[{"command":"openDialog","selector":"#drupal-modal","settings":null,"data":"\u003Cdiv class=\u0022ds-1col clearfix\u0022\u003E\n\n  \n\n  \n  \u003Cp\u003EAmong the contentious debates that have surrounded al-Qaeda for years is the current state of al-Qaeda\u2019s core leadership. Even during the Bush administration in 2005 and 2006, U.S. intelligence said that Al Qaeda\u2019s core leadership was \u201ccut off from their foot soldiers,\u201d only to reverse that analysis one year later.\u003Cspan class=\u0022footnote\u0022\u003EMark Mazzetti and David Rohde, \u201cTerror Officials See Al Qaeda Chiefs Regaining Power,\u201d \u003Cem\u003ENew York Times\u003C\/em\u003E, February 19, 2007, \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2007\/02\/19\/world\/asia\/19intel.html?pagewanted=print\u0026amp;_r=0\u0022\u003Ehttp:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2007\/02\/19\/world\/asia\/19intel.html?pagewanted=print\u0026amp;_r=0\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/span\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe outbreak of mass protests across the Arab world in January 2011, seemingly spontaneous, peaceful and devoid of Islamist underpinnings, caused many analysts to judge that the \u201cArab Spring\u201d would mark the downfall of al-Qaeda. On May 2, 2011, the \u003Cem\u003EGuardian\u003C\/em\u003E\u2019s Ian Black wrote that \u201cNone of the uprisings\u2026has involved significant Islamist activity \u2013 let alone the violent, extremist \u003Cem\u003Ejihadi\u003C\/em\u003E ideas promoted by Bin Laden\u2026Al-Qaida had already looked marginal and on the back foot for several years. But the dawn of largely peaceful change in the Middle East and North Africa this year rendered it irrelevant.\u201d\u003Cspan class=\u0022footnote\u0022\u003EIan Black, \u201cAl-Qaida Already Looked Irrelevant after Arab Spring,\u201d \u003Cem\u003EGuardian\u003C\/em\u003E (London), May 2, 2011, \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2011\/may\/02\/al-qaida-irrelevant-arab-spring\u0022\u003Ehttp:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2011\/may\/02\/al-qaida-irrelevant-arab-spring\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/span\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFawaz Gerges, writing in the \u003Cem\u003EDaily Beast\u003C\/em\u003E, asserted that, \u201cOnly a miracle will resuscitate a transnational \u003Cem\u003Ejihad\u003C\/em\u003E of the al-Qaeda variety\u2026the Arab Spring represents a fundamental challenge to the very conditions that fuel extremist ideologies. Time will tell if the Arab revolts will manage to fill the gap of legitimate political authority. If this happens, Arab opinion will deliver the final blow to al Qaeda and its local branches.\u003Cspan class=\u0022footnote\u0022\u003EFawaz A. Gerges, \u201cFawaz A. Gerges on How the Arab Spring Beat Al Qaeda,\u201d \u003Cem\u003EDaily Beast\u003C\/em\u003E, May 13, 2012, \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.thedailybeast.com\/articles\/2012\/05\/13\/fawaz-a-gerges-on-how-the-arab-spring-beat-al-qaeda.html\u0022\u003Ehttp:\/\/www.thedailybeast.com\/articles\/2012\/05\/13\/fawaz-a-gerges-on-how-the-arab-spring-beat-al-qaeda.html\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/span\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EPerhaps the staunchest advocate of this view has been Peter Bergen, an expert on al-Qaeda and terrorism analyst for CNN who was part of the crew that interviewed Bin Laden in 1997. In 2006, he took issue with Bush administration officials who used the terms \u201con the run\u201d and \u201cdecimated\u201d to refer to the state of al-Qaeda at the time, preferring to say that, \u201cYes, al-Qaeda as an organization is severely impaired, but it has been replaced by a broader ideological movement\u2026motivated by a doctrine that can be called \u201cBinladenism.\u201d\u003Cspan class=\u0022footnote\u0022\u003EPeter Bergen, \u201cAl-Qaeda, Still in Business,\u201d \u003Cem\u003EWashington Post\u003C\/em\u003E, July 2, 2006, \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/article\/2006\/06\/30\/AR2006063001342.html\u0022\u003Ehttp:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/article\/2006\/06\/30\/AR2006063001342.html\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/span\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EBut by June 2012, Bergen wrote, \u201cTime to declare victory: al Qaeda is defeated.\u201d\u003Cspan class=\u0022footnote\u0022\u003EPeter Bergen, \u201cTime to Declare Victory: Al Qaeda is Defeated,\u201d CNN, June 27, 2012, \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/security.blogs.cnn.com\/2012\/06\/27\/time-to-declare-victory-al-qaeda-is-defeated-opinion\/\u0022\u003Ehttp:\/\/security.blogs.cnn.com\/2012\/06\/27\/time-to-declare-victory-al-qaeda-is-defeated-opinion\/\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/span\u003E Bergen pointed to the assassination of 28 al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan and Yemen during the Obama administration, and to the fact that al-Qaeda had failed to \u003Cem\u003Esuccessfully\u003C\/em\u003E attack the West since the London Underground bombing in July 2005. In Bergen\u2019s estimation, Ayman al-Zawahiri \u201cinherited the Blockbuster Video of global \u003Cem\u003Ejihad\u003C\/em\u003E and has done nothing to resuscitate it.\u201d\u003Cspan class=\u0022footnote\u0022\u003EPeter Bergen, \u201cTime to Declare Victory: Al Qaeda is Defeated,\u201d CNN, June 27, 2012, \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/security.blogs.cnn.com\/2012\/06\/27\/time-to-declare-victory-al-qaeda-is-defeated-opinion\/\u0022\u003Ehttp:\/\/security.blogs.cnn.com\/2012\/06\/27\/time-to-declare-victory-al-qaeda-is-defeated-opinion\/\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/span\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOn the other side of the debate are those who say that, despite the assassination of Bin Laden and many other high-level al-Qaeda operative, the organization\u2019s expansive affiliate network might make it even more potent. According to Thomas Joscelyn, a terrorism analyst for the \u003Cem\u003ELong War Journal\u003C\/em\u003E, \u201cal Qaeda\u2019s expansion in recent years has led to more threats against the U.S. Homeland, not less.\u201d\u003Cspan class=\u0022footnote\u0022\u003EThomas Joscelyn, \u201cGlobal Al Qaeda: Affiliates, Objectives, and Future Challenges,\u201d Long War Journal, July 18, 2013, \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.longwarjournal.org\/archives\/2013\/07\/global_al_qaeda_affi.php#\u0022\u003Ehttp:\/\/www.longwarjournal.org\/archives\/2013\/07\/global_al_qaeda_affi.php#\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/span\u003E Joscelyn pointed to numerous plots against the U.S. and Canada since 2009 that nearly succeeded, including the attempted December 25, 2009, bombing of a commercial airline traveling to Detroit, and the May 2010 attempted Times Square car-bombing which proved failed when the explosives failed to detonate.\u003Cspan class=\u0022footnote\u0022\u003EThomas Joscelyn, \u201cGlobal Al Qaeda: Affiliates, Objectives, and Future Challenges,\u201d Long War Journal, July 18, 2013, \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.longwarjournal.org\/archives\/2013\/07\/global_al_qaeda_affi.php#\u0022\u003Ehttp:\/\/www.longwarjournal.org\/archives\/2013\/07\/global_al_qaeda_affi.php#\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/span\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Cem\u003EForeign Policy\u003C\/em\u003E, Marc Lynch argued in August 2013 that the Arab Spring actually benefitted al-Qaeda. Lynch noted that, \u201cHad the revolutions led to successful democratic transitions, the blow to al Qaeda could well have been fatal,\u201d but transitions in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia proved disastrous, and al-Qaeda has been a major player in the Syrian civil war. Rather than marking the end of al-Qaeda, Lynch pointed out that, \u201cThe failure of most of the Arab uprisings has therefore been an extraordinary gift to al Qaeda.\u201d\u003Cspan class=\u0022footnote\u0022\u003EMarc Lynch, \u201cThe Gift,\u201d \u003Cem\u003EForeign Policy\u003C\/em\u003E, August 8, 2013, \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.foreignpolicy.com\/articles\/2013\/08\/08\/the_gift_al_qaeda_arab_spring\u0022\u003Ehttp:\/\/www.foreignpolicy.com\/articles\/2013\/08\/08\/the_gift_al_qaeda_arab_spring\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/span\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOne month later, after al-Shabab\u2019s attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nariobi, Kenya, the \u003Cem\u003EEconomist\u003C\/em\u003E published a scathing critique of the Obama administration\u2019s counterterrorism strategy that focused on limiting terrorist attacks to local, soft targets away from the homeland. \u201cMr Obama might argue that the assault on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi by al-Qaeda\u2019s Somali affiliate, the Shabab, was just the kind of thing he was talking about\u2026Yet the inconvenient truth is that, in the past 18 months\u2026al-Qaeda and its jihadist allies have staged an extraordinary comeback. The terrorist network now holds sway over more territory and is recruiting more fighters than at any time in its 25-year history. Mr Obama must reconsider.\u201d\u003Cspan class=\u0022footnote\u0022\u003E\u201cThe New Face of Terror,\u201d \u003Cem\u003EEconomist\u003C\/em\u003E, September 28, 2013, \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.economist.com\/news\/leaders\/21586832-west-thought-it-was-winning-battle-against-jihadist-terrorism-it-should-think-again\u0022\u003Ehttp:\/\/www.economist.com\/news\/leaders\/21586832-west-thought-it-was-winning-battle-against-jihadist-terrorism-it-should-think-again\u003C\/a\u003E.\u003C\/span\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n\n","dialogOptions":{"minWidth":850,"resizable":true,"modal":true,"title":"Al-Qaeda\u2019s Arab Spring: Decimated or Expanding?"}},{"command":"doFootnotes"}]