

# **Policy Paper**

## **Rethinking the Fight against Antisemitism after October 7**

### **From Incident Response to Strategic Disruption**

**Counter Extremism Project (CEP) Germany**

Berlin/Germany | April 2026

[www.counterextremism.com/german](http://www.counterextremism.com/german) | [@CEP\\_Germany](https://twitter.com/CEP_Germany)

**COUNTER**  
**EXTREMISM**  
**PROJECT**

## About this paper

This paper is a product of the collaboration between CEP and the German Federal Foreign Office, Division “International Cooperation against Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime and Corruption”. CEP is grateful for constructive support and feedback from the Federal Foreign Office. We also express our gratitude to the external experts engaged in the webinar series that served as the foundation for this paper.

The positions presented in this paper reflect the views of the author and do not necessarily correspond with the positions of the German Federal Foreign Office.

---

## About CEP

The Counter Extremism Project (CEP) is a nonprofit and non-partisan international policy organization formed to combat the growing threat from extremist ideologies. CEP builds a more moderate and secure society by educating the public, policymakers, the private sector, and civil society actors about the threat of extremism. CEP also formulates programs to disrupt the financial, recruitment, and material support networks of extremist groups and their leaders.

**Alexander Ritzmann** is a senior advisor with CEP and leads the [work](#) on the effective countering of organized antisemitic extremism and other forms of violence-oriented extremist and terrorist (transnational) strategies and networks, both online and offline.

For more information about the activities of the Counter Extremism Project (CEP) Germany, please visit [www.counterextremism.com/german](http://www.counterextremism.com/german). Please direct inquiries regarding this study to [berlin@counterextremism.com](mailto:berlin@counterextremism.com).

---

## Contents

Executive Summary .....	4
1. Introduction .....	5
2. Working Definitions .....	6
3. The Threat Picture Today .....	7
4. A New Operational Category: Violence-Oriented Antisemitic Extremism (VAE) .....	9
5. A New Operational Approach Against Organized VAE .....	13
5.1 Typology of Organized VAE Actors .....	13
6. Strategic Utility for Policy: Joint Task Forces .....	15
7. Policy Recommendations for EU and U.S. Institutions .....	17
Annex: Expert Consultations and Webinar Inputs .....	19

Abbreviation / Acronym	Meaning / Full term
<b>BfV</b>	Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Germany)
<b>BKA</b>	Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Police Office, Germany)
<b>CEP</b>	Counter Extremism Project
<b>CT</b>	Counterterrorism
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FBI</b>	Federal Bureau of Investigation
<b>FIU</b>	Financial Intelligence Unit
<b>IMPAC</b>	International Movement for Peace & Coexistence
<b>IRGC</b>	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
<b>ISIS</b>	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
<b>NGO</b>	Nongovernmental organization
<b>ONR</b>	National Radical Camp (Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny)
<b>P/CVE</b>	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
<b>PFLP</b>	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>U.S.</b>	United States
<b>VAE</b>	Violence-Oriented Antisemitic Extremism

# Executive Summary

This paper argues that current responses to violence-oriented antisemitic acts remain incident-led and do not focus sufficiently on the professionalized and organized actors who drive, coordinate, finance, and amplify the most serious threats. To close this gap, this paper proposes to differentiate between “general” and “organized” antisemitism for more effective preventive and repressive responses and measures. In addition, this paper proposes the operational use of a separate analytical threat category “violence-oriented antisemitic extremism (VAE)”.

The paper focuses on policy implications for the European Union, its Member States, and the United States, while drawing on a wider European threat picture where relevant to the underlying pattern of attacks, plots, and hostile activity. The recommendations are drawn from the findings of the April 2025 CEP study on the role of antisemitism in the mobilization to violence by extremist and terrorist actors in France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the United States. In addition, the paper draws expert insights and recommendations from a CEP webinar series held in late 2025.

Key conclusions and recommendations include:

- To increase conceptual and operational efficiency, a separate analytical VAE threat category could be created and operationalized to capture cases where antisemitic worldviews are central to the organization or justification of violence. This would not create a new criminal offense but change how authorities tag, prioritize, allocate resources, connect, and escalate cases across intelligence, prevention, prosecution, and policy.
- Governments should implement an operational focus on analyzing and combating organized VAE to specifically disrupt “professional” VAE actors. Such an approach should leverage the full range of P/CVE/CT tools, administrative measures, Joint Task Forces, and lessons from the fight against organized crime.
- Further policy recommendations include enhancing data collection and analysis and fostering international collaboration. The paper stresses the need for tailored preventative and educational initiatives and stricter online content moderation to combat the spread of violence-oriented antisemitism.

# 1. Introduction

Antisemitism is a persistent security problem across multiple countries and regions, with distinct manifestations shaped by specific historical, cultural, and political contexts. Shared patterns include the dissemination of conspiracy theories, targeting of Jewish communities, and the politicization of antisemitic narratives for extremist agendas. The conflict in the Middle East in general, especially since October 7, 2023, has led to a significant increase in reported antisemitic incidents in many countries. However, in contrast to other extremist ideological categories such as Islamism or right-wing extremism, antisemitism itself is currently not considered a separate threat category by many governments. This means that in most countries, neither prosecutors nor police or other authorities have a specialized unit targeting (organized) violence-oriented antisemitism.

The April 2025 CEP report "The role of antisemitism in the mobilization to violence by extremist and terrorist actors", commissioned by the German Federal Foreign Office, focused on antisemitic threats, actors and networks across France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the United States.<sup>1</sup> The report documents antisemitic<sup>2</sup> narratives that serve as tools to justify violence across ideological lines, framing Jewish communities and individuals as threats or scapegoats. Right-wing extremists propagate conspiracy theories like the "Great Replacement," portraying Jews as orchestrating adverse societal change. Islamist extremists often conflate Jewish identity with global oppression, particularly through the misuse of ideological narratives concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for their propaganda purposes. Some left-wing extremists link Jews to capitalism or imperialism, using anti-Zionism to mask their antisemitism. These narratives are adapted to local and geopolitical contexts, reinforcing the targeting of Jewish communities and individuals. Transnational networks facilitate the spread of antisemitic narratives. Linkages between antisemitic actors and organized crime are visible in various countries.

This paper also builds on a webinar series conducted by CEP and the German Federal Foreign Office throughout the fall and winter of 2025, building on central aspects and challenges identified in the CEP report. These webinars focused on three topics: transnational connections between antisemitic extremist and terrorist actors; linkages between antisemitic key actors and organized crime; and the need to rethink antisemitism after October 7.

The overall goals for these events were not only to raise awareness concerning these issues with international and multilateral policy stakeholders, as well as the international expert community. They also aim to initiate policy debates and to encourage concrete joint and coordinated action and policy development to prevent and counter the threat emanating from (organized) violence-oriented antisemitic extremism (VAE). Summaries of the webinar presentations can be found in the annex of this paper.

This paper focuses on policy implications for the European Union, its Member States, and the United States, while drawing on a wider European threat picture, including the United Kingdom, where relevant to the underlying pattern of attacks, plots, and hostile activity.

## 2. Working Definitions

For the purposes of this paper, antisemitism is the overarching phenomenon. Organized antisemitism refers to professionalized actors and networks that systematically produce, mobilize, or exploit antisemitic narratives and incidents. Antisemitic extremism refers to cases in which antisemitic worldviews are central to the actor's ideology or objectives. Violence-oriented antisemitic extremism (VAE) refers to the subset of such cases in which violence, preparation for violence, material support, or the legitimization of violence is central.

### **Antisemitism**

A perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.<sup>3</sup>

### **Anti-Zionism as Antisemitism**

Criticism of Israeli government policy is not in itself antisemitic. Anti-Zionism is a form of antisemitism when it denies Jewish self-determination, calls for the destruction or delegitimization of Israel as the state of the Jewish people, applies standards not demanded of any other state, or uses classic anti-Jewish stereotypes under the label "Zionists."<sup>4</sup>

### **Organized Antisemitism**

Professional actors, groups and networks who systematically produce antisemitic narratives and incidents for ideological, financial or political gain.

### **Antisemitic Extremism**

Activities, positions, or efforts by individuals or groups that are motivated primarily by antisemitic worldviews and directed against democratic order, fundamental rights, or the equal participation and security of Jewish individuals, communities, or institutions, or those perceived as such. It applies where antisemitic narratives are not incidental, but central to the actor's ideology, mobilization, or objectives.

### **Violence-Orientation**

Violence-orientation includes: (A) violent acts; (B) willing/prepared to use violence; (C) providing material support; (D) threaten/incite/legitimize violence.<sup>5</sup>

### **Violence-Oriented Antisemitic Extremism (VAE)**

Activities of individuals or groups who commit violent acts, are willing/prepared to use violence, provide material support, threaten/incite/legitimize violence, motivated primarily by antisemitic worldviews, in order to pursue political, ideological or religious goals that undermine democratic order, fundamental rights, and the security of Jewish individuals, communities or institutions, or those perceived as such.

### 3. The Threat Picture Today

Across 2025 and 2026, the threat picture in the EU and the United States shows not only lethal attacks but also a broader spectrum of foiled plots, hostile surveillance, and attacks on Jewish and Israeli institutions. Publicly reported cases include:

- the February 2025 stabbing at Berlin's Holocaust Memorial,<sup>6</sup>
- the May 2025 killing of two Israeli embassy staff outside the Capital Jewish Museum in Washington, D.C.,<sup>7</sup>
- the October 2025 disruption in Germany of a Hamas-linked plot targeting Jewish or Israeli institutions,<sup>8</sup>
- the October 2025 Yom Kippur attack on a synagogue in Manchester, which killed two people,<sup>9</sup>
- the January 2026 car-ramming attack on Chabad-Lubavitch headquarters in New York<sup>10</sup>,
- the March 2026 explosion at a synagogue in Liège,<sup>11</sup>
- the March 2026 synagogue attack in Rotterdam described by Dutch prosecutors as having terrorist intent,<sup>12</sup>
- the March 2026 explosion at a Jewish school in Amsterdam<sup>13</sup> and a foiled bomb plot against a synagogue in Heemstede,<sup>14</sup>
- the March 2026 foiled "deadly and antisemitic" plot in France,<sup>15</sup>
- the March 2026 arson attack of Jewish community ambulances in north London,<sup>16</sup>
- the March 2026 attack on Temple Israel in West Bloomfield, Michigan, classified by the FBI as a Hezbollah-inspired act of terrorism,<sup>17</sup>
- the March 2026 UK case involving alleged hostile surveillance of the Israeli Embassy, Britain's oldest synagogue, and other Jewish targets in London.<sup>18</sup>

These incidents matter not only as individual attacks or plots. Read together, they point to a broader operating environment characterized by networked mobilization, cross-ideological borrowing, and enabling infrastructures. Several of the attacks against Jewish targets since March 2026 are reportedly linked to "Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia", an alleged new Shiite terrorist group affiliated with government actors in the Islamic Republic of Iran.<sup>19</sup>

Taken together, the attacks suggest that the current threat environment is not limited to isolated hate crimes. It includes executed attacks, disrupted attack planning, hostile reconnaissance, and transnational or proxy-linked targeting of Jewish and Israeli sites, which is precisely why an incident-based framework is increasingly insufficient.

#### **The Shift to Networked Mobilization**

Contemporary antisemitic threats have evolved into a sophisticated system of transnational multi-connected networks. Professionalized networks are engaged in a rapid dissemination of conspiracy theories and the coordination of violent activities across borders, utilizing both digital platforms and physical meeting spaces. Unlike traditional hierarchical extremist organizations, these networks are flexible and operate as VAE network hubs that can facilitate collaboration between seemingly disparate ideological camps.<sup>20</sup>

## Transnational Collaboration Across Ideologies

A defining feature of the current landscape is the cross-ideological convergence around antisemitism as a unifying tactical framework. These connections manifest in several ways:

- **Pro-Palestinian and Foreign Ideology Hubs:** Networks like Masar Badil<sup>21</sup> and Samidoun<sup>22</sup> act as primary hubs that bring together left-wing extremist and Islamist extremist actors. They utilize shared slogans such as "from the river to the sea" to delegitimize Jewish self-determination and organize coordinated protests across countries in Europe, such as France and Germany, as well as the United States.<sup>23</sup>
- **Right-Wing Extremist Networks:** Transnational connections exist between hierarchical groups like Combat 18 and more decentralized networks like Active Clubs.<sup>24</sup> In Central Europe, groups such as Hungary's Jobbik and Poland's National Radical Camp (ONR) collaborate informally, sharing narratives regarding Holocaust denial and "Jewish global control".<sup>25</sup>
- **Islamist-Criminal Linkages:** Disparate organizations within this milieu, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir or ISIS, leverage shared ideological frameworks to recruit supporters and spread propaganda that frames Jewish communities as global oppressors, providing a justification for violence.<sup>26</sup>

## The Extremist-Organized Crime Nexus

The operational convergence between VAE and organized crime is a growing security concern. These linkages are driven by mutual interests in financing and logistics:

- **Financial Diversification:** Right-wing extremist organizations have been documented engaging in drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, and extortion. To legitimize these funds, they often utilize "legitimate" businesses in the construction, security, and event industries for money laundering.
- **Logistical Support:** Islamist extremist networks frequently collaborate with family-based criminal structures. These provide essential support for operational planning, including access to forged documents, illegal weapons, and established smuggling routes.
- **Hybrid Entrepreneurs:** This has led to the emergence of "hybrid extremist-criminal entrepreneurs", actors who straddle both worlds, using criminal revenue to fund VAE networks and utilizing extremist ideologies to mask or justify their criminal actions.

## Foreign State Influence and Proxy Violence

The roles of foreign state actors, specifically the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation, are critical in the transnational mobilization of VAE.<sup>27</sup> Iran has shifted toward a strategy of hiring organized crime actors to carry out attacks on Jewish or Israeli targets in Europe to maintain plausible deniability.

- **The Hells Angels Incident:** German authorities identified a case in 2022 where the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reportedly utilized a member of the Hells Angels to orchestrate attacks on Jewish targets in North Rhine-Westphalia.<sup>28</sup>

- **The Paris Plot:** In May 2024, French authorities detained a couple accused of being involved in an Iranian-backed plot to murder Jewish and Israeli individuals in both France and Germany.<sup>29</sup>

## 4. A New Operational Category: Violence-Oriented Antisemitic Extremism (VAE)

### Beyond the "Bridge Narrative" Model

Historically, Western security frameworks have classified antisemitism as a "cross-cutting prejudice" or a sub-narrative that travels within established ideologies such as Islamist, right-wing extremist, or left-wing extremism. In Germany, for example, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) conceptualizes antisemitism as a *Brückennarrativ* (bridge narrative) that connects distinct extremist environments. However, since the escalation of antisemitism following October 7, 2023, such classifications should be under review because they fall short of recognizing antisemitism as a standalone extremist worldview. Unlike other social biases, antisemitism functions as a world-interpreting structure that assigns collective and metaphysical guilt and independently authorizes ideologically motivated violence.

EU and Member State frameworks recognize the severity of antisemitism but still treat it mainly as a hate crime or cross-cutting prejudice, not as a standalone extremist ideology. This conceptual choice has practical consequences and potentially limits intelligence collection, prosecutorial thresholds, and policy prioritization. Recent EU and national strategies already treat antisemitism as a specific challenge for justice, security, and fundamental rights.<sup>30</sup> However, most threat taxonomies in law enforcement and intelligence services still classify cases only by broader ideological milieus, such as Islamist extremism, right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism, or other forms of politically or religiously motivated crime. This creates a gap between strategic commitments on fighting antisemitism and the operational categories used in day-to-day analysis and decision-making.

To close this gap, this paper proposes the operational use of a separate analytical threat category, violence-oriented antisemitic extremism (VAE), alongside existing extremist categories. For the purpose of this paper, antisemitic extremism refers to activities, positions, or efforts by individuals or groups that are motivated primarily by antisemitic worldviews and directed against democratic order, fundamental rights, or the equal participation and security of Jewish individuals, communities, or institutions, or those perceived as such. It applies where antisemitic narratives are not incidental, but central to the actor's ideology, mobilization, or objectives. Violence-orientation includes: (A) violent acts, (B) willing/prepared to use violence, (C) providing material support, (D) threaten/incite/legitimize violence.<sup>31</sup> These working definitions follow existing practice

on conceptualizing extremism by focusing on behavior, intent, and impact, and remain compatible with current hate crime and terrorism frameworks.<sup>32</sup>

This working definition for VAE is not intended to limit or criminalize legitimate criticism of the policies, actions, or laws of any state, including Israel. Criticism that does not rely on antisemitic stereotypes or double standards, that does not collectively demonize Jews as Jews, and that does not advocate or justify violence or discrimination against Jews or Jewish institutions, remains fully protected under democratic free speech/freedom of expression standards. The VAE category is meant to capture cases where antisemitic worldviews and narratives are central to the justification or organization of violence.

### **How Anti-Zionist Framing Can Function in VAE Mobilization**

**Policy Baseline:** Criticism of Israeli government policy is not in itself antisemitic. Anti-Zionism should be treated as a form of antisemitism when it denies Jewish self-determination, calls for the destruction or delegitimization of Israel as the state of the Jewish people, applies standards not demanded of any other state, or uses classic anti-Jewish stereotypes under the label “Zionists.”<sup>33</sup>

**Why Antisemites use Anti-Zionist Framing:** Anti-Zionist, anti-colonial, or anti-imperialist framing can function as a vehicle for VAE mobilization when it substitutes ‘Zionists’ for ‘Jews’, collectivizes blame, or helps extremist narratives circulate in more publicly defensible political language.

**Practitioner Test:** The key assessment questions are context, target, and function: who is speaking, what exactly is being said, what symbols accompany it, and whether the rhetoric is used to justify hostility toward Jews, Jewish institutions, or Jewish communal life rather than toward identifiable state policy.<sup>34</sup>

**Operational Indicator:** Actors speak about “Zionists” or Israel, but the real-world targets are synagogues, Jewish schools, or Jewish communal services.

**Policy Implication:** The focus should be not on whether an actor self-describes as anti-Zionist, but on whether the narrative collectivizes blame onto Jews, legitimizes exclusion or violence, or is linked to attacks, intimidation, or organized mobilization against Jewish persons or institutions.

Recognizing VAE as a separate category could bring several concrete advantages. First, it could improve early warning and situational awareness. Agencies could systematically tag incidents, investigations, and intelligence holdings where antisemitic ideology plays a central role, regardless of whether the primary ideology is classified as Islamist, right-wing, left-wing or “mixed.” This tagging would allow joint databases to be filtered for antisemitic motives, help detect escalation patterns (for example, rapid spikes in threats against Jewish schools or synagogues), and support more accurate allocation of protective resources to Jewish communities, institutions, and associated targets.

Second, a distinct analytical threat category could help security and justice actors use existing tools more effectively. EU publications highlight that antisemitic hate crimes and discrimination often remain under-prosecuted or misclassified.<sup>35</sup> A clearer focus on antisemitic extremism could justify dedicated training curricula, liaison structures, and guidelines for police, prosecutors, and security services, including on eliminationist anti-Zionist narratives and their security implications. It could also support the creation of targeted multi-agency structures, such as joint task forces that combine hate crime, counter terrorism, and organized crime expertise, for cases where VAE intersects with transnational networks and financial crime. In this way, agencies could deploy the full toolkit of tax, fraud, money-laundering, proscription, charity law and online-safety measures in a more coordinated manner against the same set of professional VAE actors.

Third, a shared working definition of VAE could improve transatlantic and intra-EU comparability. The EU Strategy on Combating Antisemitism and Fostering Jewish Life, the U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism and several national strategies already move in a similar direction, but their operationalization remains uneven. A common understanding of VAE as a cross-cutting threat could help align threat assessments, training, and joint investigative work, and could support more coherent reporting to national and international organizations that already monitor antisemitism. It would also make it easier to benchmark progress and evaluate whether national and EU-level antisemitism strategies are having measurable security effects.

A formal VAE category could be perceived as giving antisemitism a higher status than other hate forms, prompting demands for parallel categories (“Islamophobic extremism”, “anti-Roma extremism”) and as complicating taxonomies. Where such concerns are raised, VAE could serve as a pilot or as a model for how to treat specific, historically embedded forms of hatred that meet certain criteria (e.g., transnational reach, cross-ideological function, link to mass-casualty violence). The recent creation of categories like “nihilistic violent extremism” and “anti-government extremism” in many jurisdictions shows that security taxonomies are not fixed but adapt when new threat patterns or the need for analytic depth arise that cut across traditional extreme-left/-right or jihadist buckets.<sup>36</sup>

## **Practical Consequences of a New “Violence-Oriented Antisemitic Extremism (VAE)” Category**

### **Core point:**

A separate category would not automatically create a new criminal offense. It would change how authorities tag, prioritize, resource, connect, and escalate cases across intelligence, prevention, prosecution, and policy.

### **If antisemitism remains only a cross-cutting issue:**

- Cases stay fragmented across Islamist, right-wing, left-wing, hate crime, public-order, and ordinary-crime files, making it harder to retrieve the full VAE threat picture.
- Police and prosecutors are more likely to treat incidents case-by-case rather than as networked campaigns involving recurring organizers, financiers, propagandists, and facilitators.
- No dedicated category usually means no dedicated collection requirements, staffing, metrics, or interagency tasking.

### **If VAE becomes a distinct analytical category:**

- Analysis / intelligence: agencies can tag cases across ideology families, produce trend reporting, issue collection priorities, map transnational links, and allocate protection based on a dedicated threat stream.
  - Prevention: frontline guidance can shift from generic hate prevention to antisemitism-specific indicators, campus/community risk markers, online mobilization patterns, and tailored referral pathways.
  - Prosecution / investigations: more cases can be escalated from isolated hate incidents to structured investigations using conspiracy, incitement, financing, tax, fraud, money-laundering, and material-support tools where facts justify it.
  - Policy / governance: governments can assign leads, publish annual threat assessments, create specialized liaison structures, and measure disruption of organized actors rather than only counting incidents.
- A separate category would let authorities move from incident management to disruption of organized VAE actors, enabling environments, and financial infrastructures, while keeping lawful speech protections intact.

## 5. A New Operational Approach Against Organized VAE

Combating violent antisemitism more effectively is a complex and challenging endeavor. Illegal antisemitic incidents are usually investigated and prosecuted in a one-by-one, bottom-up manner. However, organized and professional VAE groups and networks support violence or initiate calls for violence. Investigating and prosecuting them would require a new approach similar to approaches used to combat organized crime. Of course, there are clear differences between the phenomena of organized crime and organized antisemitism, e.g., the objective of organized crime groups is to obtain a financial or other material benefit, which is only part of the aims of organized VAE actors. Nevertheless, lessons learned and strategies deployed when fighting networks of organized crime can be applied here.

Organized VAE groups or networks systematically promote hostility, prejudice, or discrimination against Jewish individuals and communities. They often operate in (transnational) networks, utilizing online platforms and offline activities to propagate hate and justify or conduct violence. Their scope is larger, often transnational, with significant resources, networks and professionalism. These entities often operate with a defined leadership structure, coordinate activities, and follow identifiable, specific agendas aimed at propagating antisemitic ideologies and committing or instigating antisemitic crimes.<sup>37</sup>

A practical example is the VAE network that celebrated the October 7, 2023, attack on that same day on the streets of Europe as well as on social media. This network ranges from the EU-designated terrorist organizations, such as Hamas and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) to its proxy networks such as Samidoun and its affiliate, the Masar Badil network. These organizations are the visible VAE network hubs.<sup>38</sup> However, a significant number of less visible VAE groups and organizations operating in the EU are connected to these key VAE actors, but remain under-investigated. There is also an overlap with some left-wing extremist groups and networks. Similar networks exist within the right-wing extremist spectrum.<sup>39</sup>


### 5.1 Typology of Organized VAE Actors

The four-type typology below is designed to help policymakers and law enforcement prioritize organized VAE actors:

1. **Professional Propagandists and “Superspreaders”:** These are the most relevant media channels, influencers, and content creators whose primary “product” is the dissemination of violence-oriented content. Their work ensures that extremist tropes, such as “false flag” theories or “Great Replacement” narratives, remain scalable and visible across digital platforms.
2. **Professional Organizers and Fixers:** These individuals handle the physical and logistical requirements of mobilization. They arrange venues, manage security for events, and coordinate the activities of protest coalitions and campaign fronts. Groups such as

Samidoun and the Masar Badil network serve as operational hubs for these activities, connecting diverse extremist actors.

3. **Professional Financiers and Enablers:** This category includes the individuals behind charities, foundations, and companies that systematically fund VAE actors. This also encompasses state proxies and foreign-funded entities, such as those linked to the Islamic Republic of Iran or the Russian Federation, which provide the financial infrastructure necessary for sustained extremist activity.
4. **Hybrid Extremist-Criminal Entrepreneurs:** These actors occupy the intersection of organized crime and extremism. They utilize criminal revenue from drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, human trafficking, or extortion to fund VAE networks. This category is exemplified by reports of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) hiring organized crime figures, such as members of the Hells Angels, to orchestrate attacks on Jewish targets in Europe<sup>40</sup> as well as clan-linked Islamist organized crime groups.



By categorizing actors into these four types, government authorities can determine whether administrative measures, financial investigations, or criminal prosecution are the most appropriate and most effective disruptive response. The typology also helps to identify which actors are the most significant ones that should be disrupted. The operational question then is how to organize the state response against them. The core recommendation of this paper is to treat the most serious cases of organized VAE as multi-faceted challenges requiring coordinated and varied investigative and administrative action. For instance, while key propagandists may be targeted through stricter online content moderation and platform regulation, financiers and hybrid entrepreneurs require the intervention of Joint Task Forces that integrate, among others, law enforcement, intelligence and security authorities as well as tax authorities, local government bodies or licensing bodies to tailor a specific multipronged approach aiming for maximum disruptive effects while limiting unintended consequences.

## 6. Strategic Utility for Policy: Joint Task Forces

The organized VAE actors typology above helps identify which actors are the most significant and whose activities should be a priority to disrupt. The next question is how governments should organize themselves to respond to them. Prioritizing cross-agency investigations into the connections and activities of key actors of organized VAE, and of the broader VAE ecosystems in which they operate, could significantly enhance the effectiveness of current strategies to combat antisemitism.

To design such an approach, lessons learned from government strategies targeting financially motivated organized crime are instructive. Cross-agency collaborations, such as Joint Task Forces, are deployed if specific threats are considered a priority by the political or agency leadership. In many cases, individual government authorities possess important pieces of the “puzzle” but lack additional information or some specific expertise that would allow for a complete and effective identification of the particular threat. The Joint Task Force concept aims at overcoming these informational gaps and ensuring intensified information sharing, as well as the use of the full range of executive tools to counter these networks.

One could conceptualize such a Joint Task Force as a table where all the relevant agencies put their puzzle pieces together to create a more complete picture and to further investigate the most relevant leads. A “Follow the Money” approach, similar to structural investigations into organized crime, could also be applied here to increase the understanding of the underlying (illegal) financial activities of such groups and networks.<sup>41</sup>

### Strategic Disruption and Policy Solutions


To counter these VAE actors effectively, governments could adopt a disruption-oriented approach similar to that used against organized crime.

- **“Follow the Money” approach:** Applying structural investigations into the underlying financial activities of these networks can disrupt their operational capacity.<sup>42</sup> This includes monitoring illicit financial flows, possible money laundering, tax code violations, subsidy fraud, and ensuring that no public funds are directed toward organized VAE actors, e.g., in the form of NGO project funding.
- **Joint Task Forces:** Establishing cross-agency collaborations that integrate police, intelligence, customs, and tax authorities and other relevant agencies is essential. These Joint Task Forces allow different agencies to pool their specific “puzzle pieces” of information to create a comprehensive picture of transnational networks.<sup>43</sup>

For the European Union and its Member States, a Joint Task Force could include police, prosecutors, Financial Intelligence Units, tax authorities, customs authorities, domestic intelligence services, asset recovery offices, charity and nonprofit regulators, company and legal-entity registrars or regulators, cybercrime and digital-forensics units, and, in cross-border cases, Eurojust, Europol, and the European Anti-Fraud Office.

For the United States, a Joint Task Force could include federal, state, and local law enforcement, prosecutors, the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, the Financial Intelligence Unit of the Treasury (FinCEN), the Internal Revenue Service, Customs and Border Protection, asset forfeiture or recovery units, financial regulators and supervisors, charity and nonprofit oversight bodies, company-registration or corporate-transparency authorities, and cybercrime and digital-forensics units.

## Implementing a Combating **Organized** Antisemitism Approach



Graph: CEP

## 7. Policy Recommendations for EU and U.S. Institutions

The policy recommendations below are intended to inform the European Union, its Member States, and the United States about practical steps to strengthen the effectiveness of government responses to violence-oriented antisemitic extremism.

### **Introduce “violence-oriented antisemitic extremism (VAE)” as a separate threat category**

- Use VAE as a cross-cutting analytical category and use this threat category systematically in threat assessments and casework to improve early warning, resource allocation, and evaluation of strategies to counter key antisemitic groups, networks, and actors.

### **Add an “organized antisemitism” lens to existing P/CVE and CT frameworks**

- Systematically differentiate between general incidents and organized/professional VAE actors in threat assessments and programming.
- Use the four-type typology (propagandists, organizers, financiers/enablers, hybrid extremist-criminal entrepreneurs) as a practical tool for prioritization and for matching interventions to actor profiles.

### **Apply organized crime and Follow the Money approaches**

- Treat professional VAE networks as organized entities that can be disrupted through leadership targeting, financial investigations, and the deployment of charges concerning enabling offenses (e.g., tax, fraud, money laundering, terror financing, etc.).
- Strengthen the role of FIUs and financial crime units in identifying suspicious flows connected to antisemitic key actors, including abuse of charities, NGOs, and public funding.
- Initiate FIU cooperation via the Egmond Group of FIUs focused on financial information on VAE networks.

### **Build multi-agency task forces and hybrid threat platforms**

- Establish standing task forces that bridge politically motivated crime, extremism/terrorism, organized crime, financial intelligence, tax, customs, and relevant regulators.
- At the local level, create hybrid threat coordination mechanisms involving municipalities, social services, and law enforcement to address intersecting vulnerabilities in welfare systems, procurement, licensing, and community safety.

## **Use existing legal frameworks against eliminationist anti-Zionism**

- Encourage prosecutors and regulators to make full use of existing hate crime, anti-discrimination, and religious-intolerance frameworks to address VAE acts under an anti-Zionist pretense, while maintaining robust protection for legitimate policy criticism of Israel.
- Promote conceptual clarity in guidance and training so that law enforcement and platforms can distinguish between harsh but legitimate criticism and calls for the erasure of Jewish collective presence or sovereignty.

## **Address enabling environments and support architectures**

- Increase due diligence standards for public funding, procurement, and licensing to ensure that entities linked to VAE or designated organizations cannot access public resources.
- Work with universities, professional associations, and civil-society infrastructures to identify and mitigate capture by professional VAE actors masquerading as NGOs, student movements or advocacy initiatives.

## **Strengthen data, analysis and international cooperation**

- Improve collection and analysis of antisemitic incidents and actors across disciplines and agencies, building on the April 2025 CEP report and similar studies.
- Foster transatlantic cooperation on designation, information-sharing and joint investigative work related to professional VAE actors.
- Use the common category of violence-oriented antisemitic extremism (VAE) to align EU and U.S. threat assessments and to support joint training, information-sharing and reporting.

## Annex: Expert Consultations and Webinar Inputs

CEP and the German Federal Foreign Office have conducted a virtual event series throughout the fall and winter of 2025, building on central aspects and challenges identified in the CEP report. The overall goals for these events were not only to raise awareness concerning these issues with international and multilateral policy stakeholders as well as the international expert community, but also to initiate policy debate and to encourage concrete joint and coordinated action and policy development to prevent, manage, and counter the emerging threat emanating from (organized) violence-oriented antisemitism.

This annex highlights and summarizes the main lines of analysis and recommendations emerging from the webinar series. It focuses on three core strands:

- 1) Transnational connections between antisemitic extremist and terrorist actors across ideologies.
- 2) Linkages between antisemitic key actors and organized crime.
- 3) Rethinking antisemitism after October 7, 2023.

### **Webinar 1: Transnational Connections and Collaborations between Antisemitic Extremist/Terrorist Groups (also across Ideologies)**

The first webinar<sup>44</sup> explored how antisemitic actors from different ideological backgrounds, in particular extreme-right, extreme-left, Islamist, and foreign ideology movements, interact across borders, and ideological lines to amplify antisemitic narratives and actions.

#### **Transnational Islamist Extremism, Terrorism and Antisemitism**

*Dr Hans-Jakob Schindler, Senior Director, Counter Extremism Project (CEP)*

Hans-Jakob Schindler outlined how Hamas and other Islamist actors used the post-October 7 environment to expand recruitment, incitement, and financing, while reframing their message for Western audiences. He argued that Hamas's antisemitism remains structurally embedded (the clear antisemitic passages within the 1988 Hamas charter have never been revoked by the group) but is increasingly expressed through "modernized" anti-Zionist and anti-colonial language intended to resonate in academic and activist spaces. This is clearly demonstrated by the language used within Hamas' propaganda publication "Our Narrative - Operation Al-Aqsa Flood", released by Hamas in January 2024. This propaganda publication, distributed in English, was clearly produced with a Western audience in mind, couching the terrorist attack of October 7 in the language of anti-colonial thinking and therefore attempting to frame the public debate.

He highlighted a German court case in which Hamas operatives based in Europe had been instructed to stabilize residency, maintain operational security, and retrieve weapons from depots in Poland and Bulgaria for potential terrorist attacks in Germany. This case was used to challenge the assumption that Hamas is territorially confined to Israel/Palestine and to underline its status

as a transnational terrorist actor with embedded European logistics. Schindler's recommendations focused on adjusting threat perceptions, strengthening intelligence and judicial cooperation on embedded operatives and logistics chains, and developing counter-narratives that directly address Hamas's "Western-coded" messaging.

### **Transnational (pro-)Palestinian Extremism/Terrorism and Antisemitism**

*Patricia Teitelbaum, President, International Movement for Peace & Coexistence (IMPAC)*

Patricia Teitelbaum mapped Samidoun and Masar Badil as part of a long-running, transnational ecosystem centered on a small group of recurring organizers and spokespersons. The same individuals appeared repeatedly across multiple NGOs, student groups, legal advocacy structures, and direct-action networks. She presented examples of explicitly antisemitic rhetoric and glorification of violence after October 7<sup>th</sup>, and argued that mobilization had shifted from earlier two-state framings towards delegitimization of Israel's existence, including "from the river to the sea" narratives and an expanded focus on 1948.

Teitelbaum stressed the role of "support architecture": fiscal sponsorships, charitable structures, and professional associations that provide fundraising channels, administrative cover, and reputational shielding for networks linked to groups such as the PFLP. She cautioned that designations and bans are insufficient on their own, as successor entities can rapidly emerge. Her recommendations concentrated on targeting key individuals and organizers, scrutinizing enabling financial and organizational structures, and treating this ecosystem as a domestic security and democratic-resilience challenge rather than a narrow foreign-policy issue.

### **Transnational Right-Wing Extremism, Terrorism and Antisemitism**

*Alexander Ritzmann, Senior Advisor, Counter Extremism Project (CEP)*

Alexander Ritzmann described the extreme-right as highly transnational in practice, with long-standing networks (e.g., Combat 18, Hammerskins) and newer formations (Active Clubs, accelerationist milieus) maintaining cross-border connectivity through travel, combat-sports events, and online ecosystems. He highlighted antisemitism as a common denominator enabling cooperation across national and ideological fault lines. This included opportunistic "pro-Palestinian" signaling after October 7, where "Israel" was substituted for "Jews" in classic antisemitic slogans.

He also showed episodic narrative convergence between right-wing extremist and Islamist actors united by explicit antisemitism. Ritzmann concluded by presenting the CEP concept of "combating organized antisemitism", which differentiates diffuse antisemitic attitudes from professionalized actors who organize events, build influence, raise funds, and legitimize violence.

## **Webinar 2: Linkages between Antisemitic Key Actors and Organized Crime**

The second webinar<sup>45</sup> addressed linkages between antisemitic key actors and organized crime. It shed light on the operational convergence between extremist actors espousing antisemitic ideologies and organized criminal networks.

### **Transnational Linkages between Violent Right-wing Extremism, Terrorism and Organized Crime**

*Alexander Ritzmann, Senior Advisor, Counter Extremism Project (CEP)*

Building on the April 2023 CEP study “Transnational linkages between violent right-wing extremism, terrorism and organized crime”,<sup>46</sup> Ritzmann argued that antisemitism is often treated as a secondary feature of violent extremism instead of a strategic threat driven by professionalized actors. He distinguished between individual antisemitic attitudes and actions and organized operators who mobilize, fundraise and build influence as an ongoing activity, often across borders and platforms. He advocated applying an lessons for fighting organized crime, including network mapping, leadership targeting, and Follow the Money methodologies.

He recommended prioritizing enabling offenses such as tax violations, fraud, money laundering and possible terror financing, particularly where actors operate through seemingly legitimate civic structures or draw on public funds. He also pointed to “crime-as-a-service” dynamics, where extremist violence can be outsourced to criminal intermediaries, and situated this within a CEP typology of right-wing extremist–organized crime linkages, ranging from ad-hoc support to hybridization, the emergence of hybrid networks that have overlapping membership between the organized crime and right-wing extremist milieus.

### **Swedish Dynamics and Systemic Criminality**

*Magnus M. Ranstorp, Research Director and Associate Professor, Swedish Defence University*

Magnus Ranstorp outlined how Swedish organized crime has evolved into a systemic threat affecting welfare systems, public procurement, local governance, and institutional trust. Criminal networks increasingly rely on welfare fraud, front companies, money laundering, and intimidation of municipal actors. In the extremism context, he highlighted that many Swedish foreign terrorist fighters came from criminal milieus, creating overlaps in readiness for violence, weapons access, and logistics. Returnees risk re-entering criminal ecosystems with enhanced capabilities.

He underscored local governance vulnerabilities, where grants, contracts, and licenses can flow to actors connected to radical Islamist milieus. His recommendations called for hybrid-threat coordination models integrating preventing/countering extremism/terrorism, organized crime and financial intelligence with local authorities; stronger procurement and licensing safeguards; expanded exit pathways; and finance-led disruption that remains rule-of-law compliant.

## **Clan-linked Criminality and Antisemitic Mobilization in Germany**

*Dorothee Dienstbühl, Professor of Criminology, Brandenburg State Police University, Germany*

Dorothee Dienstbühl examined overlaps between clan-linked criminality and antisemitic mobilization in Germany. Using the German federal police's (BKA) definition, she described "clans" as informal social structures based on perceived descent and strong internal solidarity, where group affiliation can facilitate serious offending or obstruct investigations.<sup>47</sup> She linked this to post-October 7 developments, arguing that antisemitic intimidation in public space, particularly in Berlin, had become more visible and normalized. She presented examples of potential overlap between pro-Palestinian mobilization, Islamist milieus, and criminal ecosystems, including fundraising with unclear end-use, suspicious cash movements, and business portfolios associated with tax offenses, labor exploitation, and illicit trade. Dienstbühl argued that siloed responsibilities and restrictive interpretations of data protection impede operational responses.

She recommended joint, finance-led investigations that integrate extremism and organized crime workstreams and highlighted the need to pay more attention to informal value-transfer systems, cash-intensive businesses, and mixed legal/illegal portfolios.

## **Webinar 3: Rethinking the Fight against Antisemitism after October 7**

The aftermath of the antisemitic massacres conducted on October 7, 2023, in Israel by Hamas has raised many urgent questions. At the webinar<sup>48</sup>, the following questions were discussed: Do we need to rethink and reconceptualize the fight against antisemitism? Should antisemitism be its own category in the prevention and countering of violent extremism (P/CVE), not just a side aspect? How can the fight against professional antisemitic actors be improved?

## **Reconceptualizing Antisemitism in a Post-Secular Europe: From 'Prejudice' to 'Standalone Extremist Ideology'**

*Dr. Neven Vukic, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College Dublin (Ireland)*

Vukic argued that the post-October 7 surge in antisemitic incidents exposed a structural gap in European and transatlantic frameworks: antisemitism is still treated mainly as a "cross-cutting prejudice" or bridge narrative within other ideologies rather than as an extremist worldview in its own right. He compared this to the recent reclassification of misogynistic and male-supremacist extremism, the conceptualization of which moved from background prejudice to a standalone category once it clearly organized coherent worldviews and perpetrated mass-casualty violence. On the same operational criteria, he argued, antisemitism now meets this threshold for a comparable reclassification. A central element of his analysis is a "post-secular" framework centered on the theological "grammar of Zion": when anti-Zionism becomes eliminationist and denies any legitimate Jewish collective presence in the Land of Israel, it attacks the covenantal bond between people, land, and God that is a core structure of Judaism. In such cases, anti-Zionism functions as religious hostility rather than policy critique.

Operationally, Vukic proposed a hybrid model. In the short term, prosecutors and analysts should fully use existing hate crime, anti-discrimination and religious-intolerance frameworks to address eliminationist anti-Zionism. In parallel, intelligence services should gradually conceptualize “antisemitic extremism” as a standalone category, drawing on precedents such as Ukraine’s law on the prevention and counteraction of antisemitism and emerging US practice that links antisemitism to domestic violent extremism.

### **Combating Organized Antisemitism more Effectively**

Alexander Ritzmann, *Senior Advisor, Counter Extremism Project (CEP)*

Building on the CEP study of April 2025, he distinguished between general acts of antisemitism and organized antisemitism, where antisemitism-focused networks and actors systematically mobilize antisemitic narratives and incidents for ideological, financial, or political gain. He outlined a four-type typology: professional propagandists; professional organizers and fixers; professional financiers and enablers; and hybrid extremist-criminal entrepreneurs. This typology is meant to help policymakers and practitioners decide whom to regulate, whom to prosecute, whom to target financially, and where P/CVE or administrative measures are more appropriate.

The recommendations focused on moving from reactive incident handling to proactive disruption of organized networks and enablers. He proposed standing multi-mandate task forces that connect politically motivated crime units with financial-crime units, tax authorities, prosecutors, Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), and intelligence services, and called for systematic Follow the Money approaches, including scrutiny of public funding streams and sham charity operations or NGO structures used as fronts.

## Endnotes

---

<sup>1</sup> Ritzmann, Alexander et al. The role of antisemitism in the mobilization to violence by extremist and terrorist actors. Counter Extremism Project. 2025. <https://www.counterextremism.com/de/content/role-antisemitism-mobilization-violence-extremist-and-terrorist-actors>

<sup>2</sup> CEP is applying the IHRA working definition of antisemitism: International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. Working Definition of Antisemitism. IHRA. 2016. <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. What is antisemitism? 2016. <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism> and European Commission against Racism and Intolerance. ECRI General Policy Recommendation No. 9 (Revised) on preventing and combating antisemitism. Council of Europe. 2021. <https://rm.coe.int/ecri-general-policy-recommendation-no-9-revised-on-preventing-and-comb/1680a5968b>

<sup>5</sup> The concept of violence-orientation is, for example, used by the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Germany's Domestic Federal Intelligence Agency): „Individuals who can be categorized as violent, ready to use violence, supporting or endorsing violence are defined as “violence-oriented”. Annual Report 2024. English Summary. [https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/EN/reports-on-the-protection-of-the-constitution/2025-06-brief-summary-2024-report-on-the-protection-of-the-constitution.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile&v=6](https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/EN/reports-on-the-protection-of-the-constitution/2025-06-brief-summary-2024-report-on-the-protection-of-the-constitution.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6)

<sup>6</sup> Reuters. Berlin police arrest suspect in stabbing at Holocaust memorial. Reuters. 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/man-seriously-hurt-stabbing-berlin-holocaust-memorial-tagesspiegel-newspaper-2025-02-21/>

<sup>7</sup> The New York Times. Suspect Charged With Murder in Killings of 2 Israeli Embassy Aides. 2025. <https://www.nytimes.com/live/2025/05/22/us/israel-embassy-shooting-dc>

<sup>8</sup> BBC. Germany arrests suspected Hamas members over alleged attack plot. 2025. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cgknpzrkyvno>

<sup>9</sup> Reuters. Two dead in attack at UK synagogue on Yom Kippur, suspect shot dead. Reuters. 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-police-respond-incident-outside-synagogue-manchester-2025-10-02/>

<sup>10</sup> Reuters. Car slams into entrance of New York City synagogue, no injuries reported. Reuters. 2026. <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/car-slams-into-entrance-new-york-city-synagogue-no-injuries-reported-2026-01-29/>

<sup>11</sup> Reuters. Belgian synagogue damaged in blast considered antisemitic act. Reuters. 2026. <https://www.reuters.com/world/synagogue-belgian-city-liege-damaged-explosion-vrt-reports-2026-03-09/>

<sup>12</sup> Reuters. Rotterdam synagogue blast had terrorist intent, prosecutors say. Reuters. 2026. <https://www.reuters.com/world/rotterdam-synagogue-blast-had-terrorist-intent-prosecutors-say-2026-03-16/>

<sup>13</sup> Reuters. Explosion at Amsterdam Jewish school was 'deliberate attack', mayor says. Reuters. 2026. <https://www.reuters.com/world/explosion-damages-jewish-school-amsterdam-anp-reports-2026-03-14/>

<sup>14</sup> Reuters. Three more suspects arrested for antisemitic attacks in Netherlands. Reuters. 2026. <https://www.reuters.com/world/three-more-suspects-arrested-antisemitic-attacks-netherlands-2026-03-27/>

---

<sup>15</sup> Reuters. Two brothers placed under investigation in France for planning antisemitic attack. Reuters. 2026. <https://www.reuters.com/world/two-brothers-placed-under-investigation-france-planning-antisemitic-attack-2026-03-15/>

<sup>16</sup> Reuters. London Jewish community ambulances set ablaze in antisemitic attack, PM says. Reuters. 2026. <https://www.reuters.com/world/ambulances-london-jewish-community-organisation-torched-police-say-2026-03-23/>

<sup>17</sup> BBC. Michigan synagogue attack was Hezbollah-inspired act of terrorism, FBI says. 2026. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj0vzvldv0o>

<sup>18</sup> Reuters. UK charges two men with national security offences linked to Iran. Reuters. 2026. <https://www.reuters.com/world/uk-charges-two-men-with-national-security-offences-linked-iran-2026-03-18/>

<sup>19</sup> Lipowsky, Josh. Who is Ashab al-Yamin? Counter Extremism Project. 2026. <https://www.counterextremism.com/blog/who-ashab-al-yamin>

<sup>20</sup> Ritzmann, Alexander et al. The role of antisemitism in the mobilization to violence by extremist and terrorist actors. Counter Extremism Project. 2025. <https://www.counterextremism.com/de/content/role-antisemitism-mobilization-violence-extremist-and-terrorist-actors>

<sup>21</sup> Samidoun (Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network) is a transnational network active via country chapters founded by the The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a Palestinian Marxist–Leninist faction founded in 1967, listed under the EU’s terrorism asset-freeze and designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist, see <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2646>

<sup>22</sup> Masar Badil (Palestinian Alternative Revolutionary Path Movement) is an international umbrella network founded in 2021 by Samidoun, see <https://democ.de/en/article/masar-badil-terrorist-propaganda-for-the-west-dossier/>

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ritzmann, Alexander. Return of the Leader - Robert Rundo’s Impact on the Violent Extreme-Right Active Club Network. CEP Policy Brief. <https://www.counterextremism.com/content/return-leader-robert-rundos-impact-violent-extreme-right-active-club-network>

<sup>25</sup> Ritzmann, Alexander et al. The role of antisemitism in the mobilization to violence by extremist and terrorist actors. Counter Extremism Project. 2025. <https://www.counterextremism.com/de/content/role-antisemitism-mobilization-violence-extremist-and-terrorist-actors>

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> For example: Levitt, Matthew and Sarah Boches. Iranian External Operations in Europe: The Criminal Connection. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague. 2024. <https://icct.nl/publication/iranian-external-operations-europe-criminal-connection> and Nesser, Petter and Wassim Nasr. The Threat Matrix Facing the Paris Olympics. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC Sentinel). 2024. <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-threat-matrix-facing-the-paris-olympics/>

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> For example: European Commission. EU Strategy on Combating Antisemitism and Fostering Jewish Life (2021–2030). European Commission. 2021. <https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combating-discrimination/racism-and->

---

xenophobia/combating-antisemitism/eu-strategy-combating-antisemitism-and-fostering-jewish-life-2021-2030\_en

<sup>31</sup> The concept of violence-orientation is, for example, used by the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Germany's Domestic Federal Intelligence Agency): „Individuals who can be categorised as violent, ready to use violence, supporting or endorsing violence are defined as “violence-oriented”. Annual Report 2024. English Summary.  
[https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/EN/reports-on-the-protection-of-the-constitution/2025-06-brief-summary-2024-report-on-the-protection-of-the-constitution.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile&v=6](https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/EN/reports-on-the-protection-of-the-constitution/2025-06-brief-summary-2024-report-on-the-protection-of-the-constitution.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6)

<sup>32</sup> For example: European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs. Working Definition for Violent Right-Wing Extremism (VRWE). European Commission. 2021. [https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-02/VRWE%20working%20definition\\_en.pdf](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-02/VRWE%20working%20definition_en.pdf)

<sup>33</sup> International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. What is antisemitism? Working definition of antisemitism. International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. 2016/updated web resource.  
<https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism> and European Commission against Racism and Intolerance. ECRI General Policy Recommendation No. 9 (Revised) on preventing and combating antisemitism. Council of Europe. 2021. <https://rm.coe.int/ecri-general-policy-recommendation-no-9-revised-on-preventing-and-comb/1680a5968b>

<sup>34</sup> European Commission against Racism and Intolerance. ECRI General Policy Recommendation No. 9 (Revised) on preventing and combating antisemitism. Council of Europe. 2021. <https://rm.coe.int/ecri-general-policy-recommendation-no-9-revised-on-preventing-and-comb/1680a5968b> and European Commission, Bundesverband RIAS, and International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. *Handbook for the practical use of the IHRA working definition of antisemitism*. Publications Office of the European Union. 2021. <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d3006107-519b-11eb-b59f-01aa75ed71a1/language-en>

<sup>35</sup> For example: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). Monitoring and Recording Antisemitism in the EU – State of Play and Ways Forward. FRA. 2026.  
<https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2026/antisemitism-overview>

<sup>36</sup> For example: Europol. European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2024 (EU TE-SAT). Europol. 2024. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publication-events/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2024-eu-te-sat>

<sup>37</sup> Ritzmann, Alexander et al. The role of antisemitism in the mobilization to violence by extremist and terrorist actors. Counter Extremism Project. 2025. <https://www.counterextremism.com/de/content/role-antisemitism-mobilization-violence-extremist-and-terrorist-actors>

<sup>38</sup> Ritzmann, Alexander. Identifying and Disrupting Key Antisemitic Actors: A Five-Step Guide. Counter Extremism Project. 2024. <https://www.counterextremism.com/de/content/identifying-and-disrupting-key-antisemitic-actors-five-step-guide>

<sup>39</sup> Ritzmann, Alexander et al. The role of antisemitism in the mobilization to violence by extremist and terrorist actors. Counter Extremism Project. 2025. <https://www.counterextremism.com/de/content/role-antisemitism-mobilization-violence-extremist-and-terrorist-actors>

<sup>40</sup> For example: Levitt, Matthew and Sarah Boches. Iranian External Operations in Europe: The Criminal Connection. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague. 2024.  
<https://icct.nl/publication/iranian-external-operations-europe-criminal-connection>

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. and Ritzmann, Alexander. Effective Measures against Extremist Financial Strategies and Networks. Counter Extremism Project, Policy Brief. 2024.

---

<https://www.counterextremism.com/de/content/effective-measures-against-extremist-financial-strategies-and-networks>

<sup>42</sup> Ritzmann, Alexander. Effective Measures against Extremist Financial Strategies and Networks. Counter Extremism Project, Policy Brief. 2024. <https://www.counterextremism.com/de/content/effective-measures-against-extremist-financial-strategies-and-networks>

<sup>43</sup> Ritzmann, Alexander. Identifying and Disrupting Key Antisemitic Actors – A Five - Step Guide. Counter Extremism Project. Policy Brief. 2024. <https://www.counterextremism.com/de/content/identifying-and-disrupting-key-antisemitic-actors-five-step-guide>

<sup>44</sup> CEP Webinar. 2025.  
<https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLMgGq1NecSpa3xxBvlwnTsS2AXh4fD552>

<sup>45</sup> CEP Webinar.2025.  
[https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLMgGq1NecSpZ\\_s4ajuXnASf6DMC6mX8Hv](https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLMgGq1NecSpZ_s4ajuXnASf6DMC6mX8Hv)

<sup>46</sup> Ritzmann, Alexander et al. Transnational linkages between violent right-wing extremism, terrorism and organized crime Counter Extremism Project. 2025.  
<https://www.counterextremism.com/de/content/transnational-nexus-violence-oriented-right-wing-extremism-terrorism-and-organized-crime>

<sup>47</sup> Bundeskriminalamt (BKA). Bundeslagebild Organisierte Kriminalität 2024. Bundeskriminalamt. 2025.  
<https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen/JahresberichteUndLagebilder/OrganisierteKriminalitaet/organisierteKriminalitaetBundeslagebild2024.html?nn=27988>

<sup>48</sup> CEP webinar. 2025. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OBa-nyPDin8&list=PLMgGq1NecSpYU2x9KWMqKVae-ft7ifgwa> and <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QRu4NqUNk-U&list=PLMgGq1NecSpYU2x9KWMqKVae-ft7ifgwa&index=2>