

EVENT SUMMARY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Virtual Conference on May 10, 2021: Legal and Administrative Instruments to Counter the Threat from Violent Right-Wing Extremist and Terrorist Movements

Dr. Hans-Jakob Schindler, Alexander Ritzmann and Marco Macori

Counter Extremism Project (CEP) Germany

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The virtual conference organized by CEP on behalf of the German Federal Foreign Office on May 10, 2021, was opened by **Simon Herchen**, Deputy Head of Division “International Cooperation against Terrorism, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime” of the German Federal Foreign Office and **Ileana Visoiu**, Chair of the Council of Europe Committee on Counter-Terrorism. The Council of Europe, namely its Committee on Counter Terrorism (the CDCT), is in the process of a deeper analysis of the issues at the center of the conference. Pursuant to the 2018-2022 Council of Europe Counter-Terrorism Strategy,¹ one of its working groups has been tasked to map out emerging terrorist threats in Europe and give recommendations on the way forward in addressing elements of such threats that are not covered by the existing standards. The conference was organized in the framework of Germany’s chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.

Seven key policy recommendations emanated from the discussion during the event:

1. Consider adjusting legal definitions and concepts in a national context to take account of the complex, multifaceted and evolving threat emanating from the violent right-wing extremist (vXRW) milieus.
2. Improve cross-border information exchange for effective countermeasures, including administrative measures such as temporary travel restrictions for key stakeholders of the vXRW milieu who travel to recurring events of strategic relevance (hubs).
3. Consider applying existing instruments developed to fight organized crime, in cases where vXRW figures have ties to other criminal actors.
4. Develop a common understanding of key symbols employed by the vXRW milieu, which may enable more effective prosecutions when these symbols are connected to violent and criminal behavior.
5. Work towards a broader common view towards XRW violence, widening the view from a focus on the individual acts of violence by vXRW actors towards the wider enabling vXRW milieus.
6. Use already existing international legal instruments and standards, which are eclectic and not developed to counter a specific terrorist phenomenon.
7. Deepen a common understanding of the transnational character of the vXRW threat and the centrality of transnational hubs of the wider vXRW milieus to also energize the work of intergovernmental organizations such as the Council of Europe.

¹ https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=09000016808afc96

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EVENT CONCEPT

In 2020, CEP published an in-depth study focused on the transnational violent right-wing extremist and terrorist (vXRW) movement. This research was commissioned by the Federal Foreign Office of Germany.² This study focused on vXRW networks in Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. It demonstrated that this transnational movement is responsible for a steadily rising level of violent attacks. As a consequence, the threat posed by this movement is not only developing but continuously increasing. The study argued for a new conceptual perspective on this developing threat, emphasizing its transnationality as well as its functional parallels to other terrorist threats.

The study highlighted further that all six countries at the center of the research have developed countermeasures, ranging from approaches focused on the prevention and countering of violent extremism to an emphasis on executive, intelligence-led operations. The study also argued that in the past twenty years an integrated system of counter-terrorism measures has been created, which currently focuses primarily on the threat posed by extremist Islamist terrorism and that, therefore, a first initial step should be to analyze which and to what extent the already existing counter-terrorism measures could also be brought to bear to address the challenges emerging from vXRW.

This virtual event organized by CEP on behalf of Germany's Foreign Office explored this issue in greater detail. The event highlighted a range of instruments several of the 47 Member States of the Council of Europe (CoE) have found useful in countering the domestic threat posed by vXRW. The event argued that classifying the threat posed by vXRW as terrorism-related on a domestic level enables the use of a range of additional already existing instruments and, therefore, widen the toolbox of Member States in this regard. Finally, further developing a common conceptual understanding of the terrorist nature of a range of networks within the wider transnational vXRW movement as terrorism-related would also open up the possibility to use multilateral legal, administrative and operational structures, instruments and mechanisms, developed to mitigate terrorist threats.

² Kacper Rekawek, Alexander Ritzmann, Hans-Jakob Schindler, *Violent Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism – Transnational Connectivity, Definitions, Incidents, Structures and Countermeasures*, Berlin: Counter Extremism Project (CEP) Germany, November 2020, https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/CEP%20Study_Violent%20Right-Wing%20Extremism%20and%20Terrorism_Nov%202020.pdf

EVENT AGENDA

Opening remarks:

Simon Herchen,

Deputy Head, Division “International Cooperation against Terrorism, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime”, Foreign Office, Federal Republic of Germany

Ileana Visoiu,

Chair to the Council of Europe Committee on Counter-Terrorism

Panel:

Member State experiences in countering violent right-wing extremism and terrorism

Ambassador Fredrika Ornbrant,

Counter Terrorism Coordinator, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden

Prof. Vassiliki Georgiadou,

Director, Centre for Political Research, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Greece

Hana Šebová,

Head, Screening Centre, National Counter Terrorism Unit, Ministry of Interior, Slovak Republic

Alexander Ritzmann,

Senior Advisor, Counter Extremism Project, Germany

Presentation:

Counter-terrorism mechanisms and countering vXRW and terrorism

Carlo Chiaromonte,

Counter-Terrorism Coordinator of the Council of Europe

SUMMARY OF PRESENTATIONS

Panel: Member State experiences in countering violent right-wing extremism and terrorism

Ambassador Fredrika Ornbrant outlined that Sweden has a long history with vXRW, including a list of horrific attacks such as the so-called “Laserman”³ murders (John Ausonius) in 1991/92, the murder of John Hron in 1995,⁴ as well as the so-called Malexander police murders in 1999.⁵ She explained that in the 1990s vXRW networks moved to small cities and therefore became more noticeable. Shortly before the Christchurch attack in 2019, the Swedish Security Service noticed a marked increase in activities between vXRW networks and anti-migrant milieus in Sweden, possibly a delayed reaction to the migrant crisis in 2015. Furthermore, cross-border digitalization and social media increased threats against politicians, journalists and researchers, making engagement in prevention work more challenging. The Swedish government reacted to this with a substantial increase in P/CVE resources in the past five years.

This also included legislative initiatives and changes. Firstly, the criminalization of collaboration with terrorist organizations, introduced in March 2020. Due to this recent change, so far, no vXRW perpetrator has been prosecuted or convicted on this new provision. Secondly, an all-party proposal was presented to the government to make a change to the constitution, limiting the freedom of association by law for groups that engage or support terrorism. Based on this, two new legislative proposals are currently debated. A new legislation addressing criminal liability for participation in terrorist organizations, to be enacted until April 2022, and legislation addressing criminal liability for participation in racist organizations, to be enacted until July 2022.

Regarding prevention, she addressed the goal of decreasing the influx into extremist environments and outlined the tasks of the Swedish national Center for Preventing Violent Extremism⁶ (supporting the local level; cooperation of national, local and regional levels; writing of studies and reports). In January 2021, the Center published a report on violent right-wing accelerationism⁷ and in May 2021 held a conference on vXRW and the impact of the current pandemic.⁸ The event demonstrated that vXRW includes a variety of violent ideologies and networks, including antisemitism, anti-Islam and anti-migrant networks and therefore presents a significant challenge. More analysis and a better understanding why overall vXRW thinking gains in popularity is needed. Finally, she stressed the importance of a “whole-of-society

³ Termed after the laser light the perpetrator used on his weapon.

⁴ A teenager beaten to death by neo-Nazis.

⁵ Two policemen killed by right-wing extremists who were conducting a bank robbery to finance their vXRW network.

⁶ <https://www.cve.se/om-cve/in-english.html>

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https://www.cve.se/download/18.1f8c9903175f8b2aa703d77/1611826740846/2021_PM_h%C3%B6ge_rextrem_accelerationism.pdf

⁸ <https://www.cve.se/om-cve/aktuellt/arkiv/nyhetsarkiv/2021-04-23-webbinarium-pandemin-och-valdsbejakande-extremism.html>

approach” in the context of effective prevention measures regarding violent right-wing extremism.

Prof. Vassiliki Georgiadou focused in her presentation on the experiences in countering violent right-wing extremism in the case of Greece. Firstly, she stressed the transnational dimension of the threat of violent right-wing extremism. Far-right attacks tripled around the world between 2015 and 2020 according to an UN Trends Alert.⁹ In this context, violent right-wing extremism would constitute a “diffuse spectrum”¹⁰ of individuals, groups and organizations, some of which had managed to penetrate the central political arena: mainstream political actors are prone to co-opt aspects or patterns of the rhetoric of the extremist far-right, and extremist far-right “anti-stances” spread into everyday discourse.¹¹

Secondly, she elaborated on the national dimension of the extremist threat in Greece. Here, the far-right spectrum was marginal in the 1970s and 1980s as left-wing terrorist organizations dominated the extremist scene in that period. However, new left-wing extremist organizations and neo-Nazi extremist militias constitute the new mosaic of violent extremism in Greece since the outbreak of the financial crisis of the late 2000s.¹²

Thirdly, she provided analysis on the case of “Golden Dawn” (GD) as one of the most violent extremist parties in the European Union. The party promotes a Greeks-only racial nation-state, advocates the rebirth of a white racial and cultural supremacy and can be described as a militia-like neo-Nazi party. The party is organized along a paramilitary inner structure, operates along strong hierarchical lines, affords extensive power of party leader, which is called “the Führer” by party members, organizes training programs of party members to prepare them to take part in street fights against any notion of “otherness”, such as migrants, members of the Roma community, the Jewish and LGBTQ communities.¹³

Lastly, she explained that the legal action brought against GD, which resulted in the conviction of its leaders as a criminal organization, resulted in a downward trend in electoral performance and violent activities of GD. Here, the murder of P. Fyssas¹⁴ became the catalyst for institutional interventions such as:

- a full-fledged police investigation into GD’s activities;
- the trial against 69 GD’s party officials and members;
- the revelations during the trial that GD was not a “patriotic front” but a violent neo-Nazi group; and
- suspension of the state funding of GD after a legislative provision posed by a large majority in the Hellenic parliament.

⁹ https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/CTED_Trends_Alert_Extreme_Right-Wing_Terrorism.pdf

¹⁰ <https://www.gale.com/intl/essays/cynthia-miller-ldriss-white-supremacist-extremism-far-right-us>

¹¹ <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026137941830026X>

¹² https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333310584_Low-intensity_violence_in_crisis-ridden_Greece_evidence_from_the_far_right_and_the_far_left

¹³ See also: <https://www.counterextremism.com/supremacy/golden-dawn>

¹⁴ Anti-fascist Greek rapper, killed in 2013 by Giorgos Roupakias, who claimed to be a member of Golden Dawn and received a life sentence for this crime in 2020.

Furthermore, contributing factors were also civil society engagement,¹⁵ low visibility in the mainstream media of GD, decrease of party polarization and decrease of blame attribution (during the 2019 national elections Greek voters were less willing to be punitive against the political establishment). However, despite its leadership being convicted as a criminal organization, formally GD still is permitted to exist as a political party in Greece and therefore continued vigilance of this and other vXRW networks is necessary.

Hana Šebová outlined the fight against vXRW in Slovakia and highlighted the importance of music for violent right-wing extremist movements. Music is a significant part of extremist subculture with local and international dimensions. It is full of symbols, hidden messages, and expression of the main thoughts of violent right-wing extremist movements. Concerts of the right-wing extremist scene have taken place in the last years in Slovakia and neighboring countries. They are essential events for recruitment and networking. In order to counter this mechanism, Slovakia cooperated with neighboring countries in obtaining information about the bands that were scheduled to play at these concerts. Since sufficient information concerning the nature of the bands and the criminal behavior of members of the bands was obtained, Slovakia was able to ban the bands and their members from entering the country. Since the concerts were planned at a predictable time and a predictable location, a temporary entry ban was sufficient to disrupt the events effectively. Currently, there are no concerts organized in Slovakia since the various bands fear potential legal action and organizers had to deal with disgruntled concert goers.

She then focused on the financing of the violent right-wing extremist movement, concretely selling of books, music CDs or clothes/merchandise, often in the context of music concerts and festivals. Here, the use of symbols is crucial. Unfortunately, since there is no official list of forbidden symbols in Slovakia, legal countermeasures remain a challenge as expert opinions are required in each legal trial. Analyzing the actors involved in financing activities, Slovak authorities have been able to establish clear links between them as well as links to stakeholders that attempt to enter the political structure in the country via elections.

However, it remains a challenge to identify violent and non-violent extremist actors in this context, not least because the behavior of extremists has changed over the years, morphing from outright extremist behavior and slogans into a far more sophisticated strategic communications campaign. Therefore, clear-cut boundaries are difficult to draw. Another challenge is how to deal with extremist self-presentation, misuse of social media and disinformation webs (online propaganda), as well as how to fight strategic communication and hate speech used by extremists and their followers. Lastly, she pointed out that during the current pandemic, extremist ideas, including from the vXRW spectrum, have found hold in wider society and led to violence against government buildings, perpetrated by individuals previously not classified as extremist.

¹⁵ <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/media-and-the-far-right-in-western-europe/E757F0BCDA525FBE9534589CD0B79B12>

Alexander Ritzmann initially discussed the key findings of the CEP study “Violent Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism – Transnational Connectivity, Definitions, Incidents, Structures and Countermeasures”, which indicates that a new leaderless, transnational and apocalyptic vXRW movement has emerged comprised of different XRW milieus and individuals, which feels connected and united by shared narratives, values and enemies.¹⁶

He then elaborated on the legal and administrative reforms undertaken in Germany, key administrative changes and investments in Germany, and future challenges and opportunities.

A (changing) understanding of extremism and terrorism – legal and administrative reforms undertaken in Germany:

Based on the concept of a “well-fortified” or “battle-ready democracy”, enshrined in the German constitution (Grundgesetz), Articles 1 and 20, Germany has continuously evolved its understanding of the concept of “extremism” during the past decades:

- Administrative concept of extremism (1974): a supposed or confirmed hostility towards the constitution and any effort opposing the “principles of the free democratic basic order.” It is not illegal to be an extremist but can lead to government surveillance measures.
- Most recent decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court (2017):¹⁷ The denial of universal human rights, which conflicts with the core value of the inviolability of human dignity of the German Constitution, has become a key concept in modern-day interpretations of “right-wing extremism”.
- From violence-ready to violence-oriented XRW: A change of definition took place from the execution or preparation of violent acts to the legitimization of violent acts as political means, the promotion of violent acts by others, and the general endorsement of violence.
- German Criminal Code/Federal prosecutor: terrorism – forming of an organization with the objective to “seriously intimidate the population” or “destroy or significantly impair” an authority or international organization; changed for the possibility of government surveillance (2017). Does “not necessarily require there to be a group” – now includes so called “lone actors”.¹⁸

Key administrative changes and investments in Germany:

During the last 10 years, Germany has widened its definitions regarding XRW, has changed some of the structures and priorities of security agencies, has banned around 20 XRW groups and has invested significantly more funds in P/CVE work/projects. Milestones in this development were:

- The establishment of the Joint Centre for Countering Extremism and Terrorism (GETZ)¹⁹ in 2012. GETZ serves as a communication platform for the 30 federal and state police and intelligence services, and one of its aims is to combat right-wing extremism/terrorism.

¹⁶ https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/CEP%20Study_Violent%20Right-Wing%20Extremism%20and%20Terrorism_Nov%202020.pdf

¹⁷

https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2017/01/bs20170117_2bv_b000113.html

¹⁸ https://www.bka.de/DE/UnsereAufgaben/Deliktsbereiche/PMK/pmk_node.html

¹⁹ https://www.bka.de/DE/UnsereAufgaben/Kooperationen/GETZ/getz_node.html

- The relevant authorities received significantly more funding to hire staff.
- The BKA, BAMAD (military counterintelligence) and BND all created right-wing-extremism departments. The existing department at the BfV has been restructured, and a “center for the registration and investigation of right-wing-extremist activities in the public service”²⁰ has been established there.
- Germany has had XRW prevention and Exit programs in place for more than 25 years. In the 2020-2023 funding period, 460 million euros are earmarked predominantly for tackling right-wing extremism and antisemitism on a federal level.²¹

A common international understanding and shared legal concepts – challenges and opportunities:

The main challenge is a common analysis and understanding of the real size and nature of the XRW phenomena. Our perspective and focus define the threats.

- Some argue that compared to al-Qaida, Daesh and Hezbollah, vXRW is not an equal threat. But: clearly vXRW seems to follow similar objectives of violence/terrorism (targeting civilians for political goals); however, vXRW uses different strategies, tactics and targets.
- “No-flag” operations (most XRW violence is without manifestos) versus “classic” terrorism (with propaganda/manifestos). Violence is the message.
- “Attacker bias”: focus on the operation, not the supporting environments/milieus, limits deeper understanding.
- Lack of understanding and efforts regarding new developments and milieus, particularly online (TCO/DSA/NetzDG):
 - Many major XRW key actors have profiles on social media, often with several thousand followers, this is a key element of their operations.
 - Content moderation/notice and action: gatekeepers remove only 50% of illegal content, this does not present a sufficient defensive mechanism.
- Connections between XRW actors and criminal organizations (drugs traffickers/Bikers/Hooligans) should be explored with priority. This could also be seen as an opportunity as it allows the deployment of counter-crime approach to disrupt their activities. Finally, cross-agency task forces and administrative approaches against seemingly “legal” activities, including financial activities, should be prioritized.
- Further disruption could be achieved by using already established administrative measures, including more stringent controls over weapons and ammunitions, investigations on suspected tax evasion schemes, stringent security enforcement at XRW events (including ban of alcohol), or cross-border travel restrictions for key violent actors of the XRW milieus.

²⁰ See for example:

<https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/DE/2020/lagebericht-rechtsextremisten-in-sicherheitsbehoerden.html>

²¹ <https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/DE/2020/01/fachgesprach-praevention-seehofer-giffey.html>

Presentation: Counter-terrorism mechanisms and countering vXRW and terrorism

Carlo Chiaromonte stressed that the Council of Europe is in the initial stages of dealing with the issue of violent right-wing extremism and terrorism. The Council of Europe has established an expert group and tasked this group with a comprehensive analysis of emerging terrorist threats in Europe and beyond. The work of the expert group will support Member States of the Council of Europe to develop appropriate countermeasures to such new threats. The first meeting of the expert group was in January 2021 and presented preliminary proposals for its work. It can be expected that vXRW is one of the issues that this group is analysing. From the preliminary review, one can conclude that violent right-wing extremism conducive to terrorist actions is a very complex phenomenon, which poses significant challenges regarding legal definitions in Member States. The complexity of its actions, as well as that of other terrorist and violent extremism groups, has been further aggravated by the Covid-19 pandemic.

Since 2014/2015 the terrorism landscape in Europe has dramatically shifted in the last few years. Chiefly responsible for this shift was the territorial defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Syria and Iraq as well as the redistribution of al-Qaida capabilities in the Middle East and Africa and the emergence of new affiliated groups. Europe, North America and Oceanian have seen the rise of attacks fueled by white supremacist violence and hatred towards some communities. This new violence has been described by a number of different terminologies by Member States, ranging from far-right to racially and ethnically motivated terror. The high-profile attacks in Christchurch in 2019, several attacks in Europe in 2019 and 2020, including the mass shooting in Hanau/Germany in 2020 have focused the attention of many governments in Europe and beyond on this issue.

This already complex threat is further evolving due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, which has acted as an accelerator for all emerging terror threats. The misuse of new technologies by terrorist networks, which was already a concern before the pandemic, has increased considerably. Violent extremists are always early adopters of technologies. Continuing vulnerabilities in these technologies are exploited by violent extremists to recruit and coordinate online.

The emerging work of the Council of Europe will focus on actions that are conducive to terrorism, as this is part of the specific mandate of the Council. As an intergovernmental organization the work of the Council of Europe is, of course, oriented along the priorities of its member States, and vXRW was raised by several member States as one of the priority areas for future work. The already complex issue of defining the concept of terrorism internationally is even more challenging in the case of vXRW conducive to terrorism. Not only are various definitions used between different countries, but sometimes even within the same governmental structure varying definitions are used for this phenomenon. Nevertheless, reaching an agreement on a common understanding is not impossible. Currently, the Council of Europe is working on a common definition of terrorism in general for the purpose of the various conventions and Council of Europe legal instruments.

As a further step in this process, the Council of Europe will focus developing additional legal instruments in order to assist its member States. The legal instruments of the Council of Europe are always “ideology blind” and not tailored to a specific terrorist phenomenon. All actions that fulfill the constitutive elements of terrorism offences or actions as outlined by these instruments will be subsumed by them. Consequently, these instruments could already be applied by

member States to also counter this emerging threat if the constitutive actions and offences meet the criteria outlined in the various instruments.

Finally, if the transnational links between vXRW are further emerging and if this trend is confirmed, enhanced international cooperation between member States will be a central instrument to counter this threat. Here, the work of the Council of Europe can be especially valuable in this regard. Therefore, further analysis of these transnational links, their strength, functionality and operational role in the overall vXRW movement is necessary.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The event highlighted the various instruments that Member States have developed in order to counter the emerging threat emanating from vXRW and highlighted a set of particular policy areas where further action may be necessary:

1. Potential adjustments of legal definitions and concepts in a national context

The threat emanating from vXRW is complex and multifaceted and differs structurally from terrorist phenomena which emanate from more structured and hierarchical organizational groups and networks.²² Thus, narrow definitions of extremism and terrorism may hinder the effective application of already existing legal and administrative instruments when countering this threat. Deploying broader definitions may not only enable a deeper understanding of this emerging threat but would also allow the deployment of a range of existing instruments to disrupt the activities of vXRW movements and networks.

2. Cross-border information exchange can be crucial for effective countermeasures

Based on a common understanding of the threat emanating from particular groups and networks within the wider vXRW milieu, the exchange of detailed information may enable the application of administrative instruments, such as temporary travel restrictions, which may effectively disrupt the function of key networking hubs such as concerts and festivals. Since key stakeholders within the wider vXRW milieu travel across borders to meet, coordinate and cooperate at recurring events, inhibiting the travel of these stakeholders of these events will effectively disrupt their transnational coordination via these hubs.²³

3. Including counter-crime instruments to the fullest extent

The connection between vXRW stakeholders and organized crime requires further analysis. Recent arrests have demonstrated that such a link may exist in several countries. This could be seen as an opportunity to also deploy criminal law as a disruptive mechanism against the vXRW milieu. In this regard, it may also be useful to consider applying the “Administrative Approach” toolkit,²⁴ which was developed to fight organized crime more comprehensively, in cases where vXRW figures have ties to other criminal actors or activities.

4. Developing a common understanding of key symbols employed by the vXRW milieu

A specific set of key symbols, based on a range of inspirations,²⁵ are an important non-verbal communications tools of the vXRW milieu, both online and offline. Therefore, a commonly agreed compilation of these symbols, including short descriptions of their function and use within the milieu would deepen the overall understanding of the movement’s internal

²² See CEP study, p. 11f, https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/CEP%20Study_Violent%20Right-Wing%20Extremism%20and%20Terrorism_Nov%202020.pdf

²³ See *ibid.*, p. 18ff.

²⁴ <https://administrativeapproach.eu/>

²⁵ See CEP study, p. 12ff.

functionality. Existing compilations on a national level can form a basis for transnational awareness raising and training. This could also lead to more effective prosecutions when these symbols are connected to violent and/or criminal behavior.

5. Working towards a broader common view concerning XRW violence

Serious violence perpetrated by members of the wider vXRW milieu is often characterized by the actions of individuals, general violence emanating from the milieu is not accompanied by manifestos or public declarations.²⁶ Violence is often a message in itself. Consequently, a broader view of individual actions, taking the enabling social vXRW milieu into account, will enable a deeper understanding of all aspects of this emerging threat. Going beyond a focus on the individual act of violence and employing network analyses of the enabling social environment will enable additional avenues for countermeasures and the development of a common understanding of the full extent of the threat.

6. Use of already existing international legal instruments and standards

Multi-national counter-terrorism instruments, including legal instruments developed by the Council of Europe, have not been defined along the characteristics of a particular terrorist phenomenon. Therefore, these already existing instruments can be deployed as part of an overall counterstrategy against the threat emanating from the vXRW milieu. This requires that the offences and actions by stakeholders in the wider vXRW milieu are adequately matched with the definitions contained in these instruments. Hence, working towards a common understanding of the terrorism-related character of some key stakeholders within this milieu will be an important step to open-up the application of these instruments.

7. Deepen a common understanding of the transnational character of the vXRW threat

Further analysis of the transnational character of the leaderless, apocalyptic violent right-wing extremist and terrorist movement,²⁷ is necessary. This work will also support a common understanding of key transnational networks and structures that enable the functionality of the wider vXRW milieu. This new, transnational character of the movement and the threat emanating from it will also energize the work of intergovernmental organizations such as the Council of Europe.

²⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 24ff.

²⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 5ff.