some ways that we might protect against this, and who in the Tanzania has—or should have—the capability to do so?

**5. What are specific initiatives that the following bodies might implement to mitigate the issue of youth radicalization in Tanzania?**

- Government and law enforcement
- Schools and religious institutions
- CSOs and the media/social media

Key findings from the discussion during Dialogue Day Three are shared below:

- Tanzanian youth may be more susceptible to VE radicalization than elders because:
  - The sheer number of youth (according to partners, 66% of Tanzanians are under the age of 25) breeds uncertainty, competition, and scarcity of jobs and resources—rendering youth vulnerable to extremist messaging offering a “better” life;
  - Youth are more likely to come into contact with extremist content through regular use of the internet;
  - Youth, and not elders, are generally the preferred recruits of extremist movements;
  - Elders may not be familiar enough with VE issues to protect and/or dissuade youth from extremist recruitment and ideology.
- Partners believe that political and religious leaders—as well as influential peers—are the figures most likely to influence youth with hate speech and/or overtly extremist messaging.
- Tanzanian youth have engaged in VE attacks within Tanzania and regionally within East Africa, including in a 2012 bomb attack against a moderate cleric in Arusha, and in the 2015 Garissa University attack in Kenya carried out by al-Shabab.
- Communities in Tanzania with large youth populations that may be vulnerable to extremist influence include jobless, homeless, and orphaned persons, students, Muslims, gangs, prisoners, and people living with disabilities and HIV/AIDS, according to partners.
- Grievances or factors likely to be exploited by VE recruiters might include insecurities stemming from a hostile environment, lack of employment, political tensions, and real or perceived discrimination.

- Partners believe that some youth are less vulnerable to VE recruitment than other youth due to their education and employment opportunities, sense of participation in the political process, positive peer groups, and “strong ethics.”
- Partners’ major concerns related to VE radicalization over social media include the vast number of youth using social media, easy accessibility via one’s smartphone, a lack of control measures instituted by social media sites, well-known extremists’ popularity and “sway” on certain platforms, the toxicity of hate speech found in groups on sites such as Facebook, and the ability for social media users to engage in private chats and share phone numbers and/or sensitive information.
- Tanzanian youth have been exposed to extremist content on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, the Tanzanian-based JamiiForums, and WhatsApp Messenger.
- In order to curb online radicalization of youth in Tanzania, the GOT should lobby social media companies to institute stricter safety measures, urge religious leaders to disseminate peaceful counter-narratives over social media, and launch PVE trainings for the operators of JamiiForums, according to partners.

## OBJECTIVE 2

### Overview

**Objective 2:** *Regional stakeholders will have an increased ability to identify, isolate, and counter regionally-specific drivers of VE radicalization within their communities.*

CEP improved the capacity of regional stakeholders to recognize, isolate, and prevent drivers of radicalization through a nine-month series of PVE trainings and community dialogue sessions. By establishing four distinct RWGs in Arusha, Morogoro, Tanga, and Zanzibar, CEP addressed the need to work in at-risk regions of Tanzania, i.e. areas that have experienced VE events in the past and/or exhibited drivers of VE. The ten stakeholder organizations in each region (40 in total) were selected for partnership based on their interconnectedness to the community and willingness to engage in PVE programming. Each organization elected a single representative to undergo the CAPPTAN trainings and later disseminate the information received throughout his/her own organization.

Over the course of CAPPTAN’s nine-month regional training cycle, RWG partners gathered for three Regional Exchanges, during which partners were introduced to a unique PVE topic by an international specialist. CAPPTAN training cycles were divided into three VE-relevant topics: the misuse of religion, the dangers of marginalized communities, and youth radicalization. Through the follow-up trainings and dialogue days that occurred after each Regional Exchange, partners gained a foundational understanding of VE and began applying the information learned to their local context. In these subsequent sessions, RWGs discussed regionally-specific drivers of VE and brainstormed community-led initiatives that could prevent violent extremism from emerging as a large-scale problem in Tanzania. RWG partners were also the beneficiaries of CEP’s training materials, which many organizations have been utilizing to implement their own PVE projects. By the conclusion of CAPPTAN, 21 out of 40 regional stakeholders (52.50%) had

successfully conducted external PVE programming, while 29 out of 40 regional stakeholders (72.50%) had drafted PVE programming proposals.

CEP synthesized recommendations that regional partners made throughout the CAPPTAN trainings into a single digestible recommendations report. These recommendations target regionally-specific concerns that partners discussed at length and are intended to mitigate the encroachment of VE drivers into these communities.

### Formation of RWG

As part of the CAPPTAN initiative to build PVE capacity in pre-identified at-risk regions, CEP established RWGs in Arusha, Morogoro, Tanga, and Zanzibar. During March 2017, CEP staff travelled to each of these regions to explore prospective partnerships with a collection of CSOs, FBOs, and regional government offices. Meetings were held with each individual organization during which CEP staff outlined what CAPPTAN sought to accomplish and what would be expected of partners. By the end of March, 40 organizations—ten in each region—agreed to participate in the program and had signed a corresponding Terms of Reference. Every organization appointed a liaison who was responsible for both attending all CEP trainings and later circulating the information learned within his/her organization.

In order to give partners a baseline knowledge of P/VE, CEP created and dispersed an introductory guidebook in May 2017. The decision to create the document came after initial meetings with regional stakeholders. While these prospective stakeholders responded enthusiastically to CAPPTAN and the opportunity to learn about PVE, few possessed even foundational knowledge about the topic. Regional stakeholders could point to past instances of violence in the region but seemed unsure about what constituted as VE. Similarly, stakeholders could identify underlying grievances facing the community but were unaware of how these various push/pull factors could serve as drivers of radicalization. The introduction of PVE as a holistic and civil society inclusive strategy appealed to stakeholders as it offered a developmental approach to an issue previously framed in a security context.

By addressing definitions, core concepts, and misconceptions associated with VE in the guidebook, CEP increased partners' PVE capacity before the launch of regional-level trainings in June 2017. The guidebook placed significant emphasis on female inclusion into the PVE space, stressing the pivotal role women play as gatekeepers within the community. The document also featured PVE resources for partners to utilize, including recent assessments of Tanzania's capacity to combat VE along with counter-narratives from former extremists. Partners were encouraged to circulate CEP's guidebook internally throughout their organization.

### Group Composition

The four RWGs are each comprised of ten members. While most participants come from civil society and faith-based organizations, the RWGs from Arusha, Morogoro, and Tanga include local government officials.

## Training Cycle for RWG

CEP held three training cycles with the RWGs, each covering the following topics: (1) misuse of religion, (2) marginalized communities, and (3) youth radicalization. Each training cycle—lasting approximately three months—began with a one-day Regional Exchange attended by all RWG members. These one-day Regional Exchanges laid the foundation for topic introduction, capacity building, and collaboration between RWGs.

In the weeks following each Regional Exchange, the training cycle continued with two one-day follow-up trainings, and a one-day dialogue session. The follow-up sessions provided RWGs with additional training and the opportunity to discuss the topics with local application while establishing an inter-communal dialogue. The follow-up trainings and dialogue day took place in each individual area of responsibility. The three training cycles were spaced over a period of nine months with the final training cycle concluding in February 2018.



Figure 2: Regional Training Cycle

## RWG Training Timeline

### Regional Exchanges

Cycle #	Training Topics	Expert Trainer	Regional Exchange Dates
1	<i>The Misuse of Religion</i>	Dr. Muli Peleg	June 3, 2017
2	<i>Marginalized Communities</i>	Adam Matan	September 9, 2017
3	<i>Youth Radicalization</i>	Ndugwa Hassan	December 2, 2017

### Follow-up Trainings

Cycle #	Training Topics	Location	Regional Follow-up Training Dates
1	<i>The Misuse of Religion</i>	Arusha	June 14, 2017 & July 12, 2017
		Morogoro	June 13, 2017 & July 19, 2017
		Tanga	June 21, 2017 & July 19, 2017
		Zanzibar	June 21, 2017 & July 12, 2017
2	<i>Marginalized Communities</i>	Arusha	September 20, 2017 & October 4, 2017
		Morogoro	September 27, 2017 & October 12, 2017
		Tanga	September 27, 2017 & October 16, 2017
		Zanzibar	September 20, 2017 & October 19, 2017
3	<i>Youth Radicalization</i>	Arusha	December 9, 2017 & January 17, 2018
		Morogoro	December 6, 2017 & January 24, 2018
		Tanga	December 12, 2017 & January 24, 2018
		Zanzibar	December 13, 2017 & January 17, 2018

## Dialogue Day

Cycle #	Training Topics	Location	Regional Dialogue Days
1	<i>The Misuse of Religion</i>	Arusha & Zanzibar	<b>August 16, 2017</b>
		Tanga & Morogoro	<b>August 23, 2017</b>
2	<i>Marginalized Communities</i>	Arusha & Zanzibar	<b>November 15, 2017</b>
		Tanga & Morogoro	<b>November 22, 2017</b>
3	<i>Youth Radicalization</i>	Arusha & Zanzibar	<b>February 14, 2018</b>
		Tanga & Morogoro	<b>February 21, 2018</b>

\*Follow-up trainings and dialogue days take place in each individual region.

## Summary of RWG Training Topics

### **The Misuse of Religion**

This training focused on the meaning of radicalism and extremism in the context of seeking sociopolitical changes. An emphasis was placed on describing religiously-motivated extremism and its origins, methods, and potential for mobilization and violence. The training carefully distinguished between religion and the politicization of religion—addressing how religion is used in politics. The training involved diagnosis (how to identify and comprehend religiously motivated VE) and prognosis (once we understand, what are we to do). The prognosis of religiously-motivated extremism underlined social inclusion and interfaith and intercultural dialogue as means of coping with VE.

### **Marginalized Communities**

This training discussed how the marginalization of a community can drive its members toward VE ideology and action. The trainer explained how various extremist groups may exploit the discontent of neglected communities in order to motivate the marginalized groups to take action against the government or community members. This training provided the tools to identify and establish a working relationship with potentially marginalized communities in the region. Stakeholders learned about the proper placement for NGOs in building sustainable efforts to include seemingly disenfranchised groups.

### **Youth Radicalization**

This training taught government actors and community-based organizations working with youth and schools to use participatory approaches to identify, understand, document, and address issues relating to VE and radicalization. The training focused on ideas of participatory ‘popular education’ which draws on the knowledge and experience of different community stakeholders as a means to designing locally appropriate strategies for community change and youth empowerment. Peacebuilding skills of negotiation, mediation, and conflict resolution were developed throughout the training to heighten participants’ abilities to work with multi-stakeholder groups who have diverse needs and agendas. The specific roles of government and civil society in PVE through education was highlighted throughout this training.

## Regional Overviews : Arusha, Morogoro, Tanga, & Zanzibar

### Arusha

### Description of Partners

<b>1. Christian Social Services Commission (CSSC) – Northern Zone Region Branch</b>
CSSC is an ecumenical body jointly established by Tanzania Episcopal Conference and Christian Council of Tanzania in 1992 to facilitate the delivery of social services by member churches. In collaboration with various government and non-governmental partners, CCSC coordinates the implementation of numerous health and education projects such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis programs (with the Global Fund), the Malaria Communities Program, the Pay for Performance Program, and the Construction and Rehabilitation of School and Health Facilities program.
<b>2. Regional Office for Community Development</b>
Local government office responsible for community development in Arusha Region.
<b>3. East African Civil Society Organization Forum (EACSOFF)</b>
Founded in 2007, EACSOFF is the galvanizing body of apolitical CSOs in the East African Region. By offering a platform for East African CSOs to network, EASCOF helps these organizations coordinate transnational planning and implementation of programming.
<b>4. Grassroots Youth Development Organization (GYDO)</b>
GYDO is an Arusha-based organization dedicated to the well-being and development of young people within Tanzania. All programing adopts a youth-centric approach and includes informational sessions on food security and nutrition, entrepreneurship, and good governance.
<b>5. HAKIMADINI</b>
HakiMadini is a rights-based organization in the mining sector that advocates for equitable distributions of natural resources and fair treatment for laborers. The organization also addresses other ground-level issues facing mining communities such as HIV prevalence, domestic abuse, and finding livelihood alternatives.
<b>6. Legal and Human Right Centre- Arusha Branch (LHRC)</b>
LHRC was established in 1995 to create public awareness on legal and human rights with the purpose of achieving a just and equitable society. By providing a wide range of services, such as civic education, legal aid, and advocacy, to underprivileged sections of society, LHRC aims to prevent any human rights abuses and inequalities that exist at the local and national level. In order to reach all sectors of the community, LHRC partners with media houses, international aid organizations, private sector businesses, and other CSOs.
<b>7. Regional Office of Social Welfare</b>
Local government office responsible for social welfare in Arusha Region.
<b>8. Tanganyika Law Society (TLS)- Arusha Chapter</b>
TLS is the Bar association of Tanzania Mainland, founded in 1954. While TLS largely serves as a representative body for individuals practicing law in Tanzania, it also serves as a consulting body for the government on the legal framework of legislation.
<b>9. Vision for Youth (V4Y)</b>

V4Y is a non-governmental, non-profit organization focusing on youth development. All V4Y programming activities fall within three categories: health promotion, economic empowerment, or civic engagement.

#### 10. WEMA Foundation

An Arusha-based NGO dedicated to achieving sustainable development to local communities through youth-centric education and empowerment.

### History of VE in the Region

Often regarded as the heart of Tanzania's tourism industry due to its proximity to the Serengeti National Park and Mount Kilimanjaro, the Arusha Region experienced a substantial wave of VE attacks between 2013 to 2014. The first incident occurred May 2013 when an explosive went off in the middle of Sunday mass at St. Joseph's Roman Catholic Church, killing three and wounding 60 others. High-profile Catholic leaders, including the Vatican's then-ambassador to Tanzania, were in attendance at the event, although it is unknown whether they were the intended target of the attack. Seven months later, another church was bombed during a New Year's Eve celebration.<sup>2</sup> While several arrests were made in association with both these attacks, no one was convicted, and many of the initial suspects were later released from custody.

In 2014, attacks began to target Islamic community leaders as well as secular locations. During late February, a Muslim cleric and his ten-year-old son had acid thrown on them by unidentified assailants, a tactic being used by attackers in Zanzibar at the time. In July 2014, an improvised explosive device was tossed into a religiously-moderate sheikh's home, injuring him and a friend during the blast. Both a popular tourist bar and an Indian restaurant were similarly bombed in April and July, respectively.

In almost every one of these incidents, efforts to find and apprehend the assailants were unsuccessful. Without tangible evidence, Tanzanian security forces could only make educated guesses about the culprit's or culprits' identity, motivating factors, and whether any of the attacks were connected. Police and government officials, including the Minister of Home Affairs at the time, downplayed possible connectedness between the attackers and transnational terror organizations.<sup>3</sup>

### Training Outcomes

#### Push and Pull Factors in Arusha

Arusha		
<u>Type of Driver</u>	<u>Driver</u>	<u>Description</u>
	Political Tensions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The two largest political parties in Arusha are CCM and Chadema.</li> </ul>

<sup>2</sup> "Country Report: Tanzania," Wasafiri Consulting. March 2016.

<sup>3</sup> Daniel Finnan, "Tanzania: Attack in Arusha Carried Out by Tanzanians, says Home Affairs Minister," RFI, <http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20140708-tanzania-attack-against-arusha-restaurant-linked-recent-violence-says-home-affairs-m>

Push		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Incidents of politically-based violence have become more frequent, aggravating tensions between the two parties.</li> </ul>
	Resource and Land Conflicts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pastoralists are competing with farmers over land rights.</li> <li>The government has been unable to arbitrate these land disputes effectively, resulting in violent clashes between both sides.</li> </ul>
	Lack of Sufficient Education System	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Primary and secondary schools are reportedly overcrowded, and it is difficult to entice teachers to work in the rural areas of the region.</li> </ul>
	Poverty	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The National Bureau of Statistics reports that 38% of Arusha Region's population lives in poverty.</li> </ul>
	Unequal Distribution of Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In some parts of the region, locals feel that foreign companies are overstepping contractual limitations and national laws when extracting resources.</li> <li>Mismanaged urban planning is partially to blame for the unequal development of various areas/neighborhoods. Underprivileged individuals in these areas could be susceptible to radicalization because of these living conditions.</li> </ul>
Pull	Gang Recruitment of Youth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>These groups are generally divided by neighborhoods. They recruit youths through peer pressure, assurances of protection, and promises of self-worth.</li> <li>Children are trained by these groups to fight.</li> </ul>
	Religion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fringe members of Answar Sunna are suspected of carrying out previous VE attacks on moderate Muslims, Christians, and tourist hotspots.</li> </ul>

### Regionally Specific Concerns

#### *Surge in Religiously Motivated Attacks: 2013-14*

The successive targeting of religious figures and buildings between 2013 and 2014 suggests religiously-motivated VE was an emerging concern for the region. Since no group, transnational or otherwise, claimed ownership of the attacks and wide-sweeping arrests led to no notable convictions, relatively little is confirmed about the identity or motivations of the culprits. However, because of the **identities and locations of the targets**, locals allege that the perpetrators were radical, fringe members of an Islamic sect called Answar Sunna. Sources were careful to emphasize that these assertions do not reflect the



habits or beliefs of Answar Sunna as a collective, simply that the suspected individuals had loose affiliations to the organization.

In the absence of an attack on religious targets over the past few years, the threat of imminent religiously-motivated violence has outwardly lessened in the region. The individual or individuals responsible for previous attacks have seemingly left the region, died, or gone into hiding. While tensions certainly exist between and within religious communities, they are less vitriolic and palpable than those that currently exist in the political space.

#### *Worsening Relations Between Chadema and CCM*

Chadema exists as one of the strongest opposition voices in Tanzanian politics and is headquartered in Arusha Region. As a result, Chadema enjoys significant support from the local constituents despite the heavy presence of CCM leadership within the region—Regional and District Commissioners are direct appointees of the President and habitually belong to CCM. Over the last five years, tensions between the two parties have worsened due to multiple incidents of politically-based violence in the region. In 2011, Tanzanian police opened fire on Chadema protestors, killing two,<sup>4</sup> and in 2013, a grenade was thrown into a crowd of Chadema supporters during a political rally. The 2013 bombing generated pointed accusations on both sides: some CCM members claimed that Chadema planted the explosive to garner national sympathy before the upcoming elections while Chadema saw the attack as a blatant attempt to discourage political opposition.

Inter-party relations under President Magufuli's tenure have not seen drastic improvement. Many Chadema constituents believe the 2015 election was marred with government interference, and more recently, a prominent MP belonging to Chadema was critically wounded during what appeared to be an assassination attempt. In what has now become an alarming trend, Arusha Region has also seen five Chadema political councilors defect to CMM. Chadema loyalists have voiced concern that their colleagues in Arusha Region are being coerced into resignation and defection by CCM.<sup>5</sup>

Besides the clear and present danger of politically-motivated attacks, the adversarial nature of relations between CCM and Chadema poses a potential VE-threat as well. Political grievances can manifest as drivers for radicalization, especially if, despite using sanctioned methods of change, i.e. elections, lobbying, or peaceful protest, individuals and groups believe that their interests fail to be represented.

#### *At-Risk Communities*

Arusha partners categorized three areas within Arusha District as systematically marginalized: Matejoo, Unga Limited, and Daraja Mbili. All three are considered slums of the city and characterized by the following factors:

- 1) *Limited Accessibility*: The roads within and around these areas are poorly maintained, inhibiting the development of infrastructure and individuals' access to emergency and social services.

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<sup>4</sup> "Tanzania police kill two in Arusha at Chadema protest," BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12126861>.

<sup>5</sup> Mussa Juma, "Another Chadema councilor defects in Arusha," The Citizen, <http://mobile.thecitizen.co.tz/news/Another-Chadema-councillor-defects-in-Arusha/2304482-4009952-format-xhtml-c7siyd/index.html>.

- 2) *Poor Urban Planning*: According to local sources, Arusha District was negatively impacted by colonial-era urban-development choices—first by the Germans and later by the British—that continue to generate problems in these areas. Colonial governments prioritized maintaining certain parts of the city, particularly those where white citizens lived, while neglecting to develop others—an approach that still has residual effects on modern day Arusha. Matejoo, Unga Limited, and Daraja Mbili were originally developed as industrial production centers, making them ill-suited to serve as the residential areas they later became. The costs of historic mismanagement are exacerbated by the poor administrative leadership of present-day urban planning committees which have neglected to regulate sporadic construction throughout these areas.

## Morogoro

### Description of Partners

<b>1. Dakawa Economic Development (DAKEDEO)</b>
Established in 2010, DAKEDDO's primary goal is to provide economic empowerment to community stakeholders. DAKEDDO prioritizes good governance initiatives and has held informational sessions with local NGOs and CSOs about holding local government accountable. In addition to Morogoro Region, the organization also operates in Tanga, Pwani, and Dar es Salaam Regions.
<b>2. Huruma Aids Concern and Care (HACOCA)</b>
Headquartered in Morogoro Municipal, HACOCA is a non-profit, non-governmental organization that intervenes in marginalized communities to instill proper health, nutrition, and educational standards. Specifically, HACOCA's work focuses on HIV/AIDS prevention, home-based care support, child safety, sexual and reproductive health, and gender-based violence.
<b>3. Morogoro Paralegal Centre (MPLC)</b>
MPLC is a non-governmental organization striving to promote and protect human rights through the provision of legal aid services. The organization conducts activities using a wide range of outlets including radio/TV programming, theatre performances, and lecture-based educational seminars.
<b>4. My Health Foundation (MHF)</b>
Established in 2016, MHF is committed to the delivery of integrated community health, environmental conservation, and agricultural/entrepreneurial education. MHF researches and addresses prominent public health issues in Tanzania such as early pregnancy, inadequate nutrition, and the well-being of sex workers.
<b>5. Regional Office of Community Development</b>
Local government office responsible for community development for Morogoro Region.
<b>6. Regional Office of Social Welfare</b>
Local government office responsible for social welfare for Morogoro Region.
<b>7. Tanganyika Christian Refugee Services (TCRS)</b>
TCRS focuses on humanitarian, relief and development work in Tanzania on behalf of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania, the Christian Council of Tanzania, and the global ecumenical network. TCRS's

programming includes instilling good governance and accountability operations in local communities, ensuring sustainable land practices, and providing awareness programs on water sanitation and hygiene related illnesses.

#### **8. Tanzanian Women's Health Network (TWHN)**

TWHN seeks to eliminate gender-based violence by providing entrepreneurial and educational opportunities to girls and young women throughout Tanzania. The Morogoro-based organization has country-wide operations that address female genital mutilation, sex trafficking, childhood marriages, and drug abuse.

#### **9. The Islamic Foundation (TIF)**

TIF is a faith-based organization committed to humanitarian works regardless of political affiliation, race, gender, or belief. TIF has launched multi-national programming attempting to alleviate those suffering from poverty, natural disasters, and educational limitations. From its headquarters in Morogoro Region, TIF disseminates information via its three media outlets: tvImaan Tanzania, Radio Imaan FM, and Imaan Newspaper.

#### **10. Victory Youth Support Organization (VIYOSO)**

VIYOSO seeks to enrich the lives of despondent youth by providing them with career-based trainings (e.g. hotel management, tailoring), school supplies, and a learning-resource center.

### **History of VE in the Region**

Morogoro Region remained relatively devoid of observable VE activity until 2015 when a series of violent incidents occurred in Kilombero District. Unknown assailants attacked the Mgeta police station on February 2, 2015, killing two officers. Shortly afterward, Tanzanian security forces raided a mosque suspected of sheltering jihadists in mid-April. Ten individuals were arrested after being caught in possession of multiple explosives, bladed-weapons, military uniforms, and black flags covered in Arabic script. One suspect was killed by local villagers after injuring a police officer and attempting to escape custody. Afterward, Tanzanian police stated that while they strongly suspected the group's connection to al-Shabab, more evidence was required before making a definitive statement.<sup>6</sup> A month after the raid, two unidentified men blew up a car, injuring four people nearby, with a hand grenade and then fled.<sup>7</sup> Tanzanian authorities were unsure whether the three events were related.

It is also unknown whether those captured in the April raid were affiliated with a jihadist group called al-Muhajiroun, which claims to be operating in Morogoro Region. Al-Muhajiroun is a transnational VE organization in East Africa with factions in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Serving as a subordinate of al-Shabab, al-Muhajiroun has quietly gained strength through a steady influx of foreign fighters from the

<sup>6</sup> "Police must deal with terror threats soberly," The Citizen, <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/magazine/politicalreforms/Police-must-deal-with-terror-threats-soberly/1843776-2693750-11x1x02z/index.html>.

<sup>7</sup> Henry Mwangonde and Lilian Lucas "Four injured, car destroyed in Itakara bomb explosion," The Citizen, <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/national/Four-injured--car-destroyed-in-Ifakara-bomb-explosion-/1840392/2704740/-/ijds3kz/-/index.html>.

West and the Gulf States.<sup>8</sup> During an interview in 2015, the leader of its Tanzanian branch stated that the group was safely operating in Mahenge, a town centrally located in Morogoro Region.<sup>9</sup> However, no criminal or VE-related events in Tanzania have been linked to the group thus far.

## Training Outcomes

### Push and Pull factors

Morogoro		
Type of Driver	Driver	Description
Push	Resource and Land Conflicts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Land disputes between pastoralists and farmers in Mvomero and Kilosa Districts resulted in deaths and the destruction of property. Agricultural activities and markets suffered during these clashes.</li> </ul>
	Political Tensions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>One person was shot, and dozens injured during a political protest at a bus station in Morogoro.</li> <li>Politically-related violence and arson spiked during the 2017 local elections in Sofi Majiji and Kiroka Wards.</li> <li>A Chadema politician situated in central Morogoro was killed by unknown assailants in February 2018. Party members voiced concerns that this was a deliberate political assassination by the ruling party.<sup>10</sup></li> </ul>
	Lack of Economic Opportunity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Police crackdowns on the informal sector are limiting unregistered vendors' options for livelihood.</li> <li>Street vendors and police were injured during clashes over confiscated goods. Authorities claimed that vendors attempting to sell goods in open spaces were violating the law.</li> </ul>
	Poverty	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A significant number of citizens within Morogoro Region suffer from an insufficient income.</li> </ul>

<sup>8</sup> "Al-Muhajiroun : Emigrants of East Africa," Strategic Intelligence Files, <http://strategicintelligencefiles.blogspot.com/2015/05/AlMuhajiroun-East-Africa-Ansar-Mujahideen-AIShabaab-AIHijra.html>.

<sup>9</sup> "A Translated interview with Amir Abu Khalid Abu Izzadeen about Jihad in East Africa," March 11, 2015. <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/al-muhc481jirc5abn-in-east-africa-22interview-with-abc5ab-khc481lid-abc5ab-iz-al-dc4abn22.pdf>.

<sup>10</sup> Beatrice Materu, "Second opposition politician killed in Tanzania," Daily Nation, <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Opposition-politician-killed-in-Tanzania/1066-4317646-731mgdz/index.html>

	Faulty Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Students at various universities in Morogoro Region protested when the government failed to provide education loans.</li> </ul>
Pull	Influential Leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sheikh Ponda Issa Ponda was arrested in Morogoro Municipal for allegedly encouraging hate-speech and inciting religious protests. His followers threw stones at police as he was taken into custody, starting street riots.</li> </ul>

## Regionally Specific Concerns

### *Morogoro Region as a Hideout for Islamic VE Groups*

Given the 2015 mosque raid and al-Muhajiroun's claims of residency, Morogoro Region has possibly become a haven for extremist groups. The car bombing in the month following the police raid indicates that while authorities have made progress countering extremism, it has not been completely eradicated. Likewise, if al-Muhajiroun's spokesman, Abu Khalid Abu Izzadeen, is to be believed, the group is operating in Morogoro with impunity and "fear[s] no security in Tanzania."<sup>11</sup> While VE-related incidents in Arusha, Tanga, Mwanza, and Zanzibar have attracted international media attention, Morogoro has avoided scrutiny as a nondescript location despite experiencing extremism. If extremists come to view Morogoro as a safe space for encampment or transit, the region risks experiencing a deeper entrenchment of VE.

### At-Risk Communities

The Morogoro RWG identified four specific areas in Morogoro City that suffer from systematic marginalization: Chamwino, Mafisa, Kichangani, and the 'Dark City.' Due to poor urban planning, these sections of Morogoro developed in a haphazard fashion with infrastructure being built on an ad hoc basis. Such sporadic construction, especially on roads, inhibited residents' ability to access public services as well as the government's ability to deliver them. Citizens living in these areas were characterized as trapped, both economically and socially. The poor quality of education resulted in residents' limited knowledge of the public services and resources available to them, while a lack of sufficient income prevents many from moving out from these areas.

### *Tanga*

### Description of Partners

<b>1. Activista</b>
Activista is a non-profit dedicated to fighting inequality and abiding by the rule of law. With programming that supports good governance and anti-corruption initiatives at a grassroots level, Activista seeks to effect positive change with a bottom-up approach.
<b>2. African Women Aids Working Group (AFRIWAG)</b>

<sup>11</sup> "A Translated interview with Amir Abu Khalid Abu Izzadeen about Jihad in East Africa,"

AFRIWAG is a national NGO established in 1994 in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Tanzania. In addition to HIV/AIDS-focused projects, AFRIWAG implements programming that addresses supplementary public health concerns. The organization works hand-in-hand with local government to ensure beneficiaries receive sustainable and quality care.
<b>3. Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) – Tanga Branch</b>
LHRC was established in 1995 to create public awareness on legal and human rights in order to achieve a just and equitable society. By providing a wide range of services, such as civic education, legal aid, and advocacy, to underprivileged sections of society, LHRC aims to prevent any human rights abuses and inequalities that exist at the local and national societal level. In order to reach all sectors of the community, LHRC partners with media houses, international aid organizations, private sector businesses, and other CSOs.
<b>4. Novelty Youth Centre (NYC)</b>
The NYC is a non-profit institution based in Tanga District dedicated to youth development through community intervention and support programs. Operating in multiple districts in Tanga Region, NYC spearheads after-school programming that emphasizes academic, vocational, and personal training. NYC additionally seeks to raise youth awareness concerning current societal issues like human trafficking, HIV/AIDS, and violent extremism.
<b>5. Tanga City Council</b>
Local government office responsible for the municipality of Tanga.
<b>6. Tanga Civil Societies Coalition (TASCO)</b>
TASCO is an umbrella organization representing the interests of civil societies in Tanga Region. The coalition was initially formed in 2006 when ten individual CSOs from four different Tanga districts began to coordinate activity to maximize resources and efficiency. TASCO's major programming activity currently is organizing public dialogues throughout the region.
<b>7. Tanga Community Alleviation Poverty</b>
Tanga Community Alleviate Poverty endeavors to reduce poverty levels and ameliorate the socio-economic status of local community members within Tanga Region.
<b>8. Tanga District Commissioner's Office</b>
A local government office responsible for the administration of Tanga District.
<b>9. Tanga Islamic Development Foundation (TIDF)</b>
Founded in 2010, the Tanga Islamic Development Foundation is a faith-based organization operating in all the districts in Tanga Region. TIDF provides social and economic benefit services to underprivileged members of the Muslim community through poverty eradication programs.
<b>10. The Community and Social Cross-Cultural Association (COSOCRO)</b>
Established in 2008, the COSOCRO Association offers secular education initiatives and entrepreneurial trainings to community member beneficiaries. Past programming initiatives have sought to (1) establish

safe and responsible reproductive health practices and (2) enable aspiring local entrepreneurs to enter the market.

## History of VE in the Region

Reports of extremist activity began in Tanga Region around 2008. Authorities discovered a militia group inside the Lwande Forest that was recruiting and training youth in military-style tactics. The group was suspected of having ties to al-Shabab and allegedly followed a strict interpretation of sharia. Group members secured provisions by raiding nearby villages for supplies. After being alerted to the militia's presence, Tanzanian security forces confronted them, killing two and capturing 44 members.

Afterward, extremist activity remained relatively quiet in the region until November 2013. In Kilinidi District, Tanzanian security forces arrested 69 individuals associated with operating an al-Shabab indoctrination camp. Local authorities received more reports of similar extremist encampments nestled in the region. Acting on this information, Tanzanian police and military clashed with militiamen hiding in the Amboni Caves in February 2015 and again in May 2016. The perpetrators in both incidents had alleged ties to Islamic extremism, a notion supported by the release of a five-minute YouTube video in 2016 from a group operating in the Amboni Caves. Surrounded by gunmen, the speaker in the video calls upon all Tanzanian Muslims to join them in the caves and defend Islam.

Shortly after the May 2016 skirmish at the Amboni Caves, eight villagers in Kibantini were hacked to death by assailants who had supposedly been hiding out in the Caves. Sources suspected that the massacre was both revenge for group members killed by the Tanzanian security forces and a deterrent against government informants. Village leaders in Kibantini were those responsible for discovering the group's hideout and had notified the government about its presence in the caves .

In September 2016, an armed group broke onto Sebastian Kolowa Memorial University's campus, killing a security guard in the process. The assailants attempted to burn down a dormitory, and, according to survivors, the attackers discussed the most effective way to kill the students inside the building.

Regional authorities largely denied that these attacks were associated with al-Shabab or other transnational terror groups. Tanga's Regional Commissioner blamed the 2016 Amboni Caves firefight on impoverished immigrants engaging in strictly criminal activity and brushed aside accusations of extremists operating in the area.<sup>12</sup>

## Training Outcomes

### Push and Pull Factors in Tanga

Tanga		
Type of Driver	Driver	Description

<sup>12</sup> Nestory Ngwega, "East Africa: RC Clears Air on Tanga Armed Robberies, Blames Ethiopian Immigrants," AllAfrica, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201605201080.html>

Push	Lack of Economic Opportunity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Once an industrial hub of Tanzania, many of Tanga's manufacturing and processing plants have shut down.</li> <li>Unemployment in Tanga is around 20.9% for those between the ages of 20-54.</li> </ul>
	Faulty Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Slow-paced construction of public projects like the road between Tanga and Bagamoyo via Pangani and improvements to the Tanga City Port is believed to be a sign of faulty government management.</li> <li>Lack of communication between community, government, and police remains problematic.</li> </ul>
	Poverty	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>9.7% of individuals live in poverty (Tanzania Household Budget Survey, 2012).</li> </ul>
	Police & Military Injustice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Police</i>: A cyclist was shot at for improperly parking his bicycle.</li> <li><i>Military</i>: A soldier's son refused to pay bus fare, prompting the driver to confront the father. The soldier began abusing and humiliating the driver by forcing him to perform military exercises.</li> </ul>
	Lack of Sufficient Education System	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>School are underfunded. CSOs involved in youth development attempt to fill these gaps through after-school programs, providing school supplies, etc.</li> </ul>
	Resource/ Land Conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The shift from privatization to nationalization of sisal plantations is a source of strife between private businesses and the government.</li> </ul>
Pull	Religious Ideology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The groups confronted in the Amboni Caves and Lwande Forest had reported ties to Islamic extremism.</li> </ul>
	Gang Activity & Recruitment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Numerous gangs operating in Tanga target young people for recruitment.</li> <li>These gangs include the Chui, Madrid, Barcelona, and Black Mambas</li> </ul>



## Regionally Specific Concerns

### *Porous Border with Kenya*

Tanga Region's porous border with Kenya offers foreign extremists and returning jihadi fighters multiple entry points into Tanzania. Local CSOs speculate that Tanzania offers a safer haven for extremists than Mombasa or other areas in Kenya with densely concentrated Muslim populations. Additionally, there have been claims that border tribes have been assisting individuals across country in exchange for payment. The unrestricted and undocumented travel of foreign extremists represents a clear and present threat to Tanzanian security.

### *Extremists Operating Out of the Amboni Caves*

During 2015 and 2016, Tanzanian security forces fought armed combatants hiding out in the Amboni Caves. Despite emerging victorious in both these skirmishes, authorities could not confirm whether the threat of militants operating within the Caves had been eliminated. The retaliation against the Kibantini villagers following the 2016 firefight suggests that (1) not all group members were killed, and (2) they still possess enough manpower to conduct counter-strikes. Covering an expanse of nearly 230 square kilometers, the Caves pose a formidable geographic feature to for security forces monitor thoroughly—an attribute that extremists could continue to exploit.

## At-Risk Communities

Group members identified Jampani, Magaoni, Magomeni, and Usagara Mabangi as at-risk areas in Tanga Region. According to the Tanga RWG, these locales' vulnerability to a multitude of social and economic factors have produced inhospitable living conditions for the inhabitants.

- 1) *Government Mismanagement*: Partners stated that community leaders from within these areas are not included in discussions about urban planning.
- 2) *Poor Infrastructure and Population Growth*: Both the roads leading into and within these areas are poorly developed, hindering the ability of social service providers and aid-workers to deliver support in a sufficient and timely fashion. These areas have also seen dramatic increases in population which has resulted in haphazard construction to accommodate growth.
- 3) *Prioritized Resource Allocation*: Partners speculated that most development funding was being directed at areas with economic opportunities, specifically Pangani, Raskazone, and Chongoleani.<sup>13</sup>

## Zanzibar

### Description of Partners

#### **1. Association of NGOs of Zanzibar (ANGOZA)**

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<sup>13</sup> Pangani draws in revenue from beach tourism, Raskazone is a seaport and economic hub, and the Uganda-Tanzania Crude Oil Pipeline is currently being built in Chongoleani.

With nearly 230 members, ANGOZA is the umbrella organization of the Zanzibari NGO community. It is committed to representing the interests and well-being of its constituents, along with coordinating NGOs' activities in similar sectors to prevent overlap and maximize resources. ANGOZA's past accomplishments include hosting nine dialogue meetings between CSOs and members of the House of Representatives in Zanzibar, implementing Public Expenditure Tracking Systems in the government's service sectors, and helping draft the Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (2016-2020).

## **2. Anglican Diocese of Zanzibar**

The Anglican Diocese of Zanzibar is the longest-standing Christian organization in Zanzibar and hosts multiple humanitarian and public service projects across the archipelago. These include interfaith initiatives, education programming targeting primary and secondary school dropouts, and sponsoring gender-specific employment.

## **3. Center for Youth Dialogue (CYD)**

CYD is an organization committed to elevating the socio-economic status of young people through collaborative engagement with policy-makers and Tanzanian youth. In particular, CYD focuses on programming efforts concerning peace and security along with good governance. Recognizing the need to PVE in East Africa, CYD began participating in the Imams Exchange Program in 2017—a project that allows idea-sharing and networking among East African Muslim community leaders.

## **4. Labayka Development Foundation**

Labayka Development Foundation is a CSO based in Nungwi (located in northern Zanzibar) that was established in 2003. Originally founded to address the poor economic and educational conditions of Nungwi residents, the organization now has ongoing operations throughout most of northern Zanzibar. Labayka focuses on four thematic areas with its programming: (1) education, (2) protection of the environment and waste management campaigns, (3) health and hygiene, and (4) domestic household conflict management.

## **5. Jumuiya ya Maimamu Zanzibar (JUMAZA) or “The Zanzibar Imams Association”**

JUMAZA is an intra-faith organization composed of Zanzibari Muslim clerics. Involved in a number of humanitarian projects across Zanzibar, JUMAZA also serves as a platform through which localized religious grievances can be voiced.

## **6. Rahaleo Development Foundation (RADEA)**

RADEA is a CSO focused on educating community-level beneficiaries on civil responsibilities, public health concerns like HIV/AIDS, and detrimental inequalities within society.

## **7. Zanzibar Association for Children's Advancement (ZACA)**

Registered as an NGO in 1998, ZACA seeks to ameliorate the social, economic, and physical conditions of vulnerable children and youth throughout Zanzibar. Programming activities range from malaria prevention to youth engagement in the fine arts.

## **8. Zanzibar Association of Tour Operators (ZATO)**

ZATO is a membership organization comprised of Zanzibari Tour Operators. Tour Operators are responsible for arranging travel packages, establishing rates, and supervising security protocol for those individuals visiting Zanzibar.

### **9. Zanzibar Fighting Against Youth Challenges (ZAFAYCO)**

Recognized as an official NGO in 2011, ZAFAYCO is dedicated towards promotion, empowerment and self-realization of youth through awareness, capacity building and networking programs.

### **10. Zanzibar Youth Forum (ZYF)**

ZYF is a CSO that serves as a platform to advocate for the rights and empowerment of young people. The organization creates youth-centric programming that addresses a wide-range of concerns this demographic, including unequal gender dynamics, risky reproductive practices, and substance abuse.

## **History of VE in the Region**

Over the last seven years, the overflow of perceived historical, political, and religious grievances manifested as domestic extremist attacks in Zanzibar. The identities of the targets—churches, moderate religious leaders, government officials, clerics, and Western tourists—suggest that the attacks were carried out by local Islamic militants. Repeated incidents where assailants used acid in hit-and-run tactics also indicate a likelihood that one specific group was orchestrating the attacks. The most infamous of these incidents drew international headlines in August 2013 when two young British women volunteering in Zanzibar were assaulted in Stonetown. Two unidentified men sharing a moped threw acid at the two women—reportedly bypassing other tourists on the streets to reach them.<sup>14</sup> Starting in 2011, similar acid attacks had occurred, targeting Christian clerics, government officials, and moderate sheikhs who had condemned extreme interpretations of Islam.

Acid attacks were not the only *mode de guerre* used by extremists. Drive-by shootings and arson attempts targeting Catholic priests and churches inflamed religious tensions between Christians and Muslims. Moderate faith-leaders on both sides openly condemned the violence and held inter-religious dialogues in hopes that a measured response would promote communal peace.

Starting around the 2015 elections, a new group emerged in Zanzibar called the “zombies.” These masked militiamen would patrol the streets in trucks, attacking CUF supporters and destroying their property.<sup>15</sup> The zombies’ activity tended to surge around local elections, and locals report that police have done little to confront the militiamen. Given the identity of the victims and the unwillingness of police to conduct arrests, some CEP partners suspect that the group operates as a government proxy.

## **Training Outcomes**

<sup>14</sup> “Gordon Rayer and Mike Planz, “Zanzibar acid attack: British teenagers were ‘targeted’ and had been attacked before,” The Telegraph, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zanzibartanzania/10231051/Zanzibar-acid-attack-British-teenagers-were-targeted-and-had-been-attacked-before.html>

<sup>15</sup> “Trouble in paradise: Tanzania’s two component parts are not getting on well,” The Economist, <https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21708269-tanzanias-two-component-parts-are-not-getting-well-trouble-paradise>

## Push and Pull Factors in Zanzibar

Zanzibar		
Type of Driver	Driver	Description
Push	Political Tensions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The political rivalry between CCM and CUF, the two largest parties in Zanzibar, often verges on becoming violent.</li> <li>Many Zanzibaris remain convinced that the 2015 election was rigged to facilitate a CCM victory. CUF leaders urged protesters to stand down in order to maintain peace.</li> <li>Zanzibar has a history of fixed elections that have resulted in violent outbursts</li> </ul>
	History of Separation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Zanzibar long existed as an autonomous region, independent of mainland Tanganyika until unification in 1964.</li> <li>Zanzibar perceives itself as a disenfranchised, junior partner in its relationship with the mainland government.</li> </ul>
	Perceived Resource Mismanagement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Zanzibaris perceive that the mainland government does not properly reinvest taxed revenue back into the island.</li> </ul>
	Ethnic Tensions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As members of the established upper-class, Arabs were targets during the Zanzibari revolution. A history of slavery and oppression had embittered Bantu Zanzibaris against this ethnic group.</li> <li>Inhabitants of Pemba and Tumbatu—two islands off the coast of mainland Zanzibar— sometimes receive ethnic slurs referencing their supposed Arabic and Indian heritage.</li> <li>These tensions occasionally manifest themselves politically, with one side claiming the other is “half-African,” and therefore lesser, because of ethnic roots.</li> </ul>

Pull	Extremist Religious Figureheads	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Wandering Muslims clerics claiming to follow <i>tabligh</i><sup>16</sup> are preaching violent interpretations of the Quran.</li> <li>• This rhetoric appeals to those in Zanzibar who feel that Muslims occupy a marginalized position in Tanzania.</li> </ul>
	Religious and Social Ties with External Forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Zanzibar shares historic and religious ties with countries experiencing extremism.</li> <li>• Partners voiced concern that these connections allow extremist rhetoric to filter into the culture.</li> <li>• Foreign VE groups utilize perceived anti-Muslim rhetoric from the West as propaganda.</li> <li>• Dozens of youth have disappeared with the suspected intent of joining al-Shabab in Somalia.</li> </ul>

## Regionally Specific Concerns

### *Zanzibari Youth Travelling to Somalia*

In 2015, Kenyan authorities arrested three women under the age of 21 attempting to travel into Somalia, one was of whom was Zanzibari. Kenyan police suspected that the trio intended to join al-Shabab once crossing the border.<sup>17</sup> This incident offered insight into an unexplained phenomenon occurring in Zanzibar: dozens of youth disappearing from the community without an explanation. According to locals, Zanzibari citizens suspected that extremist recruitment could be a causation but lacked sufficient evidence to support this assumption. Underlying drivers of radicalization certainly exist in Zanzibar, and its youth appear to be fighting an uphill battle in securing their livelihood.

Conversations with partners about exploitable youth grievances were summarized using the Swahili idiom, “vyuma kukaza” meaning “the iron is tight.” According to partners, the situation for youth in Zanzibar has gotten progressively worse, and young people have observed this deterioration of living conditions first-hand. Businesses of all sizes have been reportedly shutting down across Zanzibar due to higher government taxation. Construction, a sector dominated by youth workers, has been limited, and the lack of consumer spending has contributed to economic woes. In this context, extremists could tap into any number of legitimate concerns as a means of radicalization.

### *History of Separation & Political Opposition*

<sup>16</sup> Tabligh – an Islamic practice that encourages proselytization by preaching at foreign mosques. This is generally conducted by travelling Muslim clerics who are unaffiliated with any single mosque. It is unclear how common this practice is in Zanzibar or Tanzania at large.

<sup>17</sup> “TZ girl arrested en route to Al-Shabab militants,” The Citizen, <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/national/TZ-girl-arrested-en-route-to-join-Shabaab-militants-/1840392-2671154-8nmmbz/index.html>

A potential danger is the manifestation of these political and religious grievances into extremist ideology, prompting Zanzibari Muslims to accept a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. Mass appeal for extremism is not needed for to have a dangerous impact, and past incidents in Zanzibar suggest lone-wolf attacks to be the most prominent form of VE.

### *The Pemba and Tumbatu Islands*

- 1) *Historical Allegiances and Political Affiliation:* During the struggle to achieve freedom from the Sultan of Zanzibar's government in the 1960s, many of the residents from Pemba and Tumbatu did not support the pro-independence Afro Shiraz Party (ASP). Following the Zanzibar Revolution of 1964, the ASP gained power and the inhabitants of Pemba and Tumbatu became considered political opponents of the ruling party. The ASP evolved into CCM after it merged with the mainland's Tanganyika African National Union and currently holds power in Zanzibar. This historical legacy of perceived political opposition still exists today as Pemba is widely regarded as the one of CUF's strongholds.

Certain prejudices exist regarding Pemba and Tumbatu residents. These communities are perceived as overwhelmingly anti-CCM, economically disenfranchised, and as having a deep-seated distrust in government authority. Public expression of these biases may lead



residents of Pemba and Tumbatu to regard themselves as second-class citizens, rendering them vulnerable to VE rhetoric and recruitment.<sup>18</sup>

## OBJECTIVE 3

### Overview

**Objective 3:** *Creation of a sustainable, country-wide PVE network composed of civil society and faith-based organizations equipped to launch their own PVE programming and contribute PVE recommendations to the UNDP's National Action Plan for PVE in Tanzania.*

CAPPTAN effectively established a country-wide network of PVE literate, community-level stakeholders capable of PVE program implementation and resource-sharing. Through face-to-face interactions, connectivity via WhatsApp groups, and a bimonthly e-newsletter, both national and regional CAPPTAN partners developed cohesive relations that serve as a resilience mechanism against VE. This collection of PVE stakeholders offered CEP insight into VE-related grievances occurring in differing sectors. Based off ideas and innovations dictated by partners throughout CAPPTAN trainings and dialogue days, CEP produced a comprehensive report in June 2018 that provides overarching recommendations to each PVE-related sector, as well as regionally-specific recommendations for Arusha, Morogoro, Tanga, and Zanzibar.

### CAPPTAN's Sustainable PVE Network

To ensure the continuation of PVE programming in Tanzania after CEP's departure, CAPPTAN established communication methods between partners. The NWG and each RWG have respective WhatsApp groups which have been used for idea-sharing, posting PVE-relevant news stories, and keeping partners informed of upcoming PVE activities. While CEP managed the WhatsApp accounts during CAPPTAN, administrative positions within the groups were transferred over to partners at the end of the program.

The Ujumbe, or "Message," was developed as another method of CAPPTAN network communication. Launched in April 2018 at the conclusion of partners' mandated trainings and dialogue days, the Ujumbe is a bimonthly e-newsletter designed to keep NWG and RWG members aware of each other's activities and informs organizations of PVE-related funding opportunities. The e-newsletter also contained P/CVE current events occurring in East Africa in order to keep partners aware of the regional progression or regression of PVE. Following the end of the program, CEP delegated publication of the Ujumbe to volunteer CAPPTAN partners interested in continuing and contributing to the e-newsletter.

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<sup>18</sup> It is important to distinguish that while there are marginalized communities within Zanzibar, many Zanzibaris view themselves as marginalized at-large by the policies issued from the mainland government of Tanzania.

National and regional partners met face-to-face when CEP convened CAPPTAN trainees to present and discuss recommendations for PVE with officials from the U.S. Embassy and UNDP. The following day, CEP hosted a networking luncheon for all national partners and the 12 regional partners in Dar es Salaam. Beyond celebrating partners' hard work and commitment to CAPPTAN, the luncheon helped to strengthen CEP's local networks by providing trainees with an environment to discuss their PVE initiatives—leading to organic networking and potential program collaboration. These events were the capstone of CEP's 18-month program and gave national and regional partners an opportunity to network, share initiatives, and discuss the way forward regarding PVE in Tanzania.

### Partner PVE Programming: Highlights

As a result of CAPPTAN, CEP partners have demonstrated a desire to implement their own PVE programming. At least 31 out of 59 partners (52.54%) have drafted PVE-related program proposals, while 30 out of 59 (50.84%) have incorporated PVE into their programming or launched unique PVE initiatives. Collectively, CAPPTAN partners cover a wide-range of PVE-relevant sectors (i.e. youth development, religion, gender, media, peacebuilding, etc.) and operate as critical agents of change in bringing about a more PVE-literate community. Programming efforts have ranged from lone organization's action to group efforts in hosting events. The following success stories showcase the progression CAPPTAN partners have made streamlining PVE into their local communities.

#### *Inter-Religious Council for Peace Tanzania – Dar es Salaam*

In early June 2017, IRCPT received a grant from the Foundation for Civil Society to pursue community-based PVE programming in Lindi and Mtwara Regions. IRCPT attributed this success to the high quality of its application, which included content—terminology, phraseology, and concepts—introduced by CEP in CAPPTAN NWG trainings. IRCPT's primary objective through the "Building Community Resilience toward Violent Extremism" program is to grow awareness of PVE and foster interfaith cohesion for a more resilient society. The program, which launched in August 2017 and is funded for three years, is designed to equip communities with PVE and conflict resolution skills so that drivers of extremism are less likely to develop and fester.



Through its program, IRCPT has conducted a baseline study of drivers to violent extremism in Lindi and Mtwara Regions. As their first initiative, they convened dialogues with key community stakeholders (i.e. government officials, security personnel, religious leaders) at the national and regional levels in order to gain support for the program and raise awareness of the issue. IRCPT has also formed interfaith committees composed of religious leaders, women, and youth at the regional level in each region, and developed a PVE manual for those interfaith committees with expert input from religious communities and security committees. IRCPT has trained interfaith committees to help local communities utilize local conflict resolution tactics, and has fostered interfaith relations through shared community projects such as social welfare management and peacebuilding. Finally, IRCPT has created peace education manuals to be taught in primary and secondary schools and religious education institutions (i.e. madrassas and Sunday schools).



Figure 4: IRCPT Promotes Its Activities via Social Media

#### *Global Peace Foundation – Dar es Salaam*

GPF launched self-funded PVE trainings for primary and secondary school children in Bagamoyo, Pwani Region, in early 2018. According to GPF's Program Manager, the goal of the trainings is to build awareness of PVE and foster resilient communities. GPF identified trainees by coordinating with the Tanzanian Youth Scouts. It held the first training in February 2018, convening 113 students in a single day. The second training took place in May 2018 and drew 60 students, all of whom were new and had not attended the first training.

#### *Vision for Youth (V4Y) – Arusha*

In addition to training in-house staff on PVE, V4Y has hosted two large-scale P/VE informational events in 2017 and 2018 respectively. For the first event, V4Y partnered with the International Republic Institute to conduct a training on PVE for religious leaders and local government officials in Arusha Region. V4Y utilized

CEP training materials to help facilitate its portion of the event. The second event—hosted in partnership with CEP and Inherit Your Rights—was a three-day workshop intended to inform 130 attendees from local youth clubs on VE and human rights. Attendees were responsible for then disseminating the information learned during this training to their peers.

#### *The Islamic Foundation (TIF) – Morogoro*

Utilizing the large-scale media resources at its disposal, TIF has been broadcasting PVE information via its Radio Imaan and TV Imaan programs. This faith-based media campaign emphasizes peaceful means of conflict resolution and draws attention to contradictions between extremist rhetoric and religious texts. Likewise, TIF has been and is continuing to host PVE seminars for its affiliated mosques' imams. These seminars instill in religious leaders the ability to identify, confront, and dissuade susceptible individuals affiliated within their congregation from being radicalized.

#### *Community and Cross Cultural Association (COSOCRO) – Tanga*

On June 26th, COSOCRO administered a single-day PVE training to local and religious leaders of Maweni Ward in Tanga District. As one of the communities directly affected by the Amboni Caves attacks in 2015 and 2016, COSOCRO identified Maweni Ward as an area in need of PVE programming. With nearly 60 beneficiaries, including government officials, the training touched on the three thematic areas of VE introduced to the RWGs during CAPPTAN—religious extremism, youth radicalization, and marginalized communities. Partners from the Tanga RWG (Novelty Youth Centre, ACTIVISTA, and Tanga Community Alleviation Poverty) assisted in leading the training by facilitating discussion between participants about each of these specific PVE themes. The head official from Pongwe Ward, the highest-ranking government representative attending the event, commended COSOCRO and the other Tanga RWG members for their effort to impart PVE knowledge at the community level.

## IV. CONCLUDING ACTIVITIES

### *Closing Event*

On Thursday June 21, 2018, CEP convened CAPPTAN trainees in Dar es Salaam to present and discuss recommendations for PVE with officials from the U.S. Embassy and UNDP. It was attended by 20 national participants representing 17 civil society organizations in Dar es Salaam, as well as 12 regional participants representing 12 total organizations from Arusha, Morogoro, Tanga, and Zanzibar.

The event marked the culmination of CAPPTAN and provided local partners with an opportunity to highlight PVE recommendations developed during the year-long training series. Designed for the Tanzanian government, public institutions, civil society, and the private sector, the recommendations are intended for implementation at the national level or are specifically geared toward CEP's four implementation regions.



Figure 5: CAPPTAN Partners Gather for the Exchange in Dar es Salaam

During the first half of the event, Dar es Salaam-based partners presented national-level PVE recommendations organized into the following categories: government, religious, economy, youth, education, gender, media, and cyber. The presenters took regular breaks to field questions and foster rich, inclusive discussion on best practices for PVE in Tanzania. During these discussions, audience members emphasized Tanzanian government action and responsibility with regard to PVE; the necessary inclusion of women in PVE efforts at community and administrative levels; and ways in which some Tanzanian communities are using religion to justify divisive, dangerous ideology. The presentation of national-level recommendations concluded with a discussion of past, current, and future PVE programming spearheaded by Dar es Salaam-based partners.

Following lunch, one trainee from each of the four regions took 30 minutes to present a) the state of VE in their region, b) PVE recommendations specific to their region, and c) PVE initiatives that regional trainees have undertaken, are beginning to undertake, or hope to launch. Like the national presenters, regional presenters engaged the room in critical, reflective discussion on the topic at hand.



Figure 6: CAPPTAN Partners Attend a Networking Luncheon

The following day, on Friday June 22, CEP hosted a networking luncheon for all national partners and the 12 regional partners at the Double Tree Hilton Hotel in Dar es Salaam. Beyond celebrating partners' hard work and commitment to CAPPAN, the luncheon helped to strengthen CEP's local networks by providing trainees with an environment to discuss their PVE initiatives—leading to organic networking and potential program collaboration.

Following these final events, CEP partners are well-versed in and prepared to promote the adoption of PVE recommendations by multisector stakeholders across Tanzania, helping to create a more inclusive, resilient society.

### PVE Recommendations: Highlights

Over the course of CAPPTAN, CEP trainees were prompted during regular group exercises to develop PVE recommendations with regard to the topic at hand, i.e. PVE through education, women and P/VE, media

and P/VE, religion and P/VE, community resilience, national and regional PVE strategies, etc. National-level trainees also devised recommendations during dialogue days focused on the misuse of religion, the unique vulnerabilities of marginalized communities, and youth radicalization. CAPPTAN staff collated all recommendations—adding edits, details, and synthesis before circulating to trainees for final review and feedback. The below recommendations are the combined effort of 59 PVE-literate CSOs, FBOs, and local government officials. Intimate with their religious, political, and social contexts, these actors are well-placed to speak on the nuances of local vulnerabilities through the lens of PVE.

Some of the key PVE recommendations are listed below, divided between national and regional:

## **National Recommendations**

### *Government*

- **Curb animosity among political parties.** Leaders from all political parties should limit hateful, inciting messages directed at opponents, currently spread through official speeches, memos, statements to the media, and social media platforms which may play a role in sparking violence between supporters of different groups.
- **Increase accessibility to political activism.** Mechanisms for peaceful political engagement (i.e. non-violent demonstrations) greatly reduce the risk of political grievances and violence.
- **PVE trainings for security committees.** Regional and district-level security committees throughout the country should be trained in foundational PVE concepts and skills.
  - Foster adherence to human rights among prison personnel.
  - Build responsible practices for immigration officers.
  - Emphasize anti-corruption measures and transparency among police.
  - Bolster judicial capacity.
- **Conduct PVE research.** Stakeholders such as universities, government bureaus, and CSOs should conduct rigorous research to identify local factors rendering Tanzania vulnerable to VE, as well as the presence of lesser-known extremist groups.
- **Employ soft-power preventative measures.** The government should create a national-level PVE committee—composed of government officials and non-governmental stakeholders—to organize and oversee soft-power prevention activities that effectively engage youth.

### *Religious*

- **Appoint PVE liaison.** Assign a focal person from each religious community to liaise with the government on PVE issues.
- **Islamic institution outreach and transparency.** Highly influential Islamic organizations (i.e. BAKWATA, Baraza Kuu, and Answar Sunnah) should increase inter-organizational communication and cooperation.
- **Muslim-Christian community-level meetings.** Dialogues between Muslim and Christian citizens at the ward, street, or village levels regarding community concerns may help to mitigate religiously-based disagreements and sources of tension.
- **PVE curriculum in religious education institutions.** Sunday schools, madrasas, and other religious education institutions should incorporate PVE modules into their curriculums.

### *Economic*

- **Modify restrictions on small-scale businesses.** Individuals operating in this sector may be forced to close their businesses if unable to meet government standards—leading to alienation, frustration, and other potential drivers of radicalization.
- **Engage the private sector.** Engage the private sector through relevant corporate social responsibility mandates and emphasize how VE can negatively affect profits while highlighting the benefits of PVE opportunities.

### *Youth*

- **Communication between parents and staff at primary, secondary, and religious schools.** This line of communication—and potential intervention—will serve as an early warning system for youth who may be vulnerable to the influence of extremist messaging.
- **Encourage and subsidize youth engagement with PVE.** The government, foundations, and CSOs should economically and logistically support youth to attend PVE-related summits, conferences, workshops, and symposiums within the country and abroad to gain exposure and network.

### *Education*

- **Training of Teachers in PVE.** Teachers and administrators in primary and secondary schools should be able to opt into trainings to i) identify and address early signs of radicalization among students, and ii) conduct conversations on P/VE with students.
- **Allocate funds for counselors in primary and secondary schools.** Primary and secondary schools should be well-equipped to provide youth with free counselling sessions.
- **PVE-related degrees.** The introduction of PVE-related classes and degrees in secondary schools and universities, respectively, will rear a new generation of PVE practitioners in Tanzania.

### *Gender*

- **Ensure that PVE programming has a gendered perspective.** The NCTC and associated offices responsible for counter-terrorism and PVE issues should actively employ and seek guidance from female professionals and experts in the subject.
- **Identify and equip local women's groups with PVE resources and skills.** Women's groups work closely with the community and should be able to identify and address radicalization at the local level.

### *Media*

- **P/VE trainings for journalists.** Media houses should train journalists on foundational concepts of P/VE for richer and more accurate reporting.

### *Cyber*

- **Swahili-language monitoring team.** The national government should create a monitoring team to identify Swahili-language extremist content on social media platforms (i.e. Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, etc). Train this team to flag such content to social media companies for removal.
- **Dissemination and promotion of counter-narratives on social media.** The Tanzanian government should encourage, and in certain cases fund, CSOs and FBOs to disseminate counter-narratives and peace campaigns on social media platforms. An abundance of peace-related messaging may decrease the monopoly that extremist preachers currently hold on these sites.

## Regional Recommendations

### *Arusha*

- **Implement programming to address gang activity.** Violence between competing neighborhood gangs is a growing problem in Arusha City, according to CEP partners. Impressionable and unemployed youth are targeted for recruitment and trained to fight, possibly rendering them susceptible to VE recruitment. Programming to mitigate the pull of gang involvement might include after-school sports and arts clubs, employment in non-skilled jobs e.g. waste management, or skilled labor trainings.
- **Mitigate inter- and intra-religious conflicts through counter-narratives and peace-building exercises.** Attacks on moderate Muslim sheikhs and Christian churches suggest the existence of religiously-motivated VE in Arusha. Proactive engagement measures may include: a) Interfaith and intrafaith dialogues; b) The development and dissemination of religious counter-narratives from trusted faith and community leaders; and c) Interfaith and intrafaith sports leagues, art fairs, etc.

### *Morogoro*

- **Increase efforts to peacefully solve land disputes.** Morogoro has suffered from violent land disputes between pastoralists and farmers, resulting in the harm and destruction of people, property, and livestock.
  - Anti-corruption trainings.
  - Informational seminars.
  - Introduce land valuers at lower levels.

### *Tanga*

- **Regional immigration officials should consult the citizens of villages and towns along the Tanga-Kenya border to identify illicit passage points.** Tanga's porous border with Kenya offers foreign extremists multiple entry points into Tanzania. Local CSOs report that extremist preachers have entered Tanzania through these gateways and have spread divisive ideology within Tanga Region.
- **Prioritize gender-focused programming in Pangani and Mkinga Districts.** In both districts, women experience heavy discrimination due to tribal practices and customary law, according to CEP partners.

### *Zanzibar*

- **Publicly condemn xenophobic and racist content associated with political party platforms.** According to photographs submitted by Zanzibari CSOs, racial tensions between ethnic Arabs and Bantu people still exist on the archipelago. Hate speech has been directed toward Pembans— inhabitants of the second largest island in Zanzibar. Racially-charged rhetoric in political propaganda has exacerbated these tensions in past elections.
- **Custom-designed PVE toolkit for Muslim clerics.** Muslim faith leaders pre-trained in PVE should design and disseminate a PVE toolkit for use by Muslim clerics in Zanzibar. As trusted pillars of the community, moderate imams and sheikhs are ideal PVE educators on the archipelago. Fostering PVE-literate, moderate voices is important amid local violence stemming from political and religious grievances. This PVE toolkit would feature modules on how to undercut Islamic extremist rhetoric and develop successful religious counter-narratives.

## Program Evaluation

CEP conducted monitoring and evaluation of the CAPPTAN program by administering a pretest quantitative survey in March-April 2017 and a post-test quantitative survey in February 2018. The pretest and post-test sought to measure baseline and end-line understanding of PVE concepts among trainees in order to indicate program success.

CEP gathered data using the Quicktap Survey, a mobile device survey application. The survey was conducted in English or Swahili depending on the preference of each respondent. Data was automatically entered, cleaned, and analyzed by the Quicktap Survey program.

Key findings from the pretest quantitative survey results include:

- More than three in four respondents (77.78%) often see pictures, movies or music on the internet made by violent groups outside Tanzania.
- More than half of respondents (52.94%) have seen pictures or movies depicting violence made by groups inside Tanzania.
- When asked who they would speak to first if they thought someone was listening to messages from violent groups, 43.14% said they would speak to government and community leaders, while 26.80% chose “other.” Write-in answers for “other” included police and related security agencies, the person listening to the messages, neighbors, and the media.
- There was near-unanimous agreement (99.35%) that learning methods or tools to stop violent groups from starting would be an important skill.


When comparing the February 2018 post-test data to the April 2017 pretest findings, CEP found that an increased number of participants have viewed pictures or movies produced by domestic violent groups inside Tanzania. Understanding of communal grievances has increased, indicated by a rise in participant understanding of why community members might be angry, as well as an understanding of why these angry individuals might want to join violent groups. Responses also indicate that partners’ PVE-related skills have strengthened since the start of CAPPTAN. More partners say they would be aware if one of their acquaintances were listening to VE propaganda. Additionally, over half of respondents believe that their organization is “perfectly prepared” or “well-prepared” to prevent violent extremism following CAPPTAN trainings. Finally, partners overwhelmingly identified “political grievances” as their largest concern related to VE in Tanzania.

Key findings from the post-test quantitative survey results include:


- The percentage of respondents who see pictures or movies depicting violence made by violent groups inside of Tanzania (i.e. local extremist movements) rose from 52.94% in April 2017 to 63.41% in February 2018.
- The majority of respondents said that they could understand why community members might be angry (88.00%) and why angry individuals might attempt to join a violent group (90.24%). This increased from 83.00% and 75.16%, respectively.



- A majority of respondents (79.68%) said they could tell if someone they knew had started listening to messages from violent groups. This increased from 55.56% in April 2017.
- A majority of respondents (58.18%) believe that their organization is perfectly prepared or well-prepared to prevent violent extremism, followed by 33.33% who believe that their organization is averagely prepared.
- Political grievances were overwhelmingly selected as the largest concern related to VE in Tanzania.



*[I can understand why angry people might want to join a violent group in my community. 90.24% of respondents "agree" and "strongly agree," compared to 75.16% in the pretest.]*



*[I would approach and talk to someone I think might be listening to messages from violent groups. 85.36% of respondents "agree" and "strongly agree," compared to 80.39% in the pretest.]*

Overall, the data collected through CEP's monitoring and evaluation processes indicated that CAPPTAN participants are more knowledgeable about P/VE following the training program. Data suggests that respondents built an awareness of foundational P/VE issues and concepts, not only theoretically but applicable to their localized context. Trainees are better able to conceptualize community grievances, recognize the necessity of women in peacemaking, and honor the role of community organizations in PVE work. Additionally, partners are more willing and able to engage with acquaintances they suspect of listening to VE propaganda.



## V. Looking Forward

### Existing and Future Challenges

- **Funding for Future PVE Initiatives:** During close-out interviews with regional partners, CEP asked what factor or factors would prevent organizations from starting/continuing PVE programming. ‘A lack of funding’ was the nearly unanimous response, representing the financial realities facing many Tanzanian CSOs and FBOs on the national and regional level. The absence of monetary support effectively limits CAPPTAN partners’ resources to implement PVE programming within the community, especially if organizations consider PVE as a supplementary feature to their routine activities and do not prioritize it. By spotlighting over 10 CSO-specific funding opportunities in the Ujumbe, CEP tried to address this pervasive challenge for CAPPTAN partners.
- **Maintaining Partner Networks:** While various avenues of communication have been established for the NWG and RWGs, there is no guarantee that partners will maintain these links in the future. In many ways, this concern is tied to the funding challenge outlined above. The inability of partners to conduct PVE operations due to lapses in funding could result in the decay of these networks. In order to manage this concern, CEP chose CAPPTAN representatives who had made concerted efforts to streamline PVE into their organizations activities as the new administrators of the WhatsApp groups and Ujumbe e-newsletter. By putting PVE-conscious individuals in charge of these networks, CEP hoped to lessen the impact of close-out departure and keep Tanzanian stakeholders focused on PVE.
- **Government Sensitivity to PVE Programming:** Despite working with UNDP to craft a National Action Plan for PVE, the GOT has been reluctant to grant autonomy to non-government organizations conducting PVE programming. Greater efforts should be made to educate high-profile government officials about the holistic approach PVE takes to extremism in order to increase support for these types of initiatives. Because of the resources and legitimacy that government can provide to PVE programming, ensuring its backing at the national, regional, and local administrative levels is vital.

## At-Risk Regions for Future PVE Programming

While CAPPTAN instilled national and regional partner networks across Tanzania, it did not have the resources to cover every at-risk region in the country. In Mwanza Region, clashes between Muslim and Christian groups have been reported, coupled with security forces discovering children during a house-raid on alleged extremists. Policemen and government officials have been the targets of multiple shootings in Pwani Region. Likewise, extremism threatens to cross into Mtwara Region from Mozambique.

The northernmost province of Tanzania's southern neighbor has suffered a gradual increase in Islamic extremist attacks since October 2017. The perpetrators are a domestic VE group referred to as "al-Shabab" by locals, although the insurgents are unrelated and unaffiliated to their namesake in Somalia. Comprised primarily of Mozambicans, the group is augmented with East African foreign fighters, some of whom are reportedly Tanzanian.<sup>19</sup> If left unchecked, the Mozambican al-Shabab's influence could diffuse into southeastern Tanzania, including Mtwara Region which has been an encampment for extremist activity in the past—Tanzanian security forces arrested 13 individuals with ties to Somalia's al-Shabab for establishing a military-style training camp in 2013.<sup>20</sup>

Outreach efforts should be made by CAPPTAN beneficiaries to insulate CSOs and FBOs in these regions against extremist rhetoric and ideology. Partners with established programs in these areas would be the best candidates for PVE implementation and should conduct research within the regions to determine which communities are most vulnerable.




Figure 7: Mtwara Region Borders Mozambique's Cabo Delgado Province—the Epicenter of VE Activity

## ANNEXES

- 1) Recommendations for National Action Plan
- 2) Partner Initiatives Going Forward
- 3) Pre-test Survey Report
- 4) Post-test Survey Report
- 5) List of CAPPTAN Partners


<sup>19</sup> "Attack kills 2 in North Mozambique." *Africa Time*. December 5, 2017. <http://en.africatime.com/articles/new-attack-kills-2-north-mozambique>; "ISS Today: Mozambique's first Islamist attacks shock the region." *ISS Africa*. October 27, 2017.

<https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-10-27-iss-today-mozambiques-first-islamist-attacks-shock-the-region/#.Wmr9Ad-WaM9>

<sup>20</sup> "Two More Arrested in Connection to al-Shabab Military Training in Mtwara," *Sabahi News*

## COUNTER EXTREMISM PROJECT

June 2018



## PARTNER RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN TANZANIA

**COUNTER  
EXTREMISM  
PROJECT**

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## Preface

Over the course of CAPPTAN,<sup>1</sup> the Counter Extremism Project (CEP) has built relationships with civil society organizations (CSOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs), government representatives, and other national and international stakeholders working in Tanzania. These relationships have offered CEP insight into Tanzanian communities, while engaged stakeholders have built sustainable, collaborative, community-driven networks. The CEP team is grateful for stakeholders' unwavering dedication, insight, and trust—which has ultimately produced this comprehensive set of recommendations. Implementation of these recommendations will ensure that Tanzania maintains its position as a peaceful and stable nation.

## Introduction

Through *CAPPTAN*, CEP has formed sustainable networks of civil society, faith-based, and local government actors at the national level in Dar es Salaam and regionally in Arusha, Morogoro, Tanga, and Zanzibar. These five networks—comprised of 61 organizations and government offices working in youth empowerment, peacebuilding, religion, gender, media, and other areas—have participated in *CAPPTAN* trainings and dialogues covering the foundational concepts of violent extremism (VE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE). Equipped with this knowledge, and deeply familiar with the unique vulnerabilities of their Tanzanian communities, these civil society actors have produced a comprehensive set of PVE recommendations to be implemented by the Tanzanian government, civil society, the private sector, and other stakeholders.

This report is organized by recommendation type. It begins with overarching recommendations for implementation at the national level, divided into the following categories: government, religious, economic, youth, education, gender, media, and cyber. The report then explores regionally-specific PVE recommendations to be implemented by stakeholders in Arusha, Morogoro, Tanga, and Zanzibar. The annex lists and provides links to the legislation referenced throughout the body of the document.

## Background

The recommendations in this report were developed and compiled over the course of one year, beginning in March 2017 with the launch of *CAPPTAN* trainings in Dar es Salaam. During the ten national-level trainings, participants were prompted during regular group exercises to develop recommendations with regard to the topic at hand, i.e. PVE through education, women and P/VE, media and P/VE, religion and P/VE, community resilience, national and regional PVE strategies, etc. National-level trainees also devised recommendations during three dialogue days in November 2017, January 2018, and February 2018—specifically focused on the misuse of religion, the unique vulnerabilities of marginalized communities, and youth radicalization, respectively.

Regional stakeholders supplied recommendations throughout their nine-month training period beginning in June 2017. Trainees participated in three, three-month training cycles covering the same topics: misuse of religion, the unique vulnerabilities of marginalized communities, and youth radicalization. Each cycle consisted of three training days and one dialogue day. While regionally-specific recommendations materialized during the trainings, the majority of policy suggestions came from partners' input during dialogue days.

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<sup>1</sup> Community Awareness Program for Preventing Violent Extremism in Tanzania



CAPTAN staff collated all recommendations—adding edits, details, and synthesis before circulating to trainees for final review and feedback. The below recommendations are the combined effort of 61 PVE-literate CSOs, FBOs, and local government officials. Intimate with their religious, political, and social contexts, these actors are well-placed to speak on the nuances of local vulnerabilities through the lens of PVE.

## Overarching Recommendations

### Government

#### General Action Plans

- 1) *Make PVE a national agenda item.* In order to prioritize and organize large-scale PVE measures, the national government should incorporate PVE as an item in the national agenda.
- 2) *Enforce the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2002).* Particularly such measures that criminalize “instigation to the cause of terrorism” and the “offering of or provision of moral assistance, including invitation to adhere to a proscribed organization.” Tanzanian law enforcement should be familiar with and prepared to apprehend extremist ideologues, supporters, and recruiters, as stipulated in the legislation.
- 3) *Curb animosity among political parties.* Leaders from all political parties should limit hateful, inciting messages directed at opponents, currently spread through official speeches, memos, statements to the media, and social media platforms which may play a role in sparking violence between supporters of different groups.
- 4) *Increase accessibility to political activism.* Mechanisms for peaceful political engagement (i.e. non-violent demonstrations) greatly reduce the risk of political grievances and violence.

#### Capacity Building and Training

- 1) *PVE trainings for security committees.* Regional and district-level security committees throughout the country should be trained in foundational PVE concepts and skills.<sup>2</sup>
  - a) *Foster adherence to human rights among prison personnel.* The government should contract PVE experts to train prison officers and guards throughout the country, ensuring that prison staff uphold basic human rights including abstaining from torture and other abuses.
  - b) *Build responsible practices for immigration officers.* Immigration officers should receive PVE trainings, equipping them with the skills to recognize suspicious travel activity from known terror hubs, while refraining from profiling individuals based on ethnicity, religion, or nationality.
  - c) *Emphasize anti-corruption measures and transparency among police.* Because security-related grievances are often tied to corrupt police practices (bribery, brutality, extrajudicial arrests), police should receive PVE trainings focused on anti-

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<sup>2</sup> **Regional security committees comprise at least eight individuals:** Regional Commissioner, Regional Administrative Secretary, Regional Police Commander, Commanding Officer of the Tanzania Peoples’ Defense Forces Unit, Regional Security Officer, Regional Immigration Officer, Regional Militia Advisor, Regional Prison Officer(s). **District security committees comprise at least 12 individuals:** District Commissioner, District Administrative Secretary, City Director, Officer Commanding District, District Director of Intelligence, District Migration Officer, Director of Fire Brigade, Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau Commander, Assistant District Director of Intelligence, Navy Army Commander(s), District Militia Advisory, District Prison Officer(s).

corruption measures and upholding the rule of law. In addition, police should publicize the results of investigations into politically-motivated violent attacks.

- d) *Bolster judicial capacity.* Train Tanzanian judiciary and attorneys to appropriately and effectively charge and prosecute individuals suspected of violating the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2002. In addition, train attorneys to identify and advocate the release of individuals detained without sufficient cause or evidence.
- 2) *Broaden and strengthen community policing programs.* To foster strong civilian-security relationships, the government should expand community policing programming throughout the country. Assess the weaknesses of current community policing initiatives and ensure that each program is effectively alleviating security-related grievances among civilians. Police interacting with communities should be prepared to work with civilians in identifying and thwarting local VE- and crime-related threats.
- 3) *Develop a community-based early warning system for VE.*
  - a) *Strengthening of security desk.* Train officials at district-level security desks to better receive, analyze, and respond to grievances and VE-related concerns voiced by community members.
  - b) *Community database for street leaders.* Create a digitized database for street and village leaders, enabling them to log and identify all residents in their area of jurisdiction and convene these residents for community resilience initiatives and decision-making meetings. This will also help street and village leaders to identify, flag, and track radicalized individuals in their community.
- 4) *Conduct PVE research.* Stakeholders such as universities, government bureaus, and CSOs should conduct rigorous research to identify local factors rendering Tanzania vulnerable to VE, as well as the presence of lesser-known extremist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun of East Africa. Such findings will be used to inform future PVE initiatives in the country.
- 5) *Integrate youth into government leadership.* Launch a government internship program enabling recent graduates to intern in a variety of government sectors at multiple administrative levels. This will provide youth with government-related skills and networks, giving them credibility with government- and non-government employers.
- 6) *Civic duties training for youth.* Government officials working in youth development should coordinate with CSOs to provide trainings to youth on civic responsibilities, as well as outline appropriate ways to exercise one's democratic rights. Engagement in the democratic sphere empowers youth to effect change through nonviolent means.

Engagement in the democratic sphere empowers youth to effect change through nonviolent means

#### Administration

- 1) *Strengthen public-private partnerships involving social services.* Private organizations provide a number of social services—such as health care—to the Tanzanian public but lack the authority of state-run projects. By bridging the gap between the public and private sector and incorporating the positive aspects of each, Tanzanians could see an improvement in overall social service provision.
- 2) *Ensure that government development funds are being distributed to marginalized communities.* The parliament and Chief Accounting General should ensure that relevant

national government funding reaches marginalized groups including women, youth, individuals with disabilities, individuals with albinism, pastoralists, certain tribes, etc.

- 3) *Employ soft-power preventative measures.* The government should create a national-level PVE committee—composed of government officials and non-governmental stakeholders—to organize and oversee soft-power prevention activities (sports, theater, artwork, festivals, marches, etc.) that effectively engage youth. The PVE committee’s activities will complement those of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and other government bodies—comprising a comprehensive national approach to VE.
- 4) *Improve relations between local government and communities.* Regional governments should improve relationships with the farmers and pastoralist tribes inhabiting areas such as national parks and extractives sites. Governments have previously marginalized such citizens by

**Local government should work to strengthen relations with marginalized communities and tribes**

prioritizing land use by the tourism and extractives industries, which do not economically benefit local communities.<sup>3</sup> Close relationships may help alleviate local communities’ grievances stemming from perceived marginalization.

5) *Increase public infrastructure, services, and welfare for Tanzanians living with disabilities and albinism.* Partner with and fund private organizations that work with these communities. Both groups are often among the poorest and most ostracized within society, as their disabilities and/or albinism affect their health, education, and employment opportunities. In particular, individuals with albinism are subject to attacks by Tanzanians holding superstitious views. Individuals with disabilities and albinism may be vulnerable to radicalization due to their exclusion from mainstream society. Below are some existing protections to build upon:

- a. Individuals with disabilities
  - i. In 2010, the government passed the “Persons with Disabilities Act,” requiring employers of a workforce of 20+ to hire at least 3% employees with disabilities.
- b. Individuals with albinism
  - i. The CSO *Under the Same Sun* provides high-quality education to people with albinism and spearheads an ongoing public awareness campaign to educate Tanzanians about albinism and promote individuals with albinism’s inclusion in society.

## Religious

- 1) *Appoint PVE liaison.* Appoint a focal person from each religious community to liaise with the government on PVE issues. This individual will inform the Ministry of Home Affairs of community grievances and supply officials with recommended steps to mitigate them. The liaison will also alert the government of potential VE activity within the community. The government should regularly convene all liaisons for the purpose of information-sharing and coordination of PVE resources.

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<sup>3</sup> “Maasai locked in Tanzania legal battle with US safari firm, land conflicts grow,” Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/article/tanzania-landrights/maasai-locked-in-tanzania-legal-battle-with-us-safari-firm-land-conflicts-grow-idUSL8N12T35X20151112>; “Maasai fury as plan to lure Arabian Gulf tourists threatens their ancestral land,” The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/30/maasai-game-hunting-tanzania>.



- 2) *Appoint interfaith liaison.* The national government should appoint a focal person to liaise with prominent interfaith bodies, lending increased legitimacy and efficacy to interfaith projects and enabling the government to communicate closely with different faith leaders.
- 3) *Registration of all religious institutions.* The national and regional governments should collaborate with FBOs to officially register all places of worship and religious schools (i.e. churches and mosques, and Sunday schools and madrasas, respectively), throughout Tanzania. Such registration is integral for the regulation of these institutions and the safeguarding of their preachers, teachers, and students against extremist ideology through the identification and dismissal of extremist actors and content.
  - a) Anecdotal evidence suggests that fundamentalist sheikhs from the Middle East and North Africa are relocating to Tanzania and propagating a version of Islam that breeds extremism. These sheikhs are reportedly recruiting Tanzanian youth to leave the country and join foreign conflicts as jihadists.
- 4) *Islamic institution outreach and transparency.* Highly influential Islamic organizations (i.e. BAKWATA, Baraza Kuu, and Answar Sunnah) should increase inter-organizational communication and cooperation. In addition, these intuitions should seek full transparency with the Muslim community and the Tanzanian population at large. According to CEP partners, a notable number of Tanzanian Muslims have grievances against BAKWATA—the most influential Islamic organization—believing that it does not serve the true interests of Muslims.
- 5) *Muslim-Christian community-level meetings.* Dialogues between Muslim and Christian citizens at the ward, street, or village levels regarding community concerns may help to mitigate religiously-based disagreements and sources of tension. There have been reported instances of Christians and Muslims in Tanzania quarreling over religious butchery practices, or the right to slaughter. Bombing and burning of churches in Muslim-majority areas has also taken place.<sup>4</sup>
- 6) *Trainings by top religious leaders.* Renowned religious leaders foster a safe, unified environment in Tanzania by spreading moderate interpretations of the faith. These leaders should train a) the heads of Sunday schools and madrasas to identify and address early signs of radicalization; and b) less-experienced religious leaders within their faith on moderate scriptural interpretation.
- 7) *Development and dissemination of counternarratives.* Trusted and reputable FBOs should work with CSOs to design, produce, and disseminate religiously-based counter-narratives, utilizing traditional and social media to maximize broadcast potential. Messages should be tailored to address grievances expressed within Tanzania, whether they be locally- or internationally-focused. Messaging campaigns may feature the stories of former extremists, and seek to counter the following narratives:
  - a) “Our religious group is persecuted by other religious groups”
  - b) “Our religious group is deprived by the Tanzanian government”
  - c) “Our religious group is under attack by Western countries and ideals”

**Tension between Christians and Muslims may be eased by interfaith dialogue at the community level**

<sup>4</sup> “TANZANIA 2013 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT,” U.S. Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222317.pdf>; “TANZANIA 2015 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT,” U.S. Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/256291.pdf>; “Bombs target church, restaurant in Zanzibar,” Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-blasts/bombs-target-church-restaurant-in-zanzibar-idUSBREA1N1BA20140224>.

- d) “Our religious group used to be powerful but now we are the underdogs of society; we need to regain our place”
- e) “Our religion is superior to other religions, and we must wage violence in order to protect and spread our faith”
- 8) *PVE curriculum in religious education institutions.* Sunday schools, madrasas, and other religious education institutions should incorporate PVE modules into their curriculums. Such modules will introduce the foundational concepts of P/VE including push and pull factors, signs of radicalization, and refutation of extremist messaging.
- 9) *Faith-based programming for prisoners.* Prisons should coordinate with religious leaders to implement faith-based seminars for inmates on a case-by-case basis, emphasizing moderate scriptural interpretation. While P/VE may not be explicitly discussed, such seminars may discourage justification of grievances through a radical religious lens.
- 10) *Increase social media presence.* Moderate, respected religious leaders throughout Tanzania should maintain an active presence on social media sites and disseminate relevant information, engage in virtual Q&A sessions, and respond to direct messages from curious and impressionable youth. Taking up space on these outlets may help to eclipse the extremist messaging of regional and international actors.

## Economic

- 1) *Improve public awareness regarding budget accessibility.* Grievances stemming from perceived government non-transparency over allocation of public funding and resources may lead to the adoption of extremist, anti-government narratives. Citizens should know where to access their region’s annual budget.
  - a) A first step would be ensuring that regional budgets are shared in hard copy in government offices and uploaded in soft copy to the Bunge website. While budget speeches are available on the Bunge website, the ministerial and regional budgets are not uploaded.
- 2) *Modify restrictions on small-scale businesses.* Registered, low-profit businesses such as boda boda (motorcycle taxi), local food stores, and small-scale mining endeavors face financial burdens and may not be able to comply with all government regulations. Individuals operating in this sector may be forced to close their businesses if unable to meet government standards—leading to alienation, frustration, and other potential drivers of radicalization.
- 3) *Destigmatize the pursuit of non-conventional careers.* Tanzanian youth are discouraged from pursuing non-traditional careers (e.g. fine arts or professional athletics) because they are not seen as secure options. Working with CSOs, the government could provide workshops that offer commercial advice to individuals working in this sector, i.e. a painter attempting to establish an art studio or a semi-professional athlete managing his or her savings. Increasing economic and professional opportunity decreases the chances that these youth are drawn to VE narratives and groups.

**Economic and professional opportunity may mitigate the lure of VE**

- 4) *Ease crackdowns on the informal sector.* Informal businesses such as street food vendors, cobblers, and informal market salesmen are often targeted by officials seeking tax or immediate closure. Clashes between authorities and members of the informal business sector have turned violent throughout the country, including in Morogoro and Arusha, according to CEP partners. CSOs may be able to offer consultation to these informal businessmen, including financial management and responsible

business practices. A stronger informal sector could provide vulnerable youth with more financial opportunity.

- 5) *Engage the private sector.* Engage the private sector through relevant corporate social responsibility mandates and emphasize how VE can negatively affect profits while highlighting the benefits of PVE opportunities. Beyond promoting entrepreneurship and vocational training, the private sector can support grassroots initiatives and empowerment programs by providing access to professional networks, communication tools, and financial resources. Specifically, for-profit companies with a large market presence in Tanzania (such as Coca Cola or Vodacom) can help to fund and disseminate PVE counter-messaging campaigns throughout the country.

## Youth

- 1) *Target pre-identified problematic areas.* The regional governments in Arusha, Tanga, Pwani, Mtwara, Lindi, and Zanzibar Urban/West should offer skills development trainings and projects for youth. These regions demonstrate signs of being primed for extremism, according to CEP partners.
- 2) *Communication between parents and staff at primary, secondary, and religious schools.* How to teach and talk about scripture; updates on students' progress and attitudes; and developments at home are all important topics for discussion between parents and school staff. This line of communication—and potential intervention—will serve as an early warning system for youth who may be vulnerable to the influence of extremist messaging. Parents should be made aware of early signs of radicalization and able to identify those signs at home.
- 3) *Enforce age limitations for youth desk.* Ensure that the youth desk in the president's office is staffed by qualified individuals under the age of 35. The desk strengthens and protects youth's role in democratic processes and should be reserved solely for young people.
- 4) *Encourage and subsidize youth engagement with PVE.* The government, foundations, and CSOs should economically and logistically support youth to attend PVE-related summits, conferences, workshops, and symposiums within the country and abroad to gain exposure and network.
- 5) *Make the Youth Development Fund more accessible to CSOs.* The government should improve CSOs' accessibility to the Youth Development Fund, launched in 1993 to provide credit to youth empowerment initiatives. In particular, the government should review the fund's terms and conditions regarding funding to youth-focused programming.
- 6) *Reduce business taxes for young entrepreneurs.* A favorable tax environment for youth starting new businesses will help to jumpstart their endeavors, incentivizing new business creation and lowering the entry cost to various markets. New economic opportunities may serve as an alternative course for those youth susceptible to VE recruitment.
- 7) *Dialogue between security, government, and youth.* Foster dialogue between security bodies, local government authorities, and young people to develop joint action plans to address grievances and injustices at the community level. These mechanisms will enable young people

**The engagement of youth in PVE events—domestically, regionally, and internationally—should be subsidized by the Tanzanian government, private sector, educational institutions, and civil society networks**

to positively and constructively engage security forces, including police and intelligence officials.

- 8) *Funding small-scale peacemaking endeavors led by youth.* CSOs and the government should provide funding to youth and community-led peacemaking projects.

## Education

- 1) *Training of teachers in PVE.*
  - a) Teachers and administrators in primary and secondary schools should be able to opt into trainings to i) identify and address early signs of radicalization among students, and ii) conduct conversations on P/VE with students.<sup>5</sup>
  - b) The above PVE modules should be offered to teachers-in-training.
- 2) *Ensure children attend government-registered primary and secondary schools.* Children attending religious institutions (i.e. madrassas and Sunday schools) as their only form of education do not receive the same educational standards as those children adhering to the national curriculum.
- 3) *Allocate funds for counselors in primary and secondary schools.* Primary and secondary schools should be well-equipped to provide youth with free counselling sessions. These counselors should be trained in PVE as part of an early warning mechanism for identifying radical ideology and behavior among students.
- 4) *Launch PVE campaigns in educational institutions.* CSOs should launch peace dialogues and debates on VE at universities and secondary schools.
- 5) *PVE-related degrees.* The introduction of PVE-related classes and degrees in secondary schools and universities, respectively, will rear a new generation of PVE practitioners in Tanzania.
- 6) *Religious tolerance programs.* Incorporate religious tolerance curriculums into primary schools throughout the country. CSOs should train primary and secondary school teachers to respect and honor religious diversity among the student population. Teachers will learn how to implement interfaith activities to build trust and communication between students of different religions.
- 7) *Creative exploration of PVE concepts.* Educational institutions should launch innovative and creative activities through which students can explore PVE concepts, such as theater, music, film, fine arts, etc.

## Gender

- 1) *Ensure that PVE programming has a gendered perspective.* The NCTC and associated offices responsible for counter-terrorism and PVE issues should actively employ and seek guidance from female professionals and experts in the subject.

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<sup>5</sup> Resources for PVE discussion facilitation in a classroom setting are widely available, including a United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization [PVE guidebook](#) designed for teachers.

- When it comes to violent extremism, if women are part of the problem then they must be part of the solution**
- 2) *Gender-focused CSOs to form PVE-linked network.* CSOs working in gender equality should form nationwide and local networks to share resources and cooperate on PVE programming with a gendered lens. These networks will help to highlight—and effectuate—the inclusion of women in PVE work.
  - 3) *Identify and equip local women’s groups with PVE resources and skills.* Women’s groups work closely with the community and should be able to identify and address radicalization at the local level.
  - 4) *Civic leadership training for women.* Gender inclusion in civic life may lead to greater societal resilience to VE. CSOs should offer community-level trainings designed to strengthen women’s roles as active citizens and promoters of democracy—teaching women how to critique and challenge ideas and become advocates for the inclusion of women in the political sphere.
  - 5) *Elimination of customary and tribal law sanctioning restrictive gender practices.* Some local communities practice customary and tribal law above constitutional law, inhibiting Tanzanian women’s land rights, access to education, and employment opportunities—leading to gendered marginalization.
  - 6) *Improve conditions related to female education.* Women should be granted the same educational opportunities as their male counterparts. Any limiting measures may marginalize women and may leave them vulnerable to alternative and extremist ideologies.

## Media

- 1) *P/VE trainings for journalists.* Media houses should train journalists on foundational concepts of P/VE for richer and more accurate reporting. Journalists unfamiliar with P/VE concepts and terminology are unable to effectively and ethically inform the public on P/VE incidents and crises. As a result, P/VE reporting may be selective, sensationalist, disproportionate, or biased—potentially leading to misunderstanding, fear, discrimination, and social cleavage. The training will educate journalists on how to expose the underlying aims of terrorists while providing alternative ideological narratives. It will also help journalists dissect the lure of VE groups and ideology by covering extremism in a manner that is conflict sensitive, avoids stereotyping, and promotes the values of tolerance and cohesion. The training will help journalists develop a post-attack media strategy, including:
  - a) Hosting the voices of moderate religious and/or political leaders to offer counter-narratives,
  - b) Providing objective and insightful analysis from known experts in the field.
- 2) *PVE attitude-change campaigns on popular local media platforms.* CSOs, FBOs, the government, and other interested stakeholders should utilize renowned local media platforms—such as Clouds FM and *Shujaaz* comic books and radio—to spread awareness and foster critical analysis of VE. These attitude-change campaigns will be subject to ongoing monitoring and evaluation to measure the audience’s attitude toward VE-related content.
- 3) *Revision of the Media Service Act (2016).* Freedom to objectively report on suspected VE incidents—without government censorship—is essential for a free flow of information and a comprehensive understanding of domestic P/VE issues. With this in mind, the Bunge should revise the Media Service Act (MSA) of 2016. The Act grants vague yet seemingly unlimited power to what it terms the “regulator,” and does not provide media houses sufficient recourse if they are accused of defamation. Suggested preliminary changes to the MSA are as follows:

- a) *Accreditation of journalists by an independent entity.* The MSA stipulates that in order to legally generate content, journalists must be accredited by the Journalist Accreditation Board (JAB)—whose members are appointed by the Minister of Information.<sup>6</sup> In order to avoid potential bias, the Board should also include non-government-appointed members.
- b) *Delegate licensing of print media to a neutral, non-government body.* According to the MSA, the government's Director of Information Services has the authority to issue, suspend, and cancel licenses for all print media houses. This high degree of oversight runs counter to international law (stipulated by UNHCR, the African Union) that protect free media by discouraging government overreach.<sup>7</sup>

## Cyber

- 1) *Swahili-language monitoring team.* The national government should create a monitoring team to identify Swahili-language extremist content on social media platforms (i.e. Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, etc). Train this team to flag such content to social media companies for removal.
- 2) *Lobbying for proper safety mechanisms on major social media platforms.* Tanzanian politicians should lobby foreign social media companies to establish safety mechanisms to keep extremist content off their platforms. Potential safety mechanisms could include Swahili-language content experts able to advise on content fit for removal.
- 3) *Dissemination and promotion of counter-narratives on social media.* The Tanzanian government should encourage, and in certain cases fund, CSOs and FBOs to disseminate counter-narratives and peace campaigns on social media platforms. An abundance of peace-related messaging may decrease the monopoly that extremist preachers currently hold on these sites.
- 4) *Social media trainings for youth.* CSOs should train youth how to use social media to maximize counter-narrative campaigns, as well as how to think critically regarding extremist or conspiracy-tied information found on social media.
- 5) *PVE trainings for JamiiForums.* The owners and regulators of the JamiiForums platform should receive PVE trainings so that they are able to easily identify extremist content fit for removal.

### **Radicalization, recruitment, and dissemination of extremist propaganda over the internet should be explicitly criminalized in the Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations Act (2018)**

6) *Create a digital interface for PVE stakeholders.* The government should create a user-friendly, accessible platform where government bodies, international NGOs, the private sector, and local CSOs and FBOs can communicate about PVE issues and network.

7) *Amendment of the Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations Act (2018).* The 2018 Act prohibits the “circulating [of] information and statements with regards to possible terrorist attacks” as well as “instructions and guidance

<sup>6</sup> “Brief Analysis of Media Services Bill 2016,” Twaweza, <https://www.twaweza.org/uploads/files/Analysis%20-%20Media%20Services%20Bill%20-%20FINAL.pdf>

<sup>7</sup> “Comments of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, 12 September, 2011,” United Nations, <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf>; “Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights” African Union <http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/achpr/expressionfreedomdec.html>



on Bomb-making,” but stops short of criminalizing other VE-specific internet-based activities. The Bunge should amend the 2018 Act to criminalize a wide variety of VE-related cybercrimes, such as radicalization, recruitment to extremist networks, and the proliferation of extremist propaganda.

## Regionally Specific Recommendations

### Arusha

- 1) *Implement PVE programming, encompassing economic development and advocacy initiatives, in pre-identified at-risk neighborhoods in Arusha.* CEP partners identified three potentially at-risk neighborhoods and wards within Arusha District: Matejoo, Unga Limited, and Daraja Mbili. These locations suffer from a combination of limited accessibility, poor urban planning, and criminal activity. The lack of physical safety has reportedly deterred some CSOs from operating in these areas. CSOs, FBOs, and government officials should prioritize these areas for PVE and economic aid program implementation.
- 2) *Offer PVE trainings to security committees in Arusha.* Regional and district security committees in Arusha should be trained in foundational PVE concepts. CEP’s network of CSOs in Arusha—trained in PVE and spearheading PVE programs within their communities—are capable of providing such trainings. These trainings should include structured dialogue between the security committees and local civil society actors.
- 3) *Cooperation between political parties.* Because Arusha is considered an opposition stronghold (Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo, or Chadema), initiatives building inter-political cooperation should be considered. Sports matches, public service activism, and festivals convening leaders and supporters from a variety of political parties would demonstrate a willingness to engage with the “other” and help reduce Arusha’s political tension.
- 4) *Finalize investigations into past VE incidents in Arusha.* Targets of VE-related attacks in Arusha vary, making it difficult to identify—let alone prosecute—the group or actor(s) responsible. Religious leaders, places of worship, and popular tourist locations have all been targeted. While some local CSOs suspect that attacks on secular targets were attempts by religious extremists to gain notoriety, there is not enough evidence to back this assumption. Further investigation by Tanzanian security officials might clarify these missing points.
- 5) *Implement programming to address gang activity.* Violence between competing neighborhood gangs is a growing problem in Arusha City, according to CEP partners. Impressionable and unemployed youth are targeted for recruitment and trained to fight, possibly rendering them susceptible to VE recruitment. Programming to mitigate the pull of gang involvement might include after-school sports and arts clubs, employment in non-skilled jobs e.g. waste management, or skilled labor trainings.
- 6) *Mitigate inter- and intra-religious conflicts through counter-narratives and peace-building exercises.* Attacks on moderate Muslim sheikhs and Christian churches suggest the existence of religiously-motivated VE in Arusha. Proactive engagement measures may include:
  - a) Interfaith and intrafaith dialogues;

**Address gang violence in Arusha City to protect local youth against violence and vulnerability to VE activity**

- b) The development and dissemination of religious counter-narratives from trusted faith and community leaders;
- c) Interfaith and intrafaith sports leagues, art fairs, etc.

## Morogoro

- 1) *Implement PVE programming, encompassing economic development and advocacy initiatives, in pre-identified at-risk neighborhoods in Morogoro.* CEP partners identified four specific areas within Morogoro District that suffer from systematic marginalization: Chamwino, Mafisa, Kichangani, and the 'Dark City'. CSOs, FBOs, and government officials should prioritize these areas for PVE and economic aid program implementation.
- 2) *Offer PVE trainings to security committees in Morogoro.* Regional and district security committees in Morogoro should be trained in foundational PVE concepts. CEP's network of CSOs in Morogoro—trained in PVE and spearheading PVE programs within their communities—are capable of providing such trainings. These trainings should include structured dialogue between the security committees and local civil society actors.
- 3) *Increase efforts to peacefully solve land disputes.* Morogoro has suffered from violent land disputes between pastoralists and farmers, resulting in the harm and destruction of people, property, and livestock.
  - a) *Anti-corruption trainings.* As the arbiters of land settlement disputes, local government officials are often bribed by competing sides and should receive anti-corruption trainings. Conflict resolution may be more sustainable if bribery is eliminated from the arbitration process.
  - b) *Informational seminars.* Local government and CSOs should conduct informational seminars for pastoralists and farmers to educate them on their property rights and effective arbitration methods for land disputes.
  - c) *Introduce land valuers at lower levels.* Land valuers—responsible for assessing land and recommending its uses—only engage in land disputes at the district level. Land dispute cases at the ward, village, and street levels should have access to land valuers during arbitration processes.

### Ongoing land disputes may incense, alienate, and ultimately disenfranchise Tanzanian citizens

- 4) *Maintain provision of student loans.* Students in Morogoro have repeatedly protested against government reduction of university loans and have come into conflict with security forces.
- 5) *Showcase political camaraderie between Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the Civic United Front (CUF), and Chadema.* Tensions between political parties remain high in Morogoro Region, resulting in outbreaks of violence. Relations worsened during the 2017 local elections amid a series of violent incidents, allegedly spurred by political motivation. Arsonists attacked a primary school and a teacher's home in the Sofi Majiji Ward, according to CEP partners. In Kiroka Ward, two gangs—one allegedly supporting CCM and the other CUF—targeted civilians to discourage voting for the opposing party. It would benefit local leaders to demonstrate solidarity across party lines in order to de-escalate politically-motivated violence. Tactics might include sports matches, public service activism, and unity festivals.



## Tanga

- 1) *Implement PVE programming, encompassing economic development and advocacy initiatives, in pre-identified at-risk neighborhoods in Tanga.* CEP partners identified Jampani, Magaoni, Magomeni, and Usagara Mabangi as four areas in Tanga Region that experience systematic marginalization. CSOs, FBOs, and government officials should prioritize these areas for PVE and economic aid program implementation.
- 2) *Offer PVE trainings to security committees in Tanga.* Regional and district security committees in Tanga should be trained in foundational PVE concepts. CEP's network of CSOs in Tanga—trained in PVE and spearheading PVE programs within their communities—are capable of providing such trainings. These trainings should include structured dialogue between the security committees and local civil society actors.
- 3) *Regional immigration officials should consult the citizens of villages and towns along the Tanga-Kenya border to identify illicit passage points.* Tanga's porous border with Kenya offers foreign extremists multiple entry points into Tanzania. Local CSOs report that extremist preachers have entered Tanzania through these gateways and have spread divisive ideology within Tanga Region.
- 4) *Separate inmates suspected or charged with terrorism from general incarcerated population.* Anecdotal evidence suggests that culprits arrested during VE-related incidents in Tanga have not been separated from the general prison population, allowing for the potential spread of extremist ideology among receptive inmates. The separation of extremist inmates from other prisoners should be implemented throughout the country.
- 5) *Emphasize non-violence trainings for police.* According to local sources, civilians have suffered from police brutality in Tanga. As a result, security forces are widely distrusted by the general public. Police officers throughout the region should receive training in nonviolent policing, restraint, and conflict management.
- 6) *Prioritize gender-focused programming in Pangani and Mkinga Districts.* In both districts, women experience heavy discrimination due to tribal practices and customary law, according to CEP partners.
- 7) *Establish a youth desk to regularly liaise with regional and district security committees.* According to local partners, VE groups operating in Tanga have targeted young, economically-destitute men for recruitment. These young men either take a direct role in the group or assume an auxiliary position—such as supplying food or collecting information. Through the youth desk, young people can voice their concerns about violent groups while building bilateral relationships with security officials.

**Local government and CSOs should implement gender-based programming in Pangani and Mkinga Districts**

## Zanzibar

- 1) *Implement PVE programming, encompassing economic development and advocacy initiatives, in pre-identified at-risk neighborhoods in Zanzibar.* Local CSOs have identified Pemba and Tumbatu Islands as systematically marginalized areas due to their oft-delayed receipt of public goods and services.
- 2) *Offer PVE trainings to security committees in Zanzibar.* Regional and district security committees in Zanzibar should be trained in foundational PVE concepts. CEP's network of CSOs in Zanzibar—trained in PVE and spearheading PVE programs within their communities—

are capable of providing such trainings. These trainings should include structured dialogue between the security committees and local civil society actors.

- 3) *Host political forums illustrating bipartisanship between CUF and CCM.* Events convening trusted local leaders and showcasing bipartisan activity may serve to mend Zanzibar's polarized political landscape.
- 4) *Publicly condemn xenophobic and racist content associated with political party platforms.* According to photographs submitted by Zanzibari CSOs, racial tensions between ethnic Arabs and Bantu people still exist on the archipelago. Hate speech has been directed toward Pembans—inhabitants of the second largest island in Zanzibar. Racially-charged rhetoric in political propaganda has exacerbated these tensions in past elections.
- 5) *Stronger action against "zombie" militiamen.* Since the 2015 election, plain-clothed fighters, commonly known as "zombies," have attacked dozens of Zanzibari citizens—particularly supporters of the CUF opposition party. According to CEP partners, locals report that police have been reluctant to engage with these armed vigilantes and have taken relatively few measures to ensure islanders are safe from future attacks. Firmer steps should be taken by government officials and police to mitigate these violent flare-ups and maintain trust in authorities.
- 6) *Promote police-community relations through dialogues between police officers, community members, and trusted religious leaders.* According to local sources, the relationship between Zanzibari police, civilians, and religious leaders is strained. Redefining this relationship through

**A PVE toolkit tailored to the Zanzibari context might help local faith leaders to refute extremist narratives and develop effective counter-messaging**

community dialogue is a necessary first step toward fostering trust on all sides. Creating strong partnerships will be key to ensuring the success of an early warning system designed to identify local radicalization.

7) *Custom-designed PVE toolkit for Muslim clerics.* Muslim faith leaders pre-trained in PVE should design and disseminate a PVE toolkit for use by Muslim clerics in Zanzibar. As trusted pillars of

the community, moderate imams and sheikhs are ideal PVE educators on the archipelago. Fostering PVE-literate, moderate voices is important amid local violence stemming from political and religious grievances. This PVE toolkit would feature modules on how to undercut Islamic extremist rhetoric and develop successful religious counter-narratives.

- 8) *Make regional budgets public knowledge.* Many Zanzibaris believe that the mainland government does not reinvest tax revenue into the archipelago. This issue could be resolved if the Bunge shared information detailing regional budgeting. If left unaddressed, extremists could exploit this sense of marginalization to recruit to their cause.
- 9) *Education programs to reduce appeal of foreign extremist groups.* Dozens of Zanzibari youth have disappeared with the suspected intent of joining al-Shabaab and other extremist groups abroad, according to CEP partners. School-based peace clubs should implement modules that accurately depict the life of an al-Shabaab operative, including personal narratives from former group members.

## Concluding Remarks

VE is one of the most elusive problems plaguing global security. Governments often respond with a heavy-handed security approach, failing to implement community-level initiatives that address

underlying grievances. Security-centric strategies disregard nuances in the radicalization process by neglecting economic, ethnic, and social disparities—all of which serve as drivers of radicalization. A more holistic approach includes essential security policies coupled with community-led efforts that mitigate local vulnerabilities—spearheaded by civil society actors, religious leaders, community leaders, and educators.

As Tanzania works to devise its National Action Plan for PVE, the government should explore policies that engage and connect a wide variety of actors—including civil society, media, and the private sector. Adopting the recommendations in this report is a first step to building a comprehensive approach. In particular, the policies advocating cooperation between civil society, religious leaders, and government offices will lead to rapport among these groups and lay the foundation for more sustainable PVE programming.

Government adoption and authorization of the above policy recommendations is crucial. Executive buy-in will lend legitimacy to the initiatives and give them a greater chance of success. Tanzania's resilience to VE relies on structures capable of addressing local grievances and circumstances that, if left unchecked, could serve as enablers of radicalization.

## Annex: Legislation

<b>Title</b>	<b>Link</b>
<i>Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations Act (2018)</i>	<a href="https://www.tcra.go.tz/images/documents/regulations/SUPP_GN_NO_133_16_03_2018_EPOCA_ONLINE_CONTENT_REGULATIONS_2018.pdf">https://www.tcra.go.tz/images/documents/regulations/SUPP_GN_NO_133_16_03_2018_EPOCA_ONLINE_CONTENT_REGULATIONS_2018.pdf</a>
<i>Media Service Act (2016)</i>	<a href="http://parliament.go.tz/polis/uploads/bills/1474021216-A%20BILL%20-%20%20%20THE%20MEDIA%20SERVICES%20ACT,%202016.pdf">http://parliament.go.tz/polis/uploads/bills/1474021216-A%20BILL%20-%20%20%20THE%20MEDIA%20SERVICES%20ACT,%202016.pdf</a>
<i>Persons with Disabilities Act (2010)</i>	<a href="http://www.lrct.go.tz/download/laws_2010/09-2010%20Persons%20with%20Disabilities%20Act,%202010.pdf">http://www.lrct.go.tz/download/laws_2010/09-2010%20Persons%20with%20Disabilities%20Act,%202010.pdf</a>
<i>Prevention of Terrorism Act (2002)</i>	<a href="https://www.fiu.go.tz/POTA.pdf">https://www.fiu.go.tz/POTA.pdf</a>

# PARTNER PVE INITIATIVES

**COUNTER  
EXTREMISM  
PROJECT**

Community Awareness Program for Preventing Violent Extremism in Tanzania (CAPPTAN)

COUNTER EXTREMISM PROJECT

## Introduction

Through its *Community Awareness Program for Preventing Violent Extremism in Tanzania* (CAPPTAN) program, the Counter Extremism Project (CEP) has provided training, guided discussion, and expert mentorship to 59 civil society organizations (CSOs), faith-based organization (FBOs), and local government offices—both at the national level in Dar es Salaam and regionally in Arusha, Tanga, Morogoro, and Zanzibar.

While initially unfamiliar with PVE concepts, CEP organizational partners have begun to a) write proposals for PVE programs, b) incorporate PVE efforts into existing programming, and c) launch fresh, unique PVE initiatives.

- At the national level, 11 of 19 organizations (58%) have written proposals for PVE programming, incorporated PVE efforts into existing programming, or launched fresh, unique PVE initiatives.
  - Nine of 19 organizations have incorporated PVE into existing programming or launched their own PVE initiatives.
  - Two of 19 organizations have written proposals for PVE programming.
- At the regional level, 34 of 40 organizations (85%) have written proposals for PVE programming, incorporated PVE efforts into existing programming, or launched fresh, unique PVE initiatives.
  - Twenty-one of 40 organizations have incorporated PVE into existing programming or launched their own PVE initiatives.
  - Twenty-nine of 40 organizations have written proposals for PVE programming.

## National Partner Efforts

### Christian Social Services Commission (CSSC)

Between 2014 and 2018, CSSC implemented the Jumuiya (“community”) initiative to promote social change in the fields of education and health. Through Jumuiya, CSSC worked to foster citizen-centered dialogue via prayer groups and Christian Radio stations across Tanzania. During the program, members of selected prayer groups met once per week to engage in discussion—guided by an affiliated pastor—on a specific topic related to education or health in the community. Within the same week, five distinct radio stations featured programming on the topic discussed in the prayer groups.

After partaking in a number of CAPPTAN trainings, CSSC decided to introduce the topic of P/VE by raising the issue of violence stemming from disagreements over butchery practices. Discussion leaders engaged participants in a dialogue about past tension between Muslims and Christians over the right to slaughter—and urged Christians to refrain from fighting over butchery practices and to instead spread love, respect, and kindness toward those with different religious beliefs and practices. This messaging, from a reputable religious source, served as a strong counter-narrative to religiously-based violence.

Through Jumuiya, CSSC distributed nearly 600,000 hard-copy discussion guides to diocese in five zones—the Northern, Eastern, Southern, Western, and Lake zones—reaching an estimated 780,000 church group

members. In addition, CSSC aired a total of 1,087 programs over five radio stations, reaching an estimated 2,000,000 listeners per station during the duration of the program.

One CSSC member told CEP that the Jumuiya initiative naturally mitigates the threat of VE, as it “reduces marginalization of community members [and] reduces radicalization by preaching God’s love and respect for other religions.” The Jumuiya program also educates citizens on valuing their lives and building self-esteem, which he notes are natural buffers to joining an extremist group.

CSSC hopes to receive funding for another four-year phase of Jumuiya programming, in which it plans to make PVE a primary topic. CSSC members believe it is necessary to engage community members on the topic of PVE in the context of religion, and that Jumuiya participants will be eager to share relevant views, concerns, and anecdotes—forming a safe space for citizens to openly discuss VE and build community resilience.

## Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRAGG)

CHRAGG conducts investigations into human rights abuses based on complaints it receives via phone calls, SMS, and in-person visits. Since the start of the CAPPTAN trainings, CHRAGG has conducted these investigations equipped with its new awareness of VE. According to one CHRAGG member, complaints from Kibiti Region involving the shooting of police officers has led CHRAGG to review these cases through the lens of VE. Incorporating this knowledge into CHRAGG’s existing activities has enabled the Commission to lead more comprehensive and informed investigations.

## Global Peace Foundation (GPF)

Inspired by CAPPTAN, GPF launched self-funded PVE trainings for primary and secondary school children in Bagamoyo, Pwani Region, in early 2018. According to the GPF Program Manager, the goal of the trainings is to build awareness of PVE and foster resilient communities. It held the first training in February



2018, convening 113 students in a single day. The second training took place in May 2018 and drew 60 students, all of whom were new and had not attended the first training.

During both sessions, GPF’s Program Manager used CAPPTAN training materials to educate students on the profiles of regional and international extremist groups such as al-Shabab and ISIS. He covered the definition of PVE, the characteristics of an extremist, and how to identify radicalization in the community. He also discussed

how some extremist actors use religion to further their goals, and reiterated the necessity of interfaith dialogue and harmony. Finally, he highlighted how extremists weaponize social media for propagandizing and recruitment, and warned that local extremists have been reported to disseminate CDs containing radical, divisive messaging.

The GPF Program Manager told CEP that trainees were eager to participate by sharing their outlook on the issue. One participant from Kigoma revealed that Islamic leaders in Kigoma are known to disseminate

extremist rhetoric, and that he has heard stories of people traveling from Kigoma to Somalia or Afghanistan via the Democratic Republic of Congo.

GPF hopes to continue convening PVE trainings in Bagamoyo, and to potentially spread this effort to other districts throughout the country. These necessary trainings, according to the GPF Program Manager, will make young people aware of the issues and protect their friends and communities against radicalization.

## Inter-Religious Council for Peace Tanzania (IRCPT)

In early June 2017, IRCPT received a grant from the Foundation for Civil Society to pursue community-based PVE programming in Lindi and Mtwara Regions. IRCPT attributed this success to the high quality of its application, which included content—terminology, phraseology, and concepts—introduced by CEP in CAPPTAN NWG trainings. IRCPT’s primary objective through the “Building Community Resilience toward Violent Extremism” program is to grow awareness of PVE and foster interfaith cohesion for a more resilient society. The program, which launched in August 2017 and is funded for three years, is designed to equip communities with PVE and conflict resolution skills so that drivers of extremism are less likely to develop and fester.

Through its program, IRCPT has conducted a baseline study of drivers to violent extremism in Lindi and Mtwara Regions. As their first initiative, they convened dialogues with key community stakeholders (i.e. government officials, security personnel, religious leaders) at the national and regional levels in order to gain support for the program and raise awareness of the issue. IRCPT has also formed interfaith committees composed of religious leaders, women, and youth at the regional level in each region, and developed a PVE manual for those interfaith committees with expert input from religious communities and security committees. IRCPT has trained interfaith committees to help local communities utilize local conflict resolution tactics, and has fostered interfaith relations through shared community projects such as social welfare management and peacebuilding. Finally, IRCPT has created peace education manuals to be taught in primary and secondary schools and religious education institutions (i.e. madrassas and Sunday schools).



## Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC)

LHRC launched PVE programming in December 2017 in Arusha and Tanga in order to better understand and address the drivers of violent extremism in those regions. One LHRC representative told CEP that the CAPPTAN program had introduced LHRC to the “technicalities of violent extremism and what drives people to it.” He said that LHRC’s program, Building Resilient Communities, was “all from those [CAPPTAN] trainings.”

Building Resilient Communities began with formative research in Arusha and Tanga in order to measure baseline levels of extremism and inform future program initiatives. In Tanga, LHRC implemented activities in Mchinga and Tanga Districts including a football match between boda boda (motorcycle) drivers and police officers; a youth seminar on PVE resulting in the development of the Model Youth Forum in Tanga; parent-teacher dialogues on the topic of youth involvement in community-level peace and security issues; and discussions between two leaders from two wards on local security issues.



In Arusha, LHRC implemented activities in Arusha and Longido Districts, the first being a dialogue between regional police members, religious leaders, and civilians. LHRC also trained these stakeholders in business entrepreneurship in order to address economic drivers to extremism. LHRC launched a traditional dance festival in Arusha with local Masaai people, and provided conflict resolution training to community leaders including key members of the religious community, women, and youth. Finally, LHRC trained 60 individuals from women and youth groups in social empowerment issues including social and civil engagement.

## Mwinyi Baraka Islamic Foundation (MBIF)

MBIF developed its own unique PVE programming in July 2017. Titled “Unifying a Network of Islamic Tanzanian Establishments,” or UNITE, the initiative includes two key efforts: the indexing of all mosques and madrasas in Tanzania as well as the drafting and dissemination of a PVE curriculum in madrasas in Arusha, Dar es Salaam, Pwani, Lindi, Mwanza, Tanga, and Mwanza Regions.

MBIF leaders told CEP that an estimated 90% of Tanzanian mosques and madrasas remain unregistered and are therefore vulnerable to exploitation by extremist preachers and clerics. MBIF warned that such actors may use these establishments to propagandize divisive ideology and recruit local Muslims to their extremist cause. MBIF said that this dangerous phenomenon is coupled with a lack of understanding of PVE among teachers and students in Tanzania’s madrasas.

According to MBIF, the UNITE program will enable Tanzania’s Islamic leaders to better regulate isolated and backwater mosques and madrasas throughout the country, as well as strengthen the PVE capacity of these leaders by equipping them with a synthesized PVE curriculum for deployment in madrasas. MBIF is looking for funders and is prepared to offer a concept note and preliminary budget.

## Tanzania Bora Initiative (TBI)

In August 2017, after five months of CAPPTAN trainings, TBI launched the Balozi wa Amani (“Ambassadors of Peace”) program in order to spread awareness of PVE in vulnerable areas in Dar es Salaam. Through Balozi wa Amani, TBI conducts community engagement meetings on the topic of PVE in Kinondoni and Temeke Districts. TBI also runs a television show and four distinct social media campaigns on Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram associated with the project.

## Tanzania Media Foundation (TMF)

Because of the CAPPTAN program, TMF now has a desire to launch a PVE training program for Tanzanian journalists. According to TMF, Tanzanian journalists—working for television, radio, print, and online newspapers and magazines—have little experience in reporting on VE. This lack of experience is particularly problematic given a recent rise in domestic and regional VE activity that requires that Tanzanian journalists be skilled in covering.

TMF worries that journalists unfamiliar with VE concepts and terminology are unable to effectively and ethically inform the public on VE incidents and crises. As a result, VE reporting may be selective, sensationalist, disproportionate, or biased—potentially leading to misunderstanding, fear, discrimination, and social cleavage. Ineffective and unethical VE reporting may also exacerbate conflict, lead to attacks on particular identity groups, jeopardize intelligence gathering, and eventually harm the media’s credibility.

To address these issues, in July 2017 TMF worked with CEP to develop a concept note and budget for a journalist training program called “Communication Opportunities for Violent Extremism Reporting,” or COVER. Through COVER, TMF plans to implement a media fellowship training program comprised of coursework and mentorship for 20 journalists throughout Tanzania, pre-selected for their skill and commitment to responsible journalism. COVER would encompass two consecutive six-month fellowships, with each fellowship containing three cycles of courses on media and VE. TMF is looking for potential partners and funders in order to start this program.

### Tanzania Women Interfaith Network (TWIN)

TWIN is an implementing partner of IRCPT’s PVE program “Building Community Resilience toward Violent Extremism.” TWIN has helped to support and represent the program at the national level and to engage women interfaith networks at the regional, district, and ward levels in Lindi and Mtwara Regions. They have guided regional interfaith committees to identify and liaise with different faith groups in order to increase interfaith activities and sentiments of pluralism at the grassroots level.

### Tanzania Youth Interfaith Network (TYIN)

Like TWIN, TYIN is an implementing partner of IRCPT’s PVE program “Building Community Resilience toward Violent Extremism.” Members of TYIN have helped to form the interfaith committees of religious leaders in Lindi and Mtwara Regions and to train them in PVE and conflict resolution tactics. TYIN members have led two sessions with the interfaith committees: 1) background information on IRCPT and different faith groups in Tanzania as well as the necessity of interfaith work, and 2) conflict resolution at the community level.

### Youth of United Nations Association (YUNA)

YUNA is the youth-driven body of the United Nations Association (UNA), which promotes the United Nations’ work and furthers its objectives among people and youth. After attending CAPPTAN trainings,

YUNA Tanzania decided to head a panel on the topic of “PVE through Education” during its PanAfrican Humanitarian Summit and Awards event in November 2017. YUNA asked a CEP staff member to moderate the panel discussion and share insight into CEP’s work in the field. Through this initiative, leaders in government, the private sector, and civil society from all over Africa were introduced to the topic of PVE through the lens of education and given a first-hand look into community-level PVE programming in Tanzania.



In mid-2018, a CAPPTAN trainee representing YUNA was chosen as a Peace Ambassador by the One Young World Peace Ambassador Programme. He is one of 40 Peace Ambassadors from around the world who will partake in trainings and workshops to contribute to countering violent extremism, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding in their

communities. According to this YUNA representative, he was selected to be a One Young World Peace Ambassador due to his involvement with the CAPPTAN NWG as well as the Commonwealth Peace Ambassadors Network.



## Regional Partner Efforts

### Arusha

#### Christian Social Service Commission (CSSC) - Northern Zone Region Branch

In response to the CAPPTAN trainings, CSSC incorporated PVE as part of its 2018 National Agenda. Before making this decision, CSSC had been introducing PVE (using CEP materials) to its Jumuiya Program, which convenes small, family-based discussion groups following church services to foster community cohesion and resilience. Additionally, the CSSC branch in Arusha has introduced VE and PVE concepts during its Zonal Policy Forum. This quarterly meeting gathers 16 bishops representing 21 districts across Arusha, Kilimanjaro, and Manyara Regions.

#### Grassroots Youth Development Organization (GYDO)

GYDO has taken steps to ensure PVE is streamlined into its programming activity. The organization is currently drafting a book with the title *Usiuze Amani*, or “Don’t Sell Peace,” that is in the last stages before publication. PVE skills feature prominently in the book and, once completed, the publication will be dispersed among GYDO’s youth stakeholders. GYDO has also conducted PVE trainings using CEP’s materials to its constituents in Arusha City, Namanga, and at Umbwe Secondary School in Moshi.

#### Tanganyika Law Society (TLS)

TLS made a concentrated effort to implement PVE into its programming activities when it carried out a training on mediating VE through judicial organs. Magistrates, advocates, prosecutors, and criminal investigation officers in Arusha took part in this training. TLS conducted follow-up evaluations to observe the seminar’s impact on these stakeholders. The organization plans to continue PVE advocacy by approaching the Government of Tanzania about developing comprehensive laws concerning P/VE.

#### Vision for Youth (V4Y)

In addition to training in-house staff on PVE, V4Y has hosted two large-scale P/VE informational events in 2017 and 2018 respectively. For the first event, V4Y partnered with the International Republic Institute (IRI) to conduct a training on PVE for religious leaders and local government officials in Arusha Region. V4Y utilized CEP training materials to help facilitate its portion of the event. The second event—hosted in partnership with CEP and Inherit Your Rights—was a three-day workshop intended to inform 130 attendees from local youth clubs on VE and human rights. Attendees were responsible for then disseminating the information learned during this training to their peers.

### Morogoro

#### Dakawa Economic Development Organization (DAKEDEO)

DAKEDEO conducted two separate events on peacemaking and human rights with a heavy focus on PVE for 6 CSOs from Morogoro Region.<sup>1</sup> The first event introduced the concept of VE using CEP materials, while the second was a dialogue day. During the latter, partners discussed preventative measures these CSOs could take to mitigate extremism from taking root in local communities. By undertaking the training of other CSOs in the region, DAKEDDO has strengthened the PVE network initially established by CAPPTAN.

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<sup>1</sup> Kilombo Valley Development Organization (Kilombo District), Imarika Trust Fund, (Kilosa District), Women Environment Conservation Association, Mvomero Paralegal, Morogoro Development Organization, and Dakawa Performing Arts (Mvomero District).

In preparation for future PVE projects, DAKEDEO has developed a proposal that simultaneously engages 3 strata of the community. DAKEDEO plans to first administer PVE programming to younger members of the community with an emphasis on girls between ages 5-18. The second level consists of community micro-lenders (VICOBA, SILC, etc.),<sup>2</sup> pastoralists, farmers, and local businesses, while the third level is local government administrators. Once these three groupings have been trained on PVE, DAKEDEO envisions each working in coordination with the other to reduce community level grievances (economic, political, or social) that could later manifest as factors of radicalization.

#### My Health Foundation (MHF)

MHF has been building PVE capacity within Morogoro Region by meeting with youth-centric CSOs and encouraging them to adopt PVE programming into their everyday activities. One of the more productive conversations occurred in 2018 with the Morogoro Youth Development Initiative, an organization eager to implement PVE measures within its affiliated youth groups. MHF has offered to share CEP's materials on PVE with these organizations in an effort to bridge the knowledge gap. Additionally, MHF has been using CEP's materials to introduce PVE to its after-school clubs.

In June 2018, MHF hosted an introductory PVE seminar for roughly 60 participants from Morogoro Region. Assisted by members of the Morogoro Regional Working Group, MHF presented the basic tenets of P/VE to beneficiaries from faith-based organizations, universities (Mzumbe University, Sokoine University of Agriculture, Muslim University of Morogoro), and local government offices. The seminar was intended to (1) raise community awareness about PVE within the context of peacebuilding and (2) foster a sense of national pride and identity among participants as a resistance mechanism to VE.

#### Regional Office of Social Welfare (Morogoro)

In order to build local government PVE capacity, CEP's RWG partner working for the Regional Office of Social Welfare conducted a series of P/VE awareness seminars for Morogoro's Regional Health Management Team—a government entity responsible for quality health service delivery throughout the region. Focusing primarily on the negative effects that marginalization has on sub-groups within a community, the seminars highlighted the importance of these groups receiving fair and equitable access to public health services.

#### The Islamic Foundation (TIF)

Utilizing the large-scale media resources at its disposal, TIF has been broadcasting PVE information via its Radio Imaan and TV Imaan programs. This faith-based media campaign emphasizes peaceful means of conflict resolution and draws attention to contradictions between extremist rhetoric and religious texts. Likewise, TIF has been and is continuing to host PVE seminars for its affiliated mosques' imams. These seminars instill in religious leaders the ability to identify, confront, and dissuade susceptible individuals affiliated within their congregation from being radicalized.

#### Victory Youth Support Organization (VIYOSO)

VIYOSO has successfully converted PVE information learned during CAPPTAN into a digestible format for its youth group beneficiaries. Achieving PVE awareness is being integrated into the broader programming goals VIYOSO has for these clubs, such as entrepreneurial skills and ethics training. The organization directly impacts a significant number of youth within the region, partnering with over 760 primary school

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<sup>2</sup> Village Community Banks – VICOBA; Savings and Internal Lending Communities – SILC.

students and 310 secondary school students. VIYOSO also has been introducing PVE concepts and terminology through another outreach program it operates targeting children that have dropped out of school.

## Tanga

### Activista

On August 24, 2017, Activista Tanzania coordinated with the National Association of Youth Organizations and Activista Zimbabwe to hold an online discussion panel titled “Peace is Possible.” Participants from Gambia, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania shared their experiences on peacebuilding and spotlighted obstacles hindering stability in their respective countries. Activista Tanzania’s representative, who also is a member of the Tanga Regional Working Group, touched on the importance of youth in PVE as a means to create successful and sustainable peace initiatives at the community level. Additionally, the representative talked about the key drivers of VE among youth in Tanzania and what specifically has been done to foster youth collaboration on peacebuilding projects.

### African Women AIDS Working Group

AFRIWAG incorporated aspects of CEP’s materials into its trainings on health education with the local government officials and other stakeholders in Pangani District. This inclusion of PVE topics, with the overarching goal being the increase of local CSO’s PVE awareness, into programming is part of AFRIWAG’s Strategic Action Plan: 2018-2022. With this objective in mind, AFRIWAG has conducted PVE information-sharing meetings with like-minded CSOs such as the Tanga AIDS Working Group and the Tanga Women Development Initiative. AFRIWAG plans to have PVE education prominently feature in all program activities—school out-reach, training fellow NGOs, etc.—starting in July 2018.

### Community and Cross Cultural Association (COSOCRO)

On June 26th, COSOCRO administered a single-day PVE training to local and religious leaders of Maweni Ward in Tanga District. As one of the communities directly affected by the Amboni Caves attacks in 2015 and 2016, COSOCRO identified Maweni Ward as an area in need of PVE education. With nearly 60 beneficiaries, including government officials in attendance, the training touched on the three thematic areas of VE introduced to the RWGs during CAPPTAN—religious extremism, youth radicalization, and marginalized communities. Partners from the Tanga RWG (Novelty Youth Centre, ACTIVISTA, and Tanga Community Alleviation Poverty) assisted in leading the training by facilitating discussion between participants about each of these specific PVE themes. The highest-ranking government representative at the event, the Pongwe Ward leader, commended COSOCRO and the other Tanga RWG members for their effort to impart PVE knowledge at a grassroots community level.

### Novelty Youth Centre (NYC)

Since receiving CAPPTAN training, NYC has been one of the most active partners in terms of conducting PVE-related programming. With the support of CEP and companion members of the Tanga RWG, the organization has hosted two large-scale events for its youth beneficiaries. The first event was a writing competition on VE, which nearly 200 NYC youth club members attended. After introducing the topic to participants using condensed CEP training materials, NYC prompted them to identify motivating factors of VE and provide policy recommendations for Tanzanian stakeholders within their essay. The winner illustrated a keen level of perception concerning VE in her essay, noting domestic and international groups that fit extremist characteristics.



NYC hosted their second PVE event in December 2017, with nearly 300 secondary school youth gathered in Tanga City to attend the organization’s “Moral Concert to Prevent Violent Extremism.” The event served as the culmination of moral and leadership trainings that NYC had been conducting with young people throughout Tanga Region. These trainings were meant to instill desirable civic traits in youth and, in doing so, had featured learning PVE skills—such as recognizing acts of VE and identifying their underlying causes—that NYC had garnered through CEP-led workshops.

The concert succeeded in drawing public attention to the topic of VE, thereby achieving one of NYC’s overarching goals. Flanked by a police escort, event participants marched through the city, carrying banners with messages like ‘Religion should encourage peace and not otherwise’ and ‘Tanga is a cool city. We are not used to violence.’ A trumpet band accompanied the participants throughout their three-kilometer trek, and prominent Tanzanian media outlets—ITV, Tanga TV, and Clouds—provided coverage of the event. The march ended at the Novelty Youth Centre’s headquarters where youth had the opportunity to share their knowledge about VE through poems, songs, dances, and informative presentations. With the help of five attendees from CEP’s Regional Working Group, NYC awarded prizes to youth participants who had demonstrated the highest level of VE comprehension during their training coursework.



Moral Concert Participants March through Tanga City with Police Escort

Building off its success with both the writing competition and the moral concert, NYC has outlined plans to organize trainings to increase the computer literacy of local religious leaders. Such efforts would be the first step in curbing the issue of online radicalization in Tanzania and rely heavily on the CEP-material provided to CAPPTAN partners about extremists’ weaponization of web

#### Tanga Community Alleviation Poverty (TCAP)

TCAP has assisted RWG partners host PVE initiatives by serving in auxiliary roles during implementation. During the Novelty Youth Centre’s “Moral Concert to Prevent Violent Extremism,” TCAP was instrumental in both helping to organize the march through the city and evaluating participants’ performances demonstrating VE comprehension. Likewise, a TCAP representative assisted COSOCRO conduct its Maweni Ward PVE training in June 2018. The representative lectured beneficiaries about the relationship between marginalized communities and VE and the preventative measures stakeholders can pursue to mitigate factors of radicalization within these groups.

#### Tanga Civil Societies Coalition (TASCO)

TASCO has held joint dialogue sessions on PVE in three districts throughout Tanga Region: Mkinga, Lushoto, and Tanga District. These talks brought together high-profile district government officials, migration officers, and twenty local youth to discuss PVE initiatives. Officials in attendance included each area’s District Commissioner, District Administrative Secretary and the Officer Commanding District—the military attaché. TASCO introduced government leaders to the risks of radicalization facing marginalized

communities that are alienated economically, politically, or socially from mainstream society. By conducting these dialogues, TASCO intended to make local government aware of these concerns and garner support regarding future PVE initiatives.

#### [Tanga District Office of Community Development \(TDOCD\)](#)

Since receiving CAPPTAN trainings, the Tanga District Office of Community Development has been attempting to streamline PVE initiatives into routine programming. In April 2018, the local government office gathered 93 women from Mabokweni Ward to administer a seminar on child-raising. During the seminar, trainers outlined and discussed PVE while emphasizing to participants the role family units serve as resistance mechanisms to VE. Participants were receptive to the training since PVE was an entirely new concept to most of them. In this gradual fashion, TDOCD plans to keep incorporating small features of PVE into its everyday activities.

#### [Zanzibar](#)

##### [Anglican Diocese of Zanzibar](#)

The Anglican Diocese of Zanzibar has held dialogues with key members of the Interfaith Committee Council of Zanzibar seeking to address community-specific vulnerabilities. During these meetings, the Diocese focused on finding means of advocacy for marginalized demographics within Zanzibar that could be susceptible to VE radicalization, particularly women and youth. The Diocese additionally emphasized the role of the messenger for these advocacy measures and the importance of community gatekeepers in delivering messages to the local populace. The Diocese plans to integrate PVE topics into the curriculum of its affiliated theological colleges and Sunday schools.

##### [Association of NGOs of Zanzibar \(ANGOZA\)](#)

ANGOZA has conducted in-house trainings on PVE in addition to introducing PVE concepts during regular meetings with constituent NGOs. As an umbrella organization consisting of most Zanzibari NGOs, ANGOZA has been able to disseminate PVE information, including CEP materials, in a widespread fashion through its partner networks. Organizations, like the Zanzibar Youth Development Association, that find PVE knowledge especially pertinent to their objectives have been increasingly vocal about receiving more information on the topic.

##### [Centre For Youth Dialogue \(CYD\)](#)

CYD operates youth-centric programming and consequently all PVE initiatives have focused on building that demographic's resiliency to radicalization. The CSO started implementing PVE awareness programs in secondary schools throughout Vikokotoni, explaining to beneficiaries (1) what is VE, (2) how unaddressed communal grievances benefit VE recruiters, and (3) push/pull factors of radicalization. CYD was simultaneously running a PVE media campaign (via local radio and television) called "Reshaping Narratives."

##### [Jumuiya ya Maimamu Zanzibar \(JUMAZA\)](#)

JUMAZA has been organizing PVE dialogues between its members—imams and madrasa teachers. During the sessions, these religious authorities discussed the best way to respond to VE incidents (i.e. the past acid attacks and targeting of moderate Muslim clerics) and how to develop resistance programs against extremist rhetoric. In hosting these discussions, JUMAZA wanted to fill the communal and civil space with moderate religious voices that advocate peacebuilding and undercut faith-based justifications for violence.

### Zanzibar Youth Forum (ZYF)

ZYF is under contract by Foundation for Civil Society—a Tanzanian-based grant maker that advocates CSO empowerment and good governance—to implement a peace project in four Zanzibari districts. As part of the program, dubbed the “Strengthening Capacity for Peaceful Dialogue and Conflict Resolution,” ZYC created a peacebuilding toolkit, with CEP’s PVE resources featuring a prominent role, for designated community-level trainers. ZYF has likewise included PVE programming in its 5 Year Action Plan as a feature of the Governance and Democratic Rights goals.



# ***Pretest Survey Report***

## **Perceptions of Violent Extremism in Tanzania**

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### **Green Light Project**

March 8 – April 22, 2017

This report presents the findings of a pretest survey on Violent Extremism (VE) conducted by the Green Light Project in Tanzania between March 8 and April 22, 2017.

Prepared by MS: Clare Ahabwe Bangirana

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## 1.0 Introduction

The data presented in the Green Light Project's (GLP) Pretest Survey Report was collected between March 8 and April 22, 2017, in the Tanzanian regions of **Arusha, Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, Tanga, and Zanzibar**. At each site, GLP interviewed between three and five staff members from various partner civil society organizations (CSOs). A total of 153 respondents from 46 partner CSOs completed the survey.

GLP gathered data using the Quicktap Survey, a mobile device survey application. The survey—containing 36 Likert scale questions and three fill-in questions—was conducted in English or Swahili depending on the preference of each respondent. Respondents were interviewed individually and took an average of 25 minutes to complete the survey. Data was automatically entered, cleaned, and analyzed by the Quicktap Survey program. A second level of data analysis was performed using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Scientists) to generate descriptive statistics.

### 1.1 Objectives

The objectives of this survey are twofold:

- 1) To provide a pre-program perspective of support for Violent Extremism (VE)
- 2) To serve as a baseline data point to measure program impact at the conclusion of the project

### 1.2 Key Findings

GLP found that a majority of respondents have seen online propaganda produced by VE organizations within and outside of Tanzania. Troublingly, respondents provided an array of answers regarding who they would contact if an acquaintance was listening to extremist messaging. The diverse responses suggest that the larger Tanzanian population may not know how to appropriately respond if confronted with this issue. Finally, an overwhelming majority of respondents agreed on the importance of learning methods or tools to prevent VE groups from starting in their communities.

- ❖ More than three in four respondents (**77.78%**) **often see pictures, movies or music** on the internet made by **violent groups outside Tanzania**.
- ❖ More than half of respondents (**52.94%**) have **seen pictures or movies depicting violence** made by **groups inside Tanzania**.
- ❖ When asked **who they would speak to first** if they thought **someone was listening** to messages from violent groups, **43.14%** said they would speak to **government and community leaders**, while **26.80%** chose **"other."** Write-in answers for **"other"** included **police** and related security agencies, **the person listening** to the messages, **neighbors**, and the **media**.
- ❖ There was near-unanimous agreement (**99.35%**) that learning **methods or tools** to stop violent groups from starting would be an **important skill**.

### 1.3 Participant Characteristics

#### Gender


A breakdown of respondents' gender is organized by region in the table below:

Region	Male	Female	Total
<i>Arusha</i>	11	8	19
<i>Dar es Salaam</i>	28	15	43
<i>Morogoro</i>	17	10	27
<i>Tanga</i>	22	12	34
<i>Zanzibar</i>	22	8	30
			<b>153</b>

GLP interviewed **100 male** respondents (65.36%) and **53 female** respondents (35.64%).

#### Age

A breakdown of respondents' age is organized in the chart below:



At the time of data collection, **38.91%** of respondents were between **26 and 35** years of age, while **19.61%** were between ages **36 and 45**. **17.65%** were between **16 and 25**, and **15.69%** were between **56 and 55**. Only **9.15%** of participants were **older than 55**. GLP did not interview any individuals between the ages of 10 and 15.

#### Marital Status


The below table charts the respondents' marital status:

	Frequency	Percent
Single (never married)	63	41.18%
Married or domestic partnership	85	55.56%
Separated	1	.65%
Widowed	4	2.61%
<b>Total</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>100%</b>

At the time of data collection, a plurality of respondents (**41.18%**) were **single** (never married), while **55.56%** were **married** or in a domestic partnership. Only **one** participant was **separated**, and **four** were **widowed**.

## Education Level

The diagram below presents the highest level of education attained by the respondents:



At the time of data collection, **43.79%** of respondents had graduated from **college**. **20.29%** had graduated from **trade, technical, or vocational school**, while **19.99%** had graduated from **professional or secondary school**. **15.03%** had graduated from **high school**, while **3.27%** percent had only completed **nursery school to 8<sup>th</sup> grade**.


## 2.0 Survey Findings

### 2.1 Perceptions of Community Safety

Over half of respondents (**59.48%**) feel their **community is peaceful and safe**, while approximately one in five (**19%**) do not. However, a majority of respondents (**71.24%**) **worry** about violent groups such as **ISIS and Al Shabaab operating in Tanzania**, while only **17.65%** do not. In addition, **86.93%** worry about violent extremist **groups from outside Tanzania “causing problems”** in the country.

**76.47%** of respondents think that **violent groups starting** in their communities is a **“large problem.”** Finally, 127 respondents (**83.01%**) think that **groups like ISIS and Al Shabaab** are a larger danger than regular criminals or gangs in their communities.

The bar graph below depicts attitudes toward foreign VE groups operating in their communities:




## 2.2 Personal Exposure to VE Messaging

147 respondents (96.08%) have **heard of** violent groups outside of Tanzania such as **Al Shabaab and ISIS**, while **77.78%** often see **pictures, movies, and music** made by such **groups on the internet**. Only **13.73%** do not often see that type of content.

More than half of respondents (**52.94%**) have seen **pictures or movies** depicting violence made by **violent groups inside Tanzania**, while 41.18% have not. Finally, **69.93%** have **heard of people in their communities** talking about the **ideas or messages of violent groups**, while only 20.92% have not.

The bar graph below presents the number of respondents who “often” see propaganda produced by foreign VE groups on the internet:




## 2.3 Perceptions of Community Exposure to VE Messaging

A majority of respondents (**83.66%**) **worry that children** in their communities **hear about violent groups and their ideas through the internet**. In addition, **53.59%** believe that the **children in their communities are exposed** to violent groups and their ideas **at school**, while **33.99%** do **not** believe this.

**69.93%** of respondents **believe young men** in their communities have **seen or heard** of violent groups **inside** of Tanzania, while only **13.73%** do not believe this. Finally, **69.93%** have **heard of people in their communities talking** about the ideas or **messages of violent groups**.

The below chart depicts the number of respondents who worry that children in their communities hear about violent groups and their ideas through the internet:




## 2.4 Religion

131 respondents (**85.62%**) believe that **all religious groups are welcome** and accepted in their communities. **77.12%** believe that the **leaders** of these **religious groups** are **working together to stop** violent groups **from starting** in Tanzania.

However, over half (**54.23%**) worry that some **religious figures** in their communities are **“creating problems or violence”** in Tanzania. In addition, nearly half of respondents (**47.71%**) worry that **“very religious”** members of their communities **might join violent groups**.


The below graph presents the number of respondents who worry that very religious members of their communities might join violent groups:



## 2.5 The Role of Media

**73.68%** of respondents think that the **Tanzania media** (television, radio, and newspaper) **do a “good job”** of keeping them **informed about violent groups** in their communities—while **13.07%** do not think this. In addition, there was near-unanimous agreement (**98.04%**) that the **Tanzania media** should **inform** citizens when **violent groups act** within Tanzania.

The below chart presents the number of respondents who believe that the Tanzania media should inform them about the actions of violent groups within Tanzania:



## 2.6 Online Radicalization


**88.66%** of respondents worry that **children** in their communities **hear about violent groups** and their ideas through the **internet**. Similarly, **80.39%** worry that the **internet** is being used to **spread the messages** of violent groups in their communities. Only 12 respondents (7.84%) do not worry about this.

When asked about seeing VE propaganda on the internet, more than three in four respondents (**77.78%**) say they “often” see **pictures, movies and music** made by violent groups **outside of**




**Tanzania.** In addition, **52.94%** say they have seen **pictures or movies depicting violence** made by **violent groups within Tanzania**, while **41.18%** have **not** seen such content.

The graphic below depicts the number of participants who often see propaganda created by foreign VE groups online:




## 2.7 Communal Grievances

A majority of respondents (**83.01%**) understand why **someone in their community** might be “angry,” while **75.16%** can understand why an **angry person** might want to **join a violent group** in their community. In addition, **81.06%** believe that community members from **different ethnic groups** can **talk through “any” of the problems** in the community. Two in three respondents (**66.67%**) believe the **government and police** are keeping their communities safe from violent groups, while **23.53%** do **not** believe this. Finally, nearly all respondents (**95.42%**) think that their **community leaders** ought to “**be more aware**” of the **causes of violent groups** in their communities. See the table below:




## 2.8 The Role of Women

A majority of respondents (**92.16%**) believe **women are important** in **keeping the peace** in their communities.



## 2.9 Individual Awareness and Action in Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE)

A majority of respondents (**62.75%**) believe they would **know** if a **colleague or friend started listening** to **VE propaganda**, while **17.65%** said they would **not** know. When asked if they would **approach** and **talk to** someone they thought might be **listening to VE propaganda**, **80.39%** said they **would**, while only **6.5%** said they **would not**. In addition, **85.62%** of respondents believe that **people who join violent groups** can be **welcomed back** into the community if they leave those groups. Finally, there was near-unanimous agreement (**99.35%**) that **learning methods or tools to stop violent groups** from starting would be an **important skill**. See the below graphic:



### 3.0 Additional Response Questions

The last section of the survey contained **three** fill-in questions, the results of which are presented below.

**Question 1:** I believe \_\_\_\_\_ would be vulnerable to listen to the messages of violent groups.  
(Please select all that apply)

Respondents were asked to select as many applicable answers from the following list: *young men; children; very religious community members; members of police and armed forces; don't know.*

Response	Frequency
<i>Young men</i>	139
<i>Children 10 – 18 years</i>	118
<i>Very religious community members</i>	76
<i>Members of police and armed forces</i>	39
<i>Don't know</i>	2

Respondents selected **young men** and **children** as the groups most vulnerable to VE messaging.

**Question 2:** If I thought I knew someone who had started listening to the messages of violent groups, I would speak to \_\_\_\_\_ first.

Response	Frequency	Percentage
<i>Government and Community Leaders</i>	66	43.14%
<i>Other</i>	41	26.80%
<i>Friends and Family</i>	28	18.30%
<i>Religious Leaders in my community</i>	13	8.50%
<i>Co-workers or my boss</i>	4	2.61%
<i>Don't know</i>	1	0.65%
<b>Total</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>100%</b>

Overall, respondents were most likely (**43.14%**) to select **government and community leaders** as the first point of contact. Of the 41 respondents that selected **other**, **23** said they would speak to **police**

and other related security agencies, while **14** said they would speak to the **person listening to the messages**. Additional answers in the “other” category included **neighbors** (mentioned by two respondents) and **media** (mentioned by two respondents).

**Question 3:** I believe that \_\_\_\_\_ are the best choice to stop violent groups in my community.

Respondents were asked to choose from the following options: *community and religious leaders; the government of Tanzania (ministries and army); the police; school teachers and administrators; other; and all these options need to work together.*

Response	Frequency	Percentage
<i>All of these options need to work together</i>	122	79.74%
<i>Community and Religious Leaders</i>	25	16.34%
<i>The Government of Tanzania (Ministries and Army)</i>	5	3.27%
<i>The Police</i>	1	0.65%
<i>School teachers and administrators</i>	0	0%
<i>Other</i>	0	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>100%</b>

The majority of respondents (**79.74%**) believe that **all relevant stakeholders** should work together to **stop violent groups from starting** in their communities. However, 25 respondents (**16.34%**) believe that **community and religious leaders** are best equipped to confront this issue.

## 4.0 Conclusions and Recommendations

The data presented in GLP’s Pretest Survey Report indicates that respondents are worried about VE in Tanzania and have been exposed to VE propaganda online. GLP is concerned that the wide range of answers regarding who respondents should speak to if confronted with extremism in their communities suggests confusion on this issue throughout the country. Overall, respondents agree that gaining tools or learning methods to prevent VE in their communities would be an important skill.

By providing a glimpse into local perceptions of VE, GLP’s Pretest Survey Report constitutes an essential resource for the CAPPTAN project and other initiatives in the field. However, efforts must be made to further explore local perceptions of VE. Qualitative data may provide insight into this issue, as well as eliminate biases specific to quantitative data, (i.e., the potential for respondents to choose a certain response in order to portray themselves or their organizations in a positive light).

After collecting and analyzing the above data, GLP recommends further trainings and community engagement initiatives to address local misperceptions about VE. Raising community awareness of VE and equipping local leaders with the tools to prevent it are the first steps in building national resilience to VE ideology and recruitment.

# ***Post-test Survey Report***

Perceptions of Violent Extremism in Tanzania

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## **Counter Extremism Project**

February 2018

This report presents the findings of a post-test survey on violent extremism conducted by Counter Extremism Project in Tanzania from February 12-23, 2018.

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## 1.0 Introduction

The data presented in the Counter Extremism Project (CEP)'s *Post-Test Survey Report* was collected between February 12-23 in the Tanzanian regions of **Arusha, Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, Tanga, and Zanzibar**. The data measures participants' understanding of and attitudes toward violent extremism (VE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) in Tanzania. At each site, CEP interviewed between one and six staff members from various partner civil society organizations (CSOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs), and local government offices. A total of 123 respondents from 54 partner organizations completed the survey.

CEP staff gathered data using the Quicktap Survey, a mobile device survey application. The survey—containing 36 Likert scale questions and seven fill-in questions—was conducted in English or Swahili depending on the preference of each respondent. Data was automatically entered, cleaned, and analyzed by the Quicktap Survey program. Throughout this document, CEP compares post-test data to pre-test data collected in March-April 2017. CEP surveyed 153 respondents representing 46 partner organizations during pre-test data collection.



## 1.1 Objectives

The objectives of the post-test report are twofold:

- 1) To provide a post-program perspective of partners' awareness of and attitudes toward violent extremism;
- 2) To measure program impact by comparing findings to those from the April 2017 pre-test.

## 1.2 Key Findings

When compared to the April 2017 pre-test findings, CEP found that an increased number of participants worry that “very religious” community members may be compelled to join violent groups. Worryingly, more participants have now viewed pictures or movies produced by domestic violent groups inside Tanzania. Understanding of communal grievances increased, indicated by a rise in participant understanding of why community members might be angry, as well as an understanding of why these angry individuals might want to join violent groups. Responses also indicate that partners' PVE-related skills have strengthened since the start of CAPPTAN. More partners say they would be aware if one of their acquaintances were listening to VE propaganda. Additionally, more than one-third of participants believe that their organization is “well-prepared” to prevent violent extremism following CAPPTAN trainings, while one-fifth believe their organization is “perfectly prepared.” Finally, partners overwhelmingly identified “political grievances” as their largest concern related to VE in Tanzania.

- ❖ **62.61%** of respondents worry that **very religious** members of their communities **might join violent groups**, an increase from **47.71%** in the March 2017 pre-test findings.
- ❖ The percentage of respondents who **see pictures or movies depicting violence made by violent groups inside of Tanzania** (i.e. local extremist movements) rose from **52.94%** to **63.41%**.
- ❖ The majority of respondents said that they could **understand** why **community members** might be **angry (88.00%)** and **why angry individuals might** attempt to **join a violent group (90.24%)**. This increased from **83.00%** and **75.16%**, respectively.
- ❖ A majority of respondents (**79.68%**) said they **could tell** if someone they knew had **started listening to messages** from violent groups. This increased from the March 2017 results (**55.56%**).
- ❖ A plurality of respondents (**36.59%**) believe that their organization is **well-prepared** to prevent violent extremism, followed by **33.33%** who believe that their organization is **averagely prepared**, and over one in five, or 21.95%, who believe it is **perfectly prepared**.
- ❖ **Political grievances** were overwhelmingly selected as the **largest concern** related to **VE in Tanzania**.

## 1.3 Participant Characteristics

### Gender


A breakdown of respondents' gender is depicted in the chart below:



CEP interviewed **75 male** respondents (60.98%) and **48 female** respondents (39.02%).

### Age

A breakdown of respondents' age is depicted in the chart below:



At the time of data collection, a plurality of respondents (**45.53%**) were between **26 and 35** years of age, while **17.07%** were between ages **16 and 25**.

**13.82%** were between **36 and 45**, and about the same amount, **13.01%**, were between **46 and 55**. Only **10.57%** were **older than 55**.

## Marital Status

The table below charts respondents' marital status:

	Frequency	Percent
Married or domestic partnership	68	55.28%
Single (never married)	53	43.09%
Widowed	2	1.63%
<b>Total</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>100%</b>

At the time of data collection, a majority of respondents (**55.28%**) were **married or in a domestic partnership**, while **43.09%** were single, or never married. **Two** participants were **widowed**.

## Education Level

The table below presents the highest level of education attained by respondents:

	Frequency	Percent
College graduate	75	60.98%
Professional or Secondary degree (M.A., PhD, etc.)	25	20.33%
Secondary	19	15.45%
Trade/technical/vocational training	4	3.25%
<b>Total</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>100%</b>

At the time of data collection, a majority of respondents (**60.98%**) had graduated from **college**. **20.33%** had attained a **professional or secondary degree** such as an M.A. or PhD. **15.45%** received a **secondary** degree as their highest level of education, while **4.35%** of respondents had only completed **trade, technical, or vocational training**.

## 2.0 Survey Findings


### 2.1 Threat of Radicalization

Only **37.4%** of respondents feel their community is **peaceful and safe**, a decrease from **59.47%** in the April 2017 pre-test findings. Likewise, the percentage of respondents who worry about **religious figures** creating “**problems or violence**” in their communities rose from **54.25%** in April 2017 to **61.79%** in February 2018. The percentage of participants who believe that **violent groups forming** in their community is a “**large problem**” rose from **74.47%** to **81.31%**. Additionally, **93.49%** of respondents worry that **VE groups from outside of Tanzania** will cause “**problems**” in their country, up from **86.93%** in April 2017.

When considering foreign terror groups such as **ISIS and Al Shabab**, only **65.04%** of participants think that those groups **pose a larger danger than regular criminals** or gangs in their communities, a drop from **83.01%** in April 2017. This decrease may speak to a now-realistic understanding of the problem, (i.e. criminals and gangs do indeed pose a larger danger than ISIS and Al Shabab within most Tanzanian communities).

**62.61%** of respondents worry that **very religious** members of their communities **might join violent groups**, an increase from **47.71%** in April 2017. In addition, **63.42%** of post-test participants said they believe that **children** in their community are **exposed to violent groups and their ideas at school**, up from **53.59%** in the pre-test findings. Finally, the percentage of participants who believe the **government and police are keeping their communities safe** from violent groups fell, but only marginally, from **66.67%** to **58.54%**.

The below graph depicts perceptions related to government and police with regard to VE.




*[I believe the government and police are keeping my community safe from violent groups. 58.54% of participants “agree” and “strongly agree.”]*

## 2.2 Vulnerable Groups

**Seventy-five respondents (69.11%)** think that **all ethnic groups**— (different tribes, Arabs, and Indians)— **are welcome and accepted** within their communities, falling from **82.35%** in April 2017. In addition, only **64.23%** of respondents believe that community members from **different ethnic groups** can **talk through community problems**, down from **81.05%** in April 2017. There was a smaller change in participants who believe that **all religious groups** are **welcome and accepted** in their communities, falling from **85.62%** to **72.36%**.


The graph below presents the number of respondents who believe that all religious groups are welcome and accepted in their community.



*[I believe that all religious groups are welcome and accepted within my community. 72.36% of participants “agree” and “strongly agree.”]*

## 2.3 Sentiments Toward the Media

Less than half of respondents (**42.28%**) “agree” or “strongly agree” that the **Tanzanian media** (television, radio, and newspaper) **does a good job** at keeping them informed about **violent groups in their community**. This dropped from **73.86%** in April 2017. Still, the **42.28%** of respondents represents a plurality, with **29.27% disagreeing** and **28.46% remaining neutral**. The percentage of respondents who feel that the **Tanzanian media should inform them** when **violent groups act** within Tanzania stayed at **98%** in both the pre-test and post-test findings.




[I think the Tanzania media (Television, Radio, and Newspaper) does a good job at keeping me informed about violent groups in my community. 42.28% of participants “agree” and “strongly agree.”]

## 2.4 Online Radicalization

Findings suggest that a majority of participants continue to see foreign extremist content on the internet. **82.12%** of respondents said they often see pictures, movies and music on the internet made by violent groups outside of Tanzania. Only **9.75%** said they **do not** often see this material, while **8.13% remained neutral**. The percentage of respondents who see often see this content rose slightly from **77.78%** in April 2017.

The percentage of respondents who see **pictures or movies depicting violence** made by **violent groups inside of Tanzania** (i.e. local extremist movements) rose from **52.94%** in April 2017 to **63.41%** in the post-test findings. This may suggest a rise in the amount of Tanzanian-based VE content available on the internet.

Three in four respondents (**76.43%**) say they worry that the children of their community hear about violent groups and their ideas through the internet. Finally, nine in ten respondents (**90.24%**) worry that the internet is being used to spread messages of violent groups in their communities. This rose from **80.39%** in April 2017.



[I worry that the internet is being used to spread messages of violent groups in my community. 90.24% of respondents “agree” and “strongly agree.”]


## 2.5 Roles of Community and Local Organizations

A majority of respondents (**70.73%**) believe that **community organizations**, including CSOs and FBOs, are now **capable of preventing violent extremism at a grassroots level**. Similarly, a combined 109 (**88.62%**) individuals believe that **these organizations** are essential to **keeping “young people away from violent groups.”**

However, respondents noted that there is room for improvement for local leaders with regard to PVE. **95.12%** of those surveyed **commented** that these **leaders should be more perceptive** about why VE groups are forming in their communities.

There has been a notable **shift in respondents’ perception** of how **religious leaders** are collaborating to **“stop violent groups from forming.”** In the post-test, only **62.60%** of participants believed this was the reality compared to **77.12%** of respondents during the pre-test.

The graphic below illustrates the number of respondents who believe that community organizations are critical gatekeepers in preventing youth from joining VE groups.




[Community organizations play an important role in keeping young people away from violent groups. 88.62% of respondents “agree” and “strongly agree.”]

## 2.6 Communal Grievances

The majority of respondents said they could **understand** why community members **might be angry (88.00%)** and why these **angry individuals** might attempt to **join a violent group (90.24%)**. Both of these **figures increased compared to** the April 2017 **pre-test results—83.00% and 75.16%**, respectively—suggesting that stakeholders can now a) better conceptualize underlying grievances facing their communities, and a) correlate underlying grievances to VE indoctrination.

Nearly **81% of respondents** indicated that **economic factors play a role in VE recruitment**, agreeing that a lack of jobs in the community might prompt young men “to join violent groups.”

The graphic below depicts the number of respondents who understand why angry individuals might seek to become part of a violent group.




*[I can understand why angry people might want to join a violent group in my community. 90.24% of respondents “agree” and “strongly agree.”]*

## 2.7 The Role of Women in PVE

Respondents overwhelmingly think that **women have an “important role to play”** in resolving VE issues (**93.50%**). This sentiment was reinforced by **92.68%** of those surveyed who **deny** that **women are not necessary in maintaining peace** in the community.

The graphic below depicts views on women’s importance in solving issues related to violence.



*[I think women have an important role to play in solving issues or problems with violence in my community. 93.50% of respondents “agree” and “strongly agree.”]*

## 2.8 Development of PVE Skills


After completing CAPPTAN trainings, stakeholders appear **more confident** in their ability **to recognize and address localized VE issues**. A clear majority (**79.68%**) now say they can tell if someone they know has started listening to messages from violent groups from outside their community. This increased dramatically from the April 2017 pre-test results, in which only **55.56%** of respondents claimed to have this capability.

The number of stakeholders willing to **approach individuals** suspected of **listening to extremist rhetoric** increased from **80.39%** to **85.36%** over the course of the trainings. Most respondents (**83.74%**) maintain



that **they would know who to talk to** if they thought an acquaintance was listening to VE messaging. Finally, nearly every respondent (**98.04%**) believes that **developing PVE-related skills** is **beneficial**.

The graphic below features the number of respondents who would approach and talk to someone they think might be listening to the messages of violent groups.



*[I would approach and talk to someone I think might be listening to messages from violent groups. 85.36% “agree” and “strongly agree.”]*

### 3.0 Additional Response Questions

The last section of the survey contained **seven** fill-in questions, the results of which are presented below.

**Question 1:** I believe \_\_\_\_\_ would be vulnerable to listen to the messages of violent groups.  
(Please select all that apply)

Respondents were asked to select as many applicable answers from the following list: *young men*; *marginalized groups*; *children (10-18 years)*; *very religious community members*; *women*; *members of the police and armed forces*.

Response	Frequency
<i>Young men</i>	116
<i>Marginalized groups</i>	94
<i>Children (10-18 years)</i>	91
<i>Very religious community members</i>	86
<i>Women</i>	68
<i>Members of the police and armed forces</i>	48

Respondents selected **young men**, **marginalized groups**, and **children** as the groups most vulnerable to VE messaging.

**Question 2:** If I thought I knew someone who had started listening to the messages of violent groups, I would speak to \_\_\_\_\_ first.

Response	Frequency	Percentage
<i>Government and Community Leaders</i>	64	52.03%
<i>Friends and Family</i>	32	26.02%
<i>Religious Leaders in my community</i>	14	11.38%
<i>Colleagues or my boss</i>	10	8.13%

<i>Other</i>	3	2.44%
<b>Total</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>100%</b>

A majority of respondents (**52.03%**) selected **government and community leaders** as the first point of contact. Approximately one in four respondents (**26.02%**) said they would speak to **friends and family** first, followed by **religious leaders** in the community (**11.38%**) and **colleagues or their boss** (**8.13%**). Only **three people** said “**other.**”

**Question 3:** I believe that \_\_\_\_\_ are the best choice to stop violent groups in my community.


Respondents were asked to choose from the following options: *community and religious leaders; the police; women or family influencers; the government of Tanzania (ministries and army); and all these options need to work together.*

<b>Response</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<i>All of these options need to work together</i>	92	74.80%
<i>Community and Religious Leaders</i>	11	8.94%
<i>The Police</i>	8	6.5%
<i>Women or Family Influencers</i>	6	4.88%
<i>The government of Tanzania (Ministries, Army)</i>	6	4.88%
<b>Total</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>100%</b>

The majority of respondents (**74.80%**) believe that **all relevant stakeholders** should work together to **stop violent groups from starting** in their communities. However, 11 respondents (**8.94%**) believe that **community and religious leaders** are best equipped to confront this issue.

**Question 4:** Evaluate the preparedness of your community to prevent violent extremism.


Respondents were offered the following choices: (1) *perfectly prepared*; (2) *well prepared*; (3) *averagely prepared*; (4) *underprepared*; or (5) *not prepared at all*.



A plurality of respondents (**40.65%**) stated that their community is **averagely prepared to prevent violent extremism**. Nearly a third of respondents (**29.27%**) feel that their community is **underprepared**, while another significant margin of respondents (**16.26%**) believe that their community is **not prepared at all** to prevent violent extremism. These **figures outweigh** the combined 17 respondents (**13.82%**) who feel that their communities are **either well-prepared or perfectly prepared**.

#### Question 5: Evaluate the preparedness of your organization to prevent violent extremism.


Respondents were given the following options: (1) *perfectly prepared*; (2) *well prepared*; (3) *averagely prepared*; (4) *underprepared*; or (5) *not prepared at all*.



Forty-five respondents (**36.59%**) believe that their organization is **well-prepared** to prevent violent extremism in their communities. Another 41 respondents (**33.33%**) feel that their organization is **averagely prepared** to combat VE, while over a fifth of respondents (**21.95%**) believe their organization is **perfectly prepared**. In contrast, a minority feel that their organization is **underprepared (6.50%)** or **not prepared at all (1.63%)** to combat VE.

**Question 6: What is your greatest concern related to violent extremism in Tanzania?**  
(Pick no more than two)


Respondents selected up to two of the following options: (1) *political grievances causing violent extremism*; (2) *disenfranchised youth*; (3) *lack of a national PVE strategy, policies, and laws*; (4) *lack of community understanding*; (5) *insecure borders and openness of Tanzanians to outside influence*; (6) *radicalization and VE trainings of young men in mosques and madrasas*; and/or (7) *other*.



An overwhelming number of respondents (**85**) believe that **political grievances** are a significant contributor to potential incidents of VE in Tanzania. This figure was nearly double the second largest response—**lack of community understanding (44)**—indicating that those surveyed find political grievances to represent the most clear and present danger with regard to VE in Tanzania. Respondents were almost equally concerned with the **lack of a national PVE strategy** in Tanzania (**38**) as the fear of **mosques and madrasas serving as points of radicalization** (37). Only a **small minority** of those surveyed believe that **insecure borders (15)** is a pressing threat.

**Question 7: What is the most useful aspect of a PVE training program in Tanzania?**

Respondents were asked to select one of the following options: (1) *the opportunity to build professional networks with other CSOs*; (2) *interact with experts in the PVE field*; (3) *skill building with regard to PVE program development*; (4) *case studies of individuals who have been radicalized*; (5) *being able to identify drivers of violent extremism in your community*; or (6) *other*.



**Being able to identify drivers of VE** within the community (**32.52%**) was the most highly-selected response. Thirty-eight respondents (**30.89%**) indicated that learning **how to develop a PVE program** is equally beneficial. Twenty-four respondents (**19.51%**) believe the most useful aspect of a PVE training program in Tanzania is being **able to network with like-minded CSOs**. A small percentage of respondents prioritize the chance to **interact with PVE experts (11.38%)**, while only six individuals (**4.88%**) feel that learning about **case studies of radicalized individuals** is the most valuable take-away.

## 4.0 Conclusions and Recommendations

The data presented in CEP's Post-Test Survey Report indicate that participants are more knowledgeable about P/VE following CAPPTAN trainings. Data suggest that respondents have built an awareness of foundational P/VE issues and concepts, not only theoretically but in a localized context. Trainees can now conceptualize community grievances, recognize the necessity of women in peacemaking, and recognize the role and importance of community organizations in combating VE. Partners are more willing and able to confront acquaintances they suspect of listening to VE propaganda.

As stated in CEP's Pre-Test Survey Report, efforts must be made to further explore local perceptions of VE. Qualitative data may provide insight into this issue, as well as eliminate biases specific to quantitative data, (i.e., the potential for respondents to choose a certain response in order to portray themselves or their organizations in a positive light).

CEP recognizes there is more to be done with regard to PVE trainings in Tanzania. An overwhelming majority of respondents believe their community leaders should be more aware of why violent groups are forming in their communities. In addition, respondents' faith in government and police to keep their communities safe from violent groups has dropped. Localized PVE trainings for community leaders, as well as regional and district-level security committees, could be a valuable next step. Journalists and media houses would also benefit from PVE education seminars focused on ethical reporting.

CAPPTAN has built networks of PVE-literate community organizations in Arusha, Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, Tanga, and Zanzibar, and helped them to launch their own PVE-focused programming. As a result, well-established community organizations throughout the country are able to identify drivers of VE and equipped to challenge radicalization at the local level. In order to continue this momentum, international donors—as well as Tanzania's national and regional governments—should prioritize funding for community-led PVE interventions across the country.

Community Awareness Program for Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) in Tanzania  
CAPPTAN

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**National Working Group and Regional Working Group Partner List**

**National Working Group**

Organization	Region
BAKWATA	Dar es Salaam
Christian Social Services Commission (CSSC)	Dar es Salaam
Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRAGG)	Dar es Salaam
Foundation for Civil Society (FCS)	Dar es Salaam
Global Network of Religions for Children (GNRC)	Dar es Salaam
Global Peace Foundation (GPF)	Dar es Salaam
Inter-Religious Council for Peace in Tanzania (IRCPT)	Dar es Salaam
Junior Chamber International (JCI)	Dar es Salaam
Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC)	Dar es Salaam
Mwinyi Baraka Islamic Foundation (MBIF)	Dar es Salaam
Restless Development	Dar es Salaam
Tanzania Bora Initiative (TBI)	Dar es Salaam
Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP)	Dar es Salaam
Tanzania Media Foundation (TMF)	Dar es Salaam
Tanzania Women Interfaith Network (TWIN)	Dar es Salaam
Tanzania Youth Alliance (TAYOA)	Dar es Salaam
Tanzania Youth Interfaith Network (TYIN)	Dar es Salaam
Tanzania Youth Vision Association (TYVA)	Dar es Salaam
The Youth of United Nations Association of Tanzania (YUNA)	Dar es Salaam

**Regional Working Group**

Organization	Region
East African Civil Society Organization Forum (EACSOF)	Arusha
Grassroots Youth Development Organization	Arusha
WEMA Foundation	Arusha
HAKIMADINI	Arusha
Christian Social Services Commission (CSSC)	Arusha



Community Awareness Program for Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) in Tanzania  
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<b>Legal and Human Right Centre (LHRC)</b>	Arusha
<b>Social Welfare Officer Arusha Region</b>	Arusha
<b>Tanganyika Law Society (TLS)</b>	Arusha
<b>Vision for Youth (V4Y)</b>	Arusha
<b>Community Development Officer Arusha Region</b>	Arusha
<b>Victory Youth Support Organization (VIYOSO)</b>	Morogoro
<b>Huruma Aids Concern and Care</b>	Morogoro
<b>Morogoro Paralegal Centre (MPC)</b>	Morogoro
<b>Tanzania Women Health Network (TWHN)</b>	Morogoro
<b>My Health Foundation (MHF)</b>	Morogoro
<b>Tanganyika Christian Refugee Services</b>	Morogoro
<b>The Islamic Foundation (TIF)</b>	Morogoro
<b>Morogoro Regional Administrative Office</b>	Morogoro
<b>Dakawa Economic Development (DAKEDEO)</b>	Morogoro
<b>Morogoro Regional Administrative Office</b>	Morogoro
<b>Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC)</b>	Tanga
<b>Activista</b>	Tanga
<b>The Community and Social Cross Cultural Association (COSOCRO)</b>	Tanga
<b>African Women Aids Working Group (AFRIWAG)</b>	Tanga
<b>Tanga Community Alleviation Poverty (TCAP)</b>	Tanga
<b>Tanga Civil Societies Coalition (TASCO)</b>	Tanga
<b>Tanga Islamic Development Foundation (TIDF)</b>	Tanga
<b>Novelty Youth Center (NYC)</b>	Tanga
<b>Tanga District Commissioner's Office</b>	Tanga
<b>Tanga City Council</b>	Tanga
<b>ANGOZA</b>	Zanzibar
<b>Center for Youth Dialogue (CYD)</b>	Zanzibar
<b>Anglican Diocese of Zanzibar</b>	Zanzibar
<b>Zanzibar Association of Tour Operators (ZATO)</b>	Zanzibar
<b>Raheleo Development Association</b>	Zanzibar
<b>Zanzibar Fighting Against Youth Challenges (ZAFAYCO)</b>	Zanzibar

Community Awareness Program for Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) in Tanzania  
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<b>Zanzibar Association for Children's Advancement (ZACA)</b>	Zanzibar
<b>Jumuiya ya Maimamu Zanzibar (JUMAZA)</b>	Zanzibar
<b>Zanzibar Youth Forum (ZYF)</b>	Zanzibar
<b>Labayka Development Foundation (LDF)</b>	Zanzibar