

**COUNTER
EXTREMISM
PROJECT**

HAQQANI NETWORK

Name: Haqqani network

Type of Organization: insurgent, non-state actor, regional, terrorist, transnational, violent

Ideologies and Affiliations: Deobandi, Islamist, jihadist, Pashtun, Salafi, Sunni, Wahhabi

Place of Origin: Afghanistan

Year of Origin: 1996

Founder(s): Jalaluddin Haqqani

Places of Operation: Afghanistan and Pakistan

Executive Summary:

The Haqqani network is a militant Islamist group operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is considered a branch of the Afghan Taliban, but operates independently from the organization and has a more diffuse command structure.¹ It originated in the late 1970s but rose to prominence in the resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. After the 1989 Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Jalaluddin Haqqani formed an alliance with the Taliban and supported the growth of al-Qaeda. When the Taliban violently assumed de facto control of Afghanistan in 1996, the group appointed Haqqani as minister of tribal affairs.² Ever since, the Haqqani network has been subsumed under the larger Taliban, although the Haqqanis preserve distinct command and control.³

Since the Taliban regime's overthrow in 2001, the Haqqani network has been a lethal and sophisticated arm of the Afghan insurgency against the Western-backed government in Kabul. The Haqqani network's base of operations is located near Miramshah, in North Waziristan, part of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).⁴ Although it has cooperated with and even praised al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network focus is regional, not global like al-Qaeda's. Indeed, according to declassified U.S. intelligence, the Haqqanis enjoyed close ties with the United States from the time of anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s until September 11, 2001.⁵

¹ Eric Schmitt, "Taliban Fighters Appear Blunted in Afghanistan," *New York Times*, December 26, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/27/world/asia/27policy.html?_r=0.

² "Part 3: Through the eyes of the Taliban," Asia Times Online, May 5, 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/FE05Ag02.html.

³ "The Haqqani Network," Institute for the Study of War, accessed April 20, 2015, <http://www.understandingwar.org/report/haqqani-network>.

⁴ Anand Gopal, "The Most Deadly US Foe in Afghanistan," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 1, 2009, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2009/0601/p10s01-wosc.html>.

⁵ "Blacklisted," *Economist*, September 15, 2012, <http://www.economist.com/node/21562974>.

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Jalaluddin Haqqani and his Islamist fighters received considerable military assistance from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the anti-Soviet struggle.⁶ Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency has also given extensive support, including safe harbor and access to weapons, to the Haqqani network, enabling the group to expand. However, the Afghan government and coalition forces have inflicted great damage on the Haqqani network in recent years, bringing its total force size down from as many as 10,000 in 2011 to as few as 2,000 in 2012.⁷

Since the network's leader, Jalaluddin Haqqani, has grown ill, his son Sirajuddin has become the operational director of the organization, enhancing its cooperation with al-Qaeda and other violent Islamist groups in the region.⁸ The Haqqani network is regarded by the U.S. intelligence community as the leading insurgency force in South Asia, with more intimate ties to Arab jihadist groups and Pakistani intelligence than any other faction.⁹ In 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, then-chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, called the Haqqanis a "veritable arm" of the ISI.¹⁰

Doctrine:

The Haqqani network seeks to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan and Afghanistan and build a caliphate under Islamic law. Like the Taliban, the Haqqani network endorses an austere and radical interpretation of sharia (Islamic law), positing that Muslims must aspire to live in accordance with the actions of the *Salaf*, the first generation of Muslim leaders after the Prophet Muhammad.¹¹

The Haqqani network gained momentum during the Soviet occupation and came to play a central role in the Afghan mujahideen movement. Like the Taliban, they embrace a strict interpretation of Sunni Islam known as Deobandi.¹² This school of thought was a branch of Hanafi Islam that developed in the late nineteenth century in the madrassas (religious schools) of the Indian

⁶ Jason Ukman, "The Haqqani Network: al Qaeda's Dangerous Patron," *Washington Post*, July 11, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/al-qaedas-dangerous-haqqani-patron-in-pakistan/2011/07/18/gIQAtWmcLI_blog.html.

⁷ "Mapping Militant Organizations," Stanford University, last modified May 15, 2015, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/363>.

⁸ Jason Ukman, "The Haqqani Network: al Qaeda's Dangerous Patron," *Washington Post*, July 11, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/al-qaedas-dangerous-haqqani-patron-in-pakistan/2011/07/18/gIQAtWmcLI_blog.html.

⁹ Anand Gopal, "The Most Deadly US Foe in Afghanistan," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 1, 2009, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2009/0601/p10s01-wosc.html>.

¹⁰ "Blacklisted," *Economist*, September 15, 2012, <http://www.economist.com/node/21562974>.

¹¹ Michael Semple, "Rhetoric, Ideology and Organizational Structure of the Taliban Movement," United States Institute of Peace, January 15, 2015, <http://www.usip.org/publications/rhetoric-ideology-and-organizational-structure-of-the-taliban-movement>.

¹² Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 88.

subcontinent.¹³ What set the Deobandis apart was their habit of instructing youth in Islamic theology and little else. They strove to inculcate students with a fierce respect for piety. This rigorous instruction turned out pious Muslims who were able to recite the Quran and aimed to adhere as closely as possible to the lived experience of Islam's prophet Muhammad as revealed in the Hadith (the sayings and actions of Muhammad). The Deobandis' vision put faith at the center of life, drawing a stark distinction between the *kuffar* (unbelievers) and the *ummah* (community of believers).¹⁴

After seizing power in Kabul in 1996, the Taliban announced its aims to impose order and enforce sharia. All this was done to defend the special Islamic character of the "Emirate of Afghanistan."¹⁵ The Taliban banned most sporting events and forms of entertainment, from poetry and music to kites. They closed all-girls schools, and women were allowed in public only under strict male supervision. Even when women were in the home, the windows were painted black to prevent passersby from glimpsing women in their private quarters.¹⁶

In 2008, Jalaluddin Haqqani stated that "all the Mujahideen wage Jihad under the leadership of [Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar] against the American invaders and their lackeys."¹⁷ In September 2012, Haqqani's son Sirajuddin declared, "We are one of the fronts of the Islamic Emirate... and we are proud of our pledge to its Emir [Mullah Omar] and we carry out its orders and all its regulations... and we obey completely in good deeds the Emir of the Believers Mullah Muhammad Omar."¹⁸ The Taliban even released a statement on its website stating that there is "no separate entity or network in Afghanistan by the name of Haqqani" and that Jalaluddin Haqqani is "a member of the Leadership Council of Islamic Emirate and is a close, loyal and trusted associate" of Mullah Omar.¹⁹

No events since have altered the Haqqani network's pledge of allegiance to the Taliban. With the rise of ISIS, for instance, the Haqqani network has fallen in line with its Taliban and al-Qaeda allies in calling for pan-Islamic unity. The Taliban has advised ISIS to "avoid extremism" that risks splintering the violent Islamist movement across the broader Middle East.²⁰ Despite these

¹³ "Deobandis," Oxford Islamic Studies Online, accessed May 1, 2015,

http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e522?_hi=1&_pos=2.

¹⁴ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 88.

¹⁵ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 22.

¹⁶ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 90.

¹⁷ "The Haqqani Network," Institute for the Study of War, accessed April 20, 2015,

<http://www.understandingwar.org/report/haqqani-network>.

¹⁸ Bill Roggio, "Haqqani Network is part of the Taliban- Siraj Haqqani," *Long War Journal*, October 5, 2012,

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/10/siraj_haqqani_denies.php.

¹⁹ Bill Roggio, "Haqqani Network is part of the Taliban- Siraj Haqqani," *Long War Journal*, October 5, 2012,

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/10/siraj_haqqani_denies.php.

²⁰ Greg Pollowitz, "The Taliban Warns ISIS of Being Too Extreme," *National Review*, July 13, 2014,

<http://www.nationalreview.com/feed/382615/taliban-warns-isis-being-too-extreme-greg-pollowitz>.

warnings, hundreds of Taliban members have joined ISIS's Pakistani branch and some evidence indicates that ISIS's ranks are growing throughout the Hindu Kush.²¹

Organizational Structure:

The Haqqani network's leadership is largely clan-based and hierarchical. It is located near Miramshah, in North Waziristan, part of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).²² Although the Haqqani network has been responsible for some of the most gruesome violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan in recent years, Pakistani intelligence has nonetheless labeled it as a potential partner in peace—a “moderate” Taliban.²³

The Haqqani network's leadership structure is akin to the Taliban's former ten-member leadership council (Supreme Shura) previously based in Kandahar.²⁴ Jalaluddin Haqqani served as the minister of “Frontier Affairs” in the Taliban's Supreme Shura until the regime was deposed by the U.S.-led intervention in 2001. Ever since, the Taliban have operated as an insurgent force out of Pakistan under its modified Quetta Shura, a combination of the leadership and consultative councils. This more recent form of leadership was founded in the winter of 2002, when Mullah Omar fled across the Pakistani frontier.²⁵ The Quetta Shura is responsible for much of the Taliban's operations in southern and western Afghanistan.²⁶ As of 2009, the Shura consisted of an estimated 23 to 46 members.²⁷

The Quetta Shura appoints a governing structure in Afghanistan, dispatching “shadow” governors to many Afghan provinces.²⁸ In 2009, it established a committee to redress grievances from the indigenous population. The Quetta Shura “[installs] ‘shari’a’ courts to deliver swift and enforced justice in contested and controlled areas. [It levies] taxes and [conscripts] fighters and

²¹ Mushtaq Yusufzai, “ISIS in Pakistan and Afghanistan: Taliban Fighters Sign up, Commanders Say,” NBC News, January 31, 2015, <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/isis-pakistan-afghanistan-taliban-fighters-sign-commanders-say-n296707>.

²² Anand Gopal, “The Most Deadly US Foe in Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, June 1, 2009, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2009/0601/p10s01-wosc.html>.

²³ Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos* (London: Penguin Books: 2009), 221.

²⁴ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press: 2010), 250.

²⁵ Jeffrey A. Dressler, “Securing Helmand,” Institute for the Study of War, September 2009, <http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/SecuringHelmandPDF.pdf>.

²⁶ Abubakar Siddique, “The Quetta Shura: Understanding the Afghan Taliban's Leadership,” *Terrorism Monitor* 12, no. 4 (February 21, 2014),

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42006&cHash=7af7678306a23ff6734f35e261b15b90#.VTVCgyHBzGc; Jeffrey A. Dressler, “Securing Helmand,” Institute for the Study of War, September 2009, <http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/SecuringHelmandPDF.pdf>.

²⁷ Jeffrey A. Dressler, “Securing Helmand,” Institute for the Study of War, September 2009, <http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/SecuringHelmandPDF.pdf>.

²⁸ Thomas Joscelyn, “The Taliban's shadow government,” *Long War Journal*, September 24, 2009, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/09/the_talibans_shadow_government.php.

laborers.” It claims “to provide security against a corrupt government, ISAF forces, criminality, and local power brokers [and] to protect Afghan and Muslim identity against foreign encroachment.”²⁹

The Taliban also operates a military base in Peshawar, Pakistan, from which leaders direct the insurgency in Afghanistan’s north and east. The Peshawar military commission reportedly oversees a total of 20 provinces, divided into six command zones, one of which falls under the Haqqani network’s purview.³⁰

The Haqqani network’s Miramshah Shura, its most direct leadership organ, features both military and political wings and consists of Haqqani family members along with veteran commanders trusted by the family.³¹ As of 2015, Sirajuddin Haqqani leads the Miramshah Shura and is the chief liaison to the Quetta Shura as well as the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaeda.³² According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the Haqqani network has been critical in building and maintaining this insurgency infrastructure on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border. It operates as a conduit between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani intelligence, along with al-Qaeda and other insurgent groups.³³

Financing:

The Haqqani network has long been financed by its local allies, ranging from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to the Taliban and al-Qaeda.³⁴ The group also receives funding from wealthy donors across the Arab world, especially in the Gulf States. These associations have been deeply entrenched since at least 1980, when Jalaluddin Haqqani—with the help of one of his Arab wives living in the United Arab Emirates—opened fundraising offices in several Gulf

²⁹ Thomas Joscelyn, “The Taliban’s shadow government,” *Long War Journal*, September 24, 2009, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/09/the_talibans_shadow_government.php.

³⁰ “The Taliban,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed April 21, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/taliban/p35985?cid=marketing_use-taliban_infoguide-012115#!/.

³¹ Anand Gopal, Mansur Mahsud, and Brian Fishman, “Inside the Haqqani network,” *Foreign Policy*, June 3, 2010, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/06/03/inside-the-haqqani-network/>.

³² Anand Gopal, Mansur Mahsud, and Brian Fishman, “Inside the Haqqani network,” *Foreign Policy*, June 3, 2010, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/06/03/inside-the-haqqani-network/>; Jason Ukman, “The Haqqani Network: al Qaeda’s Dangerous Patron,” *Washington Post*, July 11, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/al-qaedas-dangerous-haqqani-patron-in-pakistan/2011/07/18/gIQAtWmcLI_blog.html.

³³ “The Taliban,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed April 13, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/taliban/p35985?cid=marketing_use-taliban_infoguide-012115#!/.

³⁴ Anand Gopal, “The Most Deadly US Foe in Afghanistan,” *Christian Science Monitor*, June 1, 2009, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2009/0601/p10s01-wosc.html>.

states.³⁵ Jalaluddin Haqqani's sons have personally traveled to meet these patrons on several occasions.³⁶

The Haqqani network also boasts a range of criminal enterprises, from smuggling jewels and precious metals to kidnapping.³⁷ It also operates legitimate commercial enterprises, especially ones tied to Pakistan's military and intelligence elite.³⁸

Recruitment:

The Haqqani network runs an elaborate network of madrassas in North Waziristan, from which they cull members.³⁹ It has also used the Taliban's larger network of Saudi-funded Wahhabi madrassas to find new recruits.⁴⁰ These religious schools can be found on both sides of the Durand line, and represent the primary recruiting grounds for the Taliban as well.⁴¹

Training:

The Haqqani network is known to train its fighters in camps on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border. According to U.S. intelligence, for instance, a 2011 training video put out by the Haqqani network was recorded in Pakistan's tribal-controlled North Waziristan.⁴² This video features Haqqani recruits enrolled in a kind of basic training course replete with mock ambushes, other simulated other battlefield conditions, and weapons training.

In 2011, the Haqqani network released a field manual of its training methods and tactics.⁴³ The field manual runs 144 pages, and was published under "Khalifa Sirajuddin Haqqani," the operational commander of the Haqqani network. It details methods to obtain financing and

³⁵ Jeffrey Dressler, "The Haqqani Network: A Foreign Terrorist Organization," Institute for the Study of War, September 5, 2012, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Background_Haqqani-FTO.pdf.

³⁶ Jeffrey Dressler, "Terror is Their Family Business," *Weekly Standard*, July 16, 2012, http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/terror-their-family-business_648234.html.

³⁷ Mark Mazzetti, "Brutal Haqqani Crime Clan Bedevils U.S. in Afghanistan," *New York Times*, September 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/25/world/asia/brutal-haqqani-clan-bedevils-united-states-in-afghanistan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

³⁸ Jeffrey Dressler, "Terror is Their Family Business," *Weekly Standard*, July 16, 2012, http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/terror-their-family-business_648234.html.

³⁹ "The Haqqani Network," Institute for the Study of War, accessed May 30, 2015, <http://www.understandingwar.org/report/haqqani-network>.

⁴⁰ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 43.

⁴¹ Owais Tahid, "Pakistani teen tells of his recruitment, training as suicide bomber," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 16, 2011, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2011/0616/Pakistani-teen-tells-of-his-recruitment-training-as-suicide-bomber>.

⁴² Bill Roggio, "Haqqani Network Releases Video of Training Camps," *Long War Journal*, November 17, 2011, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/11/haqqani_network_rele.php.

⁴³ Bill Roggio, "Haqqani Network Releases Video of Training Camps," *Long War Journal*, November 17, 2011, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/11/haqqani_network_rele.php.

directs readers to recruit and train new members. It also documents ambush methods, explosives, and instructions for suicide missions. Further, it features religious propaganda and praise for al-Qaeda.⁴⁴

Key Leaders:

- Jalaluddin Haqqani: Founder [[Image](#)]
- Sirajuddin Haqqani: Operational commander⁴⁵ [[Image](#)]
- Abdul Aziz Ahbasin: Haqqani network governor of Pakita province, Afghanistan⁴⁶ [image not available]
- Khalil al-Rahman Haqqani: Gulf-based fundraiser and facilitator⁴⁷ [image not available]

History:

1976: Jalaluddin Haqqani begins to train Islamist militants in North Waziristan, with the goal of ousting Afghan President Mohammad Daud Khan, who had recently seized power in a coup.⁴⁸

1983: Jalaluddin Haqqani expands his area of operations from the Zadran tribal areas to the cities of Khost and Urgan, which his forces seize from the Afghan government forces and their Soviet backers.⁴⁹

Late 1980s: The Haqqani network establishes ties with Osama bin Laden’s forces during the anti-Soviet war.⁵⁰

April 1992: Afghanistan falls to the mujahideen, in which Haqqani plays a key role.⁵¹

1994: The Taliban seize control of Kandahar. Soon after, Haqqani pledges allegiance to the Taliban.⁵²

⁴⁴ Bill Roggio, “Haqqani Network Releases Video of Training Camps,” *Long War Journal*, November 17, 2011, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/11/haqqani_network_rele.php.

⁴⁵ Bill Roggio, “The Afghan Taliban’s top leaders,” *Long War Journal*, February 23, 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/02/the_talibans_top_lea.php.

⁴⁶ Bill Roggio, “US adds five al Qaeda, Taliban, Haqqani Network and IMU facilitators to terrorist list,” *Long War Journal*, September 29, 2011, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/09/us_adds_5_al_qaeda_t.php.

⁴⁷ “Mapping Militant Organizations,” Stanford University, last modified May 15, 2015, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/363>.

⁴⁸ *Encyclopedia Britannica*, s.v. “Jalaluddin Haqqani,” accessed June 10, 2015, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1844743/Jalaluddin-Haqqani>.

⁴⁹ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 234.

⁵⁰ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 224.

⁵¹ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 256.

⁵² Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 12.

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1996: Mullah Omar is made Amir ul-Momineen, the leader of the Taliban, when it captures Kabul by force and asserts control over most of Afghanistan.⁵³ In exchange for his support of the Taliban, Haqqani is made a member of the cabinet as the Minister of Tribal Affairs until the United States ousts the Taliban government in 2001.⁵⁴

2001: Following al-Qaeda's 9/11 attacks and the subsequent U.S. war in Afghanistan, Haqqani fighters flee across the Pakistani frontier and establish a base of operations in North Waziristan. The Haqqani network spurns an offer from Pakistan and the United States to turn against the Taliban and instead extends a safe harbor to retreating al-Qaeda forces.⁵⁵

September 2006: The Haqqani network orchestrates a suicide bombing that kills Abdul Hakim Taniwal, the governor of Paktika province and a close associate of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. A second suicide bomber struck Taniwal's funeral procession on the following day, killing 7 and wounding more than 40.⁵⁶

September 2007: The Haqqani network deploys a suicide bomber aboard a bus carrying Afghan Army recruits, killing 31.⁵⁷

October 2007: Military officers in the Western coalition describe the Haqqani network as the most dangerous threat to Afghan security.⁵⁸

January 2008: The Haqqani network attacks the Serena Hotel in Kabul, killing eight people.⁵⁹

April 27, 2008: The Haqqani network executes an assassination attempt on Afghan President Karzai. The president escapes, but three people are killed.⁶⁰

July 7, 2008: A car bomb explodes at the Indian embassy in Kabul, killing 54. The Haqqani network claims responsibility.⁶¹

⁵³ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 257.

⁵⁴ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 60.

⁵⁵ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 224.

⁵⁶ "Bomb Attack Kills Afghan Governor," BBC News, September 10, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/5333178.stm.

⁵⁷ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 230.

⁵⁸ Matt Duppe, "The Haqqani Network: Reign of Terror," Long War Journal, August 2, 2008, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/the_haqqani_network.php#ixzz3PxiGGbMx.

⁵⁹ "Haqqani Network," United Nations Security Council Committee, 2011, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1988/NSTE01212E.shtml>.

⁶⁰ Anand Gopal, "The Most Deadly US Foe in Afghanistan," Christian Science Monitor, June 1, 2009, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2009/0601/p10s01-wosc.html>.

⁶¹ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 232.

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January 2010: The Haqqani network launches attacks on government buildings in Kabul, killing five and wounding 70.⁶²

June 2011: The Haqqani network claims responsibility for an attack on the International Hotel in Kabul that kills 11 Afghan civilians and two policemen.⁶³

September 2011: The Haqqani network launch a nearly day-long assault on the U.S. embassy in Kabul and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). At least sixteen Afghan civilians, including six children, are killed in the attack.⁶⁴

October 2011: U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proposes peace talks between the U.S. government and the Haqqani network.⁶⁵

April 2012: The Haqqani network launches an assault in Kabul that leaves 36 insurgents and 11 others dead.⁶⁶

September 7, 2012: The U.S. Department of State designates the Haqqani network a Foreign Terrorist Organization under Executive Order 13224.⁶⁷

November 2013: A U.S. drone strike in Pakistan kills five Taliban members in addition to a senior commander in the Haqqani network, Maulvi Ahmad Jan.⁶⁸

February 2014: The U.S. creates a special military unit headquartered in Kabul dedicated to dismantling the Haqqani network.⁶⁹

⁶² “Haqqani Network,” United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), accessed June 18, 2015, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1988/NSTE01212E.shtml>.

⁶³ “Haqqani Network,” United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), accessed June 18, 2015, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1988/NSTE01212E.shtml>.

⁶⁴ “Haqqani Network,” United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), accessed June 18, 2015, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1988/NSTE01212E.shtml>.

⁶⁵ Donna Cassata, “Clinton defends outreach to Taliban-linked group,” NBC News, October 27, 2011, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/45066513/ns/politics-capitol_hill/t/clinton-defends-outreach-taliban-linked-group/.

⁶⁶ Associated Press, “Haqqani militant network behind deadly Afghanistan assault,” April 16, 2012, *New York Daily News*, <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/haqqani-militant-network-behind-deadly-afghanistan-assault-article-1.1062366>.

⁶⁷ Associated Press, “Haqqani network designated terrorist organization by U.S.,” *Politico*, September 7, 2012, <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0912/80911.html>.

⁶⁸ Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Drone strike kills Haqqani network’s No. 2, other Taliban commanders: officials,” NBC News, November 21, 2013, <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/drone-strike-kills-haqqani-networks-no-2-other-taliban-commanders-f2D11632474>.

⁶⁹ Missy Ryan and Phil Stewart, “Eyeing Afghan exit, U.S. intensifies campaign against Haqqani militants,” Reuters, February 26, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/26/us-afghanistan-usa-militants-idUSBREA1O1SV20140226>.

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July 15, 2014: The Haqqani network uses a truck to deliver a bomb to a crowded market in eastern Afghanistan, killing 72.⁷⁰

January 15, 2015: Pakistan outlaws the Haqqani network after the Taliban's attack on a Peshawar school leaves 134 children dead.⁷¹

June 1, 2015: The Afghan government leaks a letter from President Ashraf Ghani to the Pakistani government urging Islamabad to detain members of Taliban and the Haqqani network.⁷²

July 2015: A senior member of the Haqqani network claimed that its founder, Jalaluddin Haqqani, had been dead for more than a year. This was not confirmed either by US intelligence or the Taliban.⁷³

Violent Activities:

The Haqqani network has employed violence since its founding. Haqqani fighters first acquired battlefield experience during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. Members later honed their capabilities in the realm of terrorism through deep cooperation with al-Qaeda and the Taliban, especially after 2001.⁷⁴ For a period, the Haqqani network was regarded by both the U.S. and Afghan governments as the most dangerous outfit operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan. By 2011, Haqqani operations accounted for 10 percent of attacks on coalition forces and about 15% of casualties.⁷⁵ Since 2011, the group has sustained heavy casualties from the Pakistani military as well as from U.S. drone strikes, but it remains a formidable fighting force in the region.

The Haqqani network has executed a number of violent attacks, including:

September 2006: The Haqqani network orchestrates a suicide bombing that kills Abdul Hakim Taniwal, the governor of Paktika province and a close associate of Afghan President Hamid

⁷⁰ Mirwais Harooni, "Senior Leaders of the Haqqani Network Arrested in Afghanistan," Huffington Post, October 16, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/16/haqqani-network-leaders-arrested_n_5995800.html.

⁷¹ Mehreen Zahra-Malik, "Pakistan bans Haqqani network after talks with Kerry," Reuters, January 16, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/16/us-pakistan-militants-haqqani-idUSKBN0KP1DA20150116>.

⁷² Mariana Baarbar, "Kabul seeks detention of Taliban, Haqqani network leaders," *Politico*, June 1, 2015, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-37773-Kabul-seeks-detention-of-Taliban-Haqqani-network-leaders>.

⁷³ Matthew Rosenberg and Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, *New York Times*, July 31, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/01/world/asia/founder-of-haqqani-network-died-nearly-a-year-ago-member-says.html>.

⁷⁴ Don Ressler and Vahid Brown, "The Haqqani Network and al-Qaeda," *Foreign Policy*, July 19, 2011, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/07/19/the-haqqani-network-and-al-qaeda/>.

⁷⁵ Lisa Curtis, "Combating the Haqqani Terrorist Network," Heritage Foundation, September 13, 2012, <http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2012/09/combating-the-haqqani-terrorist-network>.

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Karzai. A second suicide bomber struck Taniwal's funeral procession on the following day, killing 7 and wounding more than 40.⁷⁶

September 2007: The Haqqani network deploys a suicide bomber aboard a bus carrying Afghan Army recruits, killing 31.⁷⁷

January 2008: The Haqqani network attacks the Serena Hotel in Kabul, killing eight people.⁷⁸

April 27, 2008: The Haqqani network executes an assassination attempt on Afghan President Hamid Karzai. The president escapes, but three people are killed.⁷⁹

July 7, 2008: A car bomb explodes at the Indian embassy in Kabul, killing 54. The Haqqani network claims responsibility.⁸⁰

January 2010: The Haqqani network launches attacks on government buildings in Kabul, killing five and wounding 70.⁸¹

June 2011: The Haqqani network claims responsibility for an attack on the International Hotel in Kabul that kills 11 Afghan civilians and two policemen.⁸²

September 2011: The Haqqani network launches a nearly day-long assault on the U.S. embassy in Kabul and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). At least sixteen Afghan civilians, including six children, are killed in the attack.⁸³

April 2012: The Haqqani network launches an assault in Kabul that leaves 36 insurgents and 11 others dead.⁸⁴

⁷⁶ "Bomb Attack Kills Afghan Governor," BBC News, September 10, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/5333178.stm.

⁷⁷ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 230.

⁷⁸ "Haqqani Network," United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), accessed June 18, 2015, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1988/NSTE01212E.shtml>.

⁷⁹ Anand Gopal, "The Most Deadly US Foe in Afghanistan," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 1, 2009, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2009/0601/p10s01-wosc.html>.

⁸⁰ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 232.

⁸¹ "Haqqani Network," United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), accessed June 18, 2015, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1988/NSTE01212E.shtml>.

⁸² "Haqqani Network," United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), accessed June 18, 2015, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1988/NSTE01212E.shtml>.

⁸³ "Haqqani Network," United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), accessed June 18, 2015, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1988/NSTE01212E.shtml>.

⁸⁴ The Associated Press, "Haqqani militant network behind deadly Afghanistan assault," April 16, 2012, *New York Daily News*, <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/haqqani-militant-network-behind-deadly-afghanistan-assault-article-1.1062366>.

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July 15, 2014: The Haqqani network uses a truck to deliver a bomb to a crowded market in eastern Afghanistan, killing 72.⁸⁵

January 15, 2015: Pakistan outlaws the Haqqani network after the Taliban's attack on a Peshawar school leaves 134 children dead.⁸⁶

Designations:

U.S.

March 2008

The U.S. Department of State added Sirajuddin Haqqani to its list of specially designated global terrorists in March 2008.⁸⁷

U.S.

September 7, 2012

The U.S. Department of State designated the Haqqani network a Foreign Terrorist Organization under Executive Order 13224 on September 7, 2012.⁸⁸

Foreign governments and organizations:

U.N.

November 2012

The United Nations designated the Haqqani network as a Proscribed Terrorist Organization in November 2012.⁸⁹

Associations:

Ties to Extremist Entities:

Al-Qaeda:

⁸⁵ Mirwais Harooni, "Senior Leaders of the Haqqani Network Arrested in Afghanistan," Huffington Post, October 16, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/16/haqqani-network-leaders-arrested_n_5995800.html.

⁸⁶ Mehreen Zahra-Malik, "Pakistan bans Haqqani network after talks with Kerry," Reuters, January 16, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/16/us-pakistan-militants-haqqani-idUSKBN0KP1DA20150116>.

⁸⁷ Bill Roggio, "US State Department adds Mullah Sangeen to terrorist list," *Long War Journal*, August 16, 2011, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/08/us_state_department_1.php.

⁸⁸ Associated Press, "Haqqani network designated terrorist organization by U.S.," *Politico*, September 7, 2012, <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0912/80911.html>.

⁸⁹ "Haqqani Network," United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), accessed June 18, 2015, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1988/NSTE01212E.shtml>.

The Haqqani network maintains extensive links to al-Qaeda in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. U.S. intelligence findings indicate that the network has supplied vital assistance to al-Qaeda in the realm of training, propaganda support and networking channels.⁹⁰ This record has solidified a robust collaborative relationship between the Haqqani network and core al-Qaeda.⁹¹

Taliban:

The Haqqani network is considered an integral part of the Afghan Taliban, but it operates independently from the core organization.⁹² Drawing on its own fundraising network, it is financially independent from the Taliban. Despite its largely autonomous status, the Haqqanis continue to advance the objectives of a resurgent Taliban. In May 2014, the Haqqanis orchestrated the release of five Taliban commanders held at Guantanamo Bay in exchange for the U.S. serviceman, Bowe Berghdal.⁹³ They also pledge allegiance to the Taliban.⁹⁴

Ties to Other Entities:

Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI):

The Haqqani network has had extensive ties with Pakistan's ISI dating back to the 1980s.⁹⁵ According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the Haqqani network has been critical in building and maintaining this insurgency infrastructure on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border. It operates as a conduit between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani intelligence, along with al-Qaeda, and other insurgent groups.⁹⁶ In 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called the Haqqanis a "veritable arm" of the ISI.⁹⁷

Ties to Extremist Individuals:

⁹⁰ Jason Ukman, "The Haqqani Network: al Qaeda's Dangerous Patron," *Washington Post*, July 11, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/al-qaedas-dangerous-haqqani-patron-in-pakistan/2011/07/18/gIQAtWmcLI_blog.html.

⁹¹ Jason Ukman, "The Haqqani Network: al Qaeda's Dangerous Patron," *Washington Post*, July 11, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/al-qaedas-dangerous-haqqani-patron-in-pakistan/2011/07/18/gIQAtWmcLI_blog.html.

⁹² Eric Schmitt, "Taliban Fighters Appear Blunted in Afghanistan," *New York Times*, December 26, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/27/world/asia/27policy.html?_r=0.

⁹³ Bill Roggio, "US posts rewards for 5 Haqqani Network leaders," *Long War Journal*, August 21, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/08/us_posts_rewards_for.php.

⁹⁴ Jeffrey Dressler, "Terror is Their Family Business," *Weekly Standard*, July 16, 2012, http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/terror-their-family-business_648234.html.

⁹⁵ Jason Ukman, "The Haqqani Network: al Qaeda's Dangerous Patron," *Washington Post*, July 11, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/al-qaedas-dangerous-haqqani-patron-in-pakistan/2011/07/18/gIQAtWmcLI_blog.html.

⁹⁶ "The Taliban," Council on Foreign Relations, accessed April 13, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/taliban/p35985?cid=marketing_use-taliban_infoguide-012115#!/.

⁹⁷ "Blacklisted," *Economist*, September 15, 2012, <http://www.economist.com/node/21562974>.

Mullah Mohammed Omar:

The Haqqanis had long pledged allegiance to Mullah Omar and recognized the now-deceased Taliban leader as *amir al-momineen* (the commander or leader of the faithful).⁹⁸ After the announcement of Omar's death, the Haqqanis recognized his successor, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, as their leader.⁹⁹

Osama bin Laden:

The Haqqanis praise al-Qaeda and have shared training personnel with the terrorist organization. Al-Qaeda's legendary al-Farouq training camp was even located at the Haqqani base at Zawara, Afghanistan.¹⁰⁰

Media Coverage/Analysis of Group:

Arab Media

Al Jazeera has cast the Haqqani network in a relatively positive light, referring to it as an "armed group" aligned with the Taliban.¹⁰¹ In its coverage of the Haqqani network, Al Jazeera has generally refrained from describing it as a "terrorist" organization, despite its long-established record of targeting civilians. Al Jazeera has been one of the few media outlets to obtain an interview with Sirajuddin Haqqani, the group's operational commander.¹⁰²

Al Jazeera's coverage of the faltering peace process between the United States and the Taliban has been more suspicious than its Western counterparts of the role played by the Afghan government. In 2013, when the Afghan-Taliban peace talks collapsed, Al Jazeera attributed this

⁹⁸ Jeffrey Dressler, "Terror is Their Family Business," *Weekly Standard*, July 16, 2012, http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/terror-their-family-business_648234.html.

⁹⁹ Mo Ahmed, "Haqqani pledges allegiance to new Afghan Taliban head, urges others to follow," *Press Examiner*, August 9, 2015, <http://www.pressexaminer.com/haqqani-pledges-allegiance-to-new-afghan-taliban-head-urges-others-to-follow/28611>.

¹⁰⁰ Abdel Bari Atwan, *After Bin Laden*, (The New Press: 2012), 135

¹⁰¹ "Haqqani Group Blamed for Suicide Blast," *Al Jazeera*, November 24, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/southasia/2014/11/haqqani-group-blamed-afghan-suicide-blast-20141124102431935437.html>.

¹⁰² "Taliban Commander Speaks Out," *Al Jazeera*, June 27, 2010, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2010/01/2010119181112836158.html>.

failure to the objection of the Afghan government “to fanfare surrounding the opening of a Taliban office” in Qatar.¹⁰³

Western Media

Western media have recognized the Haqqani network’s character as a “militant” Islamist group in open alliance with the Taliban.¹⁰⁴ For the most part, the media concur with the widespread assumption among Western intelligence agencies that the Haqqani network is the most lethal arm of the insurgency in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁵

Certain media outlets have followed the lead of the Pakistani government in recognizing the Haqqani network’s potential to serve as a negotiating partner with the United States in its ongoing fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.¹⁰⁶ The London-based *Telegraph*, for one, has played up the Haqqanis’ willingness to enter into “peace talks” with the United States. It has referred to the organization as a “militia.”¹⁰⁷

Rhetoric:

Sirajuddin Haqqani, Operational Commander of the Haqqani network, 2010¹⁰⁸

“Our Mujahedeen were not involved in the attacks, but we are happy that they took place because all foreigners who come to our country are working for the continuity of the current occupation and they help the crusaders in various areas and issues.”

Pro-Violence, Anti-Western

Sirajuddin Haqqani, Operational Commander of the Haqqani network, 2010¹⁰⁹

¹⁰³ “Pakistan officials say Afghan Taliban has signaled peace talk readiness,” Al Jazeera, February 19, 2015, <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/2/19/pakistan-officials-say-afghan-taliban-has-signal-ed-peace-talk-readiness.html>

¹⁰⁴ Declan Walsh and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Blacklists Militant Haqqani Network,” *New York Times*, September 7, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/08/world/asia/state-department-blacklists-militant-haqqani-network.html>.

¹⁰⁵ Chelsea Carter and Joe Sterling, “Haqqani leader turned network into ‘killing machine,’ intelligence officials say,” CNN, September 7, 2012, <http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/07/world/asia/pakistan-haqqani-profile/>.

¹⁰⁶ Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos* (London: Penguin Books, 2009), 221.

¹⁰⁷ Rob Crilly, “Haqqani network ‘ready to enter peace talks if Taliban approves,” *Telegraph* (London), November 13, 2012, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/9674405/Haqqani-network-ready-to-enter-peace-talks-with-US-if-Mullah-Omar-approves.html>.

¹⁰⁸ “Excerpts of Interviews with Sirajuddin Haqqani,” Anand Gopal, accessed April 20, 2015, <http://anandgopal.com/excerpts-of-interviews-with-sirajuddin-haqqani/>.

¹⁰⁹ “Excerpts of Interviews with Sirajuddin Haqqani,” Anand Gopal, accessed April 20, 2015, <http://anandgopal.com/excerpts-of-interviews-with-sirajuddin-haqqani/>.

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“We must give sacrifices in the fight against the crusaders. In this fight, whether we are killed, martyred or thrown in jail we are proud of it.”

Pro-Violence, Death-Glorifying

Sirajuddin Haqqani, Operational Commander of the Haqqani network, 2010¹¹⁰

“When we have the direction of Islam with us, we do not need the spoiled and filthy civilization of the West to tell us about women’s education.”

Anti-Western, Anti-Women, Pro-Islamism

Jalaluddin Haqqani, Commander of the Haqqani network, 2008¹¹¹

“All the Mujahideen wage Jihad ... against the American invaders and their lackeys.”

Anti-Western, Anti-American

¹¹⁰ “Excerpts of Interviews with Sirajuddin Haqqani,” Anand Gopal, accessed April 20, 2015, <http://anandgopal.com/excerpts-of-interviews-with-sirajuddin-haqqani/>.

¹¹¹ “Haqqani Network is part of the Taliban – Siraj Haqqani,” Bill Roggio, Long War Journal, October 5, 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/10/siraj_haqqani_denies.php